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    "title": "Memorandum, Abstracts on Postwar Literature on Poland",
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    "ocrText": "To Members of Congress receiving the Abstracts of Postwar Literature:\nThe enclosed abstracts deal with the problem of POLAND.\nIn selecting the matorial to be abstracted, it has been diffi-\ncult to find items which present a factual and total picture of\nthe situation but an attempt has been made to select such recent\npublished material as will throw as much light as possible on the\ndifferent points of view. Much more appears to have been pub-\nlished on the side of the Polish Government in London than in\ndefense of the Yalta agreement. Additional material of significance\nwill be abstracted as it appears and will be included in one of the\nmiscellaneous selections of abstracts sent at the end of each month.\n1 S MONIVE AND limite 1200g MAN AND\nNOVER\nNo. 941\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nCongressional Series: March 1945\nOFFICIAL STATEMENTS REGARDING POLAND\n[Note: The following official statements by President\nRoosevelt and the Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius,\nare quoted in full.]\nTHE POLISH SITUATION\nDepartment of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), October 15, 1944: 428.\n\"The President made the following remarks on the occasion of his meeting\non October 11, 1944 with officials of Polish-American organizations:\n\"I cm glad of the opportunity I have had to talk about the present position\nof Poland in the war and about the future of Poland. You and I are all agreed\nthat Poland must be resonstituted as a great nation. There can be no question\nabout that.\n'Of course we should all bear in mind that nobody here has accurate infor-\nmation about everything that is going on in Poland. Even I, as President of the\nUnited States, with access to all the information which is available, am not\nfully informed of the whole story. As an example, I still do not know all the\nfacts about the recent events in Warsaw. i.s new information comes every day,\nwe will get C. clearer picture about the whole situation.\n'The broad objective which we all seek is excellent. I am certain that world\nopinion is going to back up that objective-not only to reconstitute Poland as a\nstrong nation but also as a representative end peace-loving nation. I wish to\nstress the latter. It is very important that the new Poland be one of the\nbulwarks of the structure upon which we hope to build a permanent peace.\nINTERNAL\nMEDICAL AND\nNotes\nUNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD POLAND\nStatement by The Secretary of State\nDepartment of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), December 24, 1944: 836.\n\"The United States Government's position as regards Poland has been\nstendfastly guided by full understanding and sympathy for the interests of the\nPolish people. This position has been communicated on previous occasions to the\ninterested governments, including the Government of Poland. It may be summarized\nas follows:\n\"I. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free,\nand indopondont Polish state with the untrammeled right of the Polish people\nto order their internal existence as they see fit.\n\"2. It has been the consistently held policy of the United States Government\nthat questions relating to boundaries should be left in abeyance until the\ntermination of hostilities. As Secretary Hull stated in his address of April 9,\n1944, 'This does not mean that certain questions may not' and should not in the\nmoantime be settled by friendly conference and agreement.' In the case of the\nfuture frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement is reached by the United Nations\ndirectly concerned, this Government would have no objection to such an agreement\n(other side)\n(No. 941 Cont'd.)\nwhich could make an essential contribution to the presecution of the war against\nthe common enemy. If, as a result of such agreement, the Government and people\nof Poland decide that it would be in the interosts of the Polish state to\ntransfer national groups, the United States Government in cooperation with\nother governments will assist Poland, in so far as practicable, in such transfers.\nThe United States Government continues to adhere to its traditional policy of\ndeclining to give guarantees for any specific frontiers. The Unitod States\nGovernment is working for the establishment of a world security organization\nthrough which the United States together with other member states would assume\nresponsibility for the preservation of general security.\n\"3. It is the announced aim of the United States Government, subject to\nlegislative authority, to assist the countries liberated from the enemy in\nrepairing the devastation of war and thus to bring to their peoples the\nopportunity to join as full partners in the task of building a more prosperous\nand secure life for all men and women. This applies to Poland as well as the\nother United Nations.\nThe policy of the United States Government re garding Poland outlined above\nhas as its objective the atthinment of the announced basic principles of\nUnited States foreign policy.\"\nSubject headings: Foreign Policy, United States\nSmall States, Poland.\nEMG\nE.g. serve TRIEMAN GOVERNARD - JOYD\nNo. 942\n5 1 elimits\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nBSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nCongressional Scries: March 1945\nOFFICIAL STATEMENTS REGARDING POLAND\nTHE CRIMEA CONFERENCE\nReport of the Conference.\nDepartment of State Bulletin (Washington, D. c.), January 18, 1945: 215-216.\n[Note: The following quotation covers only the section on Poland.\nPoland\nnew situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete\nliberation by the Red Artity. This calls for the establishment of a Polish\nprovisional government which can be more broadly based than was possible before\nthe recont liberation of Western Poland. The provisional government which is now\nfunctioning in Poland should therefore be reorgarized on a bronder democratic\nbasis with the inclusion of democratic lenders from Poland itself and from\nPolos abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional\nGovernment of National Unity.