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road from the south would be lost.
(3) Attacks of various types (parachutist, naval, combined
operations, etc. ) upon Black Sea points, such as the mouth of
the Bosphorus, coal ports like Eregli, Zonguldak, and Amasra,
and such strategic harbors as Samsun and Trabzon, from which
communications lead inland. Capture of Zonguldak would also
make available to the enemy the railroad line thence to Ankara.
(4) Strategic and tactical bombing of vulnerable targets,
including railroads, roads, docks, marshalling yards, port in-
stallations, naval establishments, oil storage tanks (particu-
larly at Istanbul, Izmir, Iskenderun, and Samsun), aircraft, and
airfields, and all facilities for the transport of reinforcements
and supplies across the Marmara, such as those at Haydarpasa (Istanbul
Izmit, Bandirma, Çanakkale, Eceabat, Gelibolu, and Tekirdag.
The aggressor's basic aim would be to gain control of Turkey,
particularly the Straits, as quickly as possible and to prevent substan-
tial aid from coming to the support of the Turks. Thus the USSR, if
successful in any such aggression, would not only gain control of the
Straits and a dominant position in the Aegean Sea but would also move
forward its area of control next door to the Arab Middle East and es-
tablish a long shoreline on the Mediterranean Sea, within easy range
of the Suez Canal.
With or without aid from abroad, the Turks would resist with
all the strength at their command. The disposition of the army, as
described above, with headquarters of the three armies at Istanbul,
Balikesir, and Erzurum, and large forces in Turkish Thrace or near it,
indicate where initial resistance would be offered. The Turkish Navy
would assist in transporting and convoying troops and supplies across
the Marmara and the Aegean Sea, in closing the Straits with nets, booms,
and minefields, and in helping to protect the Turkish left flank in the
Aegean. It is doubtful whether any naval sorties, except by submarine,
would be made into the Black Sea, unless the situation as it develops
should make the risk worth taking.
The Turkish Air Force would assist ground operations, but is a
weak force at best. Lacking efficient ground crews, enough operational
fields, and proper refueling facilities, it is likely to be knocked out
of action very quickly, thus leaving Turkish ground forces at the mercy
of enemy air attacks.
The general topography of Turkey and its climate must also be
considered. (See Appendix A. ) Anatolia has been likened to an in-
verted saucer, with a mountainous plateau in its center and a narrow
rim of lowland plains around the edges. Terrain in eastern Turkey is
particularly difficult and is covered with deep snow during the winter
IV-5
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nroad from the south would be lost.\n(3) Attacks of various types (parachutist, naval, combined\noperations, etc. ) upon Black Sea points, such as the mouth of\nthe Bosphorus, coal ports like Eregli, Zonguldak, and Amasra,\nand such strategic harbors as Samsun and Trabzon, from which\ncommunications lead inland. Capture of Zonguldak would also\nmake available to the enemy the railroad line thence to Ankara.\n(4) Strategic and tactical bombing of vulnerable targets,\nincluding railroads, roads, docks, marshalling yards, port in-\nstallations, naval establishments, oil storage tanks (particu-\nlarly at Istanbul, Izmir, Iskenderun, and Samsun), aircraft, and\nairfields, and all facilities for the transport of reinforcements\nand supplies across the Marmara, such as those at Haydarpasa (Istanbul\nIzmit, Bandirma, Çanakkale, Eceabat, Gelibolu, and Tekirdag.\nThe aggressor's basic aim would be to gain control of Turkey,\nparticularly the Straits, as quickly as possible and to prevent substan-\ntial aid from coming to the support of the Turks. Thus the USSR, if\nsuccessful in any such aggression, would not only gain control of the\nStraits and a dominant position in the Aegean Sea but would also move\nforward its area of control next door to the Arab Middle East and es-\ntablish a long shoreline on the Mediterranean Sea, within easy range\nof the Suez Canal.\nWith or without aid from abroad, the Turks would resist with\nall the strength at their command. The disposition of the army, as\ndescribed above, with headquarters of the three armies at Istanbul,\nBalikesir, and Erzurum, and large forces in Turkish Thrace or near it,\nindicate where initial resistance would be offered. The Turkish Navy\nwould assist in transporting and convoying troops and supplies across\nthe Marmara and the Aegean Sea, in closing the Straits with nets, booms,\nand minefields, and in helping to protect the Turkish left flank in the\nAegean. It is doubtful whether any naval sorties, except by submarine,\nwould be made into the Black Sea, unless the situation as it develops\nshould make the risk worth taking.\nThe Turkish Air Force would assist ground operations, but is a\nweak force at best. Lacking efficient ground crews, enough operational\nfields, and proper refueling facilities, it is likely to be knocked out\nof action very quickly, thus leaving Turkish ground forces at the mercy\nof enemy air attacks.\nThe general topography of Turkey and its climate must also be\nconsidered. (See Appendix A. ) Anatolia has been likened to an in-\nverted saucer, with a mountainous plateau in its center and a narrow\nrim of lowland plains around the edges. Terrain in eastern Turkey is\nparticularly difficult and is covered with deep snow during the winter\nIV-5\nSECRET"
}