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{
    "localId": "290015596",
    "label": "Letter from General George C. Marshall to President Harry S. Truman, with Related Note",
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    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290015596"
}

{
    "id": "290015596",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290015596",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Letter from General George C. Marshall to President Harry S. Truman, with Related Note",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290015596",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Stuart, John Leighton, 1876-1962",
        "Chou, En-lai, 1898-1976"
    ],
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{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290015596",
    "naId": 290015596,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "logicalDate": "1946-10-01",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1946
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 3,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750331/750331-34-003.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nDECLASSIF'ED\nO. 11652, Sec. 3(3) and 5(D) or (E)\nOSD letter, Ap\n1974\nBy NLT- He\n, NARS Date 7-14-75\nI then decided that in order to make every possible effort, I\nwould go to Shanghai the following day, yesterday, and have an inter-\nview with General Chou En Lai, which I did. He was unaware of my\npurpose or presence until he arrived at General Gillem's house. We\nhad a three hour interview, the first portion of which was devoted\nto a lengthy discussion of the expression used in my personal memo\nto Doctor Stuart of October 6th: 'The purpose of the truce is to\ncarry out the two proposals of the Generalissimo in his communication\nto me of October 2nd. and the expression 'to consider the two pro-\nposals of the Generalissimo in his communication of October 2nd as\nused in our public release. It was difficult to understand what was\nin Chou's mind for his reactions were clouded with suspicions and\nseemingly the more innocent the procedure, the greater are the sus-\npicions, as in this case. Actually the Communist Party felt that\nthey were not being invited to sit down at a table to negotiate, but\nrather to sit down at a table and accept conditions virtually of\nsurrender, which was not at all the case, and yet it was almost im-\npossible to convince them to the contrary.\nDoctor Stuart and I have been struggling to initiate actual\nnegotiations between the two parties, but the suspicions are so\noverwhelming that thus far, as you are aware, we have been unsuccess-\nful.\nI found it impossible to convince General Chou that the truce\nwas not a Government maneuver to permit them to regroup, reinforce\nand resupply. I could not tell him, of course, that I have literally\nforced this much of a concession out of the Government though I was\nstruggling for far more. I think at the moment of this interview\nGeneral Chou was taken back and rather put on the defensive by two\nthings, one was our public statement of successive events from\nSeptember 30th on and the other was my unexpected arrival in Shanghai\nin contrast to his rather indefensible position of remaining aloof\nfrom negotiations. He resented the public release and asserted that\nwhile we did not express an opinion, nevertheless the timing had been\nto the disadvantage of the Communist Party. He objected to the so-\ncalled limitation of the matters to be discussed, notwithstanding the\nfact that I had held these down to the very minimum in favor of the\nCommunist desires, that is, to have as little as possible to clear up\nas conditions precedent to the cessation of hostilities. There was\nno thought of preventing unlimited discussions once hostilities had\nterminated. This Communist position presents a strange paradox be-\ncause it would imply what is plainly contrary to the facts, that they\nwere insisting on the continuance of hostilities until all matters had\nbeen resolved. The fact is the Government has been proceeding somewhat\nalong this line and I have continually objected. As a matter of fact,\nthe Communist reactions now are really somewhat psychoneurotic, induced\nby an overwhelming suspicion and the feeling that the life of their\nparty is being threatened by military and secret police action of the\nGovernment.\nTOP SECRET\n- 2 -"
}