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BECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or as
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1372
NARS Date 2-12-76
had faced 240 Axis Divisions of which 179 were German, whereas this year
they faced 260 of which 210 were German with six more on the way. He
said that the Soviet Union had had 330 Divi one at the start of the summer
campaign and that it was this numerical superiority over the Germans which
permitted the offensive operations to develop so successively. He added,
however, that the numerical superiority was gradually being evened up.
He said one of the great f ficulties encountered by the Soviet amies in ad-
vancing was the question of supply since the Germans destroyed literally
everything in their retreat. He mentioned that although the initiative on
the front as a whole remained in Soviet hands, the of fensive because of
weather conditions had slowed down in these sectors. In fact, in the sector
south and southwest of Kiev the German counter-offensive had recaptured the
town of Zhitamir and would probably recapture Korosten in the rear future.
He said the Germans were using for this counter-attack three old and five
new tank Divisions and twenty to twenty-three motorized infantry Divisions in
an attempt to retake Kiev.
MARSHAL STALIN then turned to the allied operations in Italy. He said
that from their point of view the great value of the Italian campaign was the
freeing of the Mediterranean to allied shipping but that they did not consider
that Italy was a suitable place from which to attempt to attack Germany proper;
that the Alps constituted an almost insuperable barrier as the famous Russian
General Suvorov had discovered in his time. He added that in the opinion of
the Soviet military leaders, Hitler was endeavoring to retain as many allied
Divisions as possible in Italy where no decision could be reached, and that
the best method in the Soviet opinion was getting at the heart of Germany with
an attack-through northern or northwestern France and even through southern
France. He admitted that this would be a very difficult operation since the
Germans would fight like devils to prevent it. Marshal Stalin went on to say
that it would be helpful if Turkey would enter the war and open the way to the
Balkans, but even so the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and while
with Turkish participation operations there would be useful, northern France
was still the best.
THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the United States and Great Britian had
long agreed as to the necessity of the cross-channel operation and that at
the present time this operation, which is known as OVERLORD, was absorbing
most of our combined resources and efforts. He added that it would take a
long statement of facts and figures to explain why, to our disappointment,
it would be impossible to undertake this operation in 1943 but that we were
determined to carry it out in the late spring or early summer of 1944. He
went on to say that the operations in North Africa and Italy had been clearly
recognised by both The President and himself as secondary in character but
that it was the best that could be done in 1943. He said. that the forces
which were now in process of execution for the OVERLORD operation involved
an initial assault of 16 British and 19 U.S. Divisions, a total of 35.
He pointed out that the strength of the individual British and American
Divi sions was considerably stronger than a German Division. He said it was
contemplated to put one million men on the continent of Europe in May, June
and July.
MARSHAL STALIN remarked at this point that he had not meant to convey
the impression that he considered the North Africa or Italian operations as
secondary or belittle their significance since they were of very real value.
-3-
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"ocrText": "BECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or as\nDept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1372\nNARS Date 2-12-76\nhad faced 240 Axis Divisions of which 179 were German, whereas this year\nthey faced 260 of which 210 were German with six more on the way. He\nsaid that the Soviet Union had had 330 Divi one at the start of the summer\ncampaign and that it was this numerical superiority over the Germans which\npermitted the offensive operations to develop so successively. He added,\nhowever, that the numerical superiority was gradually being evened up.\nHe said one of the great f ficulties encountered by the Soviet amies in ad-\nvancing was the question of supply since the Germans destroyed literally\neverything in their retreat. He mentioned that although the initiative on\nthe front as a whole remained in Soviet hands, the of fensive because of\nweather conditions had slowed down in these sectors. In fact, in the sector\nsouth and southwest of Kiev the German counter-offensive had recaptured the\ntown of Zhitamir and would probably recapture Korosten in the rear future.\nHe said the Germans were using for this counter-attack three old and five\nnew tank Divisions and twenty to twenty-three motorized infantry Divisions in\nan attempt to retake Kiev.\nMARSHAL STALIN then turned to the allied operations in Italy. He said\nthat from their point of view the great value of the Italian campaign was the\nfreeing of the Mediterranean to allied shipping but that they did not consider\nthat Italy was a suitable place from which to attempt to attack Germany proper;\nthat the Alps constituted an almost insuperable barrier as the famous Russian\nGeneral Suvorov had discovered in his time. He added that in the opinion of\nthe Soviet military leaders, Hitler was endeavoring to retain as many allied\nDivisions as possible in Italy where no decision could be reached, and that\nthe best method in the Soviet opinion was getting at the heart of Germany with\nan attack-through northern or northwestern France and even through southern\nFrance. He admitted that this would be a very difficult operation since the\nGermans would fight like devils to prevent it. Marshal Stalin went on to say\nthat it would be helpful if Turkey would enter the war and open the way to the\nBalkans, but even so the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and while\nwith Turkish participation operations there would be useful, northern France\nwas still the best.\nTHE PRIME MINISTER stated that the United States and Great Britian had\nlong agreed as to the necessity of the cross-channel operation and that at\nthe present time this operation, which is known as OVERLORD, was absorbing\nmost of our combined resources and efforts. He added that it would take a\nlong statement of facts and figures to explain why, to our disappointment,\nit would be impossible to undertake this operation in 1943 but that we were\ndetermined to carry it out in the late spring or early summer of 1944. He\nwent on to say that the operations in North Africa and Italy had been clearly\nrecognised by both The President and himself as secondary in character but\nthat it was the best that could be done in 1943. He said. that the forces\nwhich were now in process of execution for the OVERLORD operation involved\nan initial assault of 16 British and 19 U.S. Divisions, a total of 35.\nHe pointed out that the strength of the individual British and American\nDivi sions was considerably stronger than a German Division. He said it was\ncontemplated to put one million men on the continent of Europe in May, June\nand July.\nMARSHAL STALIN remarked at this point that he had not meant to convey\nthe impression that he considered the North Africa or Italian operations as\nsecondary or belittle their significance since they were of very real value.\n-3-"
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