Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "313079500",
    "label": "Draft of Report, The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/313079500"
}

{
    "id": "313079500",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/313079500",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Draft of Report, The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/313079500",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750629/750629-04-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750629/750629-04-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750629/750629-04-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 39,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/313079500",
    "naId": 313079500,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 26,
            "logicalDate": "1949-10-26",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1949
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 39,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750629/750629-04.pdf",
    "mediaId": "0dc6384a1d2b5cf8",
    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nNOT(PSFINSC)587\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON\nStartpara v3\nOctober 26, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rusk\nGeneral Burns\nMr. Fahey\nSUBJECT:\nPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES\nWITH RESPECT TO ASIA\nReference: NSC 48\nPursuant to the reference report,\nthe NSC Staff has prepared the enclosed draft report\non the above subject for your consideration prior to\nsubmission to the National Security Council. The\nDepartment of State member of the Staff has expressed\nreservations regarding certain of the Conclusions\ncontained in the enclosure, but has concurred in sub-\nmission of the draft report to the Consultants.\nIt is requested that you indicate\nyour concurrence or non-concurrence with the enclosure\nthrough your respective NSC Staff members at the ear-\nliest practicable date. In view of the scope and im-\nportance of this report, however, it is suggested that\nit may be desirable to schedule a Consultants' meeting\nto discuss this subject before the Council considers it.\nWARRY as ARCHIVES TRUMAN \"NATIONAL MED LIBRARY\nJAMES S. LAY, JR.\nRECORDS\nActing Executive Secretary\nGOVERNMENT\ncc: Admiral Hillenkoetter\nAdmiral Davis\nGeneral Gruenther\nAdmiral Struble\nGeneral Norstad\nMr. Halaby\nPedmited 2/13/21\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.0.12065 BY BRENDA REGER(NSC) 2-13-81\nTELEPHONE CONV. WITH MRS.\nProject NLT FRANKS (NSC) 3.2.41\nBy NLT- HC\nNARS, Date 3-2-01\nTOP SECRET\nNET(PSFINSC) 508\nSANITIZE\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nCOPY NO. 18\nOctober 25, 1949\nTHE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO ASIA\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To assess and appraise the position of the United States\nwith respect to Asia* on the basis of our national security in-\nterests.\nANALYSIS\nGeneral Considerations\nMARRY S1 U.S. TRUMAN ARCHIVES **ATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND LIBRARY\n2. Asia is an area of significant potential power --political,\neconomic and military. The development in this region of stable\nand independent countries friendly to the United States and seeking\nto direct their potential power into constructive channels would\nenhance the security of Asia and strengthen the world position of\nthe United States. Conversely, the domination of Asia by a\nnation or coalition of nations capable of exploiting the region\nfor purposes of self-aggrandizement would threaten the security\nof Asia and of the United States. Recognition of these principles\nhas been implicit in our traditional policies toward Asia: we\nhave consistently favored a system of independent states and opposed\nthe aggrandizement of any powers which threatened eventual domination\nof the region.\n* For the purposes of this report \"Asia\" is defined as that part\nof the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran to-\ngether with the major off shore islands - - Japan, Formosa, the\nPhilippines, Indonesia and Ceylon.\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\n3. We should continue to promote in Asia a system of inter-\nnational relations favorable to our national security. Hence our\noverall objective with respect to that area must be to bring about\nthe development of friendly, stable and self-sustaining states in\nconformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations\nCharter. In order to achieve this, we must concurrently prevent\nthe domination of Asia by any single country or coalition. It is\nconçeivable that in the course of time a threat of domination may\ncome from such nations as Japan, China, or India, or from an Asia-\ntic bloc. But now and for the foreseeable future it is the USSR\nwhich threatens to dominate Asia through the complementary instru-\nments of communist conspiracy and diplomatic pressure supported by\nmilitary strength. For the foreseeable future, therefore, our\nimmediate objective must be to reduce the power and influence of the\nUSSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will no longer\nbe capable of threatening the security of the United States from\nthat area or the peace, national independence or stability of the\nAsiatic nations.\nWARE ARCHIVES \"NATIDUAL AND\nPolitical Considerations\n4. Asia is in the throes of political upheaval. The commu-\nnist offensive, nationalism and the revolt against colonial rule,\nthe emergence of new nations, the decline of western influence,\nthe absence of a stabilizing balance of power, the prevalence of\nterrorism, economic distress and social unrest, and the repercus-\n-2-\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nsions of the struggle between the Soviet world and the free world\nare currently disruptive forces. The conditions now prevailing\nin Asia render the realization of United States objectives there\ndifficult and facilitate expansion of the area of communist con-\ntrol and Soviet influence.\n5. The USSR is now an Asiatic power of first magnitude with\nexpanding influence and interests extending throughout continen-\ntal Asia and into the Pacific. Since the defeat of Japan, which\nended a balance of power that had previously restrained Russian\npressures in China and the Pacific, the Soviet Union has been\nable to consolidate its strategic position until the base of\nSoviet power in Asia now comprises not only the Soviet Far East,\nbut also China north of the Great Wall, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles.