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war style and to go underground if need be. The vigor of the
popular reaction, however, may have surprised the Kremlin. If
the Kremlin correctly estimated the response it would provoke,
but nevertheless felt obliged to accept that consequence, it must
have acted on a knowledge of weaknesses in the Communist position
that were not generally appreciated at the time. If, on the con-
trary, the Kremlin misjudged the extent of the reaction to be
expected, it betrayed a weakness which the Nazis also some times
revealed: an inability to understand the temper of for eign peoples.
The latest manifestation of the change in Communist policy
is the post-election speech of Maurice Thorez. Its line was no
different from that of Zhdanov at the founding of the Cominform,
but, coming from the leader of the French Party, the speech
destroyed whatever chance the Communists still had of coming to
power in France by political action. Even more importantly, it
has also compromised Communist control of the French Confederation
of Labor (CGT), an extra-political weapon of great power. If the
Communists should in consequence lose their predominant control
of French organized labor, subversive and revolutionary activity
would be the only important capability left to them.
A parallel development has not yet occurred in Italy,
where Communist political prospects once were also good. There,
for the moment, the Communists are quiet. They still retain the
adherence of the Nenni Socialists, although there are signs of
unhappiness in that camp.
The Eastern European aspect of this development is a
further effort to consolidate Communist control of the Satellite
States as indicated by the execution of Petkov, the trial of
a SERVICY RECORDS
Maniu, the flight of Mikolajczyk from Poland and of Pfeiffer from
the
Hungary, and the attack on the Slovak Demo cratic Party. The
Communists are thus eliminating every possible rallying point
for popular disaffection. It is, however, a tribute to the stub-
born recalcitrance of the peasants of Eastern Europe that the
USSR, after two to three years in occupation, should still feel
that its control of the area is fundamentally insecure.
Despite the prevalence of anti-Communist sentiment
throughout Europe, the Communists can maintain their control of
the Satellite States for an indefinite period, and the Communist
Parties of Western Europe are still dangerous, particularly in
France and Italy. Communist propaganda against the recovery
program will be unrelenting. The Communist Parties will exploit
every political opportunity afforded them. The significance of
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
NLT- 76.15
By HC NLT Date 10-4-77
SECRET
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"ocrText": "- 2 -\nSECRET\nwar style and to go underground if need be. The vigor of the\npopular reaction, however, may have surprised the Kremlin. If\nthe Kremlin correctly estimated the response it would provoke,\nbut nevertheless felt obliged to accept that consequence, it must\nhave acted on a knowledge of weaknesses in the Communist position\nthat were not generally appreciated at the time. If, on the con-\ntrary, the Kremlin misjudged the extent of the reaction to be\nexpected, it betrayed a weakness which the Nazis also some times\nrevealed: an inability to understand the temper of for eign peoples.\nThe latest manifestation of the change in Communist policy\nis the post-election speech of Maurice Thorez. Its line was no\ndifferent from that of Zhdanov at the founding of the Cominform,\nbut, coming from the leader of the French Party, the speech\ndestroyed whatever chance the Communists still had of coming to\npower in France by political action. Even more importantly, it\nhas also compromised Communist control of the French Confederation\nof Labor (CGT), an extra-political weapon of great power. If the\nCommunists should in consequence lose their predominant control\nof French organized labor, subversive and revolutionary activity\nwould be the only important capability left to them.\nA parallel development has not yet occurred in Italy,\nwhere Communist political prospects once were also good. There,\nfor the moment, the Communists are quiet. They still retain the\nadherence of the Nenni Socialists, although there are signs of\nunhappiness in that camp.\nThe Eastern European aspect of this development is a\nfurther effort to consolidate Communist control of the Satellite\nStates as indicated by the execution of Petkov, the trial of\na SERVICY RECORDS\nManiu, the flight of Mikolajczyk from Poland and of Pfeiffer from\nthe\nHungary, and the attack on the Slovak Demo cratic Party. The\nCommunists are thus eliminating every possible rallying point\nfor popular disaffection. It is, however, a tribute to the stub-\nborn recalcitrance of the peasants of Eastern Europe that the\nUSSR, after two to three years in occupation, should still feel\nthat its control of the area is fundamentally insecure.\nDespite the prevalence of anti-Communist sentiment\nthroughout Europe, the Communists can maintain their control of\nthe Satellite States for an indefinite period, and the Communist\nParties of Western Europe are still dangerous, particularly in\nFrance and Italy. Communist propaganda against the recovery\nprogram will be unrelenting. The Communist Parties will exploit\nevery political opportunity afforded them. The significance of\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority\nNLT- 76.15\nBy HC NLT Date 10-4-77\nSECRET"
}