Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "294549447",
    "label": "Memorandum from Jack Gorrie to President Harry S. Truman, with Attachment",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/294549447"
}

{
    "id": "294549447",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/294549447",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum from Jack Gorrie to President Harry S. Truman, with Attachment",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/294549447",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750367/750367-21-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750367/750367-21-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750367/750367-21-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 21,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/294549447",
    "naId": 294549447,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 21,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750367/750367-21.pdf",
    "mediaId": "bfc7f0674956a0cc",
    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nNLT NLT(PMF-SUB5)394 394\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nNATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD\nWASHINGTON 25, D. C.\nOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN\nHonorable Harry S. Truman\nThe White House\nDear Mr. President:\nThis communication and the enclosed memorandum are written in\naccordance with the statutory responsibility of the Chairman of the\nNational Security Resources Board to advise the President concerning\nthe coordination of military, industrial and civilian mobilization.\nIt reflects my concern with the strong possibility of the Soviets' con-\ntinued development of more and more effective nuclear weapons -- with\nall their implications of mass destruction which may be visited upon\nthe United States as the Soviets realize their capability to deliver such\nnuclear missiles on American cities and industrial centers.\nHave we exhausted all the scientific and technological means at our\ndisposal to defend the United States against nuclear attack?\nI believe a complete, thorough investigation of this problem by the most\ncompetent authorities available with all the resources that can be placed\nat their disposal is warranted.\nUnless we can develop a defense more adequate than that now existing\nor currently projected, a strong possibility exists that the United States\ncould be rendered impotent by a single surprise nuclear attack.\nWe recognize the outstanding efforts being made by the military to develop\nadequate protection against damaging surprise attacks. It may be that a\nnew reinforcing scientific effort can aid in solving this immediate danger.\nI urge your serious consideration of the recommendation contained in the\nenclosed memorandum.\nRespectfully,\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority NLT 2003-001 #4\nBy so NARA, Date 3/16/10\nJach Lame Gorrie\nChairman\nEnclosure\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nNLT(PSF-SUBJ/395\nTHE PRESENT NECESSITY TO\nREVIEW AND STRENGTHEN U. S. DEFENSES AGAINST\nDECISIVE ATTACK BY THE U.S.S.R.\nTRUMAN NARA\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority. NLT 2003- 001 #4\nBy. so NARA, Date. 3/16/10\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTHE PRESENT NECESSITY TO\nREVIEW AND STRENGTHEN U. S. DEFENSES AGAINST\nDECISIVE ATTACK BY THE U. S. S. R.\nI. Conclusions\nA. A basic assumption used in United States security planning since\nthe adoption of NSC 68, has recognized the possibility of a near-\nterm military attack on the U. S. by the U.S. S. R. Our knowledge\nof trends and developments in the Soviet orbit sin ce the adoption\nof that paper offers no reasonable basis for concluding that the\nSoviets are not preparing for such a military attack on the U. S.\nor that they have subordinated such a deliberate course in favor\nof other courses of action.\nB. The increasing feasibility of an initial decisive blow against the\nU. S., which results from growing strength in nuclear weapons\nand growing capability for their strategic delivery, weighs in\nfavor of Soviet military attack on the U. S. rather than against\nsuch a course of action. In fact the prospect for the success of a\nsurprise decisive blow must influence the Soviets both in selecting\ntheir primary course of action and in setting their timetable.\nC. In light of A and B, coupled with our knowledge of Soviet military\nprograms, a basic re-assessment of the implications of this\nrapidly growing threat for U. S. defensive policies and programs,\nis urgently needed.\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority. NLT 2003-001 #4\nGREAT MARA\nBy. so NARA, Date 3/16/10\nTOP SECRET\nPage / of 16\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nII. Recommendations\nA. That a new and large-scale scientific effort be undertaken to find\nnear-term solutions for the problems of protecting the Nation,\nincluding its war making potential, against the mounting threats\ncreated by weapons of mass destruction. Immediate priority\nshould be given to the formulation of new, imaginative approaches\nin the development of more effective, practicable weapons. This\naspect of the effort should be supported by a panel of eminent\nnon-governmental advisors whose early evaluations and recom-\nmendations could be made available to the President for use in\npreparing his final budget and to his successor for use in apprais-\ning the policies and programs for which he will assume responsi-\nbility.