\n\"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir 1. Clark Kerr are authorized as a\ncommission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present\nprevisional government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within\nPoland and from abroad, with a view to the ruorganization of the present\ngovernment along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National\nUnity shall be pledged to the Holding of free and unfettered ele ctions as soon\nas possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In those\nelections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take\npart and to put forward candidates.\n\"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly\nformed in conformity with the above, the government of the U.S.S.R., which now\nmaintains diplomntic rolations with the present provisional government of Poland,\nand the government of the United Kingdom and the government of the U.S.A. will\nestablish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of\nNational Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective\ngovernments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.\n\"Tho three heads of government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland\nshould follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of five to\neight kilometers in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive\nsubstantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the\nopinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be\nsought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final\ndelimitation of the westorn frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace\nconforence.\n(other side)\n(No. 942 Cont'd.)\nREPORT ON THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE\nMossage of the President to the Congress\nDepartment of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.) March 4, 1945: 325.\n[Note: The following quotation covers only the section on Poland.]\n\"One outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allies in the\nliberated areas was the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish quostion\nwas a potential source of trouble in post-war Europe, and we came' to the confer-\nonce determined to find a common ground for its solution. We did.\n\"Our objective was to help create a strong, independent, and prosperous\nnation, with a government ultimately to be selected by the Polish people them-\nselvos.\n\"To achieve this objective it was nwcessary to provide for the formation\nof a new government much more representative than had been possible while Poland\nwas enslaved, Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing\nProvisional Government in Poland on a broader democratic basis, so as to include\ndemocratic loadors now in Poland and those abroad. This new, reorganized Govern-\nment will be recognized by all of us as the temporary Government of Poland.\n\"However, the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will be\npledged to holding R free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal\nsuffrage and a secret ballot.\n\"Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on\nRussia have been made. Twice in this generation, Germany has struck at Russia\nthrough this corridor. To insure European security and world peace, a strong and\nindependent Poland is necessary.\n\"The decision with respect to the boundaries of Poland was a compromise,\nunder which, however, the Poles will receive compensation in territory in the\nnorth and west in exchange for what they lose by the Curzon Line. The limits\nof the western boundary will be permanently fixed in the final peace conference.\nIt was agreed that alorge coastline should be included.\n\"It is well known that the people east of the Curzon Line are predominantly\nWhite Russian and Ukrainian, and that the people west of the line are predomi-\nnantly Polish. As far back as 1919, the representatives of the Allies agreed\nthat the Curzon Line represented a fair boundary between the two peoples.\n\"I am convinced that the agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the\nmost hopeful agrooment possible for a free, independent, and prosperous Polish\nstate.\n\"\nSubject headings: Crimea Conference\nForeign Policy, United States\nSmallStates, Poland\n- TRUMAN - FAD ,\nEMG\nTHE\nNo. 943\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\n1\nHARRY\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nS\nCongressional Series: March 1945\nSOVIET-POLISH FRONTIER A WORKING AGREEMENT NECESSARY\nBy Winston Churchill\nVital Speeches of the Day (New York), January 1, 1945: 162-167.\nMarshall Stalin, as well as Churchill, has stated on mumerous occasions\nthat he \"was resolved upon the creation and maintenance of a strong, integral,\nand independent Poland as one of the leading Powers in Europe.\" Churchill\nalso states that the British Government has not: however, in the past\nguaranteed any particular frontier line to Poland. Britain opposed Poland's\nseizure of Vilna in 1920 and, in the past, it has been her view that the\nCurzon Line should be the Russo-Polish border. The reassurance against future\nattacks from the west demanded by Russia is just and Britain is \"going c.ll the\nway to see that she gets it not only by the might of her [Russian] arms, but\nwith the approvalmd assent of the United Nations.\"\nIt is not Churchill's feeling that Russia's claims for territory are\nunjust, and both London and Mescow have agreed that Polnnd should be\ncompensated at the expense of Germany in the north and west. The two crusial\nissues are the extent of Polish territorial gains in the northind west and\nthe relation between the Polish Government-in-Exile in London and the Russian-\nbacked Lublin National Liberation Committee. Britain feels that postwar\nFoland should have territory ad qunte for the needs of her people and not\ninferior in quality or character to her former land, although it may not\ncoincide with her pre-war border. It was Britain's hope that Mikolajcyzk\nwould gain the consent of his government, upon his return from Moscow, to\nagree to the Curzon Line C.S the Russo-Polish frontier. This failed, as did\nMikolajcyzk's attempts to join together into one government the London and\nLublin Polish Committees. This is the reason why a united Polish Government\nhas not been set up on Polish territory reconquered by the Russians, and\nexplains, also, the rift between the Russian armies and Polish underground.\nThe new Government, organized after Mikolajcyzk's resignation, cannot in\ncertain respects be applauded and it is the view of the British Government that\nthe former Polish Prime Minister is the most able person to bring about Russo-\nPolish cooperation and understanding.