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FRU
MAN
S. ARCHIVES "NATIONAL SERVICE" RECORDS AND
WHY JAPAN SURRENDERED
Umezu and Admiral Toyoda argued for a resolute
Switzerland on 11 August (west longitude date)
prosecution of the war, unless the Allies accepted
and immediately broadcast. The foreign office at
the three above-mentioned conditions. There
Tokyo intercepted it at about noon the same day.
was a long discussion of possibilities, ably led by
The Byrnes note of 11 August comprised five
Baron Hiranuma. Suzuki requested an "imperial
pertinent provisions:
decision" to break the deadlock, an unprecedented
1. "From the moment of surrender the author-
step. The Emperor rose, said that ending the war
ity of the Emperor and Japanese government
was the only way to relieve Japan from unbear-
shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of
able distress, and left the room. Suzuki then de-
the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he
clared: "His Majesty's decision should be made
deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms."
the decision of this conference as well," and the
2. The Emperor will authorize his government
S.C.D.W. adjourned at 0230 August 10.
and Imperial General Headquarters to sign the
Since an Imperial Conference had no formal
surrender and shall command all his armed
power to decide anything, a cabinet meeting was
forces to lay down their arms.
called at about 0300 August 10. There, the im-
3. Immediately upon the surrender the Japa-
perial decision was unanimously approved.
nese government shall transport prisoners of war
At 0700 August 10, a message was sent to the
and interned civilians to places of safety where
governments of the United States, Great Britain,
they can be embarked in Allied transports.
the Soviet Union, and China, stating that Japan
4. The ultimate form of the government of
was ready to accept the terms of the Potsdam
Japan shall be established by the free will of the
Declaration with the understanding that the
Japanese people.
prerogatives of the Emperor as a sovereign ruler
5. Allied occupation forces will remain in
were not prejudiced.
Japan "until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam
During that day the cabinet debated whether to
Declaration are achieved."
announce this to the public. It was decided to
The Byrnes note created new tensions and a
make no announcement until after the publica-
fresh crisis in high circles at Tokyo. It left no
tion of an imperial rescript accepting the Potsdam
doubt in anyone's mind that the Japanese would
terms, because of the fear of a militarist coup
be permitted to retain the Emperor, and most of
d'état. That possibility was real indeed. On the
the cabinet were for accepting; but Anami,
morning of 10 August, War Minister Anami
Umezu, and Toyoda were adamant, holding out
summoned all officers in Tokyo of the rank of
for self-disarmament and a limited occupation or
lieutenant colonel and above, told them what had
none. A fanatical coup d'état, with the purpose
happened, and appealed to them to keep the
of continuing the war, was narrowly averted.
Army quiet. Increasing restiveness at the war
Soon after receipt of the Allied reply, a group of
ministry during the day caused him to issue a
young Army officers in the War Ministry ap-
warning against any overt effort to obstruct the
proached Anami with a direct suggestion that the
government's decision. And Admiral Yonai issued
Army intervene to stop all peace moves. He suc-
a comparable warning to the Japanese Navy.
ceeded in putting them off, but this powder-keg
But the wireless waves and cables between
atmosphere persisted while the cabinet for two
Tokyo and Washington were working, via Switzer-
days longer remained deadlocked. Togo received
land. The message of 0700 August 10 accepting
support on 13 August in the form of a cablegram
the Potsdam Declaration was received at about
from the Japanese minister in Stockholm, re-
the same hour next day, 10 August, west longitude
porting that the United States had resisted strong
date. At Washington this created a flurry only
pressure from the Soviet Union and China to
less agitated than the one at Tokyo. Was it or
remove the Emperor.
was it not an acceptance of the Potsdam terms?
At a conference in the White House between
President Truman, Secretaries Byrnes, Stimson,
and Forrestal, Admiral Leahy, and a few others,
O.
N THE eleventh, when the Byrnes note was
the question was threshed out. "Terrible political
dispatched, President Truman ordered all "stra-
repercussions" were anticipated if a promise to
tegic" air operations (the B-29s) by the Army Air
keep the Emperor on his throne should backfire
Force to be suspended; but on the fourteenth,
by encouraging the Japanese government to con-
apparently with a view to helping the Japanese
tinue the war. The President decided, neverthe-
make up their minds, the bombers were ordered
less, to take the risk, and Secretary Byrnes drafted
to resume. That order in turn was canceled after
a note in reply to the Japanese offer, which, after
more than a thousand B-29s were in the air, but
obtaining telegraphed approval from London,
most of them were recalled before doing any
Moscow, and Chungking, he sent to Tokyo via
further damage.
