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{
    "localId": "245256643",
    "label": "Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman, with Related Material",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman, with Related Material",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 16,
            "logicalDate": "1948-03-16",
            "month": 3,
            "year": 1948
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    "seq": 5,
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n- - 2 - -\nThe USSR, consequently, cannot expect the US and the\nother Western Powers to evacuate the city voluntarily. The USSR,\ntherefore, will probably use every means short of armed force to\ncompel these powers to leave the city.\nThese devices may include additional obstruction to\ntransport and travel to and within the city, \"failure\" of services\nsuch as electric supply, reduction of that part of the food supply\nwhich comes from the Soviet Zone, flagrant violations of\nKommandatura agreements, instigation of unrest among Germans in\nthe US sector, disregard of the elected municipal government, a\ndeliberately intensified campaign of insult or personal injury to\nUS personnel, and terrorization of their German employees.\nThe degree of danger inherent in such a campaign will\ndepend on the accuracy with which Soviet authorities gauge US\ndetermination to remain and the state of discipline of US offi-\ncials and troops. Overly enthusiastic resort to insults or\npersonal violence by Soviet troops or Communists could well create\n\"incidents\", street fights, brawls, and other public disturbances\nwhich, in turn, might well lead to high-level repercussions of\nthe gravest character. Only the greatest determination and tact\non both sides could prevent a serious incident from deteriorating\nbeyond control of the Berlin authorities. Even if Soviet estimates\nof limits to US patience are accurate, the situation could and\nprobably would be aggravated by the activities of German malcontents,\nwho for one reason or another, seek to bring about an open East-\nWest conflict.\nThe Kremlin will probably defer its maximum effort to\nforce Western Power evacuation of Berlin until it has fully cal-\nculated the risks and considered the problem in the light of\nSoviet strategy elsewhere. Nevertheless, in view of probable\nirresponsible action by local Soviet officials, the day-to-day\ndevelopments in the immediate future will test the firmness,\npatience, and discipline of all US personnel in Berlin.\nTROMAN\nROCCOROS\nR. H. HILLENKOETTER\nCO\nthe\nRear Admiral, USN\nDirector of Central Intelligence"
}