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- 11 Seton-Watson may be cited again in support of the authorities here listed. He refers to "the German EmperOr and his Ministers" as"not deliberately working for war." wash Further, and as tellingly to the point as any of the scholars named, the German War Chief, Von Moltks, may be named. His letter to his wife of July 18th, 1914, indicates that on that day he did not expect the Serbian Crisis to lead to that war, which, within a fortnight, he eame to consider "Inevitable, 18 and contributed 3 himself to precipitate. trum. in There is definite tes timony, which should be considered entirely credible, to refute the "legend;" and it is extraordinarily interesting. Bulow relates, in his Denkwirdigkeiten, and there is no sound reason why we should not credit his story, that at the time of the Bosnian Crisis in 1908 the Kaiser talked to him in great excitement, with the idea that Germany ought to reverse her whole foreign policy, and cast loose from Austria-Hungary; since in what Austria had just done lay the seed of European war. That quick intellect of william II, so capable, inter alia, of brilliant flashes of penetration, had perceived, instanter, the danger spot for European peace, the source of the coming War of 1914, created by Ahrenthal's annexation, and he urged upon Bülow that Germany extri- cate herself in time! Búlow, he tells us, calmed down his master by saying he did not see why they should kick over ustria-Hungary into the camp. of their enemies; but that he would see to it that the situation did not lead to war! In 1914, when precisely that situation did lead to war, Bülow was no longer in power, since his master had dismissed hime Billow would have us believe that if he still had been, he would have made good his promise. Perhaps. But some of those who think less

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    "ocrText": "-\n11\nSeton-Watson may be cited again in support of the authorities\nhere listed. He refers to \"the German EmperOr and his Ministers\"\nas\"not deliberately working for war.\"\nwash\nFurther, and as tellingly to the point as any of the scholars\nnamed, the German War Chief, Von Moltks, may be named. His letter\nto his wife of July 18th, 1914, indicates that on that day he did\nnot expect the Serbian Crisis to lead to that war, which, within\na fortnight, he eame to consider \"Inevitable, 18 and contributed\n3\nhimself to precipitate.\ntrum.\nin\nThere is definite tes timony, which should be considered\nentirely credible, to refute the \"legend;\" and it is extraordinarily\ninteresting. Bulow relates, in his Denkwirdigkeiten, and there is no\nsound reason why we should not credit his story, that at the time\nof the Bosnian Crisis in 1908 the Kaiser talked to him in great\nexcitement, with the idea that Germany ought to reverse her whole\nforeign policy, and cast loose from Austria-Hungary; since in what\nAustria had just done lay the seed of European war. That quick\nintellect of william II, so capable, inter alia, of brilliant\nflashes of penetration, had perceived, instanter, the danger spot\nfor European peace, the source of the coming War of 1914, created by\nAhrenthal's annexation, and he urged upon Bülow that Germany extri-\ncate herself in time! Búlow, he tells us, calmed down his master by\nsaying he did not see why they should kick over ustria-Hungary into\nthe camp. of their enemies; but that he would see to it that the\nsituation did not lead to war!\nIn 1914, when precisely that situation did lead to war, Bülow\nwas no longer in power, since his master had dismissed hime Billow\nwould have us believe that if he still had been, he would have made\ngood his promise. Perhaps. But some of those who think less"
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