45
Preservation Copy
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"ocrText": "FRU\nMAN\nS. ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL SERVICE\" RECORDS AND\nWHY JAPAN SURRENDERED\nUmezu and Admiral Toyoda argued for a resolute\nSwitzerland on 11 August (west longitude date)\nprosecution of the war, unless the Allies accepted\nand immediately broadcast. The foreign office at\nthe three above-mentioned conditions. There\nTokyo intercepted it at about noon the same day.\nwas a long discussion of possibilities, ably led by\nThe Byrnes note of 11 August comprised five\nBaron Hiranuma. Suzuki requested an \"imperial\npertinent provisions:\ndecision\" to break the deadlock, an unprecedented\n1. \"From the moment of surrender the author-\nstep. The Emperor rose, said that ending the war\nity of the Emperor and Japanese government\nwas the only way to relieve Japan from unbear-\nshall be subject to the Supreme Commander of\nable distress, and left the room. Suzuki then de-\nthe Allied Powers who will take such steps as he\nclared: \"His Majesty's decision should be made\ndeems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.\"\nthe decision of this conference as well,\" and the\n2. The Emperor will authorize his government\nS.C.D.W. adjourned at 0230 August 10.\nand Imperial General Headquarters to sign the\nSince an Imperial Conference had no formal\nsurrender and shall command all his armed\npower to decide anything, a cabinet meeting was\nforces to lay down their arms.\ncalled at about 0300 August 10. There, the im-\n3. Immediately upon the surrender the Japa-\nperial decision was unanimously approved.\nnese government shall transport prisoners of war\nAt 0700 August 10, a message was sent to the\nand interned civilians to places of safety where\ngovernments of the United States, Great Britain,\nthey can be embarked in Allied transports.\nthe Soviet Union, and China, stating that Japan\n4. The ultimate form of the government of\nwas ready to accept the terms of the Potsdam\nJapan shall be established by the free will of the\nDeclaration with the understanding that the\nJapanese people.\nprerogatives of the Emperor as a sovereign ruler\n5. Allied occupation forces will remain in\nwere not prejudiced.\nJapan \"until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam\nDuring that day the cabinet debated whether to\nDeclaration are achieved.\"\nannounce this to the public. It was decided to\nThe Byrnes note created new tensions and a\nmake no announcement until after the publica-\nfresh crisis in high circles at Tokyo. It left no\ntion of an imperial rescript accepting the Potsdam\ndoubt in anyone's mind that the Japanese would\nterms, because of the fear of a militarist coup\nbe permitted to retain the Emperor, and most of\nd'état. That possibility was real indeed. On the\nthe cabinet were for accepting; but Anami,\nmorning of 10 August, War Minister Anami\nUmezu, and Toyoda were adamant, holding out\nsummoned all officers in Tokyo of the rank of\nfor self-disarmament and a limited occupation or\nlieutenant colonel and above, told them what had\nnone. A fanatical coup d'état, with the purpose\nhappened, and appealed to them to keep the\nof continuing the war, was narrowly averted.\nArmy quiet. Increasing restiveness at the war\nSoon after receipt of the Allied reply, a group of\nministry during the day caused him to issue a\nyoung Army officers in the War Ministry ap-\nwarning against any overt effort to obstruct the\nproached Anami with a direct suggestion that the\ngovernment's decision. And Admiral Yonai issued\nArmy intervene to stop all peace moves. He suc-\na comparable warning to the Japanese Navy.\nceeded in putting them off, but this powder-keg\nBut the wireless waves and cables between\natmosphere persisted while the cabinet for two\nTokyo and Washington were working, via Switzer-\ndays longer remained deadlocked. Togo received\nland. The message of 0700 August 10 accepting\nsupport on 13 August in the form of a cablegram\nthe Potsdam Declaration was received at about\nfrom the Japanese minister in Stockholm, re-\nthe same hour next day, 10 August, west longitude\nporting that the United States had resisted strong\ndate. At Washington this created a flurry only\npressure from the Soviet Union and China to\nless agitated than the one at Tokyo. Was it or\nremove the Emperor.\nwas it not an acceptance of the Potsdam terms?\nAt a conference in the White House between\nPresident Truman, Secretaries Byrnes, Stimson,\nand Forrestal, Admiral Leahy, and a few others,\nO.\nN THE eleventh, when the Byrnes note was\nthe question was threshed out. \"Terrible political\ndispatched, President Truman ordered all \"stra-\nrepercussions\" were anticipated if a promise to\ntegic\" air operations (the B-29s) by the Army Air\nkeep the Emperor on his throne should backfire\nForce to be suspended; but on the fourteenth,\nby encouraging the Japanese government to con-\napparently with a view to helping the Japanese\ntinue the war. The President decided, neverthe-\nmake up their minds, the bombers were ordered\nless, to take the risk, and Secretary Byrnes drafted\nto resume. That order in turn was canceled after\na note in reply to the Japanese offer, which, after\nmore than a thousand B-29s were in the air, but\nobtaining telegraphed approval from London,\nmost of them were recalled before doing any\nMoscow, and Chungking, he sent to Tokyo via\nfurther damage.\n45\nPreservation Copy"
}