\nB. That current programs for the protection of the Nation, including\nresearch and development programs, be reviewed and greatly\naccelerated on a selective basis without delay, and on a broader\nbasis as the guidance from the foregoing recommendation becomes\navailable.\nIII. Evidence of Growing Soviet Technical Ability\nand Industrial Capacity\nA. General Evidence of Growing Soviet Capability\nWhile Russian scientific accomplishment, both prior to and\nsince 1917, is acknowledged, there has been a tendency to dis-\ncount Soviet ability in the fields of applied science and\nANTAA\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPage 2 of 16\nTOP SECRET\nSEGRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nthe technology of mass production. There has been wide-\nspread questioning of Russia's ability to design and produce\nthe highly technical and complex weapons of modern war.\nIn the past few years the basis for this doubt has been\nsharply weakened. To illustrate, it is sufficient to point to\n(1) the nuclear bomb; (2) the efficient Soviet radar screen;\n(3) the effective jamming of the Voice of America; and (4)\nthe known capability to produce effective jet fighters in\nlarge numbers and to support them in combat. These\naccomplishments are not those of a technically inadequate\ncountry unable to translate scientific discovery into mass\nproduction.\nFurther, the program of centralized education and\ntraining in the Soviet is a rapidly expanding one yielding\nlarge groups of persons whose energies are focused on the\nobjective of making the Soviet position of strength a\ndominant one. The Soviet production of scientists has now\nreached U. S. levels both in total numbers and in numbers\nof highly qualified personnel.\nTOD SECRET\nTUT SEORLY\nSEQURITY INFORMATION\nPage 3 of 16\nTOP SECRET\nTUP SECRET\nTHOURITY INFORMATION\nB. The Pace of Soviet Rearmament\nRecent analyses of published Soviet production figures\nindicate that the year 1951 appears to mark the beginning of\na strong acceleration in the program of Soviet rearmament\nsomewhat similar to 1937 but from a much higher base.\nSignificantly, there is evidence that the output of con-\nventional armaments has not increased in proportion to\nthe total allocations for major military procurements. This\ndisproportionate expansion in unaccounted residue may in-\nclude increased allocations to research, development and\nthe production of military prototypes, but it is so large\nthat the bulk of it could have been devoted either to the pro-\nduction of newly developed weapons, or to some massive\nManhattan-type project, or both. It could include an\nexpanded atomic program or an expanded guided missile\nprogram or the development of some project like an earth\nsatellite. The possibility of deliberate statistical deception\ncannot be discounted, however, in analyzing published\nSoviet production statistics.\nMARA\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nPage 4 of 16\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nIV. Soviet Nuclear Weapons and Air Power\nA. The Balance of Nuclear Striking Power\nThe Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs in July 1952 is estimated\nat about 50, with an average strength of about 60 KT. More important\nthan present Soviet atomic strength is the carefully assessed probability\nthat they will have 300 atomic bombs (a minimum of 150 and a maximum\nof 600) and possibly an unknown quantity of hydrogen bombs by mid-1955.\nThe foregoing estimate for 1955 is based on the continued growth\nof the Soviet atomic program as it has been expanding in the past. It\nshould be noted, however, that the Soviets have the capability of\nfurther accelerating their atomic program, as our own effort recently\nhas been accelerated. A decision by the Kremlin to increase its atomic\neffort could result in a 1955 Soviet stockpile substantially greater than\nthe current estimate of 300. This would provide the Soviets with the\natomic weapons required for a saturation attack on the U. S.\nOur larger current stockpile assures us of a temporary superiority\nin nuclear tactical weapons. How decisive the enemy tacticians esti-\nmate this superiority to be, we have no means of knowing. Nor can\nwe know when the enemy will estimate that he has neutralized our\nnuclear superiority. Yet solely on these estimates by the enemy rests\nthe deterrent power of our stockpile of atomic bombs.\nWhile it is generally agreed that the United States has temporary\nsuperiority in tactical nuclear weapons it is by no means so probable\nMMAA\nTOP SECRET\nPage 5 of 16\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nthat we have a similar temporary advantage in the means for their\nstrategic delivery. There are several reasons for this uncertainty:\n1. The interim East River report concludes that the Soviet may\nhave the capability of delivering 500 bombs on target in the\nU. S. by subsonic means within five years. A saturation attack\nat the earliest date permitted by growing Soviet subsonic\ncapabilities, may well be more attractive to the Kremlin than\nan attack that would be delayed by several years pending the\ndevelopment of a supersonic capability. It is believed that 500\nbombs on target would constitute a saturation attack resulting\nin the death of over 100 million of our population and the elimi-\nnation of so much of our industrial capacity that the survivors\nwould virtually be reduced to rural, village life. If we were to\nmake a tremendous effort to provide adequate defenses in depth,\nwe could prepare to mitigate such a subsonic saturation attack\nwithin two or three years.