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    "title": "Memorandum from James Lay to Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission with Attachment",
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    "ocrText": "NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nDOCUMENT\nMemo\nFor the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the\nDECLASTIFIED 12.5.78\nAtomic Energy Commission from S. Everett Gleason\n2-8-52\nA\n(attachment)\nMemo\nFor the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of\nthe Atomic Energy Commission from James S. Lay,\nJr. (3 attachments) SANITIZED NLT77-32\n6-12-52\nA\nMemo\nFor the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and\nthe Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from\nDECLASSIFIED 12.5.21\nS. Everett Gleason\n10-24-52\nA\nFILE LOCATION\nTRUMAN PAPERS - P.S.F.\nSUBJECT FIIE - NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL - ATOMIC\nFOLDER: ATOMIC WEAPONS - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\n[Ber 202]\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nGENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION\nGSA FORM 7122 (7-72)\nGSA DC 73-495\nNLT 77-32\nThe President\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\n05\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON\n20\nCopy No. 4\nNSC, 8/28/78; DECLASSIFIED\nJune 12, 1952\n5/25/79\nDOE, 11/14/78; Star, 11/14/78, OSD,\nBy JK\nMARS,\nDate\n1/23/80\nPROJECT NLT 77-32\nSANITIZED COPY\nHELERANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense\nThe Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission\nSUBJECT:\nDepartment of Defense Interest in the\nUse of Atomic Teapons\nREFERENCES: A. Memo for Secretary of State and Chair-\nman, AEC, from Acting Executive Secre-\ntary, NSC, same subject, dated February\n8, 1952\nB. Nomo for Secretaries of State and Defense\nfrom Executive Secretary, NSC, same\nsubject, dated June 2, 1952\nThe enclosed memorandum on the subject by the\nSecretary of State, in response to Reference A, is trans-\nmitted herewith for your consideration as members of the\nSpecial Committee of the National Security Council on Atcmic\nEnergy.\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST President's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nJAMES S. LAY, R.\nExecutive Secretary\nCC: Secretary of State\n(without enclosures)\nDlspt\nH 3018\nSECRET\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nThis desument consists of\n/\nNo. 3 or # Copies, Series pages\nCOPY\nJune 11, 1952\nMEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Secretary,\nNational Security Council.\nSUBJECT:\nDepartment of Defense Interest in the Use\nof Atomic Weapons\nI transmit herewith the views of the Department\nof State with respect to the issues raised by the JCS paper on\nthe above subject which was sent to you by the Secretary of\nDefense with his concurrence on February 6, 1952.\nI request that these views be circulated to the\nmembers of the Special Committee of the National Security Council.\n/s/ DEAN ACHESON\nGREAT\nINVENT\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nThis document consists of A 8 pages\nCopy No. 6 or 8 Series\nJune 11, 1952\nSECURITY\nDepartment of State Comments\non JCS paper entitled\n\"Statement of the Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff\non Desartment of Defense Interest in the Use of Atomic veacons*\nThe following views of the Department of State are numbered according\nto the paragraphs of the JCS paper:\n1. It is recognized as stated that the \"Joint Chiefs of Staff have\na statutory responsibility to act 33 the principal military advisers to\nthe President, the National Security Council, and to the Secretary of\nDeferse.\" In this connection, however, it is important to point out that\nthe National Security Council has a statutory responsibility to \"advise\nthe President with respect to the integration of comestic, foreign and\nmilitary policies relating to the national security\". In the view of the\nDepartment of State, the question of the use of atomic weapons clearly\nfalls within the above category. Accordingly, the Special Committee of\nthe National Security Council, which the President has designated to pass\nupon at nic energy matters requiring his decision, has a responsibility to\ngive advice to the President on this question.\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST President's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\n2. Ho comment.