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Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating
that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an
attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII. It is here stated that
Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance
was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that
such use of the available planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement
to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult
decision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were
many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after
considering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal,
it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making
no attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation
became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the
Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means
available did not permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance
necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be
launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous
than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such
particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to
Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, the
following points may be noted:
(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long
range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received
and reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.
(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court
of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should
be no distant reconnaissance.
(3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion
between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after
the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or
practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The
War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been
discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The
Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been
informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified
that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the
week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted
360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
5-10
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"ocrText": "Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating\nthat an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an\nattack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.\n(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII. It is here stated that\nAdmiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance\nwas sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that\nsuch use of the available planes was not justified.\nThe Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement\nto the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult\ndecision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were\nmany factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after\nconsidering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal,\nit appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making\nno attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation\nbecame more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the\nJapanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means\navailable did not permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance\nnecessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be\nlaunched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous\nthan others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such\nparticular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to\nAdmiral Kimmel in late November and early December.\nIn addition to these comments, with which I concur, the\nfollowing points may be noted:\n(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long\nrange patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received\nand reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.\n(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court\nof Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should\nbe no distant reconnaissance.\n(3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion\nbetween Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after\nthe receipt of the \"war warning,\" as to the advisability or\npracticability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The\nWar Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been\ndiscussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The\nCommander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been\ninformed of any of the significant warning messages, testified\nthat Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.\n(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the\nweek preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted\n360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.\n5-10"
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