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that the Communists liquidated their associates and took over.
He thought that this view was a misapplication to the East of
European experience although he agreed that this was not the
case in China. He thought that in India, Indochina and Burma
and, he hoped in Indochina, history would show that the Com-
munists undertook to operate at first as the Left Wing of the
Nationalist movement and under cover of the Nationalist move-
ment. However, at an early stage in the cases mentioned, they
undertook to break with the movement and to fight it in an at-
tempt to secure control. In the other cases they had lost. It
was his hope and, I think, his judgment, that this would be re-
peated in Indochina. I mentioned the grave difficulty that such
a course presented for the French, and particularly for Schu-
man, who, I believed, was attempting to lead the French along
the right line in Indochina. The Prime Minister thought that
in this case it was not really Mr. Schuman who was in control
but the permanent officers in the Foreign Office and elsewhere
in
the Government, who he believed were perfectly hopeless on
this question.
Recognition of China
:
The Prime Minister expressed the views which he repeated
the next day in his conversation with the President that are out-
lined in that memorandum, and I refer to it here. His talk was
clearly slanted toward early recognition. I told him that that was
not our view, that we thought it important in this ease not to be-
lieve that any advantage could be gained for the country in accord-
ing early recognition, and that our primary concern here was to
indicate by our conduct our deep interest and concern for the wel-
fare of the Chinese people. I thought that this might be done by
indicating in our handling of the situation that we were concerned -
for instance, that the Government actually did control all of
China and that by early recognition we were sacrificing the in-
terests of some portions of the country which were still attempt-
ing to maintain its independence of Communist control. Then, too,
we should show our concern that the Government should establish
some form of acquiescence by the Chinese people. While this
might be something which could not be done, it was important
that the Chinese people should know we were thinking in these
terms. Finally, the Government should be required to state its
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, 7.15.75
SEGRET
Bys NLT. 4c , NARS Date 9.9.76
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"ocrText": "-3-\nSECRET\nthat the Communists liquidated their associates and took over.\nHe thought that this view was a misapplication to the East of\nEuropean experience although he agreed that this was not the\ncase in China. He thought that in India, Indochina and Burma\nand, he hoped in Indochina, history would show that the Com-\nmunists undertook to operate at first as the Left Wing of the\nNationalist movement and under cover of the Nationalist move-\nment. However, at an early stage in the cases mentioned, they\nundertook to break with the movement and to fight it in an at-\ntempt to secure control. In the other cases they had lost. It\nwas his hope and, I think, his judgment, that this would be re-\npeated in Indochina. I mentioned the grave difficulty that such\na course presented for the French, and particularly for Schu-\nman, who, I believed, was attempting to lead the French along\nthe right line in Indochina. The Prime Minister thought that\nin this case it was not really Mr. Schuman who was in control\nbut the permanent officers in the Foreign Office and elsewhere\nin\nthe Government, who he believed were perfectly hopeless on\nthis question.\nRecognition of China\n:\nThe Prime Minister expressed the views which he repeated\nthe next day in his conversation with the President that are out-\nlined in that memorandum, and I refer to it here. His talk was\nclearly slanted toward early recognition. I told him that that was\nnot our view, that we thought it important in this ease not to be-\nlieve that any advantage could be gained for the country in accord-\ning early recognition, and that our primary concern here was to\nindicate by our conduct our deep interest and concern for the wel-\nfare of the Chinese people. I thought that this might be done by\nindicating in our handling of the situation that we were concerned -\nfor instance, that the Government actually did control all of\nChina and that by early recognition we were sacrificing the in-\nterests of some portions of the country which were still attempt-\ning to maintain its independence of Communist control. Then, too,\nwe should show our concern that the Government should establish\nsome form of acquiescence by the Chinese people. While this\nmight be something which could not be done, it was important\nthat the Chinese people should know we were thinking in these\nterms. Finally, the Government should be required to state its\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter, 7.15.75\nSEGRET\nBys NLT. 4c , NARS Date 9.9.76"
}