\nIf Poland agrees to the Curzon Line, and Curzon Line A, extending south\nand including Lwow and its surrounding territory, she would in return receive\nin the north all of East Prussia south and west of Koenigsberg and including\nDanzig. Thus Poland would no longer have to worry about the corridor, but\ninstead would have 200 miles of constline extending along the Balttc and would\nalso be free to extend her territory at the expense of Germany in the west.\nThis gain in territory would more than compensate for her proposed loss, as the\nnew territory is more important and more highly developed than that in the\neast which includes the desolate Pripet Marches.\n(other side)\n(No. 943 Cont'd.)\nTo provide against any trouble which & future German minority might\ncause in the lands ceded to Poland, a population transfer will be necessary\nand will most certainly take place. Such a program succeeded between Greece\nand Turkey after the last war and there is no reason to believe that it\ncannot be successfully carried out in this case. The British Government intends\nto support wholeheartedly the Soviet claim, now and at the peace table, that\nthe Russo-Polish border be along the Curzon Line. Poland will again regain\nher freedom and independence after victory and will receive British support\nprovided she \"stands loyally as a barrier and friend of Russia against\nGerman aggression from the west.\"\n(The author is Prime Minister of Great Britain.)\nSubject headings: Boundaries; Poland, U.S.S.R.\nForeign Policy; Great Britain; Poland;\nU.S.S.R.\nABG\nCYRONAN ARCRIVES - lowid? - AND SERVICE\nTRUMAN\nNo. 944\n3 THE YOUR\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nCongressional Series: March 1945\nTHE CURZON LINE\nBy the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden\nBritish Speeches of the Day (New York), January 1945: 56-65.\nI shall analyze the Polish-Russian situation not from the point of view of\nPoland or Russia but from that of those of us who have had to deal with the\nproblem over a long period of time. A solution is desirable which will be\nacceptable to both sides. Polish-Soviet relations have been one of the most\nvoxations and anxious problems with which we have had to deal. Allied unity\nshould be maintained and to do so the Allies must be in general agreement. Un-\nless there is confidence, settlement and peace in Eastern Europe, the reper-\ncussions will be felt by all. Both Poland and Russia are our allies. We enter-\nod the war of our own free will to fulfill guarantees to Poland. We. have affection\nfor our Polish allies who have suffered perhaps most of all from this war. We\nhave a 20 years' treaty with Russia and the future peace of Europe depends upon\nour ability to work together. We have tried unceasingly to solve Polish-Soviet\ndifferences, sometimes with success, sometimes not. The historic British task,\narising from our island position and traditions is the ability \"over and over\nagain, in titanic struggles to be the leader in marshalling a coalition against\nany Power which has sought to impose its will on Europe.\"\nPolish lenders -- M. Mikolajczyk, M. Romer and M. Grabski -- understand that\nit is essential to Poland and Europe to make an effort to settle these age-long\ndisputes even at painful sacrifices. \"These frontiers have been a matter of\nvexatious dispute for centuries It is not true that Soviet Russia want's\nwants Poland to be in her orbit and have no relations with other governments.\nMarshal Stdin emphasieed that relations should be continued and reinforced between\nPoland and France, the United States and Great Britain.\n1 history of the facts of the Curzon Line is as follows: The line was\noriginally drawn in 1919 by the Commission on Polish Affairs to the Paris Supreme\nCouncil to mark Poland's eastern limit 'so that the Polish Government could immedi-\nately begin administration of that area. A year later the line was put before\nthe two parties in an attempt to end hostilities and it was then called the\nCurzon Line. \"It is fair to say that it was from the outset only intended to show\nthe minimum amount of territory which should be assigned to Poland in the cast.\"\nThe British position Was that \"any further eastward extension of Polish territory\nbeyond the Curzon Line would be highly dangerous to Poland.\nIn August 1920 the Soviet Government approached Poland with a proposal which\nwas approximately the Curzon Line, and when the Polish Government asked our opinion\nwe urged Poland not to refuse these terms. Regarding the southerly extension\nof the Curzon. Line which involves Galicia, there were two lines: Line A is that\nclaimed by the Soviet Government as the frontier. This line was the proposed\nboundary between Poland and an autonomous Eastern Galicia to be set up under the\nsuzerainty of Poland. Line B (further to the East) leaving Lvov to Poland, was'\nthat which was recommended if most of Eastern Galicia was excluded from Poland.\nThe British delegation favored Line A which W.S adopted by the Suprome Council\nand embodied in the draft Treaty, largely because of the complexion of the\npopulation problem at that time. The Poles have never constituted much more than\na third of the total population of the area between the Riga frontier and the\nCurzon Line.\n(other side)\n(No. 944 Cont'd.)\nIn the Moscow Conversations we raised the Polish question in he hope that\nagreement and C. final settlement could be reached, especially since the Russians\nwere in possession of much of Poland. The only thing which WCS agreed upon by the\nBritish, the Russians, the Lublin Committee, md the Polish Government in London was\nthat M. Mikolajczyk should be Prime Minister. The British can speak only for\nthemselves and not for the United States Government and whether or not it could\ngive a guarantee of Poland's boundary. Everyone understands the constitutional\ndifficulties of the United States.\nARE\nThe situation regarding the Corridor and Danzig was quite unworkable, even\nindependent of the Polish-Russian problem. \"The only way to solve this problem\nSEAL\nwas that East Prussia should go to the Poles and that the population of East\nPrussia should be shifted out. This is the only way to get a permanent settlement\"\nThe only alternative to trying to solve Polish-Russian relations now is to\nwait until the Peace Conference. However, \" we foresaw this position arising,\nwith Russian Armies advancing through Poland, with no understanding whatever with\nthe Polish. Government, which we were convinced represented majority opinion in\nPoland, and with no arrangements of any kind, no civil affairs agreement other\nthan some administration being set up to carry on the Government somehow, or else\nit being done direct by the Russians. We saw all the friction which would\ninevitably result. We knew, because the Russians told us this, that they were\npropared to make, with M. Mikolajczyk's Government, if the frontier could be\nsettled, an arrangement similar to the one they had with the Czechs and similar\nto the one WC have with he Belgians, the Dutch and the French If If there had\nbeen agreement between the Soviet and M. Mikolajczyk's Government, the Soviet\nGovernment would have made & civil affairs agreement with Poland similar to those\nthe British have made with the Belgians and the French.