Memorandum from Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman

TOP SECRET NLT (PSF.Intill)? CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING P 21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C. WITH 27 SEP 1946 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The moderation of the recent propaganda line and the complete reversal of the "impending war" aspect as initiated by Stalin's answers to certain questions propounded to him by Alexander Werth is a tactical maneuver designed to produce definite effects. 1. INTERNAL -- The age-old psychology of conjuring up a common fear had been used to spur the people toward greater efforts in the accomplishment of the Five Year Plan. The threat of immediate war, however, induced a. widespread feeling of depres- sion which reacted most unfavorably on the industrial and agri- cultural output (purges now in progress as a means of partial correction). With Stalin's statements erasing the likelihood of war, it is expected that the people will now see some hope for personal betterment in the future and bend their efforts toward its attainment. 2. INTERNATIONAL The external effects which are sought are: (a) To strengthen elements abroad, and especially in the U.S., who advocate appeasement and to encourage Communists and sympathizers to increase their activities. (b) To tempt elements in the British Government into the belief that collaboration with the USSR is possible and thus apply an immediate brake to the possible present formation of joint Anglo-American political and military plans. (c) To evoke an expression of gratitude to the USSR for easing world tension, which expression might be adroitly channeled into concrete form such as concessions at parleys, with- drawal of American troops from China, loans, etc. (d) The further reduction of the armed forces and bases of the U.S. and Great Britain. The statement of Stalin that "Communism in one country is entirely possible, especially in such country as the Soviet Union" is most remarkable, since on the face of it, there is diametric opposition to one of the primary tenets of the Communist doctrine. The wording was carefully chosen, since Stalin must know that such DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or AD ARCHIVES AN INATIONAL RECORDS TRUMAN Dept. letter, of State PROJECT NLT 76.15 By NLT- MC , NARS Date:-1-H TOP SECRET