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    "ocrText": "NLT(PSF Intell.) 105 105\nCOPY NO. 1\nFOR THE PRESIDENT\nTOP SECRET\nOF THE UNITED STATES\n023902\nESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET\nPOSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON\nTHE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\nAND UPON THE PROBABILITIES OF\nDIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION\nINTELLIGENCE\nCENTRA\nALENGY\nORE 91-49\nPublished 6 April 1950\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nDECLASSIFIED\nC.I.A. LTR. 10-15-79\nNNO MEMO 10.24.79\nBYNT.HU NARS, TOP SECRET\nWARNING\nThis document contains information affecting the na-\ntional defense of the United States within the meaning\nof the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.\nIts transmission or the revelation of its contents in any\nmanner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.\nTOP SECRET\nDISSEMINATION NOTICE\n1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient\ndesignated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's\noffice who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further\ndissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-\ntion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:\na. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for\nthe Department of State\nb. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army\nc. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy\nd. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force\ne. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-\nmission\nf. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff\ng. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other\nDepartment or Agency\n2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with\napplicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by\narrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.\nDISTRIBUTION:\nOffice of the President\nNational Security Council\nNational Security Resources Board\nDepartment of State\nOffice of Secretary of Defense\nDepartment of the Army\nDepartment of the Navy\nDepartment of the Air Force\nJoint Chiefs of Staff\nAtomic Energy Commission\nResearch and Development Board\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nORE 91-49\nESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB\nUPON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND UPON THE\nPROBABILITIES OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nFOREWORD\n1\nSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS\n3\nENCLOSURE A-Soviet Atomic Capabilities\n11\nENCLOSURE B-Soviet Intentions and Objectives, Particularly with Respect to Use of\nMilitary Forces\n13\nENCLOSURE C-Effects of the Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the USSR and Soviet\nPolicy\n23\nENCLOSURE D-Effects Outside the USSR of Soviet Atomic Capabilities\n27\nToΓ SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nFOREWORD\nThe subject matter of the present estimate\nCIA considered that it was more important\nhas been under consideration since October\nto publish this paper at this time than to at-\n1949. At the outset, representatives of all the\ntempt the time-consuming, if not impossible,\nagencies concerned agreed that, as a basis for\ntask of obtaining agreement. It considered,\nestimating the effects of the Soviet possession\nfurthermore, that it would be more useful to\nof the atomic bomb upon the probability of\npublish a straightforward point of view, ac-\ndirect Soviet military action, it was essential\ncompanied by contrary opinions, than to pre-\nto re-examine carefully the problem of over-\nsent a watered-down version.\nall Soviet objectives and intentions. The ex-\nInsofar as was possible in good conscience,\namination of this problem, as well as of the\nthe 10 February CIA draft has been modified\nrelated problems of the effects of the Soviet\nin consideration of the comments received\natomic bomb upon the probability of war and\nfrom the IAC agencies, particularly to clarify\nupon the security of the US, revealed wide dif-\npassages regarding which agency comment\nferences in attitude and opinion among the\nrevealed evident misunderstanding. This re-\nintelligence agencies. The examination of\nvised estimate is now presented with the final\nthese problems also brought to light many\ncomments of the IAC agencies thereon.\noperational and policy questions of far-reach-\nThe Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy\ning importance that will require some time to\nCommission, has concurred in this estimate.\nresolve and which are in large part beyond the\nThe several dissents of the intelligence or-\ncognizance of the intelligence agencies.\nganizations of the Departments of State, the\nA CIA draft was submitted to the IAC agen-\nArmy, the Navy, and the Air Force are to be\ncies on 10 February 1950. From the com-\nments made by the IAC agencies on this draft\nfound in Appendixes A, B, C, and D respec-\nit was apparent that no early agreement\ntively (pp. 29-36). It should be noted that\ncould be reached. In view of the time already\nthese dissents are on various grounds and\nelapsed and the broader significance of many\nthat the several departmental agencies dis-\nof the issues that emerged during the study,\nagree among themselves as well as with CIA.\nThis paper is to be considered as an interim\nreport. The subject is under continuing ur-\ngent consideration in an effort to obtain the\ngreatest possible resolution of these differ-\nences, and a subsequent report will be pub-\nlished when this has been accomplished.\nTOP SECRET\n1\nTOP SECRET\nESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF THE\nATOMIC BOMB UPON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED\nSTATES AND UPON THE PROBABILITIES OF DIRECT\nSOVIET MILITARY ACTION\nI. Statement of the Problem.\nscribed targets might prove decisive in knock-\ning the US out of a war. There is at present\nTo estimate the effects of the Soviet posses-\nno reliable estimate of the size of the stock-\nsion of the atomic bomb upon the security of\npile required to insure the delivery of 200\nthe United States and upon the probabilities\nbombs on the prescribed targets. (For more\nof direct Soviet military action.\ndetailed analysis, see Enclosure A.)\nII. Discussion.\n2. Soviet Intentions and Objectives in Re-\n1. Soviet atomic capabilities (see Enclosure\nlation to the Probabilities of War.\nA).\nBefore attempting to estimate the effect of\n2. Estimate of basic Soviet intentions and\nthe Soviet possession of the atomic bomb upon\nobjectives, particularly with respect to the use\nthe probabilities of war, we believe it timely\nof military force (see Enclosure B).\nto re-examine basic Soviet objectives in the\n3. Effects of the possession of the atomic\nworld situation, as the Kremlin conceives it,\nbomb upon the USSR and its policy (see En-\nand to estimate the means which the Kremlin\nclosure C).\ndeems appropriate for their accomplishment,\n4. Effects outside the USSR of Soviet atomic\nwith particular reference to the use of mili-\ncapabilities (see Enclosure D).\ntary force. Our conclusions, as they apply\nto the probabilities of war, apart from any con-\nIII. Summary and Conclusions.\nsideration of the atomic bomb, are given be-\nlow:\n1. Soviet Atomic Capabilities.\na. The basic objective of Soviet foreign pol-\na. It is estimated tentatively that the USSR\nicy is clearly the attainment of a Communist\nwill probably have a stockpile of 100 atomic\nworld under Soviet domination. In pursuit\nbombs, approximately as destructive as the\nof this objective, the USSR regards the US as\nNagasaki bomb, some time during 1953.\nits major opponent and will wage against it\nb. On even less certain grounds it is esti-\na relentless, unceasing struggle in which any\nmated that the USSR will probably have a\nweapon or tactic is admissible which promises\nstockpile of 200 bombs some time between\nsuccess in terms of over-all Soviet objectives.\nmid-1954 and the end of 1955.\nNothing in the subsequent analysis, therefore,\nc. The USSR either has or can easily pro-\nshould be interpreted to imply that Soviet\nduce enough TU-4's (B-29's) and trained\nleaders would not resort to military action\ncrews willing and able to attempt the delivery\nat any time they considered it advantageous\nagainst all key US targets any number of\nto do so. The purpose of this analysis is ob-\natomic bombs the USSR can produce.\njectively to estimate the methods which Soviet\nd. Preliminary and highly tentative US esti-\nleaders are likely to consider advantageous in\nmates indicate that an atomic attack of ap-\nterms of their over-all objectives and the cir-\nproximately 200 bombs delivered on pre-\ncumstances under which they might consider\nNote: For the position of the other intelligence agencies with respect to this paper, see \"Fore-\nword\" on preceding page.\nTOP SECRET\n3\n4\nTOP SECRET\na resort to military action either advan-\nof war, the economic and political disintegra-\ntageous or necessary.\ntion of the non-Communist world which So-\nb. There would appear to be no firm basis\nviet leaders firmly believe will inevitably come\nfor an assumption that the USSR presently\nabout according to the Marxist concept of\nintends deliberately to use military force to\nthe laws of historical development. In view\nattain a Communist world or further to ex-\nof the magnitude of the economic, political,\npand Soviet territory if this involves war with\nand social problems facing the non-Commu-\na potentially stronger US. An analysis of the\nnist world today, it is unlikely that Soviet\nStalinist concepts which motivate Soviet lead-\nleaders will lose confidence in the validity of\ners, as opposed to an interpretation of their\nthis Marxist concept until the non-Communist\nmotives and actions in the light of Western\nworld has demonstrated over a considerable\nconcepts, suggests strongly that the preferred\nperiod of time that it can reverse the trends\nobjective of Soviet policy is to achieve a Soviet-\nof the last forty years and re-establish a stable\ndominated Communist world through revolu-\nand self-confident international economic,\ntionary * rather than military means. Anal-\npolitical, and social order. The first line of\nysis of Soviet foreign policy likewise indicates\nUS defense in this context, therefore, is the\nthat Soviet statesmen are following Stalinist\nrestoration of international stability and the\ndoctrines and tactics in conducting Soviet in-\nmaintenance of a sound internal structure.\nternational relations in the interest of the\ne. In terms of this approach to their objec-\nworld revolution.\ntives, the role presently assigned by Soviet\nc. Soviet leaders, however, are thoroughly\nleaders to Soviet military power appears to\naware of the fact that they are pursuing their\nbe: (1) defense in the world power situation,\nrevolutionary objectives within the context of\naccompanied by preparations for the eventu-\na traditional world power conflict. They are\nality of war; (2) intimidation in support of\nresponsive in this context to the expansionist\ntheir revolutionary program; and (3) where\naims and the security requirements of the pre-\nconsistent with their objectives, local use\nceding imperial Russian regime. Their esti-\nagainst military and economic forces already\nmate of the objectives and behavior of the\nweakened by Communist subversion but not\nWestern Powers, however, probably is still de-\nin aggression that would automatically in-\ntermined primarily by the Stalinist concept\nvolve war with the US. Even if the USSR\nof a capitalist-imperialist world ruled by mili-\nshould gain military superiority (i.e., in over-\ntary force which will eventually be used\nall military potential) over the US and its\nagainst the Soviet Union. To ensure the pro-\nallies, it is estimated that so long as it deems\ntection of the base of the revolutionary move-\nthe opportunity to exist it will still prefer to\nment in the USSR, therefore, they must main-\nseek its objectives by exploiting measures\ntain invincible military strength and use di-\nshort of an all-out attack.\nplomacy to improve the strategic position of\nf. Although the USSR may hope and intend\nthe USSR in relation to the world power situ-\nto pursue its objectives by measures short of\nation as well as to further their revolutionary\nwar, at least until it has military superiority\nobjectives. At the same time they recognize\nover the US and its allies, there is neverthe-\nfully the value of the threat of Soviet military\nless a continuing danger of war, based upon\npower as an adjunct to their revolutionary\nthe following considerations:\nprogram.\n(1) The strength of Soviet military forces\nd. The presently active Soviet threat to US\nin being and the aggressive Soviet revolution-\nsecurity, therefore, while including the ever-\nary program require that the US maintain a\npresent danger inherent in Soviet military\nstrong military and strategic posture. Were\npower, appears to be a Soviet intention and\nit not for the likelihood of US intervention,\ndetermination to hasten, by every means short\nthe USSR, when the situation was ripe, would\n* The term \"revolutionary\" is used to connote all\nprobably use its military forces in actual in-\nmeans short of all-out war involving the US.\ntervention, progressively to support the ac-\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\n5\ncession to power of Communist parties in the\n3. Effects of the Soviet Possession of the\nstates directly beyond its area of control. Cor-\nAtomic Bomb upon the Probabilities of War.