\nNow the prospects of agreement are pretty bleak. \"They are, honestly, not as\ngood between this Polish Government and the Soviet as they were between the\nprevious Polish Government and the Seviet Government \" But it is our duty\nto\ntry to bring about an agreement. \"I think that, among the very many perils that\nmay arise, the worst that I see is the failure to reach a settlement of this\nquestion, because I see repercussions that may arise which may affect the relations\nof ourselves and our Soviet Allies, and the relations of America and ourselves and\nof all of us, and which will affect shat widesprond co-operation which is so\nindispensable:\nIt is quite likely that we shall fail and not get another'\nopportunity\nThe subject will then have to wait for the Peace Conference\nI\npray that those who have to handle it then will be more successful than we have\nbeen\nThere is a dangor that developments will occur which I think will not be\ngood for the unity of the United Nations, and that is why we are trying to avoid\nthis position coming about.' We are perfectly willing to cooperate, to travel, to\nmeet anywhere, to work with them. \"It is not in our power to do more than that\nand it is for others also to make a gesture.\"\n\"Our affection and esteem for our Polish friends is deep and real, and our\ndesire to work with our Soviet Allies is unshaken. We are in the unhappy position\nof trying to reconcile a problem which doos not date from our time but from centu-\nries ago. So far, we have not succeeded, and it is small comfort to know that\nothers have failed before us, but we shall go on trying, confident that in so doing\nwe shall not dishonor our country, but are fairly and truly trying to bring to-\ngether nations who must be' friends if their people are to live in happiness and\npence in the years to come.\"\n(The author is Secretary of State for Foreign\nAffairs, Great Britain. The speech WCS taken from the House of Commons Debates,\nEMG December 15, 1944.) Subject headings: Boundari (Eastern Europe); Foreign Policy;\nGreat Britain, Polamd, U.S.S.R.; International Organization\nNo. 945\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nCongressional Series: March 1945\nTHE CASE FOR POLAND\ne\nBy Stanislaw Mikolajczyk\nColliers (Springfield, Ohio), August 12, 1944: 14/.\nThe Polish Governmant-in-Exile in London is democratic. It is composed of\nmembers of the Peasant, Socialist, National Liberal, and National Democratic\nParties who are of humble beginning and who have no party, class, or economic\naffiliation with the wealthy or noble. The authority of this Government is\nderived from, and in constant contact with, the people inside Poland. Also, the\nFully developed underground coordinates its moves and decisions with those of\nthe Government-in-Exile, Racial and religious prejudice has greatly diminished.\nJews and Christians are cooperating wholeheartedly in order that Poland may once\nmore be free. Leaders in all fields, regardless of their race or religion, have\nbeen saved by the underground.and the feeling of brotherhood has grown during\nthis period of blood and turmoil and it would be difficult and foolish to attempt\nsegregation in the postwar era. What little bigotry still exists is no more than\nwould be found in minority groups of other nations.\nThe Polish people are fighting wherever they can, Poland is the only\ncountry which has not had any Quislings. With the Russian army, in Italy, in\nFrance, on the sea, and in the Lir, Polish men are carrying on the fight. In\nview of all this, how can Poland be asked to cede 45 percent of her territory to\nother countries? Not only has her war effort been irrepronchable, but the\nEnglish and French war declarations stated that Poland must remain intact and the\nAtlantic Charter states that no territorial changes shall take place without\nagreement by the people concerned.\nThe pre-1939 boundary was established by the Treaty of Riga of March 18,\n1921 ending the Russo-Polish War. This agreement was amicably reached. Lenin\nproposed giving Poland more territory at this time, but the latter refused,\nstating that what she was getting was sufficient. Every country in the world\nrecognized these boundaries' and friendly relations existed from them until 1939\nbetween these two countries. Poland refused Germany's offer in 1938 to join\nthem in an attack upon the Soviet, with the Ukraine as her spoils. On September\n28, 1939 Russla and Germany concluded their conquest of Poland and stated the\nlatter no longer existed as a nation.\nIn June 1941, when Russia was attacked, Poland offered her all possible\nassistance and in July signed an agreement for mutual aid and support. As a\nresult, Russia explicitly relinquished all claims to Polish territory and stated\nthat the Russo-Berman treaties as to Polish territorial changes were no longer\nvalid. In December of the same year another agreement was reached permitting\nthe formation of a Polish army on Russian soil and granting amnesty to all\nprisoners. In April 1943, Germany announced that it found, near Smolensk, the\nbodies of 11,000 Polish officers who were murdered by the Russians. Poland\ndemanded an investigation, but the territory was under German control. Russia\ndenied this accusation, claiming the Germans had massacred these officers.\nPolund then withdrew its demand for an investigation by the International Red\nCross, but Russia nevertheless broke off diplomatic relations. In January 1944,\n(other side)\n-\nour\n(No. 945 Cont'd.)\nnow\nST\nwhen Russian armics entered Poland, the underground offered its assistance but\nthis was rejected and Russia also denounced the Treaty of Rigc. as unjust and\ndemanded the Curzon line as the proper boundary. In return for Poland's loss\nof territory in the east, she is to be compensated by the return of \"age-old\nPolish lands taken away from Poland by Germany.\" Poland asked the United States\nand Great Britain to mediate, but Russia rejected mediation as a solution.