\nJapan is the principal component of a Far Eastern war-making\ncomplex remaining outside the Soviet orbit. If Japan were added\nto the communist bloc, the Soviet Asiatic base could become a\nsource of strength capable of tipping the balance of world power\ndangerously against the United States.\nAR LIBRARY\n6. Great as are the economic and military advantages of\nBARRI DE APENIVES INATIONAL AND\nthis situation to the USSR, the political advantages are equally\nsignificant. In estimating the degree of political pressure that\nthe USSR exerts from its present position in Asia, it should be\nremembered that Asiatic peoples are traditionally submissive to\npower and habituated to authoritarian government and the suppres-\nsion of the individual. Because of its strong position in Asia\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nthe USSR with relatively little overt interference in other states,\nat relatively small cost, and at limited risk, is able to give\nassistance and impetus to native communist movements. The political\noffensive of the Kremlin tends to gather additional momentum as each\nnew success increases the vulnerability of the next target. Commu-\nnist success in North China facilitates communist victory in South\nChina. Communist control of China would support the transformation\nof Burma and Indo-China into communist regimes; this in turn would\nopen the way for the fall of Thailand and the infiltration of Malaya\nand Indonesia. Exploitation by the communists of present opportu-\nnities to seize China and Korea and to penetrate the balance of\nAsia would increase the pressure on and facilitate eventual control\nof Japan.\nTRUMAN LIDITAIL\n7. Japan has ceased to be a world power, but retains the\nWARRY e ARGHIVES INSTIONAL AND\ncapability of becoming once more a significant Asiatic power.\nWhether its potential is developed and the way in which it is used\nwill strongly influence the future pattern of politics in Asia.\nBefore its defeat, Japan was a strong anti-communist force in Asia.\nThis position stemmed not so much from ideological opposition to\ncommunism as from hostility to Russia engendered by a direct power\nrivalry between the two countries. With the disappearance of this\nrivalry much of the motivating force behind Japan's former anti-\ncommunist stand is lost. The structure of Japanese society and its\nmores are not fundamentally resistant to communist ideology. Like\nall Asiatics the Japanese have not had historical experience of\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nliberty and personal experience of individualism. Respect for a\ncommunal structure of society is ingrained and the discipline of\nthe State is traditional. The ideological vulnerability of the\nJapanese people to communism is enhanced by economic maladjustment,\nwhich will grow more serious through population increases, restric-\ntions on trade in the pre-treaty period and the attractiveness of\ntrade with the communist world in the post-treaty period.\n8. Under the terms of its present constitution Japan is\ntheoretically a pacifist state. Although it would be out of keeping\nwith most of Japan's history and tradition to rely upon moral\nrather than physical force for protection, the Japanese people are\npeculiarly capable of extreme reactions. Even if Japan should\nabandon the theory of pacifism and develop a military force in the\npost-treaty period, the political pressure of the overwhelming\nSoviet position in Asia would remain. Japan's principal assurance\nagainst external communist aggression supported by the USSR would\ncontinue to be adequate United States military support. Moreover\neven if Japan's military forces were re-established there is no\nfinal assurance that those forces would be used in opposition to\ncommunism if there were compelling economic and political reasons\nfor accommodation to. the communist world.\nBARRY 05 ABOVIVES TRUMAN \"NATICHAL AND LIBRANT\n9. It can be assumed that under present circumstances the\ncommunists have the capability of dominating China. Communist\ndomination of China is significant primarily because it enhances\nUSSR capabilities for obtaining Soviet objectives in Asia and\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nconcomitantly tends to insure the pro-Soviet political orientation\nof nearly half the population of that region, with the consequent\ndanger of eventual Soviet control over the remainder. Soviet\nability to capitalize on the situation in China will depend on\nWARY S TRUMAN ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL AND LIMBARY\nthe degree of control that the Kremlin can exert over Chinese\ncommunist leaders, and on the control that the Chinese communists\ncan exert over all elements of Chinese society. It must be\nassumed that in the absence of positive counter-measures the grasp\nof the USSR upon China and of the Chinese communists on the Chinese\npeople will, for the foreseeable future, grow more firm. While\n\"Titoism\" may be a possibility in China, its development cannot be\nexpected in time to be of assistance to the United States in\nsolving present security problems in Asia.\n10. Two parts of Asia have developed almost independently of\neach other - - China and Japan in the east and north, and India\nand Pakistan in the south. Between these two centers of development\nlie the countries and dependencies from Burma to the Philippines\nwhich have in the past been influenced from both centers and which\ncan in the future be drawn toward either center. There are many\nindications that India aspires in the long run to draw the interme-\ndiate area into its orbit. As a step toward this end, India may\nseek to form and lead a regional bloc or \"third force\" designed to\nbe \"neutral\" as between the United States and the USSR. India will\nresent any effort by the United States or the USSR to turn the\ncourse of events in south and southeast Asia in a different direction.\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nThese Indian aspirations, considered along with the suspicion which\nsome Indian leaders feel toward the United States and along with\nthe time required for India to solve its internal problems, stabi-\nlize its relations with Pakistan and become a significant industrial\narea, make it impracticable for the United States to rely upon\nIndia as the bulwark against communist expansion. However, India\nhas considerable moral influence derived from her revolutionary\nleaders and from her position as the largest of the Asian dependen-\ncies to become independent of colonial rule. Within the framework\nof its own views on nationalism and colonialism, India would be\nwilling to collaborate at least to a degree in solving the problems\nof south and southeast Asia in a manner not inimical to United\nStates security interests. We must not overlook the possibility\nof utilizing the means available to us to promote active Indian\nopposition to the spread of communism in South Asia.