\n3. The Department of State is not aware that any proposal has been\nnade see \"any other agency\" intercose \"itself between [She 4037 and the\nPresident in submission to him of recommendations for B. military course\n-2-\nof action\". If the view of the JC3 contained in this paragraph has\nreference to a staff study submitted to the nembers of the Special\nCommittee for consideration on April 27, 1951, it would appear that the\nJCS has misread the conclusions of this study. The stady recognises\nthat the initial recommendation for use of atomis weapons should originate\nwith, or be referred to, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The suggested pro-\ncedures whereby the President may secure the advice of the Secretary of\nState, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy\nCommission, is not intended to interpose any agency between the Joint\nChiefs of Staff and the President in the submission of recommendations\nfor a military course of action but rather to carry out the President's\nwishes expressed in his letter of August 25, 1950 which stated in part\nas follows:\nà WITNING\n\"I an asking that the Committee of the National Security\nCouncil on Atomic Energy, which consists of Chairman of the\nAtomic Energy Commission, Secretary of State, and Secretary of\nDefense, pass on the directives which I have to make, that affect\nall throe of those Departments. I informed the Secretary of State\nof the notion which bad been taken, and instructed the Secretary\nof Defense that these actions must be considered by this Committee\nof the National Security Council before I shall approve any further\nactions. In that way everytody interested will know exactly what\nis going one\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nAs to the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff \"nor could they\nPapers of HST President's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nagree to any such other agency having a voice in determining how, when\nand where such military operations are to to conducted\", it should to\npointed out that there are grave political considerations involved in\ndetermining how, when and where. The Department of State does not feel\nthat the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the power or the authority to delimit\nthe President's choice of advisers on a matter which 13 ao Traught with\n-3-\nconsequences not only military but also non-military in nature. The\nDepartment of State considers that it has a responsibility which it\ncannot relinquish for advising the President on the questions of how,\nwhen, and where. It considers that the President may, if be deess it\nnecessary, delinit the manner in which, the extent to which, and the time\nwhen the Joint Chiefs of Staff my direct the employment of atomic reapons.\nIn this connection it will be recalled that ESC 30 states in part (para-\ngraph 11):\n\"The type and character of targets against which atomie respons\nmight be used is primarily a function of military selection in\nthe preparation and planning of grand strategy. In this case,\nhowever, there is the additional requirement for blending a\npolitical with a military responsibility in order to assure that\nthe conduct or war, to the maximum extent practicable, advances\nthe fundamental and lasting aims of United States policy.\"\nh. The comments in 3 above apply in part to the first sentence\nof paragraph 4.\n5. a (1). The first sentence is not clear. If it is interded to\nmean simply that the basic development of military requirements\nfor complete weapons is a responsibility of the Department of\nDefense, no exception can be taken. If, however, this sentance\nis meant to say that it is a responsibility of the Department\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nof lefense not only to develop requirements for complete\nweapons but also to astablish the production program including\nthe production goals and production rates of fissionable\nmaterial, then it would appear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nare assigning sololy to the Department of Defense functions in\nwhich it shares responsibility with other agencies.\n-lso\n(2) No comment.\n(3) The Department of State cannot agree with the first\nsentence as written. In its view the responsibility of the\nDepartment of Defense would be more accurately stated as\nfollows: \"In summation, it is the responsibility of the\nDepartment of Defense to establish military requirements for\nmesbers and types of atomis yearons needed for the defense\nand security of the United States.\" In this connection, the\nDepartment of State would point out that final decision within\nthe Executive branch as to the nation's atomic weapon program\nrests with the President who makes such decision only after\nall factors, both military and non military, have been taken\ninto account.\nde The Department of State considers the stated view that \"decisions\nas to the particular atomic weapon and vehicle to be used and the\nprecise nature of the method to be employed in its delivery are\npurely military in character\" may oversimplify the problem. Such\nquestions as type of weapon (u.g. II-bomb) and method of delivery\nare related to the problem of target selection and may have an\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST President's\nimportant bearing on the outcome of conflist and the possibilities\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nof winning the peace once victory is assured. To the extent that\nthis is 20, the Department of State considers that it has a proper\ninterest in this matter.\nC. (1) No comment.\nREGRET\n-\nINFORMATION\n-5-\n(2) The views expressed in paragraph 3 above apply with equal\nforce here.