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TOP SEGRET (As example, if the Russians reimpose the Berlin blockade there are not enough airplanes available to handle simuldeneously another Berlin airlift, the Korean campaign, and the absolute minimum airlift necessary for the military defense of the United States. This is still true even if we commandeered the planes of all our airlines, which action would of course seriously cripple the domestic economy.) Thisd is the fact, also presented by the Munitions Board less than two months ago, that there is no long range strategic defense plan. Without such a plan neither the Munitions Board, the Resources Board, or the State Department can operate with efficiency. In other words, on any really accelerated basis, nobody knows what to make, or how much to make, or when, or why. If a general war starts tomorrow, therefore, everybody will want everything yesterday; and the operating chaos resulting from such an approach to joint military-civilian planning would be further complicated by the knowledge that any time, from here out, this planning might have to also include recognition of the problems of major sabotage and devasta- ting atomic attacks. This situation is a far cry from the number of years we have always been favored with in the past when it became necessary to handle, with relative leisure, military and civilian mobilization. Prior to now also there has been no requirement for any true civilian defense. LASSIFIED E.O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or B 3-24-77 NSC letter, is NLT-HC KASE 5-12-77 TOP SEGRET - 2 -

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    "ocrText": "TOP SEGRET\n(As example, if the Russians reimpose the Berlin blockade there\nare not enough airplanes available to handle simuldeneously another\nBerlin airlift, the Korean campaign, and the absolute minimum airlift\nnecessary for the military defense of the United States. This is still\ntrue even if we commandeered the planes of all our airlines, which action\nwould of course seriously cripple the domestic economy.)\nThisd is the fact, also presented by the Munitions Board less than\ntwo months ago, that there is no long range strategic defense plan.\nWithout such a plan neither the Munitions Board, the Resources Board, or\nthe State Department can operate with efficiency.\nIn other words, on any really accelerated basis, nobody knows what\nto make, or how much to make, or when, or why.\nIf a general war starts tomorrow, therefore, everybody will want\neverything yesterday; and the operating chaos resulting from such an\napproach to joint military-civilian planning would be further complicated\nby the knowledge that any time, from here out, this planning might have\nto also include recognition of the problems of major sabotage and devasta-\nting atomic attacks.\nThis situation is a far cry from the number of years we have always\nbeen favored with in the past when it became necessary to handle, with\nrelative leisure, military and civilian mobilization.\nPrior to now also there has been no requirement for any true civilian\ndefense.\nLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or B\n3-24-77\nNSC letter,\nis NLT-HC KASE 5-12-77\nTOP SEGRET\n- 2 -"
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