\nMARY S. TRUMAN ARCHIVES \"HATIONAL RECORDS AND LIMBON\n11. The current conflict between colonialism and native\nindependence is the most important political factor in southeast\nAsia. This conflict results not only from the decay of European\nimperial power in the area but also from a widening political\nconsciousness and the rise of militant nationalism among the subject\npeoples. With the exception of Thailand and the Philippines, the\nsoutheast Asia countries do not possess leaders practiced in the\nexercise of responsible power. The question of whether a colonial\ncountry is fit to govern itself, however, is not always relevant\nin practical politics. The real issue would seem to be whether\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nthe colonial country is able and determined to make continued\nforeign rule an overall losing proposition for the metropolitan\npower. If it is, independence for the colonial country is the only\npractical solution, even though misgovernment eventuates. A solu-\ntion of the consequent problem of instability, if it arises, must\nbe sought on a non-imperialist plane. In any event, colonial-\nnationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive commu-\nnist activities, and it is now clear that southeast Asia is the\ntarget of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin. In\nseeking to gain control of southeast Asia, the Kremlin is motivated\nin part by a desire to acquire southeast Asia's resources and\nTRUMAN\ncommunication lines, and to deny them to us. But the political\ngains which would accrue to the USSR from communist capture of\nWARRY ARCHIVES *NATIONAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS AND LIBRARY\nsoutheast Asia are equally significant. The extension of communist\nauthority in China represents a grievous political defeat for us;\nif southeast Asia also is swept by communism we shall have suffered\na major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt\nthroughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East\nand in a then critically exposed Australia. To counter the Soviet\nideological offensive, the United States should place its reliance\non the revolutionary theme of individual freedom and liberty under\nlaw with full scope for nationalism and the use of such cooperation\nas can be obtained from India, Pakistan, the Philippines and other\nfree Asiatic or Pacific nations.\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\n12. As a result of the decline of European influence and\nthe emergence of nationalism and new nations, traditional political\npatterns have been destroyed through much of Asia. Although\nBritain, the Netherlands and France still retain important terri-\ntories in Asia they are no longer able to shape the course of\nevents in that part of the world. Particularly significant is the\nwithdrawal of the British, who have traditionally provided the\nfoundations of political stability and security in south Asia and\nlarge parts of southeast Asia. The rise of new nations in this\narea has been accompanied by political instability and economic\ndeterioration. While these new nations may retain influential\nties with their former rulers, they will also increase their\nindependence of action as they gather strength and experience.\nBARRY BARTY ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL POVERNMENT naconos AND\nIn the meantime many of them are so weak that they must inevitably\nseek guidance either from the communist bloc or from the free\nnations, of which they accept the United States as leader. Even\nif the Asiatics were able eventually to create the \"neutral\"\nregional bloc for which there is some demand, such a bloc could\nhardly avoid partisanship in any world struggle and might well\nfall victim to the communist conspiracy through inherent weakness\nto concealed aggression and infiltration.\n13. With the rise of new nations and the decline of colo-\nnialism, a consciousness of common interests and a demand for\nregional collaboration is beginning to take form among the\ncountries of Asia. This growing feeling of regionalism will\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOR SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\ndoubtless result eventually in the creation of a formal regional\norganization. Increasing collaboration among the free Asiatic\nnations, whether through a formal organization or otherwise, would\nnot be inimical to United States interests if it left the way\nopen for collaboration between Asia and the West. However, in\nmodern times all of Asia has been subjected by western nations\nto some form of political and social inferiority. Moreover, the\npeoples of Asia are racially and culturally distinct from those\nof the West. Thus there exists the danger that a developing\nregionalism in Asia could become an anti-western racial polariza-\ntion jeopardizing United States interests in the area. This\nsuggests that the United States should seek to counteract any\nKARNY ADDRIVED TRUMAN \"RATIONAL nomune EXCORDS ww LIBRARY\ntendency toward east-west polarization without incurring the\nresentment which would be engendered by any attempt to reverse\nthe trend of regional collaboration in Asia. Our interests would\ntherefore appear to demand that we encourage a constructive\nAsiatic regionalism and seek on the basis of equal participation\nto guide it toward the formation of a Pacific Association freely\ncollaborating with the West in harmony with the UN Charter.\n14. In the last analysis, the United States is the only\nnation which offers a major check to the influence of the USSR\nin Asia. Asia is only one of several fronts on which the United\nStates directly or indirectly confronts the -USSR. Pressures, or\nlack of them, on any front affect all the others. Determination\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nof the effective use of United States power, in its total sense,\non any or all of these fronts - - European, Near Eastern, or\nAsiatic - - requires decisions based upon a constant and skillful\nre-evaluation of the costs involved and the probable results to\nbe obtained in each case, both in the event of war and its pro-\nbable aftermath, and in the event of continued peace. The fortu-\nnate circumstance of occupying a favorable position both in Europe\nand in Asia allows the USSR great flexibility in the pressures it\nmay apply. Operating from the center of the Eurasian continent,\nit may advance or retreat in the east or in the west as the occa-\nsion demands. There is no longer a force either in Europe or Asia\nwhich can withstand without full United States assistance the\npower of the USSR if it should be unleashed. The cost of bolstering\nthe forces of resistance in Europe is so great that the United\nStates has heretofore been unable to make important use of Asia\nHARRYA HARRY ARCHIVED TRUMAN PRADURAL AND LIBRITY\nas an area of coordinated counter-pressure, short of actual war.