\n(3) The nub question is not whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nfeel fully prepared to furnish such advice as may be necessary\nto meet the requirements of the President, nor whether in their\nview the Department of Defanse possesses competence in the\nrealn of both the military and the technical considerations\ninvolved in the use of atomic weapons and should therefore\nconstitute the principal source of advice to the President on\nthis subject, bus rather whether the President desires advice\nfrom other agencies. It is clear from the President's letter\nof August 25, 1950 previously cited that be does=specifically\nfrom the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atonic\nEnergy Commission in addition to the Secretary of Defense.\nd. (1) No coment.\n180\nA\n(2) (a) If this paragraph is in effect recommending that a\nnew amendment to the Atcaic Strugy Act of 1946 should\nto sought in regard to methods whereby information in\nthe scientific and technical fields can be exchanged\nwith other countries, the Department of State feels that\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST President's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nsuch procesal is untimely. The recent amendment to the\nAtomic Energy Act of 1946 has not yet been long enough\nin force to make possible a determination whether the\nprocedure provided is too cumbersome. It would appear\nto the Department of State that an amendment designed to\nPEODUCT\n-6-\nsimplify the procedures provided in the recent amendment\nwould be exceedingly milkely of success at this time and\ndights well jeopardize whatever efforts are made to secure\na di:forent Dor's of amendment designed to carry out the\nobjectives set forth in the immediately following para-\ngraph (b) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper.\n(b) The Department of State supports the basie objective\nwhich is sought in this paragraph. It recognizes that the\nJCS and the Department of Defense should originate those\nproposals involving interchange of information on atomic\nweapons with other nations. In view of the foreign policy\nimplications of actions envisaged in this paragraph as\nwell as the technical problems of declassification involved,\nit considers that the President will want the views of the\nDepartment of State and of the Atomic Energy Commission\nbefore taking final action on such proposals. It is pre-\nsured that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in saking this proposal,\nenvisage securing the requisite amendment to the Atomic Energy\nAct of 1946.\n(3) The sequence of argument in this paragraph 500MS to imply that\nas a result of AEC custody of atomic weapons an unnecassarily\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nLarge number of people in the Department of State are mare of\nany proposed or actual deployments of atomic Meacons, either\ncomplete or non-muclear. The Department of State considers this\nto be a non sequiture In the last sentence of the paragraph the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff point out that the redeployment of any\nSCODET\nGEORLT\n-7-\nSECURITY INFORMATION\natorio weapons from the proposed reservoir of finished\nweapons in the custody of the military would be subject\nof course to the approval of the President. It is the\nnecessity for Presidential approval, plus his express desire\nthat the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the\nChairman of the Atonic Energy Commission give him advice on\nsuch matters, which brings about the fact that a strictly\nlimited mmber 03 people in the Department of State must be\naware of the proposals or the actions taken.\nAs to the substantive proposal of this paragraph, namely,\n\"the establishment of a reservoir of finished reapons in the\ncomplete ematody of the nilitary,\" the Department of State\n3003 a good deal of merit in this recommendation. With growing\nnumbers of weapons in the stockpile and the development of\noverseas bases to which deployments are being made, 11 would\nappear eminently sensible to place under the custody of the\nmilitary a percentage of the national weapons stockwile in\norder to increase \"readiness to use\" capabilities. The parcent\nof stockpile to be turned over should be such as to neet\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST President's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\ndeployment requirements as wall as a winimum operational\nrequirement within the continental limits of the United States.\nThe remainder should, however, remain in AEC custody. Mirsover,\nIt. would appear necessary that the AEC continue to have access\nto the entire stockpile from time to time in order to waintain\nSEPORT\nSECTICT\n3-\nquality control and to carry ont acdifications and redesign\nas dictated by technical advances.\nAs the JC3 paper points out, a distinction must be drawn\nbetween \"readiness to 2308 and \"authority to use\". The Depart-\nment of State can support the proposal for a reservoir of\natonds weapons under military control only if it is understood\nthat the procedures outlined in the attached paper are followed\nwith respect to a decision to use abosic suspons. Gwing to\nthe complax foreign relations issues involved, it is also\nessential that the Department of State participate fully in\ndecisions with respect to deployments to overseas bases.