Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman, with Attachment

24014 SEGRET NLT (PSF-Intell.) 17 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON 25, D. C. C.I.A. LTR. 5-12-78 WAS. Authority NLT- 77.79 By HC NLT Date 7.31.74 9 June 1948 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The unification by the US, the UK, and France of their zones of Germany under a provisional government and the internationalization of the Ruhr under the control of the western powers presumably will be interpreted by the Kremlin as potential barriers to the basic Soviet objective of preventing the economic recovery of European countries outside the Soviet sphere. As yet no conclusive evidence has come to light that the Kremlin believes the reorganization or unification of the western zones can be successfully accomplished or will materially assist the European recovery program. In view of the complexities inherent in the establish- ment of a provisional government under the London agreements, the USSR is likely to delay any counter moves until the Kremlin is convinced that the western German organization is becoming a threat to Soviet foreign policy. In determining its course, the USSR will take careful note of: (1) the difficulties to be overcome by the US, the UK, and France in furnishing the new regime with proper political guidance and adequate and timely economic assistance; and (2) the extent of German cooperation or non-cooperation, particularly in the Ruhr. The Kremlin's immediate reaction to the trizonal merger, therefore, will probably be an intensification of present Soviet activities in Germany rather than an abrupt change in either attitude or course of action. The USSR may be expected to continue its hindrance of western powers in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany by means short of military force. It will further consolidate Communist control of the eastern zone in order to obtain a "loyal' and "democratic" area, which can eventually be declared a, "free German" state or used to Sovietize a unified Germany. The USSR may be expected also to step up its propaganda efforts to discredit the western powers in German eyes as the disrupters and despoilers of Germany and to depict the Soviet Union as the champion of a unified Germany. If the trizonal merger appears successful and promises to re- habilitate western Germany as well as contribute to the European recovery program, the Kremlin will probably be impelled to alter its present tactics. Exclusive of a resort to military force, the Kremlin can logically pursue one of two courses: (1) ostensibly abandon its recalcitrant attitude and make an attractive offer to form a unified German Government under quadri- partitite control (in order to slow the progress of German recovery) or (2) retaliate by establishing an eastern German state. TOP SECRE - ARCHIVES RECORDS SERVICE