\nThis has resulted in giving the USSR not only the ability to choose\nthe degree of pressure to be put on any of the many fronts, but\nalso the front and the time. The USSR by the employment of cold\nwar tactics and subversive political activities in four years has\nachieved domination over more of the world's territory and people\nthan Germany and Japan were able to conquer and dominate by military\naction during approximately ten years of aggression. The United\nStates for its part must be able to apply pressure on any front\nat a time of its own choosing if it is not to lose the advantages\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nof the initiative in the struggle between the Soviet world and\nthe free world. The United States government has appropriated\nmoney to counter Soviet aggression and to combat Soviet subversion\nwith less than the desired results in Asia. The United States has\nthus far failed to make the most of the advantages in cold war\ntactics of seizing and retaining the initiative through the pro-\nsecution of a coordinated overt and covert cold war offensive.\nMobilization of our cold war potential and implementation by\neffective techniques and task forces is essential.\n15. United States ability directly to exert a counter-\nBARRYS BARRY U.S. ARGHIVES TRUMAN \"NATIONAL ROVERNITY AND\ninfluence in terms of power and prestige is now derived primarily\nfrom the temporary occupation of Japan and from more permanently\nheld rights in the Philippines and certain small islands. This\nsituation, coupled with the recurrent. tendency of United States\nopinion to advocate physical withdrawal from the Far East,\nseriously limits the influence which the United States can now\nexert in that area to check the USSR. Our ability would be\ngreatly enhanced if we could acquire broader permanent rights\nin the area. Formosa and the Pescadores represent a desirable\nlocation in this sense, though it would be desirable in seeking\npermanent rights in these islands to use a method which would be\ndefensible against the inevitable charge of imperialism.\nStrategic Considerations\n16. The Asiatic littoral marks the one place in the world\nwhere security spheres permanently manned by the national forces\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nof the United States and the USSR meet. The potential power of\nAsia is strategically significant both to the United States and\nto the USSR because of its capacity in the long run to affect the\nrelative military strength of these two countries and hence the\ncharacter of military operations in the event of war between them.\nTranslation of the Asian power potential into military strength\nwould require development of each of its elements - organization\nand training of manpower, exploitation of natural resources, im-\nprovement of communications and further industrialization - as\nTRUMAN \"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES MD LIDRAIN\nwell as their integration toward coordinated objectives. Even\ngiven the proper atmosphere for development, including the power\nto consolidate as necessary, the authority to divert channels of\ntrade, and the control required to articulate the lines of commu-\nnication of an industrial complex - the full development of Asia's\npotential power is a long term affair. In the power potential of\nAsia, Japan plays the most important part by reason of its indus-\ntrious, aggressive population, providing a large pool of trained\nmanpower, its integrated internal communications system with a\ndemonstrated potential for an efficient merchant marine, its\nalready developed industrial base and its strategic position.\n17. The location of Asia, contiguous to the USSR and sepa-\nrated from the United States, presents different strategic implica-\ntions, both offensive and defensive, to the United States and to\nthe USSR. The Asian power potential is more valuable to Russia\nthan to the United States. The estimated military-industrial\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\ncapacity of the whole of Asia is equal to nearly half that of the\nUSSR, and only about one-tenth that of the United States. The\nmanpower of Asia, while of some military importance to the USSR,\nis in the long term of relatively greater importance to the\npotential industrial capacity of the area. The industrial plant\nof Japan would be the richest strategic prize in the Far East for\nthe USSR. Japan, with a military industrial potential equal to\nabout one-fourth that of Russia, ready access to raw materials in\nManchuria, China and Korea, large resources of trained military\nand industrial manpower and a strategic location, could be the\nkey to a potent self-sufficient war-making complex in Asia. This\ncomplex controlled by the Soviet Union would add measurably to\nthe war-making potential of the USSR. Russia could not immediately\nbuild up a powerful self-sufficient war-making complex in Asia\nwithout access to Japan. Hence it is obvious that the trained\nWARN S. TRUMAN \"NATIONAL LIBRACK\nARGHINES AHD\namounts\nmanpower and industrial capacity of Japan must be denied to the\nUSSR even though economic weakness and the reluctance of former\nenemies to permit à Japanese military renascence will probably\npreclude Japan's defensive self-sufficiency against a major power\nfor a considerable period. Other assets of great value to Russia\ninclude tin, rubber and South China's tungsten. Petroleum coming\nmostly from Indonesia including Borneo, while not essential to\nmeet Russian domestic requirements, is one of the most important\nstrategic materials in the region. Asia could be of further value\nto Russia in a preclusive sense by reducing relative United States\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nmilitary strength through denial of strategic raw materials and use\nof communication lines.