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enemy objective, sooner or later. It is an established fact, however,
that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or
received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other
ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941.
The attack of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under
the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take
place was unpredictable.
XIII
Where a carrier's presence in a general area is not known in
advance and is not predictable within narrow limits of time, there must
be resort to procedure which will give warning of a hostile approach.
The usual procedure employed by carriers bent on delivering a surprise
attack, although by no means the only procedure possible, is to arrive
about 700 miles from the objective at dark the night preceding the
attack, steam at high speed during the night, and launch the planes at
dawn, about 400 miles from the objective. It is this general procedure
which establishes early morning as the time when an air attack is most
likely to be delivered. The events of 7 December, 1941, point to the
likelihood of this procedure having been followed by the Japanese.
The greatest degree of warning of an impending early morning air
attack is obtained if the hostile carrier be sighted prior to dark the
night before. In such event, a maximum warning of about twelve hours may
be obtained. In the case of an island base, such as Pearl Harbor, it is
necessary to cover the circumference of a circle of 700 miles radius each
day (the direction from which the attack is expected being unknown) in
order to obtain either positive or negative information.
1-21
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"ocrText": "enemy objective, sooner or later. It is an established fact, however,\nthat no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or\nreceived from any source which would indicate that carriers or other\nships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941.\nThe attack of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under\nthe circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take\nplace was unpredictable.\nXIII\nWhere a carrier's presence in a general area is not known in\nadvance and is not predictable within narrow limits of time, there must\nbe resort to procedure which will give warning of a hostile approach.\nThe usual procedure employed by carriers bent on delivering a surprise\nattack, although by no means the only procedure possible, is to arrive\nabout 700 miles from the objective at dark the night preceding the\nattack, steam at high speed during the night, and launch the planes at\ndawn, about 400 miles from the objective. It is this general procedure\nwhich establishes early morning as the time when an air attack is most\nlikely to be delivered. The events of 7 December, 1941, point to the\nlikelihood of this procedure having been followed by the Japanese.\nThe greatest degree of warning of an impending early morning air\nattack is obtained if the hostile carrier be sighted prior to dark the\nnight before. In such event, a maximum warning of about twelve hours may\nbe obtained. In the case of an island base, such as Pearl Harbor, it is\nnecessary to cover the circumference of a circle of 700 miles radius each\nday (the direction from which the attack is expected being unknown) in\norder to obtain either positive or negative information.\n1-21"
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