\n2. At present the United States has not quite 100 operational bombers\nwith the range to fly from the U. S. to all Soviet targets and return\nto the U. S. The U. S. has not quite 1, 000 operational medium-\nrange bombers available for the mission of reaching about three-\nquarters of the more than 200 prime targets assigned to the Air\nForce, from bases in East Anglia, North Africa and elsewhere.\n3. Our capacity to deliver a supersonic retaliatory blow, via long-\nrange rocket, has no scheduled attainment date.\nTOP SECRET\nPage 6 of 16\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nsecurity INFORMATION\n4. Soviet defenses against air attack are thought to be in a\nhigher state of readiness than our own. The Soviet radar\nfence is thought to be more effective along many sectors of\nthe Soviet border than our own, and Soviet fighters are far\nmore numerous. Because of these factors and also because\nSoviet defenses against air attack are now organized in great\ndepth, it is now estimated that on deep aerial penetrations of\nSoviet territory there would be a high rate of attrition, par-\nticularly on daylight raids, and a potentially high rate of\nattrition at night.\nB. The Prospect of Reaching Air Parity With the U.S.S.R.\nThe best available, but admittedly tenuous evidence, suggests\nthat at present the Soviet Air Force outnumbers the U. S. Air\nForce in operational military planes by about three to one; and\nthat current Soviet production of military planes is at least\ntwice that of the U. S.\nWe do not have a scheduled date for reaching air parity with\nthe Soviets. Impediments to our rearmament at a time when\nthere is an apparent acceleration in Soviet rearmament from a\nlevel already high, is likely to endanger seriously not only the\nachievement of our national objectives, but also the national\nsecurity itself.\nHARE TRUMAN NARA NALIBRAH\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPage 7 of 16\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nV. Relative Vulnerabilities of the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.\nA. The U. S. and U.S.S.R. Target Systems Under Nuclear Attack\n1. The Factor of Surprise in the Decisive Blow\nThe U. S. policy which leaves the decision to initiate\ngeneral war in the hands of the enemy, will permit sur-\nvival only if accompanied by a realistic recognition of the\nmilitary disadvantage it entails. The risks involved must\nbe kept at acceptably low levels.\nThe advantage to the Soviets of holding the initiative for\nan attempted surprise decisive blow cuts two ways. First,\nthe U. S. is not likely to have sufficient warning to prepare\nfully its available defenses and to organize adequately for\npassive protection or expeditious recovery. Second, the Soviets,\nhaving the initiative, would organize for defense and for handling\nthe consequences of our counter-blow. (They, of course, would\nhope to minimize the counter-blow as a part of the mission of\nthe initial attack.).\nThe atomic weapon can be decisive. That is, if a given\nnumber of bombs can be delivered to their targets, the capacity\nof the U. S. to recover in time to mobilize effectively may be\ndestroyed. This also has two effects: (1) The advantages of a\nsurprise decisive attack are immeasurably increased, (2) the\nbelief that large stocks of atomic bombs possessed by each side\nwill lead to neutralization is made unrealistic.\nTRUMAN NAMA\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPage 8 of 16\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nThere, of course, is a limit imposed on an aggressor by the\nresources he can commit to build a force sufficient to absorb heavy\nprobable losses while still effectively delivering a decisive blow.\nAnd in like manner there is a limit imposed on the defender not\nonly by the resources available to him but also by the extent to\nwhich his defensive force, over time, can be kept constantly alert.\nThe nature of the atomic weapon, however, is such that the aggressor\nneeds to commit much less of his resources than are required by\na defender who is endeavoring to deter a surprise attack. Over\ntime, therefore, the finite limits of atomic offense and defense\nfavor the Soviets.\nIn light of these accepted disadvantages in a general war that\nopened with an attempted decisive nuclear blow, U. S. security\ncannot be maintained nor can the Soviets be deterred from the\nfatal action, unless we obviously are prepared with adequate\ndefenses and with adequate retaliatory forces. Furthermore,\nstalemate cannot be an acceptable objective. Hence, our policy\nof attempting to prevent war by making its risks unattractive to\nthe enemy must of necessity be paralleled by equally positive non-\nmilitary policies and programs. These parallel policies and\nprograms must reduce the free world's vulnerability to communist\nnon-military threats and ultimately must free the one-third of the\nworld's peoples now held under the Kremlin's control.\nHARTS TRUMAN NARA\nPage 9 of 16\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SEGRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n2. U. S. Defenses Against an Attempted Decisive Blow\na. It is useful to classify surprise Soviet subsonic air\nattacks into three groups: (a) attacks by one or two\nairplanes per target, flying at high level; (b) attacks by\none or two airplanes per target, flying at low level;\nand (c) attacks by many planes per target flying at any\nlevel.