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localId
229036943
label
Telegram from George Wadsworth to Secretary of State Dean Acheson
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doc
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document
citationUrl
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1
Source metadata
id
229036943
contentType
document
title
Telegram from George Wadsworth to Secretary of State Dean Acheson
citationUrl
collections
President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)
Korean War Files
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229036943
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item
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day
29
logicalDate
1950-06-29
month
6
year
1950
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nara-archive
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1
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photo
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da9eec19548472a6
ocrText
DECLAS:I
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
E.0. 10501
TELEGRAPH BRANCH
16-D
RESPRICTED
A
Action
Control: 13166
NEA
Rec'd: June 29, 1950
FROM: Ankara
5:29 p.m.
Info
SS
TO:
Secretary of State
G
P
NO:
346, June 29, 6 p.m.
EUR
FE
First reaction both. Turkish press and informed public
UNA
to invasion South Korea was. recognition of gravity
USUN
of situation and implied threat such aggression, if not
OLI
halted by strong and immediate action, carried for all
CIA
countries subject to Communist pressures. US initiative
AAN
in convoking SC and SC's speedy resolution warmly welcomed
DCR
but at same time it was recognized Communist aggressors
would not heed this warning and UN was helpless to
enforce its recommendations.
From very first most commentators characterized this as
greatest test since war for US as well as UN, realistically
pointing out that only US action could meet this Soviet-
inspired challenge.
TRUNAR
President Truman's announcement that US would use armed
to
forces to assure independence of Korean Republic and
RECORDS
assist in repelling unprovoked aggressors was received
with enthusiastic satisfaction, mixed with surprise that
US was willing to take such decisive steps so quickly,
without awaiting further developments from slow machinery
of UN organization. Also no feeling this move would
precipitate full-scale conflict with Soviet Union. Such
firm action in early stages would convince Russians that
US would not permit another Munich, but was determined
meet Soviet aggression face to face and force it to
retreat as in Iran, Berlin and Greece. During first days
of Korean crisis Foreign Minister Koprulu expressed
probably what was in minds of many other government
officials by stating Korea's fate should serve as lesson
to world that countries exposed to Communist pressure
were likely to be ob jects of attack if not included in
formal security arrangements which let rest of world see
clearly that their security was guaranteed by armed
strength of their allies. Significance of° President
Truman's statement for other countries in position similar
to Korea has not yet expressed itself in press comment.
Implications, however, cannot be escaped, and Turkey
doubtless reassured by example of US policy with respect
to country to which US not bound by formal treaty arrange-
ments.
WADSWORTH
BA:ERB
NOTE:
Passed VOANY 11:30 p.m. 6/29/EHL
REPRODUCTION OF THIS
MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED