Ask the Scholar
Page 64 of 89
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States
was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most im-
portant United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine
Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been
centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more
and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his
letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early
and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he
needed. to be informed of all important developments as they occured
by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should
have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a diffi-
cult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet
dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order
to do SO he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly
moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark
failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information
available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Depart-
menths note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a
definite step towards breaking relations.
(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of
certain information available to the Navy Department concerning
the disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated
a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation
of the broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says
he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it
did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the hand-
ling of other matters of information, indicates lack of effi-
ciency in Admiral Stark's organization.
(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of
the information which he received indicating that a message was
to be given to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m., which in-
formation Admiral Stark received on the morning of 7 December,
although the implications were appreciated by at least one of
his subordinates. It appears that had this information been
handled by the quickest available means, and with due apprecia-
tion of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel
in time to enable him to make some last-minute preparations that
would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to
meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such informa-
tion as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey
in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical rela-
tions between the United States and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral
3-14
Page data
- Page
- 64
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- bad18364a166250b
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 290017624
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "290017624",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290017624",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Navy Court of Inquiry, Finding of Facts",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290017624",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750350/750350-05-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750350/750350-05-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750350/750350-05-001.tif",
"imageCount": 89,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "290017624",
"label": "Report, Navy Court of Inquiry, Finding of Facts",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290017624"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "290017624",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290017624",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Navy Court of Inquiry, Finding of Facts",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290017624",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750350/750350-05-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750350/750350-05-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750350/750350-05-001.tif",
"imageCount": 89,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/290017624",
"naId": 290017624,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 64,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750350/750350-05-064.tif",
"mediaId": "bad18364a166250b",
"ocrText": "pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.\n(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States\nwas primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most im-\nportant United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine\nIslands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been\ncentered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more\nand more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his\nletter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early\nand accurate information as to the general situation, and that he\nneeded. to be informed of all important developments as they occured\nby the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should\nhave emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a diffi-\ncult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet\ndispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order\nto do SO he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly\nmoving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark\nfailed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information\navailable in Washington, particularly in the following respects:\n(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Depart-\nmenths note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a\ndefinite step towards breaking relations.\n(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of\ncertain information available to the Navy Department concerning\nthe disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated\na Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.\n(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation\nof the broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says\nhe never got this information himself, but it is clear that it\ndid reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the hand-\nling of other matters of information, indicates lack of effi-\nciency in Admiral Stark's organization.\n(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of\nthe information which he received indicating that a message was\nto be given to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m., which in-\nformation Admiral Stark received on the morning of 7 December,\nalthough the implications were appreciated by at least one of\nhis subordinates. It appears that had this information been\nhandled by the quickest available means, and with due apprecia-\ntion of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel\nin time to enable him to make some last-minute preparations that\nwould have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to\nmeet the Japanese air attack.\n(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such informa-\ntion as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey\nin themselves the sense of intensification of the critical rela-\ntions between the United States and Japan.\n(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral\n3-14"
}