Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman

ER 8478 SEGRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUR AGENCY 2430 E STREET NW. WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 15 March 1948 Kh MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Because the USSR is unlikely to make fundamental com- promises in its demands concerning an Austrian treaty, the present London negotiations will collapse. In that event, the USSR probably will: (1) tighten its political and economic controls over eastern Austria in order to weaken the present government and force changes in its personnel; and (2) seek to reduce the size and effectiveness of the present US, UK, and French establishments in Vienna. The ultimate intention of the USSR to integrate Austria into the Satellite group remains unchanged. The treaty proposals advanced by the USSR were designed to leave Austria economically and militarily impotent to counteract Soviet methods of economic penetration, social and labor agitation, Communist-led strikes, and Satellite aggression. However, if the Soviet Union is unable to obtain a treaty which would end quadripartite occupation and facil- itate the attainment of its objectives, the Kremlin will revise its tactics in Austria. Although a Soviet-forced partition of Austria remains un- likely, it is probable that following the failure of the London negotiations, the USSR may decide that all of Austria is beyond its grasp and concentrate largely on the eastern zone. In any event, the USSR will intensify its efforts to penetrate and weaken the economy of the western zones by withholding oil, food, and other supplies, and by draining off raw materials. Communist agitation in the western zones would be increased. TRUMAN s. In order to increase the hold of the USSR upon eastern Austria, Soviet officials will remove from office non-Communist police officials and administrative personnel and replace them with Communists or "politically safe" officials who are opportunists or fellow travellers. In order to embarrass the Austrian Government, increased Communist agitation for denazification can be expected, as can further arrests, terrorization, and demoralization of non-Commun- ists in the Soviet zone. In addition, Soviet officials will probably DECLASSIFIED Authority NLT- 76-15 OEDIDE By HC NLT Date 10-4-77