Memorandum from Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman
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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (PS. F-Intell.)6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
No Change In Class.
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
Declassified
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Class. Changed to: TS S C
Next Review Date:
30 October 1946
Auth.: HR 70-2
Date: 26APR '8s
By: 03430
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RR ESIDENT
General Hodge has reported that increasing evidence points
toward a Soviet plan to "invade" South Korea this winter, using
a Soviet-trained North Korean army of 300,000 to 400,000 men
(see C.I.G. Daily Summary No. 216, item 1) This evidence
indicates that the resistance of independent farmers to enforce-
ment of the essential, but unpopular, rice collection program
would be exploited to precipitate a crisis leading to the
"invasion," which would be represented as a spontaneous Korean
movement to achieve national unity and "democracy" against the
opposition of American "imperialism." General Hodge sees a
further indication of this intention in current Soviet propaganda,
which interprets every act of the American military government
as intended to prolong the occupation for imperialistic purposes,
and which threatens liquidation of those Koreans who support the
American program when, within six months, the Communists gain
control in South Korea. He believes that some such plan will be
carried out this winter, if present trends continue.
There is open and growing antagonism toward American
military government in South Korea, even though General Hodge
has succeeded in bringing about a unification of the democratic
political parties with a view to their participation in an
advisory legislature. This antagonism springs from 8. passionate
Korean resentment toward any foreign control, and is inflamed
by Soviet propaganda and by serious difficulties in the collec-
tion and distribution of food. Since this propaganda serves
political purposes, it is not of itself evidence of military
intentions.
The Soviet objective in Korea is to dominate the entire
country through its unification under a Communist-controlled
native regime and the withdrawal of occupation forces. Unable
to accomplish this through the Joint Commission, the Soviets
have sought to consolidate their own position in the North and
to prevent the establishment of a durable democratic regime in
the South. By attributing to American military government a
desire to perpetuate the division and occupation of the country,
by provoking disorders which compel the adoption of repressive
measures, and by intimidating those Koreans disposed to support
the American program, they discredit the military government,
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