\nrespondingly, internal resistance to the rise\nIt is not yet possible to estimate with any\nof Communism in these areas would weaken\nprecision the effects of the Soviet possession\nwithout the support of a strong US.\nof the atomic bomb upon the probability of\n(2) The USSR, with its doctrinaire concepts\nwar. The implications of atomic warfare-\nof capitalist behavior and its hyper-sensitive-\neither military or psychological-have not yet\nness over security, may interpret, as potenti-\nbeen fully appraised. In particular we have\nally aggressive, future steps which the US and\nas yet no clear indications concerning the\nthe other Western Powers might take to im-\nplace of atomic warfare in Soviet military con-\nprove their defensive position against the\ncepts or concerning the effect of US retalia-\nthreat inherent in Soviet military power.\ntory capabilities upon any Soviet considera-\nSimilarly, continuing Soviet successes in the\ntion of a deliberate and unprovoked atomic\n\"cold war,\" accompanied by an increasing em-\nattack upon the US.\nphasis on US and Western military prepara-\nThe capabilities of atomic warfare, however,\ntions, could well create a situation in which\nclearly inject a new factor into an appraisal of\nthe USSR would estimate that the Western\nSoviet intentions which requires the most\nPowers were determined to prevent the future\ncareful evaluation and which, in any event,\nspread of Communism by military action\nhas vital implications for US defense plan-\nagainst the USSR. It is always possible,\nning. Although, in general, it appears un-\ntherefore, that the USSR would initiate a war\nlikely that the possession of the atomic bomb\nif it should estimate that a Western attack\nwill alter the basic considerations-as out-\nwas impending.\nlined above-which underlie Soviet policy, a\nSoviet capability for effective direct attack\n(3) The basic Soviet concept of hostility\nupon the continental US must be considered\n(the \"cold war\") as the normal relationship\nbetween the Soviet Union and the non-Com-\nto increase the danger that the USSR might\nresort to military action to attain its objec-\nmunist states, operating as it does against a\ntives.\nbackground of a power conflict in which each\nside is armed and suspicious of the aims of\nThe military services have estimated that\nthe other, creates a situation in which miscal-\nthe destructive effect of atomic attack actually\nculations or diplomatic impasses might result\ndelivered upon selected targets in the US\nin war. Furthermore, as the Soviet military\nwould be as follows:\npotential increases relative to that of the US\n(a) 10-50 bombs.\nand its allies, the USSR will probably be will-\n1. Would seriously hamper war mobiliza-\ning to take greater risks than before in its ex-\ntion and delay overseas shipments of US forces\nploitation of diplomatic opportunities or revo-\nand material.\nlutionary situations.\n2. Would delay or reduce materially the\n(4) If, after gaining military superiority\nscale of the US atomic retaliation.\n(i.e., in over-all military potential) over the\n(b) 50-125 bombs.\nUS and its allies, Soviet leaders should lose\n1. Would intensify the effects of (a)-1,\nconfidence in the Marxist concept of the in-\nabove, and prevent the immediate launching\nevitable disintegration of the capitalist world\nof an atomic offensive against the USSR.\nand hence in their ability ultimately to attain\ntheir objectives by means short of war, the\n(c) Up to 200 bombs.\ntemptation to resort to military action against\n1. Reduce the US capability for an atomic\nthe US and its allies might well prove irresist-\noffensive, possibly to a critical degree, and\nible. This conclusion should be qualified in\ncreate conditions that might destroy the US\nthe light of the possibilities inherent in atomic\ncapabilities for offensive war.\nwarfare, as discussed in the following section.\nAtomic attack, therefore, introduces the\n(For more detailed analysis, see Enclosure B.)\npossibility that the USSR under (a) and (b)\nTOP\n6\nTOP SECRET\nabove could seriously cripple the US and under\nSoviet regime itself is probably peculiarly vul-\n(c) might well knock the US out of the war.\nnerable to atomic attack. As a dictatorship,\nIf, therefore, the USSR should estimate that\nall elements of Soviet control are centered in\nit had the capability of making a crippling\nMoscow. Initiative throughout the lower\nattack upon the US that would eliminate the\nechelons and the provincial officialdom is non-\nUS margin of over-all military superiority,\nexistent. The destruction of the control cen-\nthe danger that war might develop either from\nter, many of the leaders, and the means of\na Soviet estimate that a Western attack was\ncommunication might therefore lead to com-\nimminent, or from miscalculations or impass-\nplete disintegration and revolution.)\nes in the normal diplomatic maneuvering\n(c) A more effective means of delivery than\nwithin the context of the world power con-\nthe TU-4 (B-29). (If there are doubts about\nflict, would be increased.\nthe ability of the B-36 to deliver the atom\nSimilarly, a Soviet estimate that it could de-\nbomb against the USSR, how much greater\nliver a decisive attack that would quickly\nthe doubts that the Soviet B-29 could deliver\nknock the US out of the war would increase\nit successfully against an effective and alert\nthe possibility of a decision deliberately to\nUS defense.)\nresort to military action to eliminate the\nThe greatest danger that the Soviet atomic\nmajor obstacle to a Communist world. Such\ncapability would lead to overt Soviet military\na decision, under these circumstances, might\naction would appear, therefore, to derive from\nconceivably be made prior to a Soviet convic-\na Soviet estimate that it could launch a suc-\ntion that the USSR could not ultimately attain\ncessful surprise attack that would seriously\nits objectives by means short of war. It could\ncripple or virtually eliminate US retaliatory\ncertainly be made prior to the attainment of\ncapabilities. The likelihood that the USSR\nsuperiority in over-all military potential as\nwill reach such an estimate will vary inversely\ncompared with the US and its allies.\nin relation to the effectiveness and alertness\nThere is no present means, however, of de-\nof the US defenses against such an attack,\ntermining with any accuracy whether the\nand to possible measures taken to make US\nUSSR is likely to estimate that it has the\nretaliatory bases and equipment immune to\ncapabilities to accomplish the results indi-\nattack.\ncated above. In fact, no realistic US estimate\nIn terms of the above analysis, present US\nhas yet been made of Soviet capabilities to\nestimates of destructive effects (given above)\ndeliver atomic bombs on targets in the US,\nof varying numbers of atomic bombs actually\ntaking into account Soviet operational factors\ndelivered on selected targets in the US, com-\nand US defensive capabilities. In terms of\nbined with US estimates of the Soviet atomic\ngeneral Soviet objectives and the methods to\nbomb production schedule, can furnish only\nwhich the USSR appears to be committed in\nthe roughest guide as to the timetable of theo-\nattaining them, it would appear that Soviet\nretical Soviet capabilities.\nleaders would require a high degree of cer-\nOn this tentative basis it is estimated that\ntainty before deliberately undertaking the\nbeginning shortly after 1 January 1951 the\nrisk involved in a direct atomic attack in the\nUSSR will begin to build up a theoretical\nface of the substantial US retaliatory capa-\ncapability for launching a progressively\nbilities. The following conditions would prob-\ncrippling attack upon the US.\nably be essential to any such decision:\nOn the same basis, it is estimated that at\n(a) Virtual certainty of attaining surprise\nsome indeterminate time after mid-1954 the\n(only in this way could the indicated results\nUSSR will have the theoretical capability\nbe achieved).\nof delivering 200 atomic bombs on targets\n(b) Virtual certainty that effective US re-\nin the US which might well constitute\ntaliation could be prevented. (Although the\na \"decisive\" attack, i.e., with respect to the\nUS may appear more vulnerable to atomic\nability of the US to wage offensive warfare.\nattack than the USSR, in terms of large con-\nIt appears imperative from the foregoing\ncentrations of population and industry, the\nthat an effort be made to determine Soviet\nTop SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n7\ncapabilities on the most realistic basis, that\nc. While the outlawing of the use of the\nis, in terms of Soviet operational factors and\nbomb might be militarily advantageous to the\nUS defensive capabilities. For if it is deter-\nUSSR, in terms of operations in Europe or\nmined that an atomic attack could knock the\nAsia, the USSR may estimate that the polit-\nUS out of a war, the implication would be that\nical and psychological advantages of retain-\nthe atomic bomb is, after all, an \"absolute\ning the threat of atomic warfare outweigh the\nweapon.\" Such a conclusion would have vast\nmilitary advantages of excluding it. When\nimplications for US foreign policy and for\nthe USSR acquires what it considers an opera-\nthe composition of the entire US military es-\ntional stockpile of bombs, its capabilities for\ntablishment.\nemploying threats and intimidation through\ndiplomatic channels in an effort to detach in-\n4. Possible Soviet Courses of Action with\ndividual states from the Western bloc will be\nRespect to Its Atomic Capabilities-Short of\nconsiderably increased. With the exception\nDirect Attack.\nof the UK, the US, and possibly Japan, how-\nThe precise effects of the Soviet atomic\never, this increased capability will not result\ncapabilities upon the security of the US will\nfrom apprehension on the part of these states\ndepend in part upon how the USSR chooses\nthat they will be directly attacked with atomic\nto use them. Consideration must be given\nbombs, but rather from the increased Soviet\nto several alternative courses of action that\nmilitary capabilities vis-a-vis the US and from\nare available to the USSR, and to the fact\ngeneral apprehension concerning the effects\nthat we have no information on the Soviet\nof an atomic war. The USSR could not ex-\nevaluation of atomic warfare in terms of the\npect that the threat of direct atomic attack\neffects upon the USSR of US atomic capabili-\nwould carry particular weight against those\nties.\nstates which estimated that a Soviet attack\na. Possession of the atomic bomb has not\nwould bring the US into a war and that under\nyet produced any apparent change in Soviet\nthose circumstances their territories would\npolicy or tactics, and probably will not do so\nnot be of sufficient strategic importance to\nat least through 1950. The USSR has merely\njustify the use against them of the limited\nintegrated the \"bomb\" into its general propa-\nSoviet supply of atomic bombs.\nganda and its \"peace offensive.\" It will prob-\n(For more detailed analysis, see Enclosure\nably in any event continue to stir up mass\nC.)\nopinion in the West against rearmament and\nagainst the use of atomic weapons in the event\n5. Effects of Soviet Possession of the Atomic\nof war. In this way it may hope to create\nBomb upon the Security of the US.\nsufficient public pressure on the Western gov-\na. Assuming the continued stockpiling of\nernments to neutralize the US bomb.\nbombs by the USSR and the US, Soviet atomic\nb. It would appear that on balance the de-\ncapabilities have the following military im-\nstruction of existing stockpiles of atomic\nplications for the security of the US in the\nevent of war.\nbombs and the barring of further production\nwould be militarily advantageous to the\n(1) The continental US will be for the first\nUSSR, except with respect to the possibility of\ntime liable to devastating attack. This has\na direct Soviet attack upon the continental\nvital implications for the mobilization of the\nUS war potential.\nUS. Soviet considerations of security and\n(2) The Soviet atomic capability would ap-\nnational sovereignty probably preclude the\npear to make it imperative not only that US\npossibility of an agreement for the control of\ndefenses against atomic attack, particularly\natomic energy production that would meet\nthe requirements for air defense, be greatly\nthe current requirements of the Western\nstrengthened, but that steps be taken to make\nPowers, but the USSR may renew pressure\nUS retaliatory bases and equipment, in part\nfor an international agreement to outlaw the\nat least, invulnerable to surprise attack.\nuse of the atomic bomb in warfare.\nThese measures are clearly essential to the\nTOP SECRET\n8\nTOP SECRET\npreservation of US retaliatory capabilities\nwould abide by the agreement. Under these\nwhich in turn would contribute the greatest\ncircumstances the USSR would have the op-\ndeterrent to a Soviet attack.\ntion of using the bomb or not, according to its\n(3) If it is accepted, on the basis of a realis-\nstrategic plans, and thereby acquire the initia-\ntic estimate, that an atomic attack could\ntive. If neither side used the bomb, the US\nknock the US out of a war, the implication\nwould lose its capabilities for immediate ef-\nwould appear to be that the atomic bomb is\nfective attack upon the Soviet military poten-\nafter all an \"absolute weapon.