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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
By NLT-
NARS Date f 3-76
-3-
to induce that country to take any attitude which it
might not wish to take. That will not be done. It
isn't within our policy, the President wouldn't do it,
the Congress wouldn't permit us to do it, SO we can't
do it.
I think the second thing I want to say is that it is
perfectly clear that the requests for assistance will out-
run our capacity to meet them. Already in the discussions
which have been going on it is clear that many of the
countries want far more than we can supply. Therefore, a
certain selection or pr ority comes in. It is not an
exclusion at all; it is a priority, and just from natural
considerations of ordinary common sense priorities will
have to be given where we have commitments or interests
which we have entered into. Now those would not be
determined solely by this treaty at all. For instance,
in Greece and Turkey we have interests and commitments
which have got to be considered. I think that gives you
an idea. And wherever the assistance is given, it will
be given from the point of view of the over-all military
effectiveness of the assistance. That's what we are
thinking of.
Is there anything else that I should cover?
MR. HICKERSON: The Minister asked some specific
questions, Mr. Secretary, in his conversations with
Mr. Bohlen, and we gave him answers to those questions.
Have you had a chance to look over them?
MR. ACHESON: Yes. Do you want to go into those
questions?
MR. HICKERSON: If you want to the Secretary has
confirmed in effect what we said.
MR. LANGE: I think it might be useful, if you have
no ojection, if you would.
MR. ACHESON: One of them was that of participating
countries assuming an obligation to raise their defenses
to a defined level. Now our answer to that is clearly
no. The fundamental purpose both of any North Atlantic
treaty or of any military assistance on our part would be
its deterrent value. Now to do that you immediately come
into the recovery feature of this. It seems to us clear
that to require any nation to get to a certain level of
defense or to take any arbitrary position at all would
undermine the very thing that we are trying to do. Security
and recovery have to go so nicely balanced that the mili-
tary security part of it does not defeat the recovery part,
or instead of having a deterrent to aggression you have an
invitation to aggression. So there would be no arbitrary
f
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"ocrText": "DECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973\nBy NLT-\nNARS Date f 3-76\n-3-\nto induce that country to take any attitude which it\nmight not wish to take. That will not be done. It\nisn't within our policy, the President wouldn't do it,\nthe Congress wouldn't permit us to do it, SO we can't\ndo it.\nI think the second thing I want to say is that it is\nperfectly clear that the requests for assistance will out-\nrun our capacity to meet them. Already in the discussions\nwhich have been going on it is clear that many of the\ncountries want far more than we can supply. Therefore, a\ncertain selection or pr ority comes in. It is not an\nexclusion at all; it is a priority, and just from natural\nconsiderations of ordinary common sense priorities will\nhave to be given where we have commitments or interests\nwhich we have entered into. Now those would not be\ndetermined solely by this treaty at all. For instance,\nin Greece and Turkey we have interests and commitments\nwhich have got to be considered. I think that gives you\nan idea. And wherever the assistance is given, it will\nbe given from the point of view of the over-all military\neffectiveness of the assistance. That's what we are\nthinking of.\nIs there anything else that I should cover?\nMR. HICKERSON: The Minister asked some specific\nquestions, Mr. Secretary, in his conversations with\nMr. Bohlen, and we gave him answers to those questions.\nHave you had a chance to look over them?\nMR. ACHESON: Yes. Do you want to go into those\nquestions?\nMR. HICKERSON: If you want to the Secretary has\nconfirmed in effect what we said.\nMR. LANGE: I think it might be useful, if you have\nno ojection, if you would.\nMR. ACHESON: One of them was that of participating\ncountries assuming an obligation to raise their defenses\nto a defined level. Now our answer to that is clearly\nno. The fundamental purpose both of any North Atlantic\ntreaty or of any military assistance on our part would be\nits deterrent value. Now to do that you immediately come\ninto the recovery feature of this. It seems to us clear\nthat to require any nation to get to a certain level of\ndefense or to take any arbitrary position at all would\nundermine the very thing that we are trying to do. Security\nand recovery have to go so nicely balanced that the mili-\ntary security part of it does not defeat the recovery part,\nor instead of having a deterrent to aggression you have an\ninvitation to aggression. So there would be no arbitrary\nf"
}