\nPoland hopes for an early agreement with Russia. Not only as friendly\nneighbors, but also in order that cooperative. action may be taken against the\ncommon enemy and all future problems may be solved justly. In January 1944\nPoland suggested a temporary frontier that would run east of Wilno and Lwow\nuntil the problem could be justly solved after victory. This offer still holds.\nThe Polish Govornment-in-Exile has also ordered all underground troops to come\ninto the open and aid the Russian advance.\nThe Government in London is pledged to resign the day victory is won in\norder to allow democratic elections to be held. Mikolajczyk believes postwar\nPoland will have a peoples' government taking a middle-of-the-road path. There\nwill be a balance between laissez-faire individualism and rigid collectivism.\nNatural resources and public utilities will be further nationalized, but\nprivate ownership will continue to be the basis of Poland's economy. The large\nestates will be broken up and the peasants will be given the land. Poland also\ndesires \"a united Europe as a member of a world organization pledged to\ncollective security.\" This security must be had through the cooperation of all\nnations, not just the few big powers. Poland will do anything to lift the\nthreat of recurrent wars short of surrender of independence or an acceptance of\nvassalage.\n(The author was the former Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-\nExile and is a lender of the Peasant Party.)\nSubject headings: Boundaries; Poland, U.S.S.R.\nForeign Policy; Poland, U.S.S.R.\nABG\nSEAL agentives TRUMAN - service accomm AND YOUR\nNo. 946\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nCongressional Series: Marsh 1945\nWHY ENGLAND IS WOOING RUSSIA\nBy Andre Visson\nAmerican Mercury (New York) January 1945: 44-52.\nBritish diplomats maintain that until the United States is willing to make\nmore definite commitments, their government cannot adopt a firmer attitude\ntoward Moscow. Collective security can only be achieved if the United States,\nthe Soviet Union, and Great Britain agree on an organization to make it work.\nIn case an agreement on international cooperation is not reached, both the\nUnited States and the Soviet Union have an \"alternative policy.\" Each of these\ncountries thinks it can substitute \"home-grown\" for international collective\nsecurity. The British cannot afford to indulge in any such illusion. Unable\nto assure security by her own means of defense, she is realistically appraising\nthe relative importance of the other two great powers. Although more closely\nallied politically, socially, and spiritually with the United States, Britain\ncannot forget that the basic trend of American public opinion in this war, as\nin the last, was to help the British without getting involved in the fighting.\nThe British feel that America's is a friendly neutrality: Russia's \"neutrality\"\nmay, however, be fraught with danger to the Empire.\nThe British, therefore, wish to organize Western Europe (which they\nconsider their security zone) in such a way as to strengthen their economic,\nfinancial and military position. France, as the keystone, would be incorporated\nwith the Low Countries, and possibly other Western European countries in the\nBritish cconomic and financial grouping. The success of this British diplomatic\nundertaking in Western Europe must have Stalin's approval, and to obtain it\nthe British have had to agree to his reorganization of Eastern Europe. The\nBritish attitude on the Polish problem is the most outspoken evidence of their\ndesire to consolidate their alliance with Moscow. As early as 1942 Britain\nindicated that she would not object to the \"Curzon Line\" solution. England\ncannot forget Poland's plight nor her indebtedness to 12,000 Polish pilots who\nfought in the Battle of Britain.\n8he is trying to save Poland's inde-\npendence and Britain's face, but is still more anxious not to compromise British-\nSoviet cooperation.\nBritain is also recognizing the Soviet claim to a zone of \"interest\" in\nRumania and Bulgaria. In Yugoslavia British support was transferred from\nMikhailovich to Tito at Russia's insistence. These concessions were granted in\norder to obtain Moscow's recognition of Greece as a \"zone of British intorest.\"\nEverything scemed to be working smoothly when, in October last, the Soviet Union\nmade sudden demands for oil concessions in Iran. Southern Iran is the British\nland route from British controlled Iraq to British-India. England is willing\nto recognize Soviet interest in Northern Iran provided Moscow will respect her\ninterest in Southern Iran. The British diplomats trust that Stalin will\nrecognize that there is a limit to the concessions which they can make-- they\ncannot and will not endanger the Empire's communications and its oil supply.\nThe British refute the charge of \"appeasing\" Moscow. They say theirs is a policy\nof \"reasonable concessions\" within a well-established limit. They view their\npolicy as a\"regional arrangement.\"\n(The author is a native Russian and a contributor to many European newspapers)\nSubject headings: Boundaries, Poland; Foreign Policy, Great Britain\nJEM\nNo.947\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nCongressional Scries: March 1945\nTRUMAN \"Server LOAG\nSOME TRUTHS ABOUT POLAND\nBy William Henry Chamberlin\nAmerican Mercury (Nev: York), February 1945:204-212.\nThile it is necessary to concede that the Poles have been intolerant of\nrecial minorities and that her administration of Ukrania was harsh and oppros-\nsive, one must recognize the right of the Polish people, who have fought hero-\nically in this war, to determine their own political fate. As bad as Poland's\nrecord is, it is better than that of the Soviet Union. To justify the absorp-\ntion of the Poles by Russia on \"democratic grounds\" is therefore illegical and\nabsurd.\nPoland was the first country to take up arms against Nazi Germany, and did\nnot cease fighting even when she was invaded by Russia's armies in the east.