Ask the Scholar
Page 4 of 8
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TRUMAN
RECORDS
SERVICE"
WHY JAPAN SURRENDERED
bassador in Tokyo, but nothing came of them.
justice" is established in Japan, Allied forces will
On 8 June the Supreme Council for the Direc-
occupy Japanese key points "to secure the achieve-
tion of the War (S.C.D.W.), consisting mainly
ment" of this basic objective.
of the Premier, the War, Navy, and Foreign
3. Terms of the Cairo Declaration will be
Ministers, and the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff,
carried out, and Japanese sovereignty will be
approved a basic war policy that committed
limited to Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku,
Japan to fight to the bitter end. Then, ten days
and adjacent smaller islands.
later, they voted to propose peace through neutral
4. Japanese military forces, "after being com-
powers, especially the Soviet Union.
pletely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to
Marquis Kido, who got wind of their first deci-
their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful
sion, prepared a plan, which the Emperor ap-
and productive lives."
proved, to circumvent the S.C.D.W. He opened
5. "We do not intend that the Japanese shall
a series of personal and private negotiations with
be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation,
responsible government members. These dragged
but stern justice shall be meted out to all war
along for several days without result. The Em-
criminals.
Freedom of speech, of religion,
peror then summoned the S.C.D.W. to the palace
and of thought, as well as respect for the funda-
(22 June) and supported Foreign Minister Togo
mental human rights, shall be established.'
in his determination to send a special envoy to
6. Japan may retain such industries as will
Moscow, hoping to work out some means of end-
sustain her economy, but may not rearm; and
ing the war through diplomatic negotiation.
she may look forward to "participation in world
By that time the Japanese government knew
trade relations."
that Okinawa was lost; that the B-29s were ca-
7. Occupation forces "shall be withdrawn from
pable of wiping out one Japanese city after an-
Japan as soon as these objectives have been
other; that, in a word, the war was lost. But
accomplished and there has been established
nothing was done to prepare the people for the
a peacefully inclined and responsible govern-
inevitable. On the contrary, Premier Suzuki
ment."
issued a statement that the loss of Okinawa
8. The Japanese government is called upon "to
"improved Japan's strategic position" and dealt
proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all
America a "severe spiritual blow." "Peace
Japanese armed forces." The alternative is
agitators" were threatened in official broadcasts;
"prompt and utter destruction."
efforts were made to increase war production; a
A broadcast of this declaration, received in
program of building solid houses with under-
Tokyo on 27 July, caused a flurry of discussion in
ground shelters was announced to protect the
high governmental circles as to how it should be
people from air bombing, and one of stockpiling
handled. Foreign Minister Togo wished to play
food to render them self-sufficient.
a waiting game and avoid any official statement.
In the meantime, the Japanese ambassador in
For (a typically Japanese condition), if any
Moscow was being brushed off by Stalin, and the
official declaration were made, it would have to
Soviet ambassador in Tokyo also refused to
be a flat rejection, to please the military men in
negotiate. The Emperor, concerned by the delay,
the cabinet. Unfortunately, Premier Suzuki up-
summoned Suzuki and proposed that a special
set the applecart when, at a press conference on
envoy be sent to Moscow with a personal message
28 July, he indicated that the cabinet considered
from himself to Stalin. Togo jumped at the idea,
the Potsdam Declaration to be a mere rehash of
and Prince Konoye consented to be the envoy.
the earlier and unacceptable Cairo Declaration,
Permission had to be asked of the Soviet foreign
and as such unworthy of official notice. And, he
office, and not until 18 July did the Soviet govern-
added, the increase of aircraft production gave
ment send an evasive and discouraging reply. For
renewed hope of a Japanese victory.
Stalin had already decided to declare war on
No explicit assurance about the Emperor had
Japan.
issued from Potsdam; but (so Shigemitsu, Foreign
Then, out of a clear sky, on a summer day of
Minister in the Koiso government, assured me in
sweltering heat, came the Potsdam Declaration of
1950) the reference in paragraph seven to with-
26 July by President Truman, Prime Minister
drawing occupation forces after a "peacefully in-
Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, stating the con-
clined and responsible government" had been set
ditions under which Japan would be called upon
to surrender "unconditionally." The principal
1 The Cairo Declaration stated that Japan would be deprived of
terms of the Potsdam Declaration were:
all conquests gained by aggression since the opening of Japan by
1. The authority and influence of the Japanese
Commodore Perry in 1853. Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores
would accordingly be restored to China; Korea would recover her inde-
militarists "must be eliminated for all time."
pendence; and the southern half of Sakhalin would be returned to
2. Until a "new order of peace, security and
Russia.
