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- 6 - was not active military requirements elsewhere, but because, for one consideration or another, it was not desired to supply them, the position was entirely different. A general discussion ensued at this point as to what the Turkish President meant by consideration. He said that in spite of events Turkish cordiality had remained steadfast. When the Germans were at Stalingrad and El Alemein, i.e., at the most dangerous moment of all, the Turks had renewed their assurances. On one occasion a British statement had linked together Turkey and Spain as neutrals and the Turks had at once taken exception to this. The Turks had not changed, and they did not tolerate suspicion. Actually, and although Turkey was feeble, she had done well behind her curtain, and the Turks were happy about what they had done. To the British Ambassador, at the dangerous moment, he had repeated his advice "be strong in Egypt". All this background conscientiously pushed him to a decision. But he was not ready. Supposing Germany collapsed tonight or tomorrow, everybody would be happy, he alone would be anxious, because Turkey had not come in. Mr. Churchill said that he had always realised that Turkey's pre- occupation was Russia. But Turkey's only sure course was with the Allies. As he had said at Adana, if Turkey were to come with the Allies at the chosen moment, it would be in the interest not only of Turkey but of the whole world. President Roosevelt said there was no implication of a threat. The advantages to Turkey had been explained. The United States was 3,000 miles away, but would always remain Turkey's friend. The United Kingdom would also be the friend of her old Ally. The big question for Turkey was Russia, and if he (President Roosevelt) were President of Turkey, he would consider very seriously the advantages offered by the opportunity of making friends with

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    "ocrText": "- 6 -\nwas not active military requirements elsewhere, but because, for one consideration\nor another, it was not desired to supply them, the position was entirely\ndifferent.\nA general discussion ensued at this point as to what the Turkish\nPresident meant by consideration. He said that in spite of events Turkish\ncordiality had remained steadfast. When the Germans were at Stalingrad and\nEl Alemein, i.e., at the most dangerous moment of all, the Turks had renewed\ntheir assurances. On one occasion a British statement had linked together\nTurkey and Spain as neutrals and the Turks had at once taken exception to this.\nThe Turks had not changed, and they did not tolerate suspicion. Actually,\nand although Turkey was feeble, she had done well behind her curtain, and the\nTurks were happy about what they had done. To the British Ambassador, at the\ndangerous moment, he had repeated his advice \"be strong in Egypt\". All this\nbackground conscientiously pushed him to a decision. But he was not ready.\nSupposing Germany collapsed tonight or tomorrow, everybody would be happy,\nhe alone would be anxious, because Turkey had not come in.\nMr. Churchill said that he had always realised that Turkey's pre-\noccupation was Russia. But Turkey's only sure course was with the Allies. As\nhe had said at Adana, if Turkey were to come with the Allies at the chosen\nmoment, it would be in the interest not only of Turkey but of the whole world.\nPresident Roosevelt said there was no implication of a threat. The\nadvantages to Turkey had been explained. The United States was 3,000 miles\naway, but would always remain Turkey's friend. The United Kingdom would also\nbe the friend of her old Ally. The big question for Turkey was Russia, and\nif he (President Roosevelt) were President of Turkey, he would consider very\nseriously the advantages offered by the opportunity of making friends with"
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