Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman
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OCR Page 1 of 2ER 0108
SEGNET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
MIKE
30 June 1948
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Tito's recent example in defying the Cominform is
not likely to be emulated in the immediate future by the
other Satellites. However, if Tito wins substantial con-
cessions from the Kremlin or is successful in breaking away
from Kremlin control, the "internationalist' Communists in
the Satellites will face greater obstacles in controlling
the "nationalist" Communist elements (particularly in Bul-
garia and Hungary) which are reportedly already rebelling
against blind obedience to the Kremlin.
Tito's action will confront Bulgaria with a more
immediate decision than any of the other eastern European
nations except Albania, which is little more than a Yugoslav
republic. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have achieved close economic
and military cooperation since the end of World War II. More-
over, both countries are involved in conflicting claims on
Greece and Macedonia. Bulgarian Communist Premier Dimitrov
probably will not join Tito because: (1) his rivalry with
Tito for leadership in the Balkans militates against any
rapprochement; (2) his long training in Moscow has convinced
him of the danger of defying Communist Party discipline; and
(3) his realization that the USSR could retaliate - by force,
if necessary -- effectively against Bulgaria. Thus, despite
the encouragement which "nationalist" Communists in Bulgaria
may receive if Tito is successful, Dimitrov can be expected
S.
to continue to hew to the Kremlin line.
U.S.
The leaders of the Rumanian Communist Party, in-
cluding Cominform delegates Ana Pauker, Vasila Luca, and
Gheorghiu Dej, are probably loyal to the Kremlin. Moreover,
any defection by them would be virtually impossible because
of the presence of Soviet troops in Rumania. In addition,
the secret Soviet-Rumanian protocols, which give the USSR
more extensive military and economic controls over Rumania
than over any other Satellite, would make such personal
defections useless.
As in Rumania, the Communist Parties in the other
Satellites are too vulnerable to Soviet force to risk a break
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
NLT- 76-15
SEGNE
By He
NLT
Date, 10-4-77
Terms
Subject
Tito, Josip Broz, 1892-1980
Relations
belongs_to