Report, Recent Soviet Moves

2 DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 FEB 8 1950 State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979 RECENT SOVIET MOVES CIA LTR.2-26.,22 By NLT- HC NARS, Date 3-31-82 CONCLUSIONS I. In seeking to interpret Soviet tactis, it is always useful to remind ourselves that during the course of the war, the Kremlin concluded that the US would emerge as the citadel of the non-Soviet world and there- fore the primary enemy against which the USSR would of necessity have to wage a life-and death struggle. Stalin's election speech of 1946 was an open declaration of hostility and since that time the USSR has given every sign that it neither intends to abandon the struggle, other than on its own terms, nor pause in its prosecution. In the choice of tactics, the USSR has shown a willingness to employ at any given moment any maneuver or weapon which holds promise of success. For this reason there appears no reason to assume that the USSR will in the future necessarily make a sharp distinction between "military aggression" and measures short of military aggression. In its decisions, it is guided only by considerations of expediency. As the USSR has already committed itself to the defeat of the US, Soviet policy is guided by the simple consideration of weakening the world power position of the US. This approach, on the one hand, holds out for the USSR the possibility that it can achieve success over the US with- out ever resorting to an all-out military assault. On the other hand, it leaves open the possibility of a quick Soviet decision to resort to military action, locally or generally. II. In the aggregate, recent Soviet moves reflect not only a mounting militancy but suggest a boldness that is essentially new - and borders on recklessness, particularly since in the present international situation great stakes are involved in any USSR move, and any move directly or indirectly affects the US and risks US counter action. Nothing about the noves indicates that Moscow is `preparing to launch in the near future an all-out military attack on the West. They dos however, suggest a greater willingness than in the past to "undertake a course of action, including a possible use of force in local areas, which might lead to an accidental outbreak of general military conflict. Thus the chance of war through miscalculation is increased. III. The several recent Moscow moves should be interpreted as arising both from Soviet eagerness to ex loit the opportunities presented by the expansion of the Soviet empire, particularly in the Far East, and from Soviet anxieties over the problem of imperial control, especially over Communist China. This problem, already pressing, is intensified by the very successes which have been recently achieved. The national deviation of Tiot, we know, was a severe reverse for the Krenlin. Nationalist deviation on the part of Communist China would threaten the structure of the Soviet imperialist system. Similarly, national deviation elsewhere would reverse Soviet gains in Eastern Europe, jeopardize Soviet opportunities in Southeast Asia and Moscow's use of foreign Communist Parties as instruments of Soviet foreign policy.