\nDEVERSION YORK\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST President's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nThis doeument consists of 9 pages\nCOPY No. 4 of 6 Series A\nSECTICT\nJune 11, 1952\nFORMATION\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To outline procedures whereby the President may most effectively\nobtain advice whenever he is called upon to decide on the use of atomic\nweapons.\nBACKGROUND\n2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which vests in the Atomic Energy\nCommission ownership of all fissionable materials, provides that:\n\".....the President from time to time may direct the\nCommission (1) to deliver such quantities of fissionable\nmaterials or weapons to the armed forces for such use as\nhe deems necessary in the interest of national defense...\"\n3. On September 10, 1948, the Executive Secretary submitted a report\nto the National Security Council on \"United States Policy on Atomic War-\nfare\" (NSC 30). This report dealt with the feasibility of formulating\nat that time policies regarding the use of atomic weapons. The analysis\nstated \"the United States has nothing presently to gain, commensurable\nwith the risk of raising the question, in either a well-cofined or an\nequivocal decision that atomic weapons should be used in the event of\nwar.\" On the other hand, it was pointed out that in the absence of an\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nestablished and acceptable system of international control of atomic energy,\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nthis Government should make no commitment which would deny it the right\nto employ such weapons in the event of actual hostilities. The report\ncame to the following conclusions which were subsequently adopted by\nthe National Security Council on September 16, 1948:\n-2-\n\"12. It is recognized that, in the event of hostilities,\nthe National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize\npromptly and affectively all appropriate means available,\nincluding atomic weapons, in the interests of national security\nand must therefore plan accordingly.\n,\n\"13. The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons\nin the event of war is to to made by the Chief Executive then\nhe considers such decision to be required.\"\nIn view of the adoption or these conclusions no action was taken at\nthat time (a) to obtain a decision either to use or not to use atomic\nweapons in any possible future conflict, or (b) to obtain a decision as\nto the time and circumstances under which atomic weapons might or might\nnot be employed.\n4. In the course of the last two years it has become established\npractice for atcmic energy matters requiring Presidential decision, which\naffect the Departments of State and Defense and the Atemic Energy Com-\nmission, to be referred to the Special Committee of the National Security\nCouncil on Atomic Energy for consideration and such recommendations as\nit sees fit to make to the President. This procedure was underscored by\nletter of the President dated August 25, 1950, which stated in part as\nfollows:\n\"I am asking that the Committee of the National Security\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST Président's\nCouncil on Atomic Energy, which consists of Chairman of the\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nAtomic Energy Commission, Secretary of State, and Secretary of\nDefense, pass on the directives which I have to make, that\naffect all three of those Departments. I informed the Secretary\nof State of the action which had been taken, and instructed the\nSecretary of Lefense that these actions must be considered by\nthis Consittee of the National Security Council before i small\namrove any further actions. In that way everybody interested\nwill know exactly what is going on.\"\n-3-\nThe occasion for the foregoing statement arose in connection with\nthe strategic deployment of non-muclear components to overseas areas,\na preparatory action approved by the President which did not include\nauthority to use atomic reapons.\n5. The Quabec Agreement of August 19, 1943, governing collaboration\nanong the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the field of\natomic energy provided, among other things, that \"ye [the United States\nand the United Kingdom] will not use it [the atomic bomb/ against third\nparties without each other's consent.\" The Quebec Agreement was super-\nseded by a Modus Vivendi adopted on January 7, 1948, which specifically\nprovided that \"All agreements between the three governments or any two\nof them in the field of atomic energy shall to regarded as null and of\nno effect.