\nEven after the German-Seviet pact in August 1939, Poland proferred unequal war\nto surrender. The result was the partition of Poland between Germany and the\nSoviet Union along the Ribbentrop-Molotov line. Both powers made every effort\nduring the two years of occupation to stemp out national consciousness by deci-\nmation of Polish lenders and by large-scale deportations. Nevertheless, when\nHitler attacked Russia, the Poles joined the Scviet Union unreservedly as an\nally. A treaty was signed on July 30, 1941, in which Moscow recognized \"the\nSoviet Gorman treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having\nlost their validity\". Britain and the United States had never recognized as\nlegal the German and Soviet annoxations of Polish territory. The Polish Govern-\nment in London is looked upon by some 140,000 fighting Poles as their legiti-\nmate government. It has done everything possible to keep in touch with the\nUndergroun... Systematic efforts have been made by the Communists to discredit\nthis government in favor of the so-called Polish National Council of Liberation\nset up by Russia. The members of the Moscow-made Council are for the most part\nmen of questionable reputation, whose sole function is to carry out Moscow's\norders. It has agreed to the Soviet Union's demand that Poland cede 40 percent\nof its pre-war territory and annex overwhelmingly German regions such as East\nPrussia and Lower Silesia. The annexation of these territories would greatly\nweaken the future Polend.\nThe policy of the Soviet toward Poland has become increasingly hostile as\nthe tide of war has turned in Russia's favor. The darkest chapter of the story\nhas been the treatment of the Polish Underground Army. Russia has consistently\nmade use of these fighters when it needed them and dissolved their units and\nkilled their leaders when it served her purpose. The climactic phase in the\nSoviet-Polish relations was reached in the summer of 1944 with the 63-day up-\nrising of the Farsaw Underground. As the Russian army advanced toward Warsaw,\nfrantic appeals were broadcast from Moseow by a group of emigrant Polish Com-\nmunists for the people of Warson to start an uprising. Spoedy aid was promised\nthem. The Russian army was in possession of Pruga, a suburb of Warsaw when the\nuprising started on August 1. For about a wook the uprising was successful,\nbut the promised aid aid not come. The Underground heroes were abandoned to\nextermination. Seviet propaganda accused General Bor of having started n \"pre-\nmature uprising.\" With the extermination of the Polish patriots the way was\n(other side)\n(No. 947 Cont'd.)\npave for Russia to set up a puppet government. Many think this was a pre-\nmeditated plan. The Polish Problem now is not so much = question of boundaries\nas of Poland's continued existence. \"The people of America and Great Britain\nshould consider seriously the moral and political implications of throwing\nPoland to the \"olves.\" \"\n(The author, a student of Russian history and politics, is a contributor to\nperiodical literature and one of the editors of Human Events.)\nSubject headings: Boundaries; Poland; U.S.S.R.\nForeign Policy, Poland; U.S.S.R.\nJEM\nHARRY US TRUMAN - Kewide MIN\nNo. 948\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nCongressional Series: March 1945\nPOLAND AND DUMBARTON OAKS\nBy Felix Morley\nHuman Events (Washington, D.C.), January 10, 1945. 4 p.\ns AND TEXTIONAL VAN\nThe Polish problem was intensified by the Russian recognition of the new\nProvisional National Government of the Polish Republic on January 5, 1945.\nThis provisional government was formed from the Polish Communist \"Committee of\nNational Liberation\" which functioned in the Russian-occupied Polish city of\nLublin. The British and United States Governments still recognize the Polish\nGovernment-in-Exile which has been established in London nearly five years.\nThe irony of the situation is that the Lublin Committee is allied to Russia,\nwhile the Government-in-Exile is a member in good standing of the United\nNations, among which Russia is included.\nWhen in 1939, the problem was merely whether Russia should annex the\neastorn part of Poland, & solution even then could not be found. Now the\nquestion arises as to whether any postwar Poland shall be free from Moscow\ncontrol. The Polish people themsolves, and those of Polish ancestry in other\ncountries, oppose such a satclite position. Since 1795, when Poland was\npartitioned between Prussia (now Germany), Russia, and Austria, an intense\nnationalism has developed which has as its one objective a strong and indo-\npendent Poland. If Russia succeeds in obtaining eastern Poland, Polish\npropaganda would be directed solely against Russia and it would be very\neffective as most of it would emanate from the United States especially during\nelection years.\nPresident Roosevelt stated on January 6, 1945 that no provisional govern-\nments should be set up which would block the peoples' right to choose their\nown government. This is in opposition to the Russian position and causes great\ndifficulties for the international organization envisaged at Dumbarton Oaks.\nBy endorsing Russia's claim for Polish territory, but not the new Russian-\ncontrolled provisional government, Great Britain has complicated the situation.\nDumbarton Oaks actually attempts to establish a three-power alliance with the\nlesser powers and nations supporting their actions. If this alliance is to be\nsuccessful it must be founded on mutual confidence and a reasonable identity\nof viewpoint. Differences arising once the organziation is functioning can be\nsolved in a manner prescribed by it. However, the organziation cannot be\nsuccessfully initiated if the three main powers are divided on as improtant\nan issue as Poland's form of government. The United States must either accept\nthe Russian solution, thus causing millions of people to damn the world union\nbefore it gets under way, or attempt to apply political pressure, which to\ndate has been ineffective, on Russia. Until the problem is solved, the\nDumbarton Oaks plan must mark time, as it cannot effectively be put into\noperation until the three powers reach a wholehearted agreement upon problems\nsuch as now confront them regarding Poland.\n(The author formerly with the League of Nations and editor of The Washing-\nton Post, is now President of Haverford College.)\nSubject headings: Boundaries; Poland, U.S.S.R.\nDumbarton Oaks Proposals\nForeign Policy, Great Britain, Poland,\nABG\nUnited States, U.S.S.R.\nNo. 949\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nen\nMAN\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\n- - USER\nCongressional Series: March 1945\nPOLISH PEACE AIMS\nBy Adam Pragier\nLondon, MaxLove Publishing Commany, 1944. 128 p. (D829.P7P68).\n(This abstract covers only Chapter II, \"Poland and the U.S.S.R.\" p. 36-59.)\nThe Russo-Polish border, as determined by the Treaty of Rign in 1921,\nremained peacefulmd permanent and was accepted by the other nations in March\nand April, 1923. It was the result of compromise, not the use of force, and ex-\npressly commendable for that reason. The legality of this frontier was never\nquestioned until Russin stated its dissatisfoction in 1939.