\n18. While the United States could establish a limited but\ncostly Asiatic war economy without access to Korea, Manchuria and\nChina, the strategic value of Asia to the United States rests on\nthree considerations. In the first place United States or Western\nleadership and influence over Asia would prevent the acquisition\nby the Soviets of those elements of power which would add signifi-\ncantly to the Russian war-making potential. Secondly, Asia contains\nindigenous forces which if effectively developed in aggressive\npursuit of the cold war should be able by means short of war to\ncommence the roll-back of Soviet control and influence in the area,\nwithout constituting a serious prolonged drain on United States\neconomy. The indigenous forces of Asia, including manpower reserves,\nwould also be a valuable asset if available for the support of the\nUnited States in the event of war. Thirdly, Asia is the source\nof numerous raw materials, principally tin and natural rubber,\nwhich are required by the United States for stockpiling and for\ncurrent industrial operations.\nTROMAN INATIONAL\n19. Since, from the military point of view, the primary\nHARRIE ARCHIVES COVERNMENT RECORDS AND\nstrategic interests and war objectives of the United States\nconsistent with the aim of destruction of the enemy's means to wage\nwar, are not now in Asia, the current basic concept of strategy\nin the event of war with the USSR is to conduct a strategic\noffense in the \"West\" and a strategic defense in the \"East\". In\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\n-15-\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nkeeping with this basic concept and in light of the strategic\ninterests of the United States and the USSR as developed above,\ncertain principles may be stated. As a primary matter in the\nevent of war, it is essential that a successful strategic defense\nin the \"East\" be assured with a minimum expenditure of military man-\npower and material in order that maximum effort may be expended in\nthe \"West\". In order to gain freedom of access to the Asian conti-\nnent within these limitations, the United States must now concen-\ntrate its efforts on bringing to bear such power as can be made\n15ARF S.TROMAN ANOIVES \"HATIONAL AND LIDERATE\navailable, short of the commitment of United States military\nforces, in those areas which will show the most results in return\nfor the United States effort expended. In addition the United\nStates must maintain a strategic position which will facilitate\ncontrol of both coastal and intercontinental lines of communica-\ntion in Asia.\n20. From the military point of view, the United States must\nmaintain a minimum position in Asia if a successful defense is\nto be achieved against future Soviet aggression. This minimum\nposition is considered to consist of at least our present degree\nof control of the Asian offshore island chain, and in the event\nof war its denial to the communists. The chain represents our\nfirst line of defense and in addition, our first line of offense\nfrom which we may seek to reduce the area of communist control,\nusing whatever means we can develop, without, however, using\nsizeable United States armed forces. The first line of strategic\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\ndefense should include Japan, the Ryukyus, Formosa, and the Philip-\npines. This minimum position will permit control of the main lines\nof communication necessary to United States strategic development\nof the important sections of the Asian area. It is considered that\nthis control may be adequately established by the United States only\nif the area of communist control is reduced.\n21. In the sense of modern military forces, Asia is militarily\nweak. Except for India and communist-controlled China, no indi-\nvidual state in Asia is currently capable of effectively asserting\nits military force outside its own borders without substantial aid\nfrom foreign sources. India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the Philippines\nand Korea have a limited capacity to resist external invasion and\nmaintain internal security. It would be in the interests of the\nUnited States to promote in Asia the continued lack of modern\nnational military forces capable of aggression, provided a system\nof collective security could be established which would satisfy\nthe peoples of Asia and assure alignment of Asiatic manpower with\nthe United States in the event of war with the USSR.\nMARY S.TRUMAN PRATIONAL LIBRASH\nEconomic Considerations\n22. Except for industrialization in Japan and to a lesser\nextent in India, Asia is basically an agricultural region. Pressure\nof population on the land has depressed living standards to the\nmargin of subsistence. Communications and trading facilities are\npoor and productivity is low. However, Asia is the source of im-\nportant raw and semi-processed materials, many of them of strategic\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nvalue. Moreover, in the past, Asia has been a market for the pro-\ncessed goods of industrialized states, and has also been for the\nwestern colonial powers a rich source of revenue from investments\nand other invisible earnings.\n23. The United States has an interest in the attainment by\nthe free peoples of Asia of that degree of economic recovery and\ndevelopment needed as a foundation for social and political sta-\nbility. This interest stems from recognition of the principle\nAPPRIVES INSTITUTE - LIBRORY\nthat a viable economic life is essential to the survival of in-\ndependent states free from communist domination. However, politi-\ncal stability and military security are essential to economic\nrecovery. So long as Asia is in a state of political turmoil and\ninsecurity, neither economic revival to pre-war levels nor rational\neconomic development can be expected. Hence the most effective\nstep which could be taken in support of the United States interest\nin the economic recovery of Asia would be the adoption of policies\ndesigned to advance stability and security. Once the political\nand military atmosphere essential to economic recovery has been\nestablished, this recovery should be natural and relatively rapid.\nAt the same time certain economic steps could be taken concurrently\nwith political and military measures to assist in such recovery.\n24. Our interest in a viable economic life in the non-commu-\nnist countries of Asia would be advanced by increased trade among\nsuch countries. With the revival of Japan and the development\nof India the economies of Asiatic countries may become more com-\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nplementary. The economic vacuum resulting from the defeat of Japan,\nthe devastation caused by the war in other areas and the inter-\nference and restrictions arising from extensive governmental\ncontrols have contributed to the post-war decline of intra-Asian\ntrade. Given a favorable political and military atmosphere - --\nplus adequate freedom to individual traders, readily available\nworking capital, suitable commercial agreements establishing con-\nditions favorable to commerce and navigation and general assistance\nin the promotion of trade - - it is expected that intra-Asia trade\nwill recover rapidly. The patterns of such trade, however, are\nlikely to be considerably different from those existing before the\nwar. Thus certain advantages in production costs of various com-\nmodities in the United States, Japan and Southeast Asia suggest\nthe mutually beneficial character of trade of a triangular character\nbetween these three areas. In any event, a strong trading area\namong the free countries of Asia would add to general economic\ndevelopment and strengthen social and political stability. A\nHABBYA WARRY es U.S. TOOMAN AREHIVES AND STREET\nregional association among the non-communist countries of Asia\nmight become an important means of developing a favorable atmos-\nphere for such trade.