\" Certain exceptions were made but none of them relate to the\nquestion of use of atomic weapons. The Modus Vivendi contains no language\nrelating to this question. The Joint Communique issued at the end of the\nTruman-Attlee talks on December 3, 1950 stated: \"The President stated\nthat it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use\nof the atoric bomb. The President told the Prize Minister that it was\nalso nis desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of\ndevelopments which might bring about a change in the situation.\" The\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nJoint Communique issued on January 9, 1952 concerning the Trunan-Churehill\ntalks stated:\n\"Under arrangements made for the common defense, the\nUnited States has the use of certain bases in the United\nKingdom. de reaffirm the understanding that the use of\nthese bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision\nby Ris Majesty's Government and the United States Goverment in\nthe light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.\n-:-\nINFORMATION\nwill\nTHERE\n\"No share the hope and the determination that war, with\nall its modern weapons, shall not again be visited on mankind.\nWe will ranain in close consultation on the developments\nwhich might increase danger to the maintenance of world peace.\"\n6.\ndelationship\n22\n7. During the General Assembly in the Autumn of 1950, a move by the\nSoviet Union to secure UN approval of a resolution which would brand the\nfirst user of atomic weapons as a war criminal was roundly defeated. 4a\na counter to this move, the General Assembly approved, on November 17,\n1950, a resolution which stated, among other things, that it was india-\npensable for the realization of lasting peace and security, that every\nnation agree \"to accept effective international control of atomic energy,\nunder the United Nations, on the basis already approved by the Genaral\nAssembly, in order to make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons.\"\nIt reaffirmed that \"whatever the weapons used, any aggression, whether\ncommitted openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interests of a\nforeign power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace\nand security throughout the world.\" It determined that it is indispensable\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nfor the realization of lasting peace and security \"that joint united\naction be taken to meet aggression wherever it arises.\"\n3. On several cceasions within the oast two years the President has\npublicly stated that he is prepared to make a decision as to the use of\natomic weapons when circumstances 30 require. On April 6, 1949 he stated:\n\"...if it [a decision to use the atomic bomb/ has to be made for the\nwelfare of the United States, and the democracies of the world are at\nstake, I would not hesitate to make it again.\" On November 30, 1950\nthe President stated:\n\"Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit\nin the very possession of that weapon.\n\"However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the\nPresident can authorize the use or the atom bomb, and no such\nauthorization has been given. If and when such authorization\nshould be given, the military commander in the field would have\ncharge of the tactical delivery of the weapon.\"\n9. It is recognized that responsibility for advising the President\nas to the military desirability of the use of atonic weapons, as is the\ncase with any other weapon in our national armory, rests with the Joint\nChiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Responsibility for advising\nthe President as to the political aspects of the use of atomic weapons\nrests with the Secretary of State. Military considerations and political\nconsiderations are often inextricably interrelated. By law, the power to\ndecide on the use of atomic weapons rests with the President.\n10. Once a decision is made that atomic weapons should be used, the\nPresident will give the necessary directives to the Secretary of Defense\nand the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for implementation.\n11. The means whereby the President may receive promotly the advice\nof the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST President's\nneed to be identified.\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nAMALYSIS\n12. Unless there is an initial determination by the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff that the use of atomic weapons in a given situation is militarily\ndesirable, it is difficult to see how the question of such use can arise\nin any realistic way. In the event that pressures build up for the use\nof atomic weapons in other quarters, it would appear that the first\nquestion which would require answering is whether such use is militarily\ndesirable. Accordingly, the matter should originate with, or be referred\nto, the Joint Chiefs or Staff.\n13. In the event a recommendation for use is made to the President\nby the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military reasons for the recommendation,\nand the intended employment, should be stated.\n14. After a recommendation for use is made by the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff, the President will want, in addition to the views of the Joint\nChiefs of Staff, the views of the members of the Special Committee on\nthe political, military, and technical considerations involved.