\nContrary to popular thought, the Trenty of Versailles did not definitely\nfix the Russo-Polish border. Also, the Curzon Line did not separate these two\nnations on ethnological principles. Artivle 87 of the Versailles Treaty left the\nboundaries of Poland to be decided upon at some later date by the Principle\nAllied and Associated Powers. This left the Allies with a free hand to\ndetermine these borders in the future after they SQW whether Russia was going\nto return to Czarist rule or remain Sovietized. The Allied Supreme Council\nset a temporary line of demarcation, but Poland was reserved the right to claim\nareas farther east. Only later was this same line proposed by Curzon, md then\nfor strictly different reasons. The British proposed an armistice between\nRussia and Poland, -ith the Intter's army falling back to this line. The Soviet\nrefused as it believed that this was just another English attempt to return\nRussia to the Czar. Also, before the Curzon Line was proposed Russia had\noffered Poland more territory in the cast than would be the latter's under the\nAllied proposals. The Treaty of Rign was a compromise in that the Russo-Polish\nborder, as fixed by the trenty, was considerably east of the Curzon Line but not\nas far east as was proposed by Russia.\nFrom all this the following conslusions can be drawn: (1) The Curzon Line\nwas never meant to be the final frontier. it first it was proposed as a\ntemporary demarcation until further attention could be given the problem and\nthen as a line upon which the Polish army should halt. (2) Poland was expressly\nreserved the right to claim territory further east of this demarcation line\nwhen it was first proposed. (3) Russia at all times recognized Poland's right\nto territory east of this line and denounced the Curzon Line as an allied\nattempt to bring Czarism back to Russia. (4) Not once was this line mentioned,\neither directly or indirectly, in the negotiations between Russia and Poland.\n(5) Both times that the Curzon Line was proposed it was for practical needs:\nfirst to provide for the expected return of the Czarist regime; second for the\nstoppage of military operations between Poland and Russia. Thus the Curzon Line\nhad no connection with the political and national conditions in the areas\nthrough which it was to run. The Curzon Line is also not based upon ethnological\nconsiderations: the Polish, Ukranians, and White-Ruthenians are mixed on both\nsides of this line, while the Russian population is only a small minority.\n(other side)\n(No. 949 Cont'd.)\nPoland and Russia were continually distrustful of one another militarily,\neconomically, and politically between the two wars, but the questions of the\nfrontier and the minorities in enstern Poland never once aggravated the existing\nsituation, or caused any further difficulties. The Russo-Polish non-aggression\npacts of 1932 and 1934 were still in effect when Russia attacked Poland September\n17, 1939. Poland had refused Hitler's offer to join Gormany in attacking Russin\nin 1938 and Russia promised Poland aid in the event she was attacked by Germany.\nIt was not until Russia was prepared to attack Poland that she stated her interest\nin the Ukranians and White-Ruthenians residing in Poland.\nSince the Soviet has proved that she can defeat Germany, her propaganda line\nhas changed. She is now attempting to show, that the salvation of the eastern\nEuropean nations lies in the closest possible cooperation and union, now and afte:\nthe w.r, with the Soviet. She is also minimizing the importance of the United\nStates and Great Britain in this area and representing herself \"as the only real\npower capable both of resisting the Germans ,during the war and taking their\nplace as factor of the post-war equilibrium.) Her propaganda also includes her\nmoral obligation to protect the smaller Slavonic nations and the historic right\nof the latter to unite with their kinsmen in Russia. Russia's claim of not\ndesiring additional territory is different from that of the United States and\nGreat Britain, as she states that her true borders are those existing prior to\n1914 and thus her retaking of Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, et al, is not\nterritorial aggrandizement as stated in the United Nations agreement.\nRusso-Polish friendship is needed in the postwar era for. only thus could\nPoland pay adequate attention to her western frontier which will protect not\nonly her, but also the whole of the Central-Enstom European zone. The Soviet's\ntrue interests require her to respect the integrity of those States which border\nupon her to the west. In return, these states must shape their policies with a\nview toward making their mutual relationships on. the basis of friendship. rather\nthan enmity.\n(The author is Professor at the Universal College, Warsaw, and at the\nPolish Faculty of Law, Oxford.)\nSubject headings: Boundaries; Poland, U.S.S.R.\nForeign Policy; Poland, U.S.S.R.\nABG\nYES TRUMAN INVESTIONAL kones ,\nNo. 950\nE STRITMAN ABOVE - - -\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTMAR LITERATURE\nVER\nCongressional Series: March 1945\nPOLAND\nEdited by Bernadotte E. Schmitt\nBerkeley, University of California Press, 1945. 500 p. Selected\nBibliography. (The Unitea Nations Series). (DK402.5.S3).\n(Note: This book is divided into eight parts. Part One: Land and\neoole includes chapters on Poland and Europe: Geographic Position, Anthro-\npology of Poland: Prebistory and Race. Part Two: Historical Background has\nchapters on The Formation of the Polish State, Poland as a European Power\nPartitioned Poland, 1795-1914, Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1923. Part Three:\nPolitical Development consists of the Constitutional Development of Poland,\nPolish Political Parties, Polish Politics, 1918-1939, Minorities. Part Four:\nEconomic and Social Development includes chapters on Poland's Economy between\nTwo world Mars, Industry, Foreign Trade, and Communications, Poland's Monetary\nand Financial Policy, agricultural Reconstruction in Poland, Social Progress\nin Poland, 1918-1939. Part Five: Cultural Development has chapters on Reli-\ngious Life, Education, Science and Scientific Institutions, Polish Literature,\nthe Fine Arts, Music, the Polish National Spirit. Part Six: Polish-American\nRelations has chapters on Polish-American Cultural Relationships, Polish-\nAmerican Political and Economic Relations. Part Seven: Foreign Relations.\nPart Eight: Second world War and After, Poland and the lar, and the Epilogue.