\" The accept-\ntial, and the USSR's relative capabilities\nance of this implication would in turn have\nwould be increased through the preponder-\nvital implications with regard to the composi-\nance of its conventional military strength.\ntion of the entire US military establishment.\nb. The political and psychological effects on\n(4) The Soviet military potential is in-\nUS security of a continuing Soviet atomic ca-\ncreased.\npability are estimated as follows:\n(5) The loss of the US monopoly of the\n(1) The possession of the bomb and the re-\natomic bomb has reduced the effectiveness\nsultant increase in Soviet military power will\nboth militarily and psychologically of the US\nincrease somewhat the effectiveness of Soviet\ncommitment to defend the UK and Western\nsubversive activities and propaganda in the\nEurope.\n\"cold war.\"\n(6) The US has lost its capability of mak-\n(2) Through 1950 at least, Soviet posses-\ning a decisive atomic attack upon the war-\nsion of the bomb will not cause any change\nmaking potential of the USSR without dan-\nin the present alignment of the principal na-\nger of retaliation in kind.\ntions, or in the support of current US pro-\n(7) Soviet possession of the atomic bomb\ngrams to counter Soviet aggression. It will\nwould seriously affect US capabilities for air\nprobably result, however, in demands from\noperations from the UK or other advanced\nWestern Europe for larger amounts of US\nbases and for amphibious operations against\nequipment and for further US commitments\nthe European continent or other areas within\nfor the active defense of Western Europe.\nrange of Soviet attack.\n(3) The UK, because of its extreme vulner-\n(8) Soviet atomic retaliatory capabilities\nability to atomic attack, may become some-\nraise the question as to whether it is militarily\nwhat cautious about joining with the US in\ndesirable for the US to base its strategic plans\nany actions which the UK estimated might\nupon the use of the atomic bomb except in re-\nprovoke the USSR into using armed force\ntaliation against a Soviet attack. (In view\nagainst the Western Powers. It will continue\nof the preponderance of its conventional mili-\nthrough 1950 at least, however, to base its for-\ntary forces and the damage it would sustain\neign policy on a close US-UK strategic and\nfrom a US atomic attack, the USSR might\neconomic relationship.\nconsider it advantageous not to use the bomb\nfirst and hope thereby to forestall the US use\n(4) The longer-range effects of Soviet\nof the bomb.)\natomic capabilities upon the political align-\nment of the non-Communist states will de-\n(9) If the use of the atomic bomb were\neliminated, US strategic concepts for the con-\npend in the first instance upon the extent and\nduct of a war with the USSR would have to be\nsoundness of European economic and military\ndrastically revised.\nrecovery and upon the policy and strength of\n(10) Should an international agreement be\nthe US. If present efforts to restore the eco-\nreached to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb\nnomic and military strength of Western Eu-\nthe USSR would be in a better strategic posi-\nrope fall short of their goals, there will de-\ntion than the US. We can probably assume\nvelop a strong, though not necessarily de-\nthat the USSR would not hesitate to violate\ncisive, movement for accommodation or neu-\nthe agreement in the event of war if it consid-\ntrality. If at the same time, there should be\nered it advantageous to do so, while the US\nindications of a serious weakening in US\nToΓ SECRET\nΓOP SECRET\n9\nstrength or in US commitments to resist So-\na. Increasing fear of the effects of an\nviet aggression, the movement for accommo-\natomic struggle may have produced in all\ndation or neutrality would probably become\ncountries, but particularly in the UK, US, and\ndecisive.\nJapan, an irresistible, organized popular de-\nAssuming that US support of its NAT allies\nmand for renewed efforts to bring about an\nand Japan remains firm and that the eco-\nagreement between the US and the USSR for\nnomic and military recovery of Europe is ac-\nat least the prohibition of the use of atomic\ncomplished on a firm and stable basis, there\nweapons. If, under these circumstances, this\nwill be a strong probability that the non-\nobjective were not attained, it must be consid-\nSoviet states, including the UK and Japan,\nered possible that the UK and Japan, because\nwill remain firm in their alignments with the\nof their extreme vulnerability, could be de-\nUS if the Soviet Union should threaten atomic\ntached from the US camp and that the US\nwarfare when it has attained an operational\npublic might force an accommodation with\nstockpile of bombs, or if a deterioration in re-\nthe USSR.\nlations between the USSR and the Western\nb. The concept may become generally ac-\nPowers suggested that an atomic war was im-\ncepted that the threat of mutual retaliation\nminent. In the latter circumstances, the UK\nwill preclude the use of the bomb by either\nwould be strongly influenced by its appraisal\nside. Under these circumstances the effect\nof the issues at stake; it would not be inclined\nof Soviet atomic capabilities would be neg-\nto follow the US unless it considered these is-\nligible.\nsues vital to its security.\nc. The present public attitude of indiffer-\nIn the final analysis, however, the future\nence or relative unconcern may continue; or\npublic appraisal of the significance of the\na strong determination to resist, regardless of\natomic bomb will probably be the determining\nconsequences, may develop. Under either of\nfactor on the will to resist. It is impossible\nthese circumstances, the countries concerned\nat this time to predict with any assurance\nwould probably stand firm in their alignment\nwhat this appraisal will be. In general, three\nwith the US.\nalternative trends appear possible in the in-\n(For more detailed analysis, see Enclosure\nterim.\nD.)\nTOP SECRET\nENCLOSURE A\nSOVIET ATOMIC CAPABILITIES\n1. Information at hand permits the follow-\na. Soviet estimates of the size of an atomic\ning highly tentative estimate with respect to\nair attack required to accomplish a crippling\nSoviet atomic capabilities:\nor decisive attack and of the size of the stock-\na. The USSR has, or can in reasonable time\npile the USSR would consider necessary be-\nachieve, production of an atomic bomb ap-\nfore launching such attacks.\nproximately as destructive as the Nagasaki\nb. Firm US estimates of the character and\nbomb; i.e., causing major damage and high\nscope of a \"decisive\" attack on the US both\nrate of casualties within an area of 4-7 square\nin terms of:\nmiles (circle with radius of 1.1 to 1.5 miles).\n(1) direct military and industrial damage;\nb. The USSR either has or can easily pro-\n(2) impact on the national will to resist.\ncure enough TU-4's (B-29's) and trained\nc. Estimates of Soviet operational capabili-\ncrews willing and able to make one-way flights\nties in terms of atomic sorties, including per-\nif necessary to attempt the delivery against\ncentage factors for:\nany key US targets of any number of atomic\n(1) operational losses and malfunctions;\nbombs the USSR can produce.\n(2) gross aiming errors;\nc. Atomic bombs could also be delivered in\n(3) losses due to total US anti-air defense\nUS harbors in Soviet ships prior to an out-\nsystem.\nbreak of hostilities, but the effects of such at-\nd. The Kremlin's estimate of Soviet capa-\ntacks would be limited in comparison with\nbilities with respect to c above.\nwide-scale air attacks.\n3. Without consideration of either Soviet\nd. The Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs as\noperational factors or US defensive capabili-\nof various dates is estimated as follows:\nties, the US military services have estimated\n(1) Mid-1949\n1 (exploded)\nthat the effects of Soviet military application\nMid-1950\n10-20\nof atomic bombs against the US during the\nMid-1951\n25-45\nfollowing periods would be:\nMid-1952\n45-90\na. Initial period (target objectives: political\nMid-1953\n70-135\nand population centers; most important re-\ntaliatory targets) when the USSR has the\n(2) Beyond 1953, a well-founded estimate\ncannot be made, and even for mid-1953 there\ncapability of delivering 10 to 50 atomic bombs\nON TARGET:\nis a large degree of uncertainty. For plan-\nning purposes, however, an estimate for mid-\n(1) Mobilization for war would be seriously\n1954 of 120-200 bombs is suggested on the\nhampered for a considerable period in that\nthe attacks would cause the destruction of the\nbasis that plant capacity may be increased by\nheadquarters of the Federal Government, the\napproximately 50 percent after 1952.\npartial destruction of large cities, and the\n2. An estimate of the number of atomic\npsychological shock effects of more than one\nbombs that the USSR would stockpile before\nmillion casualties.\nconsidering it possible to launch attacks of\n(2) A successful attack on the most impor-\nvarying degrees of intensity on the US must\ntant installations of the Strategic Air Com-\nbe very imprecise. Four essential elements of\nmand would delay or reduce materially the\ninformation are largely lacking at present\nscale of the planned strategic air offensive.\nand will remain hard to determine with any\n(3) The neutralization of the key ports in\ncertainty:\nthe United States would cause great delay in\nTOP SECRET\n11\n12\nTOP SECRET\nprojecting United States forces and materials\n(c) Reduce over-all military industrial ca-\noverseas.\npacity for production in the United States\nb. Intermediate period (target objectives:\nup to 30-50 percent.\npolitical and population centers; retaliatory\n(d) Cause total casualties of more than 10,-\ntargets, including manpower mobilization\n000,000 people in the United States.\ncenters; and selected industrial facilities)\n(e) Create conditions which might be de-\nwhen the USSR has the capability of deliver-\ncisive as to the ability of the United States to\ning 50 to 125 atomic bombs ON TARGET:\nwage offensive war.\n(1) An intensification of the effects of the\n4. In terms of the above analysis, present\ninitial period.\nUS estimates of destructive effects (given\n(2) Prevent the IMMEDIATE launching of\nabove) of varying numbers of atomic bombs\nan atomic offensive against the USSR.\nactually delivered on selected targets in the\n(3) Serious effect on certain vital elements\nUS, combined with US estimates of the So-\nof the war economy.\nviet atomic bomb production schedule, can\nc. Long-range period (target objectives:\nfurnish only the roughest guide as to the time-\npolitical and population centers; retaliatory\ntable of theoretical Soviet capabilities.\ntargets, including manpower and mobiliza-\nOn this tentative basis it is estimated that\ntion centers; and industrial complexes) when\nbeginning shortly after 1 January 1951 the\nthe USSR has the capability of delivering up\nUSSR will begin to build up a theoretical ca-\nto 200 atomic bombs ON TARGET:\npability for launching a progressively crip-\n(1) Atomic attacks during the long-range\npling attack upon the US.\nperiod would probably:\nOn the same basis it is estimated that at\n(a) Reduce the United States capability for\nsome indeterminate time after mid-1954 the\nan atomic offensive, possibly to a critical de-\nUSSR will have the theoretical capability of\ngree.\ndelivering 200 atomic bombs on targets in the\n(b) Delay indefinitely the industrial and\nUS which might well constitute a \"decisive\"\nmilitary mobilization in the United States,\nattack, i.e., with respect to the ability of the\nCanada, and the United Kingdom.\nUS to wage offensive warfare.\nΓOP\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nENCLOSURE B\nSOVIET INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES,\nPARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO USE OF MILITARY FORCES\n1. The Problem.\nto, or restrain them from, a resort to direct\nmilitary action.\nBefore attempting to estimate the use\nwhich the USSR will make of its capability to\nFortunately, a basis for estimating the prob-\nwage atomic warfare, we believe it timely to\nable behavior of Soviet leaders in pursuit of\nre-examine carefully basic Soviet objectives\ntheir objectives does exist in the past conduct\nin the world situation, as the Kremlin con-\nof Russian foreign relations and in the known\nceives it, and to estimate the means which\nideological concepts of the present rulers of\nthe Kremlin deems appropriate for their ac-\nthe USSR. Analysis in these terms reveals\ncomplishment, with particular reference to\nthat Soviet foreign policy is governed by two\nthe use of military force.\ndistinct but interlocking sets of influences.\nThese are:\n2. Approach to the Problem.\na. The power relationship between the So-\nviet bloc and the West, and the security re-\nIt must be recognized at the outset that\nquirements of the USSR therein.\nthere is no factual information on any of the\ndecisions or plans of the Politburo which\nb. The Communist ideology, which sup-\nwould permit a definite and authoritative\nposedly affords an infallible explanation of the\nanswer with respect to the timing and meth-\nexisting world situation, the direction in\nods which the USSR will employ in pursuit of\nwhich it must inevitably develop, and the mis-\nits objectives. Lacking such evidence it would\nsion of the USSR in the premises.\nbe as unjustifiable to assume that the USSR\ndefinitely intends to resort to military aggres-\n3. Impact of Communist Ideology.