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    "localId": "245256734",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Memorandum Number 94",
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    "id": "245256734",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Memorandum Number 94",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/245256734",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 8,
            "logicalDate": "1948-12-08",
            "month": 12,
            "year": 1948
        }
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    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nAs a quid pro quo for expected aid from the US, the Cubans offer\ntheir willingness to cooperate in US plans for Hemisphere defense.\nIn this they are sincere not only as to military cooperation but in\nsuppression of Communism. Prio personally led the campaign\nagainst the Communists in Cuba during the last year of the Grau\nregime.\nAny attempt to make the granting of advantages such as Cuba\nenjoys in the US sugar market contingent on more immediately prac-\ntical concessions, such as Cuban respect for the rights of US nationals,\nwould be opposed by the present Cuban government. It can be expected\nto continue the policies of its predecessor which termed such action\n\"economic aggression\" and induced the Bogota Conference to adopt a\nresolution that \" no state may use or encourage the use of enforcement\nmeasures of an economic or political character in order to force the\nsovereign will of another state.\"\nThe explanation for the seeming contradictions within this so-called\n'Grau Doctrine\" (persistently advocated by Guillermo Belt, Ambassador\nto the US) lies in a Cuban desire to enjoy the benefits that would accrue\nif Cuba were a quasi-dependency, while simultaneously exercising pre-\nrogatives that go with extreme nationalism. The Cuban propensity to\nbelieve that the US---for a combination of historical reasons---has a\nspecial obligation to aid Cuba nourishes the first illusion, while popular\npressure on Cuban statesmen compels them to strive for international\nprestige by striking independent attitudes, or leads them to favor laws\nthat hamper the operations of foreign nationals within Cuba.\nThe present Cuban Government like its predecessor, is the product\nof the supremacy in Cuba of democratic, liberal forces born during the\n1933 revolution against the dictator Machado. With regard to the sta-\nbility of the existing regime, the Prio government probably has suffi-\ncient political and economic support to maintain its position for at\nleast two more years. Unfavorable conditions could conceivably cause\nthe loss of present majorities in both houses of Congress in the 1950\ncongressional elections. Until that time the government's 1948 victory\nat the polls will, it is estimated, discourage illegal and revolutionary\nopposition and tend to assure the durability of the regime.\n- 2 -\nSECRET"
}