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NLT (PS. F-Intell.)6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING No Change In Class. 21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W. Declassified WASHINGTON, D. C. Class. Changed to: TS S C Next Review Date: 30 October 1946 Auth.: HR 70-2 Date: 26APR '8s By: 03430 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RR ESIDENT General Hodge has reported that increasing evidence points toward a Soviet plan to "invade" South Korea this winter, using a Soviet-trained North Korean army of 300,000 to 400,000 men (see C.I.G. Daily Summary No. 216, item 1) This evidence indicates that the resistance of independent farmers to enforce- ment of the essential, but unpopular, rice collection program would be exploited to precipitate a crisis leading to the "invasion," which would be represented as a spontaneous Korean movement to achieve national unity and "democracy" against the opposition of American "imperialism." General Hodge sees a further indication of this intention in current Soviet propaganda, which interprets every act of the American military government as intended to prolong the occupation for imperialistic purposes, and which threatens liquidation of those Koreans who support the American program when, within six months, the Communists gain control in South Korea. He believes that some such plan will be carried out this winter, if present trends continue. There is open and growing antagonism toward American military government in South Korea, even though General Hodge has succeeded in bringing about a unification of the democratic political parties with a view to their participation in an advisory legislature. This antagonism springs from 8. passionate Korean resentment toward any foreign control, and is inflamed by Soviet propaganda and by serious difficulties in the collec- tion and distribution of food. Since this propaganda serves political purposes, it is not of itself evidence of military intentions. The Soviet objective in Korea is to dominate the entire country through its unification under a Communist-controlled native regime and the withdrawal of occupation forces. Unable to accomplish this through the Joint Commission, the Soviets have sought to consolidate their own position in the North and to prevent the establishment of a durable democratic regime in the South. By attributing to American military government a desire to perpetuate the division and occupation of the country, by provoking disorders which compel the adoption of repressive measures, and by intimidating those Koreans disposed to support the American program, they discredit the military government, ARCHIVES AND 'NATIONAL RECORDS SERVICE'