\nAs to group (a), our defenses, comprising principally\nearly warning radars and the ground-to-air missile\nNIKE, are improving rapidly in quality, and within eight-\neen months, more or less, we may be able to provide\n\"adequate\" defenses for about 16 targets such as the City\nof Washington. Since the major U. S. industrial target\nareas number not less than 53, it is apparent that the\nmajority of our industrial areas are vulnerable to attack\nwithin the next two years. (The foregoing gives no con-\nsideration to other critical U. S. targets or to targets to\nbe defended overseas.).\nAs to groups (b) and (c), according to present plans,\n\"adequate\" defenses are not now in prospect. It will be\n1957 before we will have modern interceptors in signifi-\ncant quantities.\nb. None of the defensive devices scheduled to be ready by 1957\nTRUMAN NARA\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPage 10 of 16\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nwould be effective against attack by guided missiles coming\nin at supersonic speeds.\n3. The Contrasts in the Target Systems\nThe industrial target system of the U. S. has structural\ncharacteristics that make it particularly vulnerable to heavy atomic\nattack. Furthermore, practically all the information needed by\nSoviet target analysts in planning an attack has been readily avail-\nable in available and open sources. Even the location of atomic\nenergy and other newer and vital facilities could not have been con-\ncealed from communist agents. It has been estimated that effective\natomic attack on only 19 major U. S. industrial centers would\ndestroy or critically damage one-half of our basic war supporting\ncapability. There would seem to be no question that these facts are\nas well known in Moscow as they are in Washington.\nIn contrast, the Soviet target system is made up of a larger\nnumber of smaller industrial concentrations. Nuclear weapons\nlend themselves to the massive, brief assault required for a decisive,\nsingle blow. The Soviet target system, as compared with that of\nthe U. S., is less vulnerable to attack that relies heavily on mass\neffect; and it requires greater strategic selectivity. Of the two\nefforts for a decisive blow, the one on the U.S.S.R. would have to\nbe more carefully planned (despite our limited information), and\nwould require a greater aerial effort. Offsetting these disad-\nvantages from the U. S. point of view, may be the higher criticality\nof individual Soviet industrial facilities as compared with the\nlarger and stronger structure of American industry. It must be\nMain WASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPage \" of 16\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nnoted, however, that this latter favorable factor is to a large\ndegree neutralized by the concentration of U. S. industry in\nmajor centers and by our regional and geographically scattered\nspecialization of industry.\nSome 53 major target area concentrations include the great\nmajority of our industrial facilities. Moreover, within these areas\nthe concentration of production in many critical industries into a\nfew plants is great.\nThus, we have:\nA material important in production of jet engines and\nrocket motors- 100% produced in one plant. All expansion going\ninto the existing plant.\nA metal important in jet engines, guided missiles, etc.,\n95% of capacity in one plant. New capacity--equal to one-third of\npresent--going into a second plant.\nA chemical important in aviation gasoline- 66% capacity\nin one plant, 34% in another. Expansion going into a third plant.\nA metal used as an essential alloy--capacity scattered\namong four plants, but two-thirds of total is in one plant.\nA -important in electrical equipment--capacity\nlocated in six plants; but 61% in one plant.\nTo compound the risk, our skilled manpower and our technical,\nscientific and managerial personnel are concentrated in the same\nmetropolitan target areas as the critical industries.\nMRA\nTOP SECRET\nPage 12 of 16\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nB. Political and Psychological Vulnerabilities\n1. Survival of the Politburo\nGeneral war certainly would not be initiated by the Soviets\nunless the Kremlin felt reasonably certain that the regime would\nnot be seriously endangered. The Politburo can and would take\nadequate measures to protect both their persons and their machinery\nof government. It would seem fallacious to assume they would be\ndeterred from engaging in a general war by this question, par-\nticularly if they felt it within their capability to strike a decisive\nblow against the United States.\nCommunism flourishes in misery and devastation and a world\nsuffering from the aftermaths of atomic war would be ripe for\ncommunism. In times of such adversity the concept of private\nownership weakens when remaining resources must be pooled by\nthe crippled society to survive. Therefore, communism and the\nSoviet political mechanism have at least an equal chance of survival\nin general atomic war as compared to the United States and democracy.\n2. The Conditioning of the Soviet Peoples\nFor the past several months the Soviet peoples have been sub-\njected to an intensified Hate America campaign. Mr. Kennan's\nrecent cables suggest that the campaign is now reaching levels of\nvindictiveness and ingenious mendacity that have surprised even\nour thoroughly experienced Ambassador. There are several\nNARA )\nPage 13 of 16\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\n174970 101\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nplausible interpretations of this propaganda effort, but\none which cannot be overlooked is that the peoples behind\nthe Iron Curtain are being prepared for a shift in Soviet\npolicy.