\nsion involving the United States as it would\nAn analysis of the behavior and tactics of\nbe to assume the contrary. In either case an\nSoviet leaders in conducting both the foreign\nerroneous assumption could lead to a disas-\nrelations and the internal affairs of the Soviet\ntrous mis-direction of US policy.\nstate indicates clearly that Marxist ideology,\nThe essential character of the Soviet threat\nas developed by Lenin and Stalin (hereafter\nin the present world situation is clear. The\ncalled Communism), is the predominant influ-\nUSSR emerged from World War II not only as\nence on the pattern of their thought and ac-\nthe seat of Communist ideology which aims to\ntions. It is the basis for the Soviet ambition\nsubvert the world, but as the predominant\nfor world domination, as opposed to the less\nmilitary power on the Eurasian continent.\nambitious expansionist aims of Tzarist Rus-\nIt has avowed its intention to attempt to bring\nsia. It is an essential ingredient in the proc-\nabout a Communist world under Soviet domi-\ness by which Soviet leaders define their own\nnation and to this end to wage a relentless,\nobjectives, both domestic and foreign, and es-\nunceasing struggle against the US-its major\ntimate the objectives of the Western Powers.\nopponent-in which any tactic or weapon is\nIt provides the framework within which they\nadmissible which appears advantageous in\ninterpret all developments in the capitalist\nterms of over-all Soviet objectives.\nworld and a blueprint of tactics to be used in\nThe problem, therefore, is to estimate the\ngaining Soviet objectives. Its basic tenets\ntactics and weapons which Soviet leaders will\nwith respect to the historical development of\ndeem appropriate to success in this struggle\nsociety are deemed to have the validity of\nand the factors which are likely to impel them\nscientific truth. Communist ideology affords,\nTOP SECRET\n13\n14\nTOP SECRET\nthen, a key to past, present, and future Soviet\nriods of recuperation and stability will follow\nbehavior.\nperiods of weakness. The timetable is wholly\nCommunism holds that all social develop-\nflexible. The last stages of capitalism will be\nment is the result of a constant struggle be-\nmarked by increasingly severe depressions\ntween opposing interests, leading inevitably to\n(e.g., 1929) and by imperialistic wars in which\nthe establishment of a Communist society.\npredatory capitalist states seek survival by\nThere can be no peace or mutual tolerance,\npreying on others (e.g., 1939). These devel-\nat least not until this ideal (Communist) so-\nopments will weaken the capitalist world and\nciety has been achieved. Progress toward this\ncreate \"revolutionary situations\" for Commu-\ngoal is of necessity resisted by the vested in-\nnist exploitation. But throughout this pe-\nterests in the dying (capitalist) social order.\nriod there will be grave danger that capital-\nMoreover, the exploited masses also cannot be\nist states, perceiving the trend of events, may\nexpected to see the light. The goal will be too\ncombine to attack and destroy the USSR in\ndistant, therefore, if sought by persuasion and\nthe hope of averting their own inevitable fate.\ndemocratic processes. Force must be used to\nThe basic objective of Soviet foreign policy\novercome the resistance of the capitalists and\nis thus clearly the attainment of a Communist\nthe inertia of the masses. Satisfactory prog-\nworld under Soviet domination. Communist\nress can be achieved only by violent revolu-\ndoctrine suggests equally clearly that, in its\ntion conducted by the militant minority who\ndesign to bring about a Communist world, the\ndo see the vision.\nprimary aggressive instrument of Soviet for-\nThree conditions are essential, however, to\neign policy is the international Communist\nthe existence of a \"revolutionary situation,\"\napparatus, acting through subversion and\ni.e., a situation in which the militant Commu-\nrevolution, rather than military conquest by\nnist minority can hope to succeed in a revo-\nthe Soviet armed forces. Neither Lenin nor\nlutionary effort: (1) the masses must be dis-\nStalin has ever questioned the basic Marxist\nillusioned and disaffected toward the regime;\nconcept that the capitalist world is inevitably\n(2) the rulers must be themselves disorganized\ndoomed to disintegrate. The function of in-\nand unable to operate their former system of\nternational Communism is to hasten this dis-\ncontrol; and (3) a revolutionary minority\nintegration and to be prepared to grab the\nmust be organized and ready to take over by\npieces as they fall. The mission of the Soviet\nforce. A practical corollary to these three\nUnion is to support the revolutionary move-\nconditions would be the unavailability of\nment with its diplomacy (backed by Soviet\nstrong outside aid for the reactionary forces\npower) and propaganda.\nthen in control.\nA period of ebb in the tide of revolutionary\nThe Revolution having occurred in one\nopportunity would not be likely to cause the\ncountry (the USSR), that country must ex-\nUSSR to abandon this method, for an ensuing\npect the undying enmity of the capitalist\nperiod of flow would be confidently expected.\nworld. No accommodation is possible except\nOnly if the capitalist world succeeded in dem-\nas a tactical maneuver to gain time to develop\nonstrating, over a considerable period of time,\nstrength for the continuing struggle. In its\nthat it had reversed the trend of the last forty\nown interest as well as that of the world revo-\nyears, and the Communists, in consequence,\nlution, the USSR must provide a secure base\nlost faith in the verity of their basic doctrine\nand strong support for the revolution in other\nof the inevitability of capitalist disintegration\ncountries. In turn, all Communists through-\ncould a radical new departure be expected.\nout the world must serve and defend the\nSoviet military power is essentially an ad-\nUSSR, since its preservation is essential to\njunct to international Communism in attain-\nthe advancement of the world revolution.\ning this objective of a Communist world. In\nCapitalism, however, bears within itself the\nterms of Communist doctrine, its primary and\nseeds of its own destruction and will inevi-\noverriding function is to guarantee the secu-\ntably succumb. Its disintegration will take\nrity of the USSR and the revolutionary move-\nplace through a process of ebb and flow; pe-\nment against anticipated capitalist attack.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n15\nIts offensive function appears to be secondary\ntion, but rather what the USSR most fears—\nand limited, to be used locally against mili-\nthe combination of the world in arms against\ntary and economic forces already weakened\nit in a war of survival.\nby Communist subversion, but not in head-on\nHowever, no Communist-with his concept\nattack against strength in which the issue\nthat the end justifies the means-can have\nmight be in doubt. It might be used, for ex-\nany scruples regarding the use of force, in-\nample, in the form of intimidation of the ex-\ncluding military aggression, to advance the\nisting government to support the accession to\nworld revolution. Were the USSR, in the full-\npower of a Communist party in a neighboring\nness of time, to achieve total military power\nstate by intimidating the existing government.\nsufficient to enable it to defy the interventions\nIt might even be used to intervene in exploi-\nof the United States, it might be under strong\ntation of a genuine \"revolutionary situation\"\ntemptation to impose its domination on Eura-\nin a neighboring state when the use of Soviet\nsia by military force. Even in such a case,\nmilitary power would insure the success of the\nhowever, it would have reason to consider the\nrevolutionary attempt and would not at the\neffect of flagrant military aggression upon its\nsame time conflict with over-all Soviet policy\nworld revolutionary pretensions. Considera-\nor involve the USSR prematurely in military\ntion of the question, however, assumes a con-\nconflict with a stronger adversary. The \"revo-\ntinuing state of disintegration and impotence\nlutionary situations\" which Communist doc-\nin Europe and Asia. The potential strength\ntrine anticipates will result from wars be-\nof Western Europe alone, if realized, is suf-\ntween sovereign states are those resulting\nficient to preclude an easy Soviet conquest.\nfrom \"imperialist wars\" between capitalist\nWere the USSR to achieve the over-all\nstates and not from wars in which the USSR\nstrength, or an atomic or similar capability,\nitself would willingly participate. Thus, while\nnecessary for a decisive direct attack on the\nmilitary action is recognized in Communist\nUnited States (one resulting in a quick vic-\ndoctrine as a means of extending the revolu-\ntory), it would be under much stronger temp-\ntion, its use is strictly circumscribed. Any\ntation to resort to military force, for if the\nmilitary venture prejudicial to the basic se-\nUSSR could decisively defeat the United\ncurity of the USSR and the ultimate success\nStates, no power on earth could resist its dom-\nof the revolutionary movement is clearly un-\nination.\nintended.\nFlagrant military aggression against sov-\n4. The Power Relationship between the Soviet\nereign states, moreover, would not be advan-\nBloc and the West and the Security Require-\nments of the USSR Therein.\ntageous to the USSR in terms of its objective\nof advancing the world revolution. The pre-\nSoviet leaders are rulers of the Soviet state\nrequisite of world revolution is social disinte-\nas well as heads of the world Communist\ngration. Resistance to foreign aggression\nrevolutionary movement. Even though their\nwhich Soviet military action would induce is\nbasic objective may be to extend Communism\na unifying force both within and among na-\nby revolutionary methods, they are thor-\ntions. The world has long known how to\noughly alive to the fact that they are pursu-\ncombine against a would-be conqueror. How-\ning this objective within the context of an in-\never formidable the military strength of the\nternational system in which power has been\nUSSR, its unique power lies in its revolution-\na decisive factor in national existence. The\nary doctrine and apparatus. Flagrant resort\nmilitary strength and the strategic position of\nto military conquest would stultify the revo-\nthe USSR in terms of this world power situa-\nlutionary professions and the anti-imperialist\ntion, therefore, must be of vital concern to\npropaganda of the USSR, deprive it of its\nthem in the attainment of their revolutionary\nrevolutionary power, and reduce it to the sta-\nobjectives.\ntus of just another powerful imperialist ag-\nSoviet leaders in their concern for the se-\ngressor. Whatever its initial success on that\ncurity of the USSR as the base of the revolu-\nbasis, the result would not be world revolu-\ntionary movement, or in the use of their power\nTOP SECRET\n16\nTOP SECRET\nposition to extend either Soviet territory or\nThe whole of this sorry Russian experience\nareas of Communist control, are inevitably\nwas the result of the inherent weaknesses of\nresponsive to the same geopolitical and\nthe Russian state in the international power\npower factors that influenced the rulers of the\nsystem. With their accession to power in\nold Russian empire. Similarly, they can\n1917, the present Communist leaders of the\nhardly escape the influences of the historical\nSoviet state fell heirs to the position of their\nexperience of the Russian people.\nTsarist predecessors. They were immediately\nAn analysis of Russian history in these\nsubjected to experiences in the world power\nterms reveals several characteristics that may\nsituation similar to those which had created\nbe useful in providing a clue to the probable\nthe sense of insecurity already inherent in the\nbehavior of any rulers of the Russian state,\nRussian people: The German occupation of\nbe they Tzarist or Communist, in an inter-\nFinland, the Baltic States, White Russia and\nnational system governed by power politics.\nthe Ukraine, and Turkish occupation of the\nThese are:\nCaucasus, 1918; later, British, French, US,\na. The lack of secure frontiers, resulting in\nand Japanese armed intervention in the civil\nan immemorial experience (since the Tartar\nwar (1918-1922) and the Polish invasion of\ninvasion) of being overrun by more civilized\n1920; and above all, the German onslaught\nand technologically advanced foreigners, con-\nwhich reached Leningrad, Moscow, Stalin-\nstitutes the basis for a morbid sense of na-\ngrad, and Grozny in 1941-42. In the context\ntional insecurity and psychological inferiority.\nof the international power situation, there-\n(Moscow was occupied by the Poles, 1610-\nfore, the Five Year Plans of the Soviet state\n1713; the Swedes almost occupied it in 1709;\nappear less as a matter of building socialism\nthe French in 1812; and the Germans made\nin one country than of improving the power\ndeep inroads in both World Wars.) The con-\nposition of the USSR, for these Plans are pat-\nclusions which the Russians have drawn from\nently less concerned with quickly bringing the\nthis experience are that the outside world is\nblessings of abundance to the Soviet people\nhostile, that space is an essential factor in de-\nthan with enhancing the war potential of the\nfense, and that Russia can never be secure\nSoviet state.