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That, in all justice to the parties to so important a
political problem, the same high-caliber representatives (i.e.,
those sitting on Committee No. 1) should judge the problem in
the same atmosphere of high statesmanship as will prevail when
other similar problems are considered, apply the same principles,
and thus hold the problem in proper context and perspective.
(3) Following this discussion, I called by appointment on
Emir Faisal. His views were along the same lines, expressed with his
usual reserved dignity. In general, he could not see that any useful
purpose would be served by discussion between us of details and pro-
cedures, the outstanding fact being that General Marshall had flatly
committed the United States to a policy of setting up a Jewish State.
This being so, Emir Faisal could not see any aspect of the
matter in which further American-Arab cooperation was possible. He
said: "This is the most dangerous step your country has ever taken
in the Near Eastern political scene, dangerous for you and for us
and for world peace; but it just can't be made to work out as you
wish."
He made a particular point of saying that, until he heard General
Marshall make this declaration, he had every intention of not parti-
cipating in any way in the General Assembly's "general debate".
Now, however, he did not see how he could keep silent; the question
would be carefully considered at a meeting of the chiefs of the Arab
Delegations.
(4) While I was calling on Emir Faisal, Mr. Kopper attended
the Steering Committee meeting with a special view to obtaining from
Faris el-Khoury an expression of his views in the matter. A
memorandum of their conversation has been prepared.
Its keynote is that, except as to Palestine, Faris Bey was in
fullest accord with General Marshall's outstanding presentation of
the probleme and issues before the General Assembly. On the Palestine
issue, however, he was as adamently opposed to our policy as any of
the other Arab Delegates, and he believed that this issue could not
but seriously hamper Arab-American cooperation in other important
problems of mutual interest.
(5) For dinner, I had Dr. and Mrs. Jamali and Dr. and Mrs.
Malik as my guests. They were far more pessimistic than Faris Bey
as to the possibility of Arab-American cooperation on any plane.
Malik put it: "We are younger, more direct; to us and to all the
Arab Delegations Palestine is the burning issue."
Keynote of Dr. Jamali's comment was: "We see you embarked on
a policy which will lead to tragedy, a negation of the United Nations
principle of the right of a people to self-determination in their own
land, a policy which if pursued will take American troops to
Palestine in support of Jewish aggression, an aggression which all
Arabs will in honor and self-defense be forced to oppose, even by
force of arms, if, God forbid, things come to such a pass."
Both insisted that the Arabs and Great Britain could have
settled the problem between themselves had it not been for Zionist-
inspired American intervention and pressure, American pressure which
now had "forced" the problem on the General Assembly where American
influence could best be exerted to support a Zionist solution.
Whatever the result, they concluded, the United States above all
others would be held responsible.
DECLASSIFIED
RESIRI CITED
Authority E.O. 10501
3554
-2-
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"ocrText": "(c)\nThat, in all justice to the parties to so important a\npolitical problem, the same high-caliber representatives (i.e.,\nthose sitting on Committee No. 1) should judge the problem in\nthe same atmosphere of high statesmanship as will prevail when\nother similar problems are considered, apply the same principles,\nand thus hold the problem in proper context and perspective.\n(3) Following this discussion, I called by appointment on\nEmir Faisal. His views were along the same lines, expressed with his\nusual reserved dignity. In general, he could not see that any useful\npurpose would be served by discussion between us of details and pro-\ncedures, the outstanding fact being that General Marshall had flatly\ncommitted the United States to a policy of setting up a Jewish State.\nThis being so, Emir Faisal could not see any aspect of the\nmatter in which further American-Arab cooperation was possible. He\nsaid: \"This is the most dangerous step your country has ever taken\nin the Near Eastern political scene, dangerous for you and for us\nand for world peace; but it just can't be made to work out as you\nwish.\"\nHe made a particular point of saying that, until he heard General\nMarshall make this declaration, he had every intention of not parti-\ncipating in any way in the General Assembly's \"general debate\".\nNow, however, he did not see how he could keep silent; the question\nwould be carefully considered at a meeting of the chiefs of the Arab\nDelegations.\n(4) While I was calling on Emir Faisal, Mr. Kopper attended\nthe Steering Committee meeting with a special view to obtaining from\nFaris el-Khoury an expression of his views in the matter. A\nmemorandum of their conversation has been prepared.\nIts keynote is that, except as to Palestine, Faris Bey was in\nfullest accord with General Marshall's outstanding presentation of\nthe probleme and issues before the General Assembly. On the Palestine\nissue, however, he was as adamently opposed to our policy as any of\nthe other Arab Delegates, and he believed that this issue could not\nbut seriously hamper Arab-American cooperation in other important\nproblems of mutual interest.\n(5) For dinner, I had Dr. and Mrs. Jamali and Dr. and Mrs.\nMalik as my guests. They were far more pessimistic than Faris Bey\nas to the possibility of Arab-American cooperation on any plane.\nMalik put it: \"We are younger, more direct; to us and to all the\nArab Delegations Palestine is the burning issue.\"\nKeynote of Dr. Jamali's comment was: \"We see you embarked on\na policy which will lead to tragedy, a negation of the United Nations\nprinciple of the right of a people to self-determination in their own\nland, a policy which if pursued will take American troops to\nPalestine in support of Jewish aggression, an aggression which all\nArabs will in honor and self-defense be forced to oppose, even by\nforce of arms, if, God forbid, things come to such a pass.\"\nBoth insisted that the Arabs and Great Britain could have\nsettled the problem between themselves had it not been for Zionist-\ninspired American intervention and pressure, American pressure which\nnow had \"forced\" the problem on the General Assembly where American\ninfluence could best be exerted to support a Zionist solution.\nWhatever the result, they concluded, the United States above all\nothers would be held responsible.\nDECLASSIFIED\nRESIRI CITED\nAuthority E.O. 10501\n3554\n-2-"
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