\n25. South and Southeast Asia are among the principal sources\nof United States imports of basic commodities. Although imports\nfrom no single part of the world are vital to the United States,\nthose from Asia contribute greatly to United States security for\nstockpiling purposes and would be of great assistance in time of\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\n-19\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nwar if they remained available to us. At least until stockpiling\nlevels are met, this phase of the area's importance to the United\nStates will continue. Further, the development of events which\nmight lead to the exhaustion of such stockpiles would magnify the\nimportance of this source of supply. Exports to Asia from the\nUnited States are of less importance than are imports, but are not\ninsignificant. In brief, the economic advantage derived by the\nUnited States from our trade with non-communist Asia is considera-\nble and there is little doubt of the wisdom of its development.\n26. One effective means available to the United States for\nassisting in economic development, particularly in Southeast Asia,\nis the orderly and sustained procurement, both by private and\npublic agancies, of strategic and other basic commodities, such\nHARVH or APPROVED PROVIDINAL MID\nas tin, rubber, and hard fibers, in which the countries of that\narea have a marked comparative advantage in the economies of pro-\nduction. Moreover, United States purchases of strategic materials\nrepresent an important source of dollars for the sterling area and\na major element in supporting the economies of several Asiatic\ncountries of the sterling community. Another desirable step in\nfurthering economic development in certain countries in Asia would\nbe the reconstruction of transportation facilities such as ports,\nbridges and railroad rolling stock, particularly in Burma and Ma -\nlaya.\n27. Trade and other economic relations between United States\nterritory and communist areas in China and Manchuria is now almost\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nnonexistent. Although the United States might derive some econo-\nmic advantage from such trade (especially from iron ore and coking\ncoal imports into Japan) it is obvious that any trade allowed would\nbe to the net advantage of the communists and would be terminated\nthe moment they considered their advantages not sufficiently great.\nIt is also clear that it would not be in our interests to permit\nJapan and other non-communist areas to become economically depen-\ndent on relations with communist areas, giving the communists an\nimportant weapon in their campaign for expansion of the area of\ntheir control and influence. These considerations, however, in-\ncrease the necessity of promoting commerce among the non-communist\ncountries of Asia.\nFundamental Policy Decisions\n28. In the light of the foregoing it is apparent that if\nHARRYA INDIANATION GOVERNING AND\nthe United States is to achieve its basic security objectives in\nAsia it must reconsider its policies in that area, and be pre-\npared to make certain fundamental decisions respecting future policy.\nThe deteriorating situation in Asia demands that these decisions\nshould be made without delay.\n29. The first of the fundamental policy decisions concerns\ngur role in the future association of Asiatic and Pacific govern-\nments. As a power with security interests in Asia, the United\nStates must determine its attitude toward such an association.\nThe Asiatic peoples will draw together under their own, under\ncommunist or under American leadership; it is almost inevitable\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nthat they will draw together. If they do so under communist\nleadership there arises the threat to United States security which\nwe are seeking to prevent. If they draw together under Asiatic\nleadership alone, there remains the danger of communist infiltra-\ntion or alternatively a racial polarization making protection of\nour interests more difficult. It would therefore seem in the best\ninterests of the United States to participate in and guide such\nan association toward harmony with the free world. United States\nparticipation and guidance should be based upon equality and\npartnership between all members of the Pacific Association. Any\nsuggestion of arrogrance or superiority on the part of the United\nStates is to be avoided. It should also be made clear that the\nAssociation is not a vehicle for obtaining aid from the United\nStates.\n30. In China the United States faces the fundamental policy\ndecision whether to accommodate itself to a communist China or to\noppose communism. Continued challenge to the communist ability\nto seize, hold and consolidate power in China is in the interest\nof the United States. The degree and method of United States\nBARRY TRUMAN \"HATIONAL GOVERNMENT ANDOODS WAD LIBRATT\nassistance to keep alive that challenge remains to be determined.\nUnited States opposition to communist control of China will not\nincrease communist opposition to the United States in Asia. Accom-\nmodation by the United States to a communist China would greatly\nweaken our position in Asia and might make impossible a successful\nstand against communism in the balance of Asia by means short of\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nwar. If the communists should be completely successful in China\nand be able after a period of years to consolidate their power\nbeyond the possibility of internal challenge, the United States\nBARRY U.S. TRUMAN \"ARTIONAL AND LIBRER\nwould be in no worse political position for having opposed them\nthan it would be for having appeased them. It is in our interest\nto prevent that eventuality even while we must recognize it as a\npossibility. At the same time the remote possibility of \"Titoism\"\nin China is to be recognized, and any opportunity to encourage and\nfoment suspicion and antagonism between the Chinese people and\nthe USSR, as well as possible schisms within the Chinese Communist\nhierarchy, should be exploited. In the light of the present situa-\ntion and of all intelligence reports it would be folly, however,\nto base United States policy on the faint hope or distant prospect\nof \"Titoism\" in China, and thus to deny to the United States the\nmoral strength of opposing communism because of its basic evil.