\nagainst invasion as long as a potential in-\nCommunist doctrine has reinforced this\nvader exists.\nbasic sense of insecurity inherent in the ex-\nb. The corollary to this sense of insecurity\nperience of the Russian people and in the his-\nhas been a driving urge for expansion. The\ntory of the early years of the present Soviet\nexpansionism which resulted in the creation\nregime. It provides present Soviet leaders\nof the pre-World War I Russian empire, how-\nwith rigid and well-defined concepts of the\never, was characterized to a large degree by\npattern of behavior of the Western capitalist\ncaution and opportunism. It succeeded by\nstates in the imperialistic stage of historical\nmeans of persistent nibbling at the territories\ndevelopment. These capitalist states, condi-\nof neighboring powers already in the throes of\ntioned to a world of power politics, will inevit-\ninternal disintegration and by following up\nably fight among themselves for markets and\nupon foreign incursions which exhausted the\nraw materials. They may at any time attack\ninvaders.\nthe Soviet Union in an effort to rid themselves\nc. Despite its generally opportunistic char-\nof the menace of Communism. If they do\nacter, Russian expansion affords instances of\nnot launch the attack at an early stage, they\npatent miscalculation, where the resistance\nwill do so ultimately in a final effort to fore-\nencountered proved stronger than was ex-\nstall the inevitable decay of the capitalist sys-\npected, when the worth of allies had been\ntem. Soviet leaders, therefore, in terms of\noverestimated, or when stronger powers inter-\ntheir revolutionary ambitions, must build up\nvened to protect the intended victim. The\nthe military strength and improve the strate-\nrecord also affords instances in which Russia\ngic position of the Soviet state in order to pro-\naccepted diplomatic defeat rather than face\ntect it in this world of power politics in which\nthe threatened intervention of major powers.\nthe new Communist state has grown up.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n17\nThus, the geopolitical position of the USSR,\npower position has not yet, at least, induced\nthe historical experience of the Russian\nSoviet leaders to reject the influences of Rus-\npeople, and the Communist concept of the\nsian tradition, and the methods and tactics\ncapitalist threat combine to indoctrinate pres-\nprescribed by Communist ideology as outlined\nent Soviet leaders with a basic sense of in-\nabove.\nsecurity in the world power situation and a\ncorrelative urge for expansion in search of se-\n5. The Course of Soviet Foreign Policy,\ncurity. At the same time they are heirs to a\n1917-1945.\ntradition of caution and opportunism in power\nSoviet foreign policy since 1917 has con-\nrelationships which coincides with the Com-\nformed to both Russian tradition and Com-\nmunist revolutionary injunction to retreat\nmunist ideology. Disastrous defeat in the war\nbefore superior strength, to refrain from\nwith Germany in 1917 created the \"revolu-\nstriking until a situation is ripe, and to as-\ntionary situation\" which enabled the Com-\nsume no risks that would jeopardize the base\nmunist minority to seize power in Russia. In\nof the revolution in the USSR. Against this\nthe enthusiasm of that moment there were\nbackground, the postwar Soviet emphasis on\nthose who believed that universal revolution\nmilitary strength in being and the actual ter-\nwas at hand and that the war should be con-\nritorial annexations during World War II can-\ntinued, not in cooperation with the capitalist\nnot in themselves be taken as a certain indi-\nWest, but to liberate proletarian brethren in\ncation of an intent to employ military aggres-\nGermany and eventually in the West as well.\nsion on a world-wide scale.\nLenin brought them back to reality by point-\nFrom a strictly power point of view, there-\ning out that no \"revolutionary situation\"\nfore, the danger of war, as long as the US re-\nthen existed in Germany. The gist of his doc-\nmains a formidable opponent, would appear to\ntrine was that for the USSR to make war\nbe, not that of a Soviet attack on the United\nfor the purpose of carrying the revolution to\nStates, but that of a Soviet miscalculation\na country in which no \"revolutionary situa-\nof the cumulative effect of characteristic\ntion\" already existed would be reprehensible\npiecemeal aggressions in Eurasia in provoking\nadventurism, for it would jeopardize the\na warlike US reaction.\nachievement of the revolution in the USSR\nThere is obviously no assurance that the\nwithout prospect of gain commensurate with\nrulers of the Soviet Union will act in the fu-\nthat risk.\nture as Russian or Soviet leaders have acted in\nThe USSR, therefore, accepted the costly\nthe past, particularly in view of the greatly en-\nTreaty of Brest-Litovsk as the price of a\nhanced world power position which the USSR\nperiod of release from war in which to consoli-\nhas now attained and the postwar power vac-\ndate the revolution in one country and gather\nuum in Western Europe; yet they cannot\nstrength to exploit the \"revolutionary situa-\nquickly or wholly escape the influence of their\ntions\" expected to develop as the capitalist\nenvironment and historical experience. On\npowers continued to make war against each\nhistorical performance the Soviet Union could\nother. The war did produce \"revolutionary\nbe expected to take every advantage of the\nsituations\" in Eastern Europe, Germany,\ncontemporary disintegration of power in Eu-\nItaly, Greece, and Turkey, but the local Com-\nrope and Asia to expand the area of its terri-\nmunists proved incapable of seizing and hold-\ntorial control in search of further security.\ning power and, except with respect to the\nAlso on past performance, the Soviet state\nUkraine and the Transcaucasus - former\ncould be expected to go no further in terri-\nRussian territories - the USSR itself was un-\ntorial aggrandizement than supposedly could\nable to render effective support to such local\nbe done without serious risk of provoking US\nCommunist revolutionary efforts as did occur.\nintervention, at least until the USSR had\nThereafter the USSR reconciled itself to a\nachieved a power parity with the US.\nperiod of stability in the West, and in true\nThe following analysis of Soviet foreign\nTsarist fashion, redirected its effort to an-\npolicy indicates that the enhanced Soviet\nother theater: China. There also a \"revolu-\nTOP SECRET\n18\nTOP SECRET\ntionary situation\" existed, but there also it\nthat the Second Front was being deliberately\nwas not the Communists who emerged as the\ndelayed until Germany and the USSR had\nsuccessful revolutionists.\ncollapsed from exhaustion, when the United\nAfter the Chinese fiasco in 1927, the USSR\nStates would move in to take advantage of\ndevoted itself to internal development and to\nthe \"imperialistic opportunities\" which would\nperfecting the international Communist ap-\nexist in both countries. Thus the clamor for\nparatus in certain expectation of new dangers\na Second Front had a deeper political as well\nand new opportunities. The economic col-\nas an immediate military significance. Even\nlapse of the capitalist world in 1929 was fore-\nafter D-Day, until VE-Day itself, the USSR\nseen and a consequent period of imperialist\nwas fearful lest the Germans succeed in mak-\nwars anticipated. Fearing that desperate\ning their peace with the West and combining\ncapitalist states would take the occasion to\nwith it against the USSR. That, in Soviet\nattack and destroy the \"Socialist Fatherland,\"\nestimation, would have been the proper course\nthe USSR became an advocate of disarma-\nof action for the capitalist world. The corre-\nment, non-aggression pacts, and collective se-\nsponding course of action for the USSR-to\ncurity through the League of Nations.\nmake a new Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Ger-\nIn the light of Communist ideology, how-\nmany, restoring the fundamental situation to\never, the outcome of the Munich crisis, avert-\nits 1939-1941 status-must have been tempt-\ning war among the capitalist powers, was in-\ning, but was too risky, for Germany would cer-\nterpreted as a sure sign of a secret combina-\ntainly have used any evidence of Soviet per-\ntion against the USSR, or at least of a success-\nfidy to further its preferred solution of recon-\nciliation with the West and combination\nful attempt to turn Hitler's aggressive inten-\ntions eastward. It became the prime task of\nagainst the USSR.\nSoviet diplomacy to turn the tables on the\nAs the Soviet armies advanced into Europe,\nWest; to bring about a war between Germany\nthe USSR, of course, acted to perpetuate its\nand the West in which the capitalist powers\ncontrol over the territories actually occupied\nwould destroy each other while the USSR re-\nand also to exploit or develop the \"revolution-\nmained aloof, conserving its strength and\nary situation\" sure to exist, not only in de-\nready to pick up the pieces. Thus, from the\nfeated Germany, but also in all the lands\nstandpoint of security, the function of the\nwhich Germany had occupied.\n1939 pact with Germany was essentially the\nThis review of the broad aspects of Soviet\nsame as that of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,\npolicy reveals three cardinal preoccupations:\nalthough superficially the effects of it were to\n(1) To keep the USSR free of involvement\nreverse that document by restoring to the\nin imperialist wars among capitalist states.\nUSSR much territory lost in 1918. The basic\n(2) In particular, to prevent a combination\npurpose was to keep the USSR out of the war\nof the capitalist world against the USSR.\nuntil the capitalists themselves had created\n(3) To take advantage of \"revolutionary\n\"revolutionary situations\" which a stronger\nsituations\" resulting from war to extend the\nUSSR could exploit.\narea of Soviet control and advance the world\nThis strategy backfired, of course, when the\nrevolution.\nwar in the west reached a relatively quick\nstalemate and the real battle of attrition de-\n6. Soviet Postwar Policy.\nveloped in the East after all. This situation\nIt has been asserted that only the existence\nconstituted a realization of the fears of the\nof the US atomic bomb prevented the USSR\nUSSR at the time of Munich. Germany and\nfrom carrying out an intention to continue its\nthe USSR were in the process of destroying\nmilitary advance to the Atlantic in 1945.\neach other, while Great Britain and the\nThere can be no doubt that the US atomic\nUnited States remained relatively disengaged,\nbomb had a sobering and deterrent effect on\nbuilding up their strength instead of expend-\nthe USSR. There is no reason to suppose,\ning it-the reverse of Soviet expectations in\nhowever, that the USSR had any such inten-\n1939. To any Communist it would be obvious\ntion in 1945 or subsequently. The evidence\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n19\nadvanced in support of that contention-So-\nern and southern Asia. These policies were\nviet interest in hastening US demobilization-\ndeemed to cost nothing in terms of Western\nis explainable in terms of a well-established\ngoodwill, for ideologically no such thing could\nSoviet fear of US intentions and an obvious\nexist. They would expose the USSR to no\nSoviet interest in developing the \"revolution-\nrisk such as that inherent in direct military\nary situation\" in Europe by removing the pos-\naggression. They were the ideologically pre-\nsibility of strong outside support for the gov-\nscribed courses of action for the estimated\nernments to be subverted. Even without the\nsituation.\natomic bomb, outright Soviet military aggres-\nA true \"revolutionary situation\" did appear\nsion would have been self-defeating, for it\nto exist in Europe and Asia. The masses were\nwould certainly have brought about remobili-\ndisillusioned and ready to accept a change.\nzation and that combination of the capitalist\nThe former rulers were discredited and in-\nworld against the USSR in a war of survival\ncapable of governing in the old way. No ef-\nwhich the USSR chiefly fears. Certainly the\nfective outside support seemed available to\nburden of proof lies on those who would assert\nthem after the precipitate demobilization of\nthat the Soviet rulers had become so drunk\nthe United States. Communists were organ-\nwith power as to disregard all the precepts of\nized and ready to take over. The powerful\nRussian tradition and Communist doctrine\nsupport of the USSR was at hand.\nand to substitute a hazardous program of\nYet the revolution failed to come off in\nworld conquest, unlikely to succeed, for a sup-\nWestern Europe, and the USSR was checked\nposedly infallible program of world revolution.\nin the Near East. The United States re-\nActually, Soviet policy since VE-Day is ex-\nsponded with aid and support, thereby thwart-\nplicable only in terms of Russian tradition and\ning the development of the revolutionary sit-\nCommunist ideology. At the close of the war\nuation, and took over the former role of Great\nthe USSR enjoyed in the West immense pres-\nBritain in Near Eastern power politics.\ntige and goodwill. A cooperative policy\nMoreover, with the assurance of US support,\nwould have consolidated these advantages,\nthere developed a patriotic reaction to the\nfacilitated Communist accession to power in\naggressive conduct of the USSR and the sub-\nWestern Europe by democratic processes, and\nservience of local Communists to Soviet\nsecured US assistance in the rehabilitation of\ninterests.