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-6- devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint Agree- mon with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect those plans or such portions thereof as the occasion demanded. This last, however, had not boon donc at the timo of the Japanese attack. I. find that during the yoar 1941, and particularly during October and until the lattor part of November, Gonoral Short yes ro- peatedly advised of the critical events which woro developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 27th by the appropriate authoritics in Washington that a brock in diplomatic relations between the United Statos and Japan might occur at any timc, that an attack by Japen on the United States might occur, and that hostilitics wore possible ct any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considera- tions and that he was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissanco as he decmed nocessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the scriousness of the situation. General Short himsolf kn cw that it was traditionally the policy l'or a responsible commanding officor to anticipate and to be prepared for the worst form of possible attack, and he had recoived and approved military estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chicf of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarino con- stituted the principal porils to Hawaii.

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    "ocrText": "-6-\ndevised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint Agree-\nmon with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event\nof an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the\nprimary responsibility of putting into effect those plans or such\nportions thereof as the occasion demanded. This last, however,\nhad not boon donc at the timo of the Japanese attack.\nI. find that during the yoar 1941, and particularly during\nOctober and until the lattor part of November, Gonoral Short yes ro-\npeatedly advised of the critical events which woro developing. I\nfind that he was clearly warned on November 27th by the appropriate\nauthoritics in Washington that a brock in diplomatic relations between\nthe United Statos and Japan might occur at any timc, that an attack\nby Japen on the United States might occur, and that hostilitics wore\npossible ct any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense\nof his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considera-\ntions and that he was specifically directed to take such measures of\nreconnaissanco as he decmed nocessary. In addition to the information\nreceived directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources,\nGeneral Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence\nSection, which clearly revealed the scriousness of the situation.\nGeneral Short himsolf kn cw that it was traditionally the policy l'or\na responsible commanding officor to anticipate and to be prepared for\nthe worst form of possible attack, and he had recoived and approved\nmilitary estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chicf of\nStaff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarino con-\nstituted the principal porils to Hawaii."
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