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IX
October 16, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, and the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, were
advised by the War and Navy Departments of the changes in
the Japanese cabinet, of the probability of hostilities
between Japan and Russia, and of the possibility of an
attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States.
Both commanders were warned to take precautions and to make
preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their
strategic intentions or constitute provocation as against
Japan. Admiral Kimmel made certain di spositions of units
of the fleet, and placed additional security measures in
effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. At
that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in
training operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly
important to the training of the fleet personnel, and the
Army was also conducting intensive training, particularly
of its air arm. The responsible commanders testified that
to undertake increased defense measures respecting Pearl
Harbor and the Hawaiian area would necessitate curtailment
of training, if not its virtual suspension, and they thought
the situation was not such as to require this.
November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations
sent a message to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated that
in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an
attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility; that
the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations,
the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements
of its army and naval forces, supported this opinion. The
communication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of
the tense existing situation. The message advised that the
Chief of Staff of the Army requested that the local senior
Army officers be advised that he concurred in the despatch.
This message was seen by both the Commander in Chief of the
Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.
The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that
negotiations had been continued through October and November,
and were awaiting further developments. November 27, 1941,
the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, that the negotiations with
Japan seemed to be ended, with little likelihood of their
resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that
hostilititson the part of Japan were momentarily possible;
that in the event hostilities could not be avoided the
United States desired that this nation should not commit
the first overt act; that the Department Commander was not
to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his
defense. The message directed him, even prior to hostile
action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures
as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way
as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent.
He was directed to restrict the information contained in the
message to the minimum of essential officers, and to report
to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The purport of
this message was communicated by the Department Commander
to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of
Military Intelligence sent a message to the Intelligence
Officer on the Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, directing him to inform the Commanding General
and his Chief of Staff that negotiations with Japan had
practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue; and that
subversive activity might be expected.
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "IX\nOctober 16, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian\nDepartment, and the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, were\nadvised by the War and Navy Departments of the changes in\nthe Japanese cabinet, of the probability of hostilities\nbetween Japan and Russia, and of the possibility of an\nattack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States.\nBoth commanders were warned to take precautions and to make\npreparatory dispositions which would not disclose their\nstrategic intentions or constitute provocation as against\nJapan. Admiral Kimmel made certain di spositions of units\nof the fleet, and placed additional security measures in\neffect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. At\nthat time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in\ntraining operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly\nimportant to the training of the fleet personnel, and the\nArmy was also conducting intensive training, particularly\nof its air arm. The responsible commanders testified that\nto undertake increased defense measures respecting Pearl\nHarbor and the Hawaiian area would necessitate curtailment\nof training, if not its virtual suspension, and they thought\nthe situation was not such as to require this.\nNovember 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations\nsent a message to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated that\nin the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive\nmovement in any direction by the Japanese, including an\nattack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility; that\nthe doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations,\nthe statements of the Japanese government, and the movements\nof its army and naval forces, supported this opinion. The\ncommunication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of\nthe tense existing situation. The message advised that the\nChief of Staff of the Army requested that the local senior\nArmy officers be advised that he concurred in the despatch.\nThis message was seen by both the Commander in Chief of the\nFleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.\nThe responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that\nnegotiations had been continued through October and November,\nand were awaiting further developments. November 27, 1941,\nthe Chief of Staff of the Army informed the Commanding\nGeneral, Hawaiian Department, that the negotiations with\nJapan seemed to be ended, with little likelihood of their\nresumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that\nhostilititson the part of Japan were momentarily possible;\nthat in the event hostilities could not be avoided the\nUnited States desired that this nation should not commit\nthe first overt act; that the Department Commander was not\nto be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his\ndefense. The message directed him, even prior to hostile\naction, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures\nas he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way\nas not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent.\nHe was directed to restrict the information contained in the\nmessage to the minimum of essential officers, and to report\nto the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The purport of\nthis message was communicated by the Department Commander\nto the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.\nOn the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of\nMilitary Intelligence sent a message to the Intelligence\nOfficer on the Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian\nDepartment, directing him to inform the Commanding General\nand his Chief of Staff that negotiations with Japan had\npractically ceased; that hostilities might ensue; and that\nsubversive activity might be expected."
}