\nthe Soviet economy (and war potential). But\nThis situation is one in which both Russian\nSoviet thought, rigidly predetermined by Com-\ntradition and Communist doctrine counsel pa-\nmunist ideology, could not comprehend the\ntience and restraint, and it appears that the\nidea of peace and security through mutual\nUSSR is prepared to accept the status quo for\ntolerance and goodwill.\nthe time being. The USSR can afford to be\nThe alternative prescribed by Communist\npatient, being firmly convinced that time is\nideology, however, was not military conquest,\non its side, that the conflicting interests of\nbut subversion and revolution. Soviet post-\nthe capitalist powers will prevent any truly\nwar policy was true to its Tsarist precedents\ndangerous development, and that the even-\nand Communist frame of reference: to con-\ntual economic collapse of the capitalist world\nsolidate the control over Eastern Europe actu-\nwill present new revolutionary opportunities.\nally existing through the presence of Soviet\nMeanwhile, the revolution has succeeded in\ntroops and police (or of Communist revolu-\nAsia to the extent that it has been able to\ntionary governments in the cases of Yugo-\nidentify itself with the dominant political\nslavia and Albania); to exploit the \"revolu-\nforce in that region, a nationalistic reaction\ntionary situation\" apparently existing in con-\nagainst Western imperialism. In the Philip-\ntinental Western Europe and in Greece; to\npines, India, and latterly Indonesia, where na-\ntake advantage of its power position to impose\ntionalism has been satisfied in cooperation\nits will on Turkey and Iran, as any Tsarist\nwith the West, Communism has not prevailed.\ngovernment would have done; and to exploit\nNevertheless, Communism has prevailed in\nthe \"revolutionary situation\" existing in east-\nChina; the outcome in Southeast Asia re-\nToΓ SECRET\n20\nTOP SECRET\nmains in doubt, and the USSR has no reason\n(1) Sow disillusionment and disaffection\nto be dissatisfied with the situation and pros-\namong the masses throughout the capitalist\npects.\nworld.\nIn Eastern Europe, with the exception of\n(2) Promote antagonisms among capitalist\nFinland and Yugoslavia, the USSR has estab-\nstates, deprive them of effective means of\nlished a degree of control comparable to that\nmutual support, and, in particular, to dis-\nwhich it exercises over its constituent repub-\ncredit the leadership of the United States in\nlics. It is significant that, although the\ninternational affairs and disrupt the means\nUSSR could have imposed its will on these\nwhereby it exerts its influence.\ncountries in the role of a military conqueror,\n(3) Provide revolutionary organization and\nit deemed it preferable to do so ostensibly\nleadership prepared to act wherever \"revolu-\nthrough the processes of internal revolution.\ntionary situations\" develop.\nIn the case of Finland, where these processes\nThe conclusion to be derived from this con-\ncould not be made to work, the USSR has re-\nsideration of Soviet postwar policy is that the\nfrained from military coercion, although it\naltered power position of the USSR in the\ncould have exercised that power with impu-\npostwar world has not caused the Soviet rulers\nnity (but not without discrediting its revolu-\nto deviate from the course prescribed by Rus-\ntionary pretensions before the world).\nsian tradition and Communist doctrine.\nThe defection of Yugoslavia is a matter of\nTheir objective is still a Communist world\ngravest concern to the USSR, not merely be-\norder under their own domination. Their\ncause of the loss of Yugoslavia itself or even\npreferred method of attaining it is still in-\nbecause of the bad example set in Eastern\nternal revolution as \"revolutionary situations\"\nEurope, but because ultimately it threatens\ndevelop.\nSoviet control of the revolutionary potential\n7. Conclusions.\nof Communism everywhere outside of the area\nof Soviet territorial domination. It is conse-\nThe Communist foundations of the modern\nquently a matter of primary importance that\nSoviet state, the revolutionary character and\nTito be overthrown and a Stalinist orientation\nbackground of its leaders (military men are\nrestored in Yugoslavia. Yet, even in so urgent\ndefinitely subordinated) and the peculiar fea-\na matter as this, the USSR is proceeding on a\ntures of its diplomacy and propaganda sug-\nbasis of conspiracy and apparently internal\ngest strongly that the preferred objective of\nrevolution rather than by direct military\nSoviet policy is to achieve through the instru-\nment of international Communism, supported\naggression.\nby Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, a Com-\nOver and above the Soviet policy with re-\nmunist world under Soviet leadership, rather\nspect to particular situations, the general So-\nthan to conquer the world by military force.\nviet policy in the postwar world appears to be\nIn terms of basic Marxist concepts of histori-\nto apply, in international relations, the proved\ncal evolution, developed by Lenin and Stalin\ntechniques of internal revolution and the\ninto an operating and tactical procedure as\n\"class struggle.\" Thus the USSR has injected\nwell, the USSR is using international Com-\ninto its diplomatic relationships with the\nmunism, supported by the threat of Soviet\nWestern Powers the language, tactics, and\npower, to speed up the inevitable historical\ndevelopment by which the capitalist world,\npropaganda of the revolutionist. But this\naccording to doctrine, will collapse as a result\nconduct, so foreign to traditional diplomatic\nof its inherent contradictions.\npractice, does not in itself imply an intent of\nActual Soviet policy, however, in working\nthe Soviet state to launch a military attack\ntoward this objective, will obviously reflect a\nupon the governments which it is trying to\nsynthesis of Marxist and traditional power\nsubvert. By analogy to a \"revolutionary sit-\nconsiderations. Soviet leaders recognize that\nuation\" in one country, the global effort of\nthey are pursuing their objectives of a world\nthe USSR is to:\nCommunist revolution within the context of a\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n21\ntraditional power rivalry in a world in which\nThus, the military strength of the Soviet\npower has not become polarized. They expect\nUnion appears to be presently committed basi-\nthe capitalist states to be fully prepared to use\ncally for the defense of the revolutionary base\nmilitary force either to support their \"imperi-\nin the USSR and for the support of the world\nalistic aims\" or in a final attempt to stave off\nrevolution only insofar as such support does\ncollapse. Military power and strategic con-\nnot involve the USSR in a war that would en-\nsiderations are, therefore, essential concomi-\ndanger its security or conflict with its revolu-\ntants of their revolutionary approach. They\ntionary pretensions. Only if the USSR should\nrecognize fully both the value of a strong\ngain military superiority (i.e., in over-all mili-\nmilitary force in being as an adjunct to their\ntary potential) over the US and its allies, and\nrevolutionary operations and the necessity of\nat the same time should lose confidence in the\nbeing prepared to defend the USSR and its\nMarxist concept of the inevitable disintegra-\nrevolutionary gains against capitalist attack.\ntion of the capitalist world and hence in its\nIn pursuing their revolutionary objectives,\nability ultimately to attain its objectives by\ntherefore, they keep clearly in mind at the\nrevolutionary methods, are Soviet leaders\nsame time the strategic position of the USSR\nlikely deliberately to resort to direct military\nin relation to a possible armed conflict, and\naction against the US and its allies. This lat-\nview changes in the strategic position of their\nter conclusion should be qualified in the light\nadversaries, particularly the US, in similar\nof the possibilities inherent in atomic warfare,\nterms.\nas discussed elsewhere in the paper.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nENCLOSURE c\nEFFECTS OF THE POSSESSION OF THE\nATOMIC BOMB UPON THE USSR AND SOVIET POLICY\n1. Effect upon the Attitudes of Soviet Leaders\nities would, therefore, be relatively increased;\nand Population.\nand at the same time the USSR could launch\na. Possession of the atomic bomb has prob-\na war in Europe or Asia without danger of an\nably reduced somewhat the so-called \"fear\"\natomic attack upon its industrial resources.\nand \"inferiority\" complex of Soviet leaders.\n(2) The elimination of the bomb would de-\nThey have now eliminated, or are in a posi-\nprive the US of its sole means of a possibly\ntion to eliminate, a major element of weakness\ndecisive attack upon the Soviet Union. It\nin their international power position. At the\nwould correspondingly reduce the confidence\nsame time they may have some apprehension\nof Western Europe in the value of US support.\nthat the US will launch a preventive war be-\nb. However, even if the USSR appraises the\nfore they can build up an adequate stockpile\nsituation in these terms, it seems highly im-\nof atomic bombs. There is no reasonable\nprobable that it will be willing to accept in-\nbasis for estimating at this time, however,\nternational ownership and control of atomic\nwhether the possession of the bomb will tend\nenergy production or an unrestricted system\nto make Soviet leaders more reasonable or\nof international inspection as long as its con-\nmore intransigent. It seems probable that,\ncepts of security and sovereignty remain as\nas the USSR acquires a stockpile of bombs, it\nthey are today. It might be willing, however,\nmay be willing to assume greater risks in its\nto reach an agreement which did not provide\ndiplomatic disputes with the Western Powers.\nfor international ownership and control but\nAlthough the Soviet Union has played down\nwhich included the limited inspection pro-\nthe importance of the atomic bomb in its\ngram outlined in present Soviet atomic pro-\ndomestic propaganda, the announcement that\nposals.\nthe USSR now has the bomb should have a\nc. The Soviet Union, however, may well re-\nreassuring effect upon the apprehensions of\nnew pressure for an international agreement\nthe Soviet population concerning a new war.\nto outlaw the use of the atomic bomb.\n(1) Regardless of how it appraises the ef-\n2. Effect upon the Soviet Approach to the Con-\nfect of the possible use of the bomb upon its\ntrol of Atomic Energy.\npower position, it might regard an agreement\na. Does the USSR genuinely desire to elim-\nto outlaw the bomb as advantageous. The\ninate the atomic bomb as a weapon of war?\nSoviet Union would remain free to build up\nWhile no positive answer can be given to this\nits stockpile at any rate considered desirable\nquestion, and many arguments can be ad-\nand would obtain protection against a US\nvanced pro and con, it would at least appear\natomic attack in the meantime. If it cor-\nthat, on balance, the destruction of existing\nrectly estimates US public opinion, it will\nstockpiles of bombs and the prohibition of\nprobably consider that the US will live up to\nfurther production would be militarily ad-\nthe agreement in the event war breaks out\nvantageous to the USSR, except with respect\nand that the US will, therefore, lose the in-\nto the possibility of a direct attack upon the\nitiative. The USSR, on the other hand, could,\ncontinental US.\nin the event of war, either abide by the agree-\n(1) The elimination of the bomb would\nment and capitalize upon its predominant\nleave Soviet ground strength supreme on the\nground strength in confidence that the US\nEurasian continent. Soviet military capabil-\nwould not use the atomic bomb, or, if it de-\nTOP SECRET\n23\n24\nTOP SECRET\nsired, could violate the agreement and launch\nThe USSR can use its possession of the bomb\na surprise attack, thereby gaining the initia-\nto develop a number of threatening propa-\ntive. In the last analysis, however, compli-\nganda lines within the context of its peace\nance with the requirements of an agreement\noffensive. \"Peace Congresses\" and Commu-\nof this kind, as in the case of poison gas in the\nnist-front organizations such as the World\nlast war, would probably depend upon an ap-\nFederation of Trade Unions, the World Feder-\npraisal of the value of the attack as compared\nation of Democratic Youth, and the various\nwith the losses from retaliation.\nSoviet friendship societies as well as direct\n(2) The Soviet Union, purely for propa-\nSoviet propaganda can now play on the fol-\nganda purposes, might also make the pro-\nlowing promising themes in an effort to de-\nposal to outlaw the use of the bomb in antici-\ntach non-Communist countries from their al-\npation that the Western Powers would turn\nliance to the US, to bring pressure on the\nit down. A Soviet estimate of such a reaction\nWestern powers to accept Soviet proposals for\nmight be based upon two factors: (1) the con-\nthe control of atomic energy, or to neutralize\nsistent refusal of the Western Powers in the\nthe US bomb by creating mass pressures\nUN to agree to any Soviet proposals on control\nagainst its use in the event of war:\nof atomic energy; and (2) a possible convic-\n(1) The USSR is now capable of retaliating\ntion that the US was basing its military strat-\nin kind against Western atomic aggressors.