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TOP SECRET DECLASSIFEED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or E OSD letter, May 3, 1972 WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF NARS Date 7/14/15 WASHINGTON 25, D. .C. GOLD 1891 December 28, 1946 Dear Mr. President: I have just concluded a two hour conference with the Generalissimo. Following the adjournment of the National Assembly, he wished to discuss with me the steps that might be taken in an effort to reopen negotiations with the Communists. Dr. Stuart and I had previously suggested that if a sound Constitution were adopted, which is the case, and the Government proceeded with the establishment of the State Council and started with a genuine reorganization of the Executive Yuan, then two or three representatives of the Generalissimo, men of importance and liberals, might well be sent to Yenan to discuss matters with a view to reopening negotiations for the cessation of hostilities and the participation of the Communists in the reorganization of the Government, the matter to be done quietly without public announcement. However, there immediately leaked out, intentionally or otherwise, a statement of this purpose of the Government before its good faith had been at least partially estab- lished by the adoption of a sound Constitution in keeping with Political Consultative Council agreements. The Communists' reaction was, of course, unfavorable. Since then I have learned that the Communists would prob- ably resent reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Yuan before any consultation with them, for the reason I suppose that they would feel that the door would already have been practically closed on any possibility of responsible participation on their part. I therefore suggested to the Generalissimo that the visitation be carried out before the reorganizations just referred to. He agreed to my point of view and, in connection with my insistence that there be no public statements in advance, he wondered if it would not be advisable to consult the minority parties. I thought so but also thought that it would not be advisable for the Government to declare its position as this would inevitably result in a public leak and would precipitate a propaganda war on the part of the Communists. I stated that I thought that the Government, if it took this action, should make a genuine effort, carefully avoiding any complications by military actions or public statements of a provocative nature, such as have wrecked our previous efforts time and again. He appeared to accept my suggestions and stated that as the minority parties were shortly to have a meeting of their executive councils in Shanghai he thought it would be best to wait until that had occurred. TOP SECRET - 1 -

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Page context
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFEED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or E\nOSD letter, May 3, 1972\nWAR DEPARTMENT\nOFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF\nNARS Date 7/14/15\nWASHINGTON 25, D. .C.\nGOLD 1891\nDecember 28, 1946\nDear Mr. President:\nI have just concluded a two hour conference with the Generalissimo.\nFollowing the adjournment of the National Assembly, he wished to discuss\nwith me the steps that might be taken in an effort to reopen negotiations\nwith the Communists. Dr. Stuart and I had previously suggested that if\na sound Constitution were adopted, which is the case, and the Government\nproceeded with the establishment of the State Council and started with\na genuine reorganization of the Executive Yuan, then two or three\nrepresentatives of the Generalissimo, men of importance and liberals,\nmight well be sent to Yenan to discuss matters with a view to reopening\nnegotiations for the cessation of hostilities and the participation of\nthe Communists in the reorganization of the Government, the matter to\nbe done quietly without public announcement. However, there immediately\nleaked out, intentionally or otherwise, a statement of this purpose of\nthe Government before its good faith had been at least partially estab-\nlished by the adoption of a sound Constitution in keeping with Political\nConsultative Council agreements. The Communists' reaction was, of course,\nunfavorable. Since then I have learned that the Communists would prob-\nably resent reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Yuan\nbefore any consultation with them, for the reason I suppose that they\nwould feel that the door would already have been practically closed on\nany possibility of responsible participation on their part.\nI therefore suggested to the Generalissimo that the visitation be\ncarried out before the reorganizations just referred to. He agreed\nto my point of view and, in connection with my insistence that there\nbe no public statements in advance, he wondered if it would not be\nadvisable to consult the minority parties. I thought so but also\nthought that it would not be advisable for the Government to declare\nits position as this would inevitably result in a public leak and\nwould precipitate a propaganda war on the part of the Communists. I\nstated that I thought that the Government, if it took this action,\nshould make a genuine effort, carefully avoiding any complications by\nmilitary actions or public statements of a provocative nature, such\nas have wrecked our previous efforts time and again. He appeared to\naccept my suggestions and stated that as the minority parties were\nshortly to have a meeting of their executive councils in Shanghai he\nthought it would be best to wait until that had occurred.\nTOP SECRET\n- 1 -"
}