\n15. If time and circumstances permit, the Congress would pass and\nthe President would approve a Joint Resolution \"declaring war\", before\natomic weapons were employed. In the past such resolutions have provided:\n(1) that the state of war between the United States and the\nGovernment which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally\ndeclared; (2) that the President is authorized and directed to employ the\nentire military forces of the United States and the resources of the\nGovernment to carry on war against the\nGovernment; and\n(3) that to bring the conflict to a successful termination \"all of the\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nresources of the country are hereby pledged ty the Congress of the United\nStates.\" A resolution in these terms would clearly authorize the President\nto use atomic weapons and any other weapons he considered necessary to\nbring the conflict to a successful termination.\n-7-\n16. However, atomic weapons are uniquely suited for surprise and\npossibly decisive attacks, without warning and without formal declaration\nof war by the enemy. In case of a surprise attack upon the United States,\nit would be necessary, in the interest of national defense, to lausch an\nimmediate atomic counter-attack. In such event, the President would take\naction under his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief, consulting\nwith appropriate leaders of the Congress at the earliest pessible moment.\nIn contingencies short of a surprise attack upon the United States, the\nPresident will doubtless want to consult appropriate Congressional leaders.\nbefore making a decision.\n17.\nS\nNSC\ndeletion:\n5(B)(3)\nN.B.\nIt is not intended that the procedures set forth in the conclusions\nwhich follow should await last-minute developments which may require\nimmediate decision In the midst of inevitable confusion and uncertainty.\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nIt is thought that the need for decisions as to use of atomic weapons will\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nmore probably grow out of a period of increasing tensions. In such circum-\nstances it is expected there will be time in which the President, by means\nof the procedures outlined below, can secure from the Departments and agencies\nof Government most directly oncerned tentative conclusions and recommendations\nconcerning the use of atomic weapons in the light of existing and emerging\nsituations.\n&\nfor\nCONCLUSIONS\n1. In making any decision regarding the use of atomic weapons,\nit is considered that the President will want, at minimus, the views of\nthe following:\n2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff\nb. The Secretary of Defense\nC. The Secretary of State\nd. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission\n2. Any recommendation to the President regarding the use of atomic\nweapons by the Armed Services should initially be made by, or be referred\nto, the Joint Chiafs of Staff in view of their \"statutory responsibility\nas the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security\nCouncil, and the Secretary of Defense.\" In presenting their views the\nJoint Chiefs or Staff should:\na. Set forth the factors that were taken into account in\narriving at its reconsendation.\nb. Identify, in general terms, the intended employment of\nthe weapons.\n3. Before the President makes a final decision, in order to provide\nhim with a means for obtaining a full exposition of the factors involved\nfrom the officials listed in 1. above and in view of the statutory\nresponsibility of the National Security Council to \"advise the President\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY\nwith respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies\nrelating to the national security\", a meeting of the President with the\nSpecial Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy,\n-9-\ntogether with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be convened to consider\nany recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the use of\natomic wespons.\n4am Time permitting, consultation with Congrassional leaders should\ntake place before a decision to use atomie weapons 1s implemented.\n5. Additional actions to be decided upon at such meeting would\ninclude the extent, nature, and timing of consultations with, notifications\nto, or requests for action by\ndo Other departments and agencies of the Government\n(the other members of the National Security Council, the Cabinet,\nCivil Defense, etc).\nb. The American people.\nNSC\nCa Other governments\n-\nlilitive\n(6)(3\nde The United Nations.\n6. In the event of a positive decision, the President will authorize\nSecretary of Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as\nbe specified.\nSecretary's File (PSF)\nRECOMMENDATION\nPapers of HST Président's\nHARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRAR\n7. That this staff study be made available to the President."
}