\negy so firmly upon the use of the atomic bomb\nTherefore, those who lend themselves to the\nas to be unwilling to outlaw it. A refusal of\naggressive plans of the US are dragging their\nthe Western Powers to agree to a Soviet pro-\npeople to atomic destruction.\nposal to outlaw the bomb would give the So-\n(2) The horrors of atomic war require that\nviet Union a telling point in its \"peace\" cam-\nall peoples support the Soviet proposals to\npaign and would tend to confirm the USSR in\nabolish the atomic bomb and destroy all exist-\nthe belief that the US actually planned offen-\ning stockpiles.\nsive atomic warfare.\n(3) Soviet possession of the atomic bomb\n3. Probable Effect upon Soviet Policy under a\nhas greatly strengthened the peace front in\nCondition of \"Cold War.\"\nrelation to the Western aggressors.\na. The announcement that the USSR pos-\n(4) US support of Western Europe has now\nsessed the atomic bomb has not yet produced\nlost its value. Soviet possession of the atomic\nany apparent change in Soviet policy or tac-\nbomb and the proximity of Western European\ntics. The USSR has merely integrated the\ncountries to the USSR suggest the advisability\nfact of its possession of the bomb into its gen-\nof more friendly relations with the USSR.\neral propaganda and its \"peace offensive.\"\n(5) US plans to use the UK (and other\nSoviet propaganda has emphasized that So-\nBritish territories) as bases for atomic war-\nviet possession of the bomb is an important\nfare will \"force\" the USSR to consider the\nfactor in the preservation of peace. It ends\nBritish Isles a primary target in the event the\nthe period of US \"atomic diplomacy\" and\nWestern aggressors start a war. This would\nspoils the plans of the Western aggressors to\nmean that the UK would be quickly wiped\nlaunch an atomic war. The point is also\nout.\nstressed that the USSR will concentrate on\nthe development of atomic energy for peace-\n(6) The US no longer has an A-bomb\nful purposes.\nmonopoly. Therefore, its war-mongering\nleaders must change their foreign policy\nb. It is estimated that the USSR will not\nwhich has been based on this monopoly.\nsignificantly alter its policy or tactics, as a\nresult of its acquisition of the atomic bomb,\nc. When the USSR acquires what it con-\nbefore the end of 1950 at the earliest. How-\nsiders an operational stockpile of bombs, its\never, assuming that there is no agreement\ncapabilities for employing threats and intimi-\neither to outlaw or eliminate the bomb, Soviet\ndation through diplomatic channels in an ef-\ncapabilities for the cold war will be enhanced.\nfort to detach individual states from the West-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n25\nern bloc will be considerably increased. With\nUSSR could not expect that the threat of\nthe exception of the UK, the US, and possibly\ndirect atomic attack would carry particular\nJapan, however, this increased capability will\nweight against those states which estimated\nnot result from apprehension on the part of\nthat a Soviet attack would bring the US into\nthese states that they will be directly attacked\na war and that under those circumstances\nby atomic bombs, but rather from the in-\ntheir territories would not be of sufficient stra-\ncreased Soviet military capabilities vis-à-vis\ntegic importance to justify the use against\nthe US and from general apprehension con-\nthem of the limited Soviet supply of atomic\ncerning the effects of an atomic war. The\nbombs.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nENCLOSURE D\nEFFECTS OUTSIDE THE USSR OF SOVIET ATOMIC CAPABILITIES\n1. General.\nd. In the UK there will be no significant\nExcept with respect to the US, the UK, and\npressure during this period for a reorientation\npossibly Japan, the significance of the atomic\nof British foreign policy and no weakening of\nbomb as a factor in determining the align-\nsupport for continued reliance on a close US-\nment of nations in the East-West struggle and\nUK strategic and economic relationship.\nthe will to resist Soviet aggression lies pri-\nHowever, reflective British opinion is showing\nmarily in its potential enhancement of Soviet\nincreasing concern with the implications of\nthe Soviet possession of the bomb, and the\nmilitary power vis-à-vis the US rather than\nUK's greater vulnerability will become a more\nin serious apprehension on the part of these\nimportant consideration in British military\nnations that it will be used against them.\nThe USSR would not use the bomb, it is be-\nand civilian thinking. This may lead to a\nlieved, in any localized war, and in the event\nmore persistent demand than elsewhere for a\nof war with the US, it would reserve the bomb\n\"compromise solution\" on atomic control ac-\nceptable to the USSR and to a reluctance to\nfor the main strategic targets in the UK, the\nUS, and possibly Japan.\naccept any US proposal which the UK may\nthink could provoke the USSR into using\narmed force against the Western Powers.\n2. Effects through 1950.\ne. In the other areas of the world only the\na. The reaction of the outside world to So-\nJapanese feel themselves directly threatened\nviet possession of the atomic bomb has been\nby the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb.\ngenerally calm. It appears unlikely that this\nThey have a peculiarly strong desire for the\nnew Soviet military capability will of itself\nachievement of some effective international\nbring about changes in the international\ncontrol of atomic weapons. If a peace treaty\npolicies or attitudes of any principal nation\nis negotiated during this period, the absence\nat least through 1950.\nof an international atomic agreement will\nb. The current US programs to counter So-\nprobably make the Japanese more insistent in\nviet aggression will continue to receive local\ntheir demands for permission to rearm and\nsupport.\nfor firm assurances of US military and eco-\nc. The loss of the US atomic monopoly-\nnomic support. Similarly, if the Japanese\nwhich had been regarded as in itself a deter-\nfail to obtain these assurances, or lack confi-\nrent to any Soviet military move-will accele-\ndence in their effectiveness, the resultant\nrate the efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty\ntendency toward neutrality or alignment with\ncountries to build up the Western European\nCommunist Asia and the USSR would be in-\ndefense system. Increasing realization of the\ncreased. Elsewhere, the atomic bomb will be\nimportance of building up the conventional\neffective primarily as a factor of over-all So-\nmilitary strength of Western Europe will prob-\nviet power and as an element in increasing\nably lead to demands for larger amounts of\nsomewhat the effectiveness of Soviet propa-\nUS equipment and for further US commit-\nganda.\nments for the active defense of Western Eu-\nrope. It may also lead, either within this pe-\nf. There will be increasing pressure for es-\nriod or subsequently, to an agreement for at\ntablishment of effective atomic control from\nleast limited restoration of German military\nboth within and without the UN, but, except\npower and the inclusion of Western Germany,\nfor the outside operations of Communist-front\nalong with Spain, in the NAT.\norganizations and some intellectuals, the\nTOP SECRET\n27\n28\nTOP SECRET\nUSSR will be under greater pressure to modify\nviet states, including the UK and Japan, will\nits position than will the US.\nremain firm in their alignments with the US\ng. The non-Communist majority through-\nif the Soviet Union should threaten atomic\nout the satellite states of Eastern Europe will\nwarfare when it has attained an operational\nbe discouraged, because they will probably as-\nstockpile of bombs, or if a deterioration in re-\nsume that the loss of the US atomic monopoly\nlations between the USSR and the Western\nand the corresponding increase in the Soviet\nPowers suggested that an atomic war was im-\nmilitary potential reduce the chances of a\nminent. In the latter circumstances, the UK\nWestern attack upon the USSR in which they\nwould be strongly influenced by its appraisal\nhave placed their primary hope of liberation.\nof the issues at stake; it would not be inclined\nh. Moscow's control over its satellites will\nto follow the US unless it considered these is-\nbe somewhat strengthened, but it will secure\nsues vital to its security. In the final analysis,\nno real advantage in its campaign to regain\nhowever, the future public appraisal of the\ndomination over Yugoslavia. World Commu-\nsignificance of the atomic bomb will probably\nnists will be encouraged and will be more stri-\nbe the determining factor in the will to re-\ndent in their propaganda. They will not,\nsist. It is impossible at this time to predict\nhowever, obtain an appreciable increase in\nwith any assurance what this appraisal will\ntheir popular support.\nbe. In general, three alternative trends ap-\n(i) In areas where there is already a lean-\npear possible of development in the interim:\ning toward neutrality, there will be an in-\na. Increasing fear of the effects of an atomic\ncrease in this tendency.\nstruggle may have produced in all countries,\nbut particularly in the UK, US, and Japan, an\n3. Period 1950-56-as the USSR Approaches\nirresistible, organized popular demand for re-\nan Operational Stockpile.\nnewed efforts to bring about an agreement be-\ntween the US and the USSR for at least the\nThe longer-range effects of the addition of\nprohibition of the use of atomic weapons. If\nthe atomic bomb to Soviet military capabili-\nunder these circumstances this objective were\nties will depend in large measure upon the\nnot attained, it must be considered possible\nextent and soundness of European economic\nthat the UK and Japan, because of their ex-\nand military recovery and upon the policy and\ntreme vulnerability, could be detached from\nstrength of the US.\nthe US camp and that the US public might\nIf present efforts to restore the economic\nforce an accommodation with the USSR.\nand military strength of Western Europe fall\nshort of their goals, there will develop a\nb. The concept may become generally ac-\nstrong, though not necessarily decisive, move-\ncepted that the threat of mutual retaliation\nment for accommodation or neutrality. If at\nwill preclude the use of the bomb by either\nthe same time, there are indications of a seri-\nside. Under these circumstances the effects\nous weakening in US strength or in its com-\nof Soviet atomic capabilities would be neg-\nmitments to resist Soviet aggression, the\nligible.\nmovement for accommodation or neutrality\nc. The present public attitude of indiffer-\nwould probably become decisive.\nence or relative unconcern may continue; or\nAssuming that US support of its NAT allies\na strong determination to resist regardless of\nand Japan remains firm and that the eco-\nconsequences may develop. Under either of\nnomic and military recovery of Europe is ac-\nthese circumstances, the countries concerned\ncomplished on a firm and stable basis, there\nwould probably stand firm in their alignment\nwill be a strong probability that the non-So-\nwith the US.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX A\nDISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE\nThe Intelligence Organization of the De-\nanswering the question: Is there evidence on\npartment of State dissents from the subject\nthe basis of which it can be assumed that\npaper.\nSoviet leaders will not resort to military ac-\nThe subject paper indicates that, except\ntion against the US now that they possess an\nunder extreme-and apparently unlikely-\natomic weapon?\ncircumstances, the USSR will not deliber-\nThe subject paper recognizes many aspects\nately employ military force in its struggle\nof the crucially important potential of the\nagainst the US.\nA-bomb in expanding Soviet capabilities, but\nWe do not possess evidence which suggests\nit fails to bring into focus the problem of\nthat the USSR is now planning to launch\nwhether or not this development will have a\na military attack on the US. Neither do we\ndecisive effect on Soviet policy and intentions.\npossess evidence, or have reason to believe,\nWhile it recognizes numerous conditioning\nthat at any given date the USSR will with\nfactors, it takes the position that the USSR\ncertainty decide to launch a military assault\nis still unlikely to employ military force in its\non the US.\nstruggle with the West. This position is\nWe do not consider, however, that lack of\nbased upon arguments to the effect that a)\nevidence of a Soviet intention to use military\nCommunist ideology rigidly prescribes re-\nforce on the US can be taken as evidence of\nliance upon the international Communist ap-\nthe absence of such a Soviet intention.\nparatus rather than upon employment of So-\nThe subject paper states that \"the burden\nviet armed forces for the attainment of a\nof proof\" of a Soviet intention to resort to\nCommunist world dominated by the USSR,\nworld military conquest \"lies on those who\nand b) Russian imperial history reveals that\nwould assert\" that this is the Soviet intention.\nRussian expansionism has traditionally been\nWe believe that this statement reflects a\ncautious and has not been pursued at the risk\nfundamental misunderstanding of the prob-\nof a military clash with a \"major\" power.\nlem which faces us at the present time. It is\nConsidering the import to US defense and\naccepted by all intelligence agencies of the\nforeign policy of an assurance that the USSR\ngovernment that the Soviet Union's basic ob-\nis not likely to resort to military action, we\njective is to establish a Communist world\nconsider these arguments undependable.