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claim ready for South Austria (a large portion of Carinthia
and Styria) and may have similar designs on parts of Hungary
and Greece, if his methods in Venezia Giulia suceed (see
Caserta's telegram 2037, May 8, midnight, and 2042, May 9,
2 p.m.)
Although the stability of Italy and the future orienta-
tion of that country with respect to Russia may well be at
stake, the present issue is not a question of taking sides
in a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia or of becoming
involved in internal Balkan politics. The problem is es-
sentially one of deciding whether we are going to permit the
Soviet Government, which operates directly on territorial
settlements in the case of Poland, lying in the Soviet
military theater, to operate through its satellite Yugoslavia
in the Mediterranean (Anglo-American) theater, to set up
whatever states and boundaries look best for the future power
of the U.S.S.R. Yugoslav (Russian) occupation of Trieste,
which is the vital outlet of large areas of Central Europe,
would have most far-reaching consequences beyond the immediate
territory involved.
Tito's anxiety to "liberate" parts of Ital y, while
sizable parts of Yugoslavia itself (the region between Istria
and Belgrade) were still in German hands can, of course, be
expla: ined by his primary interest in territorial aggrandize-
ment rather than defeating the common enemy
Thus on the very day of victory in Europe, we see tactics
being employed by some of our allies which are strongly
reminiscent of the nethods the Japanese used in Manchuria
an Hitle copied in 1938-1939 to increase their territories
and ul timat ely to plunge all of Europe and the world into
war. Ata time when we have at last achieved military victory
in Europe and have a force of millions of men in arms on that
continent, we must decide if we will acquiesce in unilateral
action by force as a method of drawing the future boundaries
of Western Europe. (See Rome's 1209 of May 8, 3 p.m. attached.)
There is no doubt that Prime Minister Churchill sees the
implications in these developments and feels, as suggested in
A
his message to you of April 30, that we should not give way to
Tito.
SERVICE,
to
Alexander's Chief of Staff has been authorized to
endeavor to obtain from Tito an agreement on a purely military
basis to permit Alexander limited facilities in this area.
Tito's acquiescence even to an unsatisfactory minimum now
seems questionable. In these circumstances we may be faced
with the necessity of withdrawing completely from this area,
with all of its consequences, or of implementing our present
policy
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"ocrText": "-2-\nclaim ready for South Austria (a large portion of Carinthia\nand Styria) and may have similar designs on parts of Hungary\nand Greece, if his methods in Venezia Giulia suceed (see\nCaserta's telegram 2037, May 8, midnight, and 2042, May 9,\n2 p.m.)\nAlthough the stability of Italy and the future orienta-\ntion of that country with respect to Russia may well be at\nstake, the present issue is not a question of taking sides\nin a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia or of becoming\ninvolved in internal Balkan politics. The problem is es-\nsentially one of deciding whether we are going to permit the\nSoviet Government, which operates directly on territorial\nsettlements in the case of Poland, lying in the Soviet\nmilitary theater, to operate through its satellite Yugoslavia\nin the Mediterranean (Anglo-American) theater, to set up\nwhatever states and boundaries look best for the future power\nof the U.S.S.R. Yugoslav (Russian) occupation of Trieste,\nwhich is the vital outlet of large areas of Central Europe,\nwould have most far-reaching consequences beyond the immediate\nterritory involved.\nTito's anxiety to \"liberate\" parts of Ital y, while\nsizable parts of Yugoslavia itself (the region between Istria\nand Belgrade) were still in German hands can, of course, be\nexpla: ined by his primary interest in territorial aggrandize-\nment rather than defeating the common enemy\nThus on the very day of victory in Europe, we see tactics\nbeing employed by some of our allies which are strongly\nreminiscent of the nethods the Japanese used in Manchuria\nan Hitle copied in 1938-1939 to increase their territories\nand ul timat ely to plunge all of Europe and the world into\nwar. Ata time when we have at last achieved military victory\nin Europe and have a force of millions of men in arms on that\ncontinent, we must decide if we will acquiesce in unilateral\naction by force as a method of drawing the future boundaries\nof Western Europe. (See Rome's 1209 of May 8, 3 p.m. attached.)\nThere is no doubt that Prime Minister Churchill sees the\nimplications in these developments and feels, as suggested in\nA\nhis message to you of April 30, that we should not give way to\nTito.\nSERVICE,\nto\nAlexander's Chief of Staff has been authorized to\nendeavor to obtain from Tito an agreement on a purely military\nbasis to permit Alexander limited facilities in this area.\nTito's acquiescence even to an unsatisfactory minimum now\nseems questionable. In these circumstances we may be faced\nwith the necessity of withdrawing completely from this area,\nwith all of its consequences, or of implementing our present\npolicy"
}