\n3. The Problem of U. S. Public Understanding and Support\nAt the same time, due to a combination of the desire\nto avoid disruption of our economy during the military\nbuild-up period and to a tendency toward under-estimation\nof the rate of build-up of Soviet power, American public\nopinion has been conditioned to a belief that the present\nrate of build-up of our defense posture is adequate. This\nbelief has been strengthened by public observation of the\nso-called stretch-out program and the long steel strike.\nIf a sharp selective increase in tempo in the build-up of\nour defenses and our military posture is to be secured,\nevery appropriate means must be employed to convey to\nthe public a thorough understanding of the nature of the\nincreased Soviet threat and the urgent necessity for a very\nrapid strengthening of the free world's position.\nTOP SECURITY\nSECRET\nHTY REFORMATION\nPage 14 of 16\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nVI. Summary\nOne of the gravest threats to national security is the existence\nof a nation or a group of nations having the will to undertake war\nand equipped with the means to destroy the resistance of the victims\nof their aggression. The United States and other nations in the free\nworld face that grave threat today from the Soviet and its satellite\ngovernments.\nOur knowledge of trends and developments in the Soviet Orbit\noffers no reasonable basis for concluding that the Soviets are not\npreparing for a military attack on the United States or that they\nhave subordinated such a deliberate course in favor of other courses\nof action. Available evidence denies that the Kremlin has a will\nto cooperate and strive for a peaceful world. When modern means\nfor waging war are considered, the lack of a will to strive for a\npeaceful world becomes doubly important.\nThere exist today, atomic weapons that could be decisive in an\nunbelievably short time. These modern weapons of war have im-\nmeasurably increased the advantages of surprise attack, and have\nmade unrealistic the belief that large stocks of atomic bombs pos-\nsessed by each side will lead to neutralization of their use. The\nprospects for success of an initial decisive blow are so attractive\nthey weigh in favor of surprise action by a nation willing to under-\ntake aggressive war.\nCHECK MM )\nTOP TOT\nSECRET\nPage 15 of 16\nREQURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nToday, there is much evidence of the increasing technical\nability and industrial capacity of the Soviet nations. They are\nsuperior in manpower resources. They have planes and other\nmodern equipment that can deliver atomic attack.\nAn appraisal of the threats facing the free world reveals\nthat its continued existence depends on an adequate defense. It\nalso reveals that no defense may be adequate unless it can cope\nwith an initial surprise attack that can be launched with atomic\nand other modern weapons.\nBetter defensive measures against surprise atomic attack\nseem especially necessary. The gravity of the situation\nrequires that the planning of the military be reinforced by the\nbest thinking from the scientific world.\nMARA\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nPage 16 of 16\nABOUDITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nIn view of the growing possibility that the Soviets are\nacquiring the capability to launch a devastating attack on the\nUnited States, I wish to re-examine our defenses and our capa-\nbility to retaliate effectively. For this purpose, I submit the\nfollowing questions:\n1. Is our capability to limit the damage that could be\ninflicted by a surprise attack growing at a rate ahead\nof the Soviet capability to make a critical or decisive\nattack on the United States\n2. Is our capability to strike back at the Soviets, with\ndevastating effect on their war-making potential, grow-\ning ahead of U.S.S.R. defensive capabilities as now\nestimated?\n3. Are the resources which we have diverted to military\nprograms now being allocated within those programs so\nas to yield an appropriate strengthening of our defensive\nand offensive capabilities, in light of the rapidly developing\nSoviet capabilities?\n4. Should we materially increase our effort to develop means\nof defense against weapons of mass destruction, and do\nwe know of areas that promise high return for sharply\nincreased effort?\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority. NLT 2003-001 #4\nBy so NARA, Date 3/16/10\nTOP SECRET\nPage / of 2 pages\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n5. Similarly, should we materially increase the effort to\nimprove the effectiveness of our retaliatory and offensive\ncapabilities\n6. In which ways, if any, could we curtail present military\nresearch, developmental, and procurement programs of\nlower priority so as to free limited resources to deal\nmore adequately with the problems of possible surprise\nattack and of ensuring our capability to retaliate\neffectively?\n7. Is the over-all rate of military build-up now adequate to\nhold the military risks we face at acceptably low levels\nand, at the same time, to maintain the deterrent influ-\nence which it is our policy to exert on the Soviet orbit?\nTOP SECRET\nPage 2 of 2 pages\nSECURITY INFORMATION"
}