Preservation Copy
43
Page data
- Page
- 4
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 69209cebdb49e486
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 269703272
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "269703272",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703272",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Magazine Article, The Atlantic, \"Why Japan Surrendered\" by Samuel Eliot Morison",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703272",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750315/750315-43-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750315/750315-43-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750315/750315-43-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 8,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "269703272",
"label": "Magazine Article, The Atlantic, \"Why Japan Surrendered\" by Samuel Eliot Morison",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703272"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "269703272",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703272",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Magazine Article, The Atlantic, \"Why Japan Surrendered\" by Samuel Eliot Morison",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703272",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750315/750315-43-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750315/750315-43-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750315/750315-43-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 8,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703272",
"naId": 269703272,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"logicalDate": "1960-10-01",
"month": 10,
"year": 1960
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 4,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750315/750315-43-004.jpg",
"mediaId": "69209cebdb49e486",
"ocrText": "TRUMAN\nRECORDS\nSERVICE\"\nWHY JAPAN SURRENDERED\nbassador in Tokyo, but nothing came of them.\njustice\" is established in Japan, Allied forces will\nOn 8 June the Supreme Council for the Direc-\noccupy Japanese key points \"to secure the achieve-\ntion of the War (S.C.D.W.), consisting mainly\nment\" of this basic objective.\nof the Premier, the War, Navy, and Foreign\n3. Terms of the Cairo Declaration will be\nMinisters, and the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff,\ncarried out, and Japanese sovereignty will be\napproved a basic war policy that committed\nlimited to Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku,\nJapan to fight to the bitter end. Then, ten days\nand adjacent smaller islands.\nlater, they voted to propose peace through neutral\n4. Japanese military forces, \"after being com-\npowers, especially the Soviet Union.\npletely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to\nMarquis Kido, who got wind of their first deci-\ntheir homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful\nsion, prepared a plan, which the Emperor ap-\nand productive lives.\"\nproved, to circumvent the S.C.D.W. He opened\n5. \"We do not intend that the Japanese shall\na series of personal and private negotiations with\nbe enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation,\nresponsible government members. These dragged\nbut stern justice shall be meted out to all war\nalong for several days without result. The Em-\ncriminals.\nFreedom of speech, of religion,\nperor then summoned the S.C.D.W. to the palace\nand of thought, as well as respect for the funda-\n(22 June) and supported Foreign Minister Togo\nmental human rights, shall be established.'\nin his determination to send a special envoy to\n6. Japan may retain such industries as will\nMoscow, hoping to work out some means of end-\nsustain her economy, but may not rearm; and\ning the war through diplomatic negotiation.\nshe may look forward to \"participation in world\nBy that time the Japanese government knew\ntrade relations.\"\nthat Okinawa was lost; that the B-29s were ca-\n7. Occupation forces \"shall be withdrawn from\npable of wiping out one Japanese city after an-\nJapan as soon as these objectives have been\nother; that, in a word, the war was lost. But\naccomplished and there has been established\nnothing was done to prepare the people for the\na peacefully inclined and responsible govern-\ninevitable. On the contrary, Premier Suzuki\nment.\"\nissued a statement that the loss of Okinawa\n8. The Japanese government is called upon \"to\n\"improved Japan's strategic position\" and dealt\nproclaim now the unconditional surrender of all\nAmerica a \"severe spiritual blow.\" \"Peace\nJapanese armed forces.\" The alternative is\nagitators\" were threatened in official broadcasts;\n\"prompt and utter destruction.\"\nefforts were made to increase war production; a\nA broadcast of this declaration, received in\nprogram of building solid houses with under-\nTokyo on 27 July, caused a flurry of discussion in\nground shelters was announced to protect the\nhigh governmental circles as to how it should be\npeople from air bombing, and one of stockpiling\nhandled. Foreign Minister Togo wished to play\nfood to render them self-sufficient.\na waiting game and avoid any official statement.\nIn the meantime, the Japanese ambassador in\nFor (a typically Japanese condition), if any\nMoscow was being brushed off by Stalin, and the\nofficial declaration were made, it would have to\nSoviet ambassador in Tokyo also refused to\nbe a flat rejection, to please the military men in\nnegotiate. The Emperor, concerned by the delay,\nthe cabinet. Unfortunately, Premier Suzuki up-\nsummoned Suzuki and proposed that a special\nset the applecart when, at a press conference on\nenvoy be sent to Moscow with a personal message\n28 July, he indicated that the cabinet considered\nfrom himself to Stalin. Togo jumped at the idea,\nthe Potsdam Declaration to be a mere rehash of\nand Prince Konoye consented to be the envoy.\nthe earlier and unacceptable Cairo Declaration,\nPermission had to be asked of the Soviet foreign\nand as such unworthy of official notice. And, he\noffice, and not until 18 July did the Soviet govern-\nadded, the increase of aircraft production gave\nment send an evasive and discouraging reply. For\nrenewed hope of a Japanese victory.\nStalin had already decided to declare war on\nNo explicit assurance about the Emperor had\nJapan.\nissued from Potsdam; but (so Shigemitsu, Foreign\nThen, out of a clear sky, on a summer day of\nMinister in the Koiso government, assured me in\nsweltering heat, came the Potsdam Declaration of\n1950) the reference in paragraph seven to with-\n26 July by President Truman, Prime Minister\ndrawing occupation forces after a \"peacefully in-\nChurchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, stating the con-\nclined and responsible government\" had been set\nditions under which Japan would be called upon\nto surrender \"unconditionally.\" The principal\n1 The Cairo Declaration stated that Japan would be deprived of\nterms of the Potsdam Declaration were:\nall conquests gained by aggression since the opening of Japan by\n1. The authority and influence of the Japanese\nCommodore Perry in 1853. Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores\nwould accordingly be restored to China; Korea would recover her inde-\nmilitarists \"must be eliminated for all time.\"\npendence; and the southern half of Sakhalin would be returned to\n2. Until a \"new order of peace, security and\nRussia.\nPreservation Copy\n43"
}