\n31. In Japan the United States faces the fundamental policy\ndecision whether to continue the occupation indefinitely or to\npress for a peace settlement at the earliest possible date. United\nStates security requires that Japan be a potential ally, making\navailable in support of United States interests in the event of\nwar its territory, manpower, industrial and communications facili-\nties. According to current United States policy, the United States\nrequires in time of peace only that it be able to use the naval\nbase facilities at Yokosuka. It is inevitable that the Japanese\nwill increasingly resent continued military occupation, no matter\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nhow benevolent. The friendly ties of a dependable ally cannot be\nbased on inferior status or military occupation. Indefinite con-\ntinuation of the occupation increases the danger of the United\nStates being forced to yield from political weakness in Japan\nrather than to lead with strength. It increases the possibility\nof obedience turning to disobedience and open resistance. If that\nfatal corner were turned the situation would become irretrievable.\nThere remains adequate Japanese leadership convinced that Japan's\nbest fortune lies with and not against the United States. At the\nsame time, it would be unwise to assume that there are not in\nJapan deep scars of resentment and thoughts of revenge which only\ntime and wise statesmanship can obliterate. If the Japanese are\nnot enabled and encouraged to reach out economically and politically\nthrough peaceful means, they will either atrophy or again become\naggressive. Thus far they have shown little indication of losing\ntheir national virility.\nHARRY 5 TRUMAN TRATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRAM\n32. With the eventual withdrawal from Japan, the United\nE.S.\nGOVERNENT\nStates must face the fundamental policy decision whether to estab-\nlish in Asia a position which would be politically impressive or\nto withdraw physically to our own territories and islands in the\nPacific. Provided we can assume that in the event of war the USSR\nwill not be able immediately to occupy any of the Asian off-shore\nisland chain and that we will be able to establish whatever addi-\ntional bases will be required for the conduct of the war, bases in\nthe Ryukyus are from the military point of view, adequate for our\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\ninitial war needs. But from the political point of view our present\nbase system in the Pacific is inadequate. Freedom to use Formosa\nwould enhance our ability to exert our influence in Asia. Hence\nwe must decide whether to acquire Formosa and if the decision is in\nthe affirmative we must determine the means. These means should be\nsuch as will be defensible against the inevitable charge of \"imper-\nialism\".\n33. Other policy decisions concern south and southeast Asia.\nWe must decide whether to attempt to make India the bulwark against\nthe extension of communist control into this area. In the light of\nIndia's ambitions, the suspicion of some Indian leaders toward\nUnited States motives and the elements of weakness in the structure\nof India, it appears clear that such an attempt would be unwise\nas the principal basis for United States opposition to communism.\nWEREY St U.S. APCRIVES TROMAN \"MATIONAL SOMIH AND UID\nIt would, however, be in our interest to endeavor to draw India\ninto such collaboration with the free world as appears politically\nfeasible and as would not endanger our interests. Our problems\nwith respect to southeast Asia are probably solvable in the context\nof existing policy concepts, provided we do not lose in all of Asia.\nIt would be desirable that we continue to exercise leadership direc-\nted toward resolving the colonial nationalist conflict in such a\nway as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist move-\nments, lay the basis for political stability and resistance to commu-\nnism, and avoid weakening the colonial powers who are our western\nallies. To the extent practicable and when in the interests of the\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nUnited States, efforts should also be made to obtain the collabora-\ntion of western nations having interests in Asia.\n34. In the economic field the United States faces the funda-\nmental policy decision whether to utilize economic warfare as a\nweapon to oppose communism in Asia, particularly in China. If We\nare to assume an attitude of basic opposition to communism in\nAsia, it would clearly not be to our interest to discard the prin-\nciple of economic warfare, which has rich potentialities both for\nweakening the hold of communism upon areas which it now controls\nand for reducing its attraction for areas presently free but under\npressure. In connection with the latter point, we must be particu-\nlarly alert to prevent countries now or prospectively friendly to\nus, such as Japan, from becoming economically dependent on commu-\nnist areas and hence more susceptible to communist influence. Eco-\nnomic warfare could be a flexible instrument of policy, affording\nin its methods and implementation the widest scope for tactical\nmaneuver in the light of changing conditions.\nAMERICA TRUMAN NATIONAL LISTED\nABOUTHS AND\n35. Other problems in the economic field do not involve\nfundamental policy decisions. However, United States participation\nin promoting the economic recovery and development of Asia, at\nleast to the degree required for a foundation for political stability,\nmay require some changes in policy and in particular will require\nthe sustained application of consistent measures, many of which,\nsuch as the Point IV program, are already in operation or under\nconsideration. The United States in recent years has demonstrated\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nits willingness to use its economic resources in support of security\nobjectives, at least in emergency situations. In Asia at present,\nthe principal economic need in support of United States interests\nis not direct aid in the form of grants from public funds, but\nTHEM U.S. TRUMAN ANDRIVES J'UATIONAL GOVERNO ARMINT AECORDS RED LIBE\ncooperative assistance in the promotion of private trade, invest\nment