\nunder Soviet domination. It is also accepted\nThe first argument is in direct contradiction\nthat Soviet leaders will employ any methods\nto earlier assertion in the CIA paper that the\nand tactics which in their mind offer promise\nUSSR in pursuit of its objective \"will wage\nof success.\na relentless, unceasing struggle [against the\nPrior to the Soviet development of an\nUS] in which any weapon or tactic is admis-\natomic weapon it was generally agreed that\nsible which promises success in terms of over-\nan early Soviet military attack on the West\nall Soviet objectives\" and that nothing in the\nwas unlikely, if not precluded, because of the\npaper \"should be interpreted to imply that\npreponderance of strength which its economic\nSoviet leaders would not resort to military\npotential and its atomic monopoly gave the\naction at any time they considered it ad-\nWest. With Soviet possession of an atomic\nvantageous to do so.\" Furthermore, this\nweapon this particular assumption obviously\nemphasis upon revolutionary policy not only\nis subject to reconsideration.\nrests upon a doubtful interpretation of the\nIn the interest of the national security,\nextremely complex question of the role of the\ntherefore, we are faced with the necessity of\nUSSR as the \"first socialist state\" in effecting\nToΓ SECRET\n29\n30\nTOP SECRET\nworld revolution, but also assumes a rigidity\nconclusions as to Soviet intentions regarding\nin tactics-in the means to be employed in\nthe deliberate use of military force in the So-\nreaching a fixed objective-comparable to the\nviet struggle against the non-Communist\nfirmness with which that objective itself is\nworld.\nheld, an assumption which is demonstrably\n1. There is at present no evidence which in-\nfalse.\ndicates a Soviet determination at any given\nThe second argument, that a resort to mili-\ntime to employ military force against the non-\ntary action by the USSR is precluded by the\nCommunist world.\nfact that Russia since time immemorial has\nbeen cautious in its foreign policy, is based\n2. The Soviet Union is, however, engaged\nupon a misreading of the actual historical\nin what is considers to be a life-and-death\nfacts. Russian history is characterized by\nstruggle with the non-Communist world. In\nneither recklessness nor caution in foreign\nthis struggle Soviet leaders can be expected\naffairs, but a mixture of recklessness and\nto employ any weapon or tactic which prom-\ncaution, depending upon the circumstances\nises success.\nexisting at a given time and on the make-\n3. The only sound test by which to judge\nup of the rulers in power. Russian rulers\nSoviet intentions to resort to military action\ncan no more be generally dubbed \"cau-\nis, therefore, the pragmatic test of whether or\ntious\" than can the rulers of Prussia.\nnot such action would, at a given moment, ap-\nMoreover, it is questionable that the pattern\npear advantageous to the Soviet Union.\nof Russian history under the Tsars is in itself\na safe guide by which to predict the actions\n4. Prior to Soviet development of an atomic\nof Soviet leaders.\nweapon, all evidence indicated that the pre-\nThe danger of accepting these arguments\nponderance of strength enjoyed by the US in\nas a basis for assuming the line of action\nconsequence of its over-all economic superior-\nwhich Soviet leaders will follow is illustrated\nity and its atomic monopoly made unlikely a\nby the subject paper itself. At a time when\nSoviet estimate that it would be to the ad-\nall evidence indicates increasingly militant\nvantage of the USSR to resort to military\nactivity on the part of the USSR in virtually\naction.\nall areas of the world, the paper asserts that\n\"[the existing] situation is one in which both\n5. Soviet development of an atomic weapon\nRussian tradition and Communist doctrine\nmay have decisively changed this situation,\ncounsel patience and restraint, and it appears\nparticularly if surprise employment of the\nthat the USSR is prepared to accept the status\nweapon could sharply reduce retaliatory ac-\nquo for the time being. The USSR can af-\ntion or make it impossible.\nford to be patient, being firmly convinced that\nThe subject report does not effectively deal\ntime is on its side, that the conflicting inter-\nwith this possibility of a change. We feel\nests of the capitalist powers will prevent any\ntruly dangerous development, and that the\nthat the report confuses the issues on Soviet\neventual economic collapse of the capitalist\nmotives and leaves unclear the new balance\nworld will present new revolutionary oppor-\nof factors which will probably determine the\ntunities.\"\nSoviet estimate of the advantage the USSR\nThe Intelligence Organization of the De-\ncould gain through a deliberate employment\npartment of State has reached the following\nof military forces.\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX B\nDISSENT BY THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,\nG-2, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY\n1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dis-\nnitely intends to resort to military aggression\nsents with the subject paper. It is recom-\ninvolving the United States. This portion of\nmended that this paper be withdrawn and\nthe paper is unrealistic and not germane to\nJIC 502 be substituted therefor as a basis for\nthe problem.\nresolving differences in attitude and opinion.\nThe conclusions as they apply to the prob-\nThe differences of opinion are considered to\nabilities of war are developed apart from any\nbe so divergent that it is impractical to con-\nconsideration of the atomic bomb (p. 3, III,\nsider resolving them on the basis of the pres-\n2, last sentence) in spite of the fact that the\nent paper.\nstatement of the problem (p. 3, I) requires\n2. This dissent is based on the following:\nsuch consideration.\na. The threat of Soviet aggression is mini-\nb. The second major difference of opinion\nmized to the point where dissemination of the\nis the manner in which the subject matter\npaper and its use for planning purposes could\ncontained in the enclosure is presented. Re-\nseriously affect the security of the United\nfinements of logic and multiplicity of alterna-\nStates. A major portion of the paper is de-\ntives make the paper extremely difficult to\nvoted to developing the thesis that it is un-\nunderstand. As a study, it fails to reach\njustifiable to assume that the U.S.S.R. defi-\nclear-cut conclusions.\nTOP SECRET\n31\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX c\nDISSENT BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE\n1. The Office of Naval Intelligence dissents\nSoviet leaders abandoned their Marxist view\nfrom ORE 91-49.\nof the eventual collapse of capitalism and\nimperialism. There is at present no indica-\n2. The discussion (enclosures A through D)\ntion that the Soviets are losing confidence in\nis generally in accordance with ONI's views,\ntheir Marxist philosophy and, furthermore,\nbut it is not considered that the Summary and\nthere is no basis on which to predict what\nConclusions are properly drawn from the en-\ntheir policies might be should they abandon\nclosures. The following comments are there-\nthat philosophy.\nfore directed primarily toward the Summary\nand Conclusions:\n(c) The hypothesis that a major war may\n(a) There is no integrated analysis of what\nresult from miscalculation is considered, in\nthe effects of Soviet possession of atomic\nthe light of recent events, to be unrealistic.\nweapons will be. Instead, there is an exami-\nIf either the U.S. or the USSR should let an\nnation based on several mutually exclusive\nincident or diplomatic impasse develop into\nhypotheses. From these hypotheses one may\na war, it is considered that such a war, as\nchoose estimates which range from no change\nwell as the incident or the impasse, would re-\nin Soviet policy to basic and alarming changes\nsult from a plan, not from a blunder.\nin that policy.\n(d) In many instances ORE 91-49 exceeds\n(b) It is noted that one argument in ORE\nthe bounds of intelligence and draws infer-\n91-49 rests on extremely hypothetical specu-\nences and conclusions of an operational and\nlations as to \"what might happen\" if the\nplanning nature.\nTOP SECRET\n33\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX D\nDISSENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE\n1. The following comment concentrates on\nare at war right now, and that an all-out na-\nthe one point which the D/I, USAF, considers\ntional effort designed to maintain permanent\nof such overriding importance as to make the\nmilitary and political superiority over the So-\nCIA estimate, ORE 91-49, dangerous as an in-\nviet Union, is required.\ntelligence basis for national policy.\n5. The paper begs the issue under discus-\n2. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, be-\nsion when it states that there appears \"to be\nlieves the primary reason why the Kremlin\nno firm basis for an assumption that the USSR\nhas not resorted to military action against the\npresently intends deliberately to use military\nUnited States to date is the fact that the\nforce\nif this involves war with a potenti-\nKremlin has believed, and still continues to\nally stronger U.S.\" Actually, there is a very\nbelieve, it is operating from an inferior power\nfirm basis for the assumption that they would\nposition. ORE 91-49, therefore, failed to\ndo no such thing, simply because an aggres-\npoint out the full and true character of the\nsor has never resorted to war if he were sure\nSoviet threat. Unless the full and true char-\nthat he would lose. The problem at issue is\nacter of this threat is pointed out, Soviet total\n(a) whether the acquisition of an atomic\nrelative power may be permitted to grow to\ncapability has provided the Soviet Union for\nthe point where the U.S. can no longer cope\nthe first time in history with a clear-cut capa-\nwith it successfully.\nbility that would enable them to win the war\n3. Subject paper states that (a) the USSR\nagainst the U.S.; and (b) whether, under con-\nregards the U.S. as its main opponent; (b) it\nditions of atomic warfare, the lack of instantly\nwill wage against the U.S. a relentless, un-\navailable American military power vitiates\nceasing struggle in which any weapon or tac-\nthe importance of the great American war\ntic is admissible; and (c) that nothing in the\npotential. Another no less important prob-\npaper should be construed as implying that\nlem would be to determine how the Soviets\n\"the Soviet leaders would not resort to mili-\nwill integrate the atomic bomb into their tra-\ntary action at any time they considered it\nditional strategy and tactics. To this prob-\nadvantageous to do so.\" While these state-\nlem ORE 91-49 does not address itself.\nments, in the opinion of the D/I are correct\nas far as they go, the rest of the subject paper\n6. The D/I, USAF, sets forth the following\nfor the record:\nactually weakens and contradicts this original\nposition.\na. Communist thinking, from Marx to\n4. The paper completely misses the inter-\nStalin, clearly recognizes the inter-relation-\nrelationship between war and revolution. It\nship between war and revolution, and, specifi-\ndoes not realize, as the Soviets do, that a great\ncally, the fact that no major revolution is\npower such as the U.S. cannot be overthrown\nfeasible without war.\nby revolution alone but that revolution can\nb. The Soviets are clearly on record that (1)\nbe the result only of a preceding war. It\nthey consider the Soviet Union as an opera-\ntherefore overlooks the fact that Soviet policy\ntional base and (2) they consider the Red\naims above all at preparing for the show-down\nArmy as the main weapon of the proletariat.\nwar against the United States. Therefore the\nThe Soviets know that they have never ex-\nfirst line of U.S. defense is not, as the paper\npanded beyond their frontiers without the\nsuggests, the \"restoration of international\nuse of military means, i.e., all the territories\nstability and the maintenance of a sound in-\ntaken by them were taken by the Red Army\nternal structure\" but is to recognize that we\nor a satellite force (Tito, Mao).\nTOP SECRET\n35\n36\nTOP SECRET\nc. In \"Problems of Leninism\", Stalin stated\nby Soviet authorities to the effect that World\nclearly that capitalism can be overthrown\nWar I produced Communism in Russia; that\nonly by violence, and ultimately only by war.\nWorld War II produced Communism in East-\nActually the theory that capitalism will fall\nern Europe and China; and that World War\nof its own weight has never been Stalin's idea,\nIII will see the victory of Communism\nand there is much evidence that he has op-\nthroughout the world.\nposed this concept as ideological \"deviation-\nf. There is ample reason to believe that the\nism\".\nKremlin regards its growing atomic capability\nd. The Soviets made a major contribution\nto be the major force which will eventually\nto the outbreak of World War II. They did\nplace them in position to liquidate the center\nnothing to prevent that war, and everything\nof hard-core opposition-the United States—\nto make it a reality.\nutilizing all means at their disposal, including\ne. There are numerous recent statements\nmilitary action.\nTOP SECRET\n023902\nAPR 6 3.51 PM:50\nTOP SECRET\nGPO-State Serv.-50-4935"
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