Ask the Scholar

Page 4 of 5
I can add historical knowledge about this page.

Page image

Page 4

OCR

between our two countries she would adopt a realistic view towards this treaty. We had been unable to agree on a treaty for Germany and Austria to date largely because each of the four powers was afraid that it would lose a position of strength in those areas which it now held. In Japan the Soviet Union had no such position and would lose nothing by adhering to the type of treaty suggested, and if it took a realistic attitude, it could make a real contribution towards the relaxation of tensions without sacrificing anything of importance. 13. Mr. Malik replied by saying that he under- stood Mr. Dulles but felt that the realistic approach should be mutual. Ever since the end of the war, United States military power had flowed in to areas which the war had left in a state of political or military vacuum until the Soviet Union was now surrounded by United States military bases. The United States had a base on Okinawa but the Soviet Union had none in the Caribbean. American propagandists incited their people constantly to a fear of the Soviet Union whereas there was, in fact, no inten- tion on the Soviets' part to attack the United States or do anything but live in peace and friendship. The United States, which was a believer in the "profit system" seemed, in its international relations, to be an exponent of more and more profits never satisfied with what it had attained. 14. Mr. Dulles said that, as regards American bases, sea and air power manifested themselves in a manner somewhat different from land power. He pointed out that if the cause of tension resulted from the natural expan- sion of two dynamic powers, we had probably attained a state of balance by now and there should be hope of a stabilization of the situation. 15. Mr. Dulles then said that he desired to make one more point. He felt that one of the causes of fear of the Soviet Union on the part of the United States was the fact that the former was using its great national power in support of a World-Wide Revolutionary idea that interfered in the internal affairs of other nations by force and other means. He felt that there were no serious prob- lems between the Soviet Union as a nation and the United States as a nation and that neither had anything to fear from the other. He did feel, however, that we were justi- fied in fearing the power of the Soviet Union in support of an international revolutionary movement. 4- CEORLI

Page data

Page
4
Source index
0
Type
photo
Media ID
76e1ea0af8f855d2
Size
unknown

Document data

ID
269703294
Core
doc
Type
document
DTO data
{
    "id": "269703294",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703294",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum of Conversation with Jacob Malik, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Others",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703294",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750316/750316-05-001.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750316/750316-05-001.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750316/750316-05-001.jpg",
    "imageCount": 5,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

Context sent to Scholar

Document identity
{
    "localId": "269703294",
    "label": "Memorandum of Conversation with Jacob Malik, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Others",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703294"
}
Document source metadata
{
    "id": "269703294",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703294",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum of Conversation with Jacob Malik, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Others",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703294",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750316/750316-05-001.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750316/750316-05-001.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750316/750316-05-001.jpg",
    "imageCount": 5,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/269703294",
    "naId": 269703294,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 26,
            "logicalDate": "1950-10-26",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1950
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
    "seq": 4,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750316/750316-05-004.jpg",
    "mediaId": "76e1ea0af8f855d2",
    "ocrText": "between our two countries she would adopt a realistic view\ntowards this treaty. We had been unable to agree on a\ntreaty for Germany and Austria to date largely because\neach of the four powers was afraid that it would lose a\nposition of strength in those areas which it now held.\nIn Japan the Soviet Union had no such position and would\nlose nothing by adhering to the type of treaty suggested,\nand if it took a realistic attitude, it could make a real\ncontribution towards the relaxation of tensions without\nsacrificing anything of importance.\n13. Mr. Malik replied by saying that he under-\nstood Mr. Dulles but felt that the realistic approach\nshould be mutual. Ever since the end of the war, United\nStates military power had flowed in to areas which the\nwar had left in a state of political or military vacuum\nuntil the Soviet Union was now surrounded by United States\nmilitary bases. The United States had a base on Okinawa\nbut the Soviet Union had none in the Caribbean. American\npropagandists incited their people constantly to a fear\nof the Soviet Union whereas there was, in fact, no inten-\ntion on the Soviets' part to attack the United States or\ndo anything but live in peace and friendship. The United\nStates, which was a believer in the \"profit system\" seemed,\nin its international relations, to be an exponent of more\nand more profits never satisfied with what it had attained.\n14. Mr. Dulles said that, as regards American\nbases, sea and air power manifested themselves in a manner\nsomewhat different from land power. He pointed out that\nif the cause of tension resulted from the natural expan-\nsion of two dynamic powers, we had probably attained a\nstate of balance by now and there should be hope of a\nstabilization of the situation.\n15. Mr. Dulles then said that he desired to\nmake one more point. He felt that one of the causes of\nfear of the Soviet Union on the part of the United States\nwas the fact that the former was using its great national\npower in support of a World-Wide Revolutionary idea that\ninterfered in the internal affairs of other nations by force\nand other means. He felt that there were no serious prob-\nlems between the Soviet Union as a nation and the United\nStates as a nation and that neither had anything to fear\nfrom the other. He did feel, however, that we were justi-\nfied in fearing the power of the Soviet Union in support\nof an international revolutionary movement.\n4-\nCEORLI"
}