and economic development. (However, emergency situations\nundoubtedly will arise in the future as in the past which will call\nfor direct relief). The greatest prospect for economic progress\nin Asia will be found under conditions in which private initiative\nand free enterprise can play a leading role, in which international\ntrade will operate on a basis of mutually advantageous exchange\nof goods and services, rather than on financial grants, and in which\ntrade will be free to the greatest extent possible from governmen-\ntal restrictions. It devolves upon governments to create an atmos-\nphere of general confidence, which can derive only from political\nstability and security, supported by sound economic policies. The\npresent adverse trends in Asia are not susceptible to reversal by\nmaterial assistance alone. Financial and material assistance, where\nessential as an adjunct to other measures, will be most successful\nif extended as a stimulant to the recipients' latent capacity for\nself-help rather than as a mere monetary inducement not to accommo-\ndate to communism.\n36. United States power and prestige in the world place this\ngovernment in a role of leadership which remains unchanged whether\nthat role is played in a positive manner through action or in a\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nnegative manner through inaction. Both are effective; but only\nwith a program for action can the United States retain that degree\nof influence necessary to achieve its objectives. The policies\nset forth in the Conclusions are designed to express a dynamic\nprogram clarifying the direction in which the United States should\ninfluence the future course of events in Asia. This program is\nessentially expressive of what is desirable for the United States.\nWhile describing certain steps to be taken at once and while sug-\ngesting a springboard for positive action in Asia, this program\ndoes not provide objectives in absolute terms to be achieved by a\nspecific date. The practicalities of day-to-day developments will\ndetermine what it is possible to accomplish in the light of what\nis desirable. In refinement and implementation of this dynamic\nprogram it will be necessary on occasion to specify objectives to\nbe achieved within a given period of time. The policies of the\nUnited States with respect to Asia do not differ fundamentally\nWARRY ARGINVES TRUMAN FINATIONAL RECEIDS 180 LIDRAPO\nfrom its policies with respect to the rest of the world in the\nsense that the principles for which this country stands are univer-\nsal in their applicability. Under those principles, in Asia as\nin the rest of the world, the United States desires continued ex-\npansion of mutually beneficial exchanges among the various peoples\nand governments. In order to promote these exchanges, the United\nStates desires tolerance of different but nevertheless compatible,\npolitics, cultures and races. In order to protect and to preserve\nthese exchanges the United States desires an alignment of power\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nwhich will quickly defeat any nation resorting to war and eventually\nwill make resort to war unthinkable.\nCONCLUSIONS\n37. Our basic security objectives with respect to Asia are:\na. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on\na stable and self sustaining basis in conformity with the\npurposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.\nb. Reduction of the power and influence of the USSR\nATONISES DOVERSION AND LIBRARY\nin Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will no longer\nbe capable of threatening the security of the United States\nfrom that area or the peace, national independence and stability\nof the Asiatic nations.\nC. Prevention of power relationships in Asia which would\nenable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security\nof the United States from that area, or the peace, national\nindependence and stability of the Asiatic nations.\n38. If these objectives are to be achieved, the United States\nmust take the initiative in Asia and exert an influence consonant\nwith its responsibilities by developing a program which will not\nonly advance its own national interests but will also appeal to the\nfree Asiatic nations as being compatible with their national in-\nterests and worthy of their support.\n39. As the basis for eventual realization of our objectives,\nit should now be determined that the United States will pursue\ntoward Asia as a whole a coordinated, long-range policy which\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\n29-\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nincludes the following components:\nA. The United States should encourage and participate\nin a Pacific Association of non-communist Asiatic and Paci-\nfic nations. In so doing we should bear in mind the sensi-\nbilities of the Asiatics, and be guided by such principles\nas the following:\nMARRY TRUMAN INATIONAL LIBRITY\n(1) The Association should be based on equality and\nARCHIVES GOVERNATE ROOTROS AND\npartnership, and designed for constructive multilateral\ncollaboration in solving the political, economic, security\nand cultural problems of the area.\n(2) The Association should be in consonance with the\nobligations of states under the Charter of the United\nNations.\n(3) The Association should be open to all free peoples\nof Asia and the Pacific, but this aim need not preclude\nits initiation on a more limited basis. The United States\nand the Philippines, with or without Japan, could form\nthe nucleus, but a broader base might be desirable.\n(4) The Association should promote the development of\nclose, friendly relations between the peoples of Asia\nand the United States and other free nations.\n(5) From the outset the Association should not give the\nimpression that any of the members individually or col-\nlectively be obligated to give or certain to receive\neconomic grants-in-aid or security guarantees.\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nB. The United States should in concert with the members of\nthe Pacific Association begin now the gradual development of\ncollective security arrangements for Asia based on self-help\nand mutual assistance and, as appropriate, modelled on the\narrangements contemplated by Article 43 of the UN Charter.\nSuch further principles as the following should be taken into\naccount:\n(1) These arrangements should be designed eventually to\nobviate competitive national military forces among the\nAsiatic nations, enabling national forces to be devoted\nto internal security purposes.\n(2) These arrangements should be designed to discourage\naggression in Asia, particularly among the Asiatic nations.\