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to Tokyo for war games* preparatory to a final formulation of operation
plans. The final games reportedly got underway on 2 September 1941, with
most of the high ranking officers participating on one of the three
teams that were organized: the "N" (Nippon) Team, "A" (America) Team,
and "E" (England) Team.
During the afternoon of 3 September, 50 copies of an outline of
conditions under which the games were to be held were prepared and
contained the heart of Operation Order No. 1. These plans must have
been under development for several months, as extensive preliminary
planning was indicated.
On 5 September, it is known that Pearl Harbor plans were under dis-
cussion and the Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet
units in the Pacific in Pearl Harbor, as well as units which they be- -
lieved were recently transferred from the Atlantic. "N" Team expected
to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on Hawaii and
one AKAGI-class aircraft carrier and one SORYU-class aircraft carrier
were estimated as sunk.
On 6 and 7 September, "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting
Pearl Harbor. Captain Kurojima (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral
Ito (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an
amphibious assault on Hawaii. Ito was in favor of an early landing but
Kurojima won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistic problems.
These early sessions apparently were confined primarily to two general
problems: first, the details for a surprise raid on Pearl Harbor; and
- 2 -
* See Appendix 1.
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "to Tokyo for war games* preparatory to a final formulation of operation\nplans. The final games reportedly got underway on 2 September 1941, with\nmost of the high ranking officers participating on one of the three\nteams that were organized: the \"N\" (Nippon) Team, \"A\" (America) Team,\nand \"E\" (England) Team.\nDuring the afternoon of 3 September, 50 copies of an outline of\nconditions under which the games were to be held were prepared and\ncontained the heart of Operation Order No. 1. These plans must have\nbeen under development for several months, as extensive preliminary\nplanning was indicated.\nOn 5 September, it is known that Pearl Harbor plans were under dis-\ncussion and the Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet\nunits in the Pacific in Pearl Harbor, as well as units which they be- -\nlieved were recently transferred from the Atlantic. \"N\" Team expected\nto lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on Hawaii and\none AKAGI-class aircraft carrier and one SORYU-class aircraft carrier\nwere estimated as sunk.\nOn 6 and 7 September, \"N\" Team debated the best means of assaulting\nPearl Harbor. Captain Kurojima (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral\nIto (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an\namphibious assault on Hawaii. Ito was in favor of an early landing but\nKurojima won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistic problems.\nThese early sessions apparently were confined primarily to two general\nproblems: first, the details for a surprise raid on Pearl Harbor; and\n- 2 -\n* See Appendix 1."
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