\nThis abstract covers only p. 451-456).\nPoland's future is the result of the objectives which led it to decide to\nresist German aggression in 1939 even though it had unequal forces. Had Poland\ncapitulated to German demands there would not have been a Polish-German war.\nPolish resistance delayed Hitler's time table by eight months. German pro-\nposals for a compromise while the war was raging were scorned by the Polish\nnation. No Quisling developed. Fully aware of the disastrous consequences of\nresistance, Polana believed that there was a world conscience which would be\nawakened by its struggle and sacrifice. \"Furthermore, Poland believed that\nthe present war would decide the liberty and equality of nations, collective\nsecurity, and an equal chance to prosperity for all peoples. Poland also be-\nlieved that the struggle was against overt as well as covert methods of impo-\nsition and exploitation of individuals by individuals and of one nation by\nanother. It had learned from dire experience that the world, for all time to\ncome, would repudiate the basic principle of the pernicious German philosophy\nwhich distinguished between the rights allowed master nations and those of\nslave nations which were small and indigent. Poland believed that the founda-\ntions of the future peace would be based on principles and rights equal and uni-\nform for all nations, that the new peace would become an organized international\ncooperation and exchange on the largest scale possible of all achievements of\nhuman minds and of material gains. And Poland also believed that the crimes\ncommitted by the totalitarian states would meet with an exemplary punishment\nand that world peace would be safeguarded not only by a system of collective\nsecurity, but also by & system of planned control over the aggressor nations\nas well as their reeducation.\" Poland has faith in America's idealism. They\nbelieve in the Atlentic Charter. The Poles expect to attain the objectives\nfor which they made a deliberate sacrifice and not be dominated by it Great\nPower.\nSubject headings: Peace Aims, Poland.\nEMG\nSmall States, Poland.\nNo. 950A\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS\nLegislative Reference Service\nABSTRACTS OF POSTWAR LITERATURE\nCongressional Series: April 1945\nTHE POLISH QUESTION: The Legality of the Polish Government in London\nrecycles -\nBy Leopold Infeld\nThe Canadian. Forum (Toronte), April 1945:10-12\nPoland has never had democracy. The people of Poland, Yugoslavia, and\nGreece fought for 2 democracy they had never known. The people who governed\nPoland stood with Franco, Mussolini, feudal Hungary, and corrupt Rumania.\nThey were bound by bonds of hatred toward the Soviet Union. \"If the Polish\nGovernment in London is a lawful government then it is a descendant of those\nwho suppressed the rights of their own people.\"\nAlthough Poland adopted a democratic constitution in 1921, the govern-\nment followed a reactionary policy. In 1926 Pilsudski accomplished a coup\nd'etat, being helpod by progressive elements. While Pilsudski destroyed\nTory influences, he (and his followers after his death), destroyed democracy\nin Poland in favor of their own semi-fascism. In 1930, Pilsudski threw the\nelected members of Parliament into a concentration camp. After Pilsudski's\ndeath, a new constitution was forced on the country in 1935 with the aim of\npreventing democracy from rising again. In time of war, according to this\nconstitution, the president appoints his successor which is how the present\nPolish Government came into existence. \"Mr. Moscicki, before becoming &\nSwiss citizen, appointed Mr. Raczkiewicz as president, Mr. Raczkiewicz also\nlegally and according to the constitution of 1935, appointed his cabinet. The\nlegal source of the present government is Mr. Moscicki's signature and the\nconstitution of 1935.\" The Polish Government in France, and later in London,\nwas the only one Poland could have had at that time and it kept up the\nfighting spirit of the Polish army and was headed by a far-seeing prime\nminister, General Sikorski, who signed a treaty of friendship with Russia.\nThis is to give praise only where praise is due.\nThe problem of Poland's eastern frontiers is a debatable question.\nWhile land east of the Curzon Line belonged to Poland more than a hundred\nyears ago, at present the Poles are a minority in this area. The greatness\nand strength of a country are not measured merely in terms of square miles,\nparticularly if inhabited by resentful minorities. While the loss of Lvov,\na Polish city (but surrounded by a rural population with a Ukrainian majority),\nwill be painful, it must not be blamed only on the Soviet Union. If Poland\nhad possessed C. truly democratic government and had been able to say that\nnational minorities were treated just the same as Poles in Poland, these\narguments would have been the basis of negotiations which could have resulted\nin the inclusion of Lvov within Poland. But Poland had treated her minorities\nunjustly and did not possess a democratic government.\nWhile some members of the Polish Government in London are honorable\nFolish patriots, they belong to the past and do not believe in the people\nthey claim to represent. \"Their chief driving force is a boundless hatred\nof the Soviet Union.\" Their foreign policy was based on the premise that\nGermany would defeat Russia and then the United States and England would de-\nfeat Germany. Their policy called for an alliance with Czechoslovakia,\nRumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary as a \"shock-absorber\" federation. \"The\nFolish Government in London declared in actions and words that Stalin and\nthe Soviet Union cannot be trusted. Did it ever enter their heads to ask\n(other side)\n(No. 950A Cont'd.)\nwhether they could be trusted by the Soviet Union? Or, as a matter of fact,\ncan they be trusted by any progressive, liberal people anywhere in the world?\"\nThe Polish question, and that of the Polish Government in London, is not one\nonly for Poland. Even though the Polish Government in London ceases to exist,\nits propaganda will continue. Many members will not be able to return to\nPoland because they have shown that they hate Russia more than they love\ntheir own country. They will remain in other countries trying to push\nEngland and the United States into a war with Russia. Thus the Polish\nproblem is of direct concern to all countries.\nSubject headings: Boundaries, Poland.\nForeign Policy, Poland\nSmall States, Poland\nEMG\nS-TRUMAN is MEANS: BOYERNING 160"
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