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- 3 = Lessons were learned, however, particularly with respect to matters of procedure and the futility of attempting to negotiate with a Soviet-controlled majority. In his statement on the last day of the proceedings, the American Delegate, Ambassador Cavendish Cannon, said: "The Delegates of ten Governments have now sat around this table, flanked by deputies and experts, for nearly three weeks. We have made speeches, appointed committees, and discussed specific articles of a proposed new treaty. To all outward appearances, we have gone through the motions of a normal international conference. "But anybody who has been seated in this hall or in the gallery knows that this has been a deception. This has been a unique performance in the history of international negotiations. I know of no previous international conference where a majority of the participants, with cynical solidarity, have refrained from proposing even minor changes in the text laid before them for discussion. The document about to be put to the final vote is the document which the Delegate of the Soviet Union brought to this Conference to receive its stamp of approval. "There has been no negotiation. There has been no attempt to reconcile differences of technical opinion. There has been no compromise, even in matters of form. 11 a on our first real working day 000 it was made brutally clear that there was to be no real discussion of the problem for which we were brought together. There was a solid phalanx of seven governments which were already committed to the adoption of this Soviet text, and already determined to disregard whatever proposals the Delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom or France might present." 1 Another member of the U.S. Delegation wrote: "The Soviet Union demonstrated by its actions at Belgrade that 1t was incapable of negotiating in an inter- national conference in which it had the votes to push through its own policies. The Soviet majority was wielded to beat down any opposition. Soviet strategy seemed to be to drive the 1 Documents and State Papers, November and December 1948, Po 504. See also Radius, statement cited

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    "ocrText": "- 3 =\nLessons were learned, however, particularly with respect\nto matters of procedure and the futility of attempting\nto negotiate with a Soviet-controlled majority. In his\nstatement on the last day of the proceedings, the\nAmerican Delegate, Ambassador Cavendish Cannon, said:\n\"The Delegates of ten Governments have now sat\naround this table, flanked by deputies and experts, for\nnearly three weeks. We have made speeches, appointed\ncommittees, and discussed specific articles of a proposed\nnew treaty. To all outward appearances, we have gone\nthrough the motions of a normal international conference.\n\"But anybody who has been seated in this hall or\nin the gallery knows that this has been a deception.\nThis has been a unique performance in the history of\ninternational negotiations. I know of no previous\ninternational conference where a majority of the\nparticipants, with cynical solidarity, have refrained\nfrom proposing even minor changes in the text laid before\nthem for discussion. The document about to be put to the\nfinal vote is the document which the Delegate of the\nSoviet Union brought to this Conference to receive its\nstamp of approval.\n\"There has been no negotiation. There has been no\nattempt to reconcile differences of technical opinion.\nThere has been no compromise, even in matters of form.\n11\na on our first real working day 000 it was made\nbrutally clear that there was to be no real discussion\nof the problem for which we were brought together. There\nwas a solid phalanx of seven governments which were already\ncommitted to the adoption of this Soviet text, and already\ndetermined to disregard whatever proposals the Delegations\nof the United States, the United Kingdom or France might\npresent.\" 1\nAnother member of the U.S. Delegation wrote:\n\"The Soviet Union demonstrated by its actions at\nBelgrade that 1t was incapable of negotiating in an inter-\nnational conference in which it had the votes to push\nthrough its own policies. The Soviet majority was wielded\nto beat down any opposition. Soviet strategy seemed to be\nto drive the\n1\nDocuments and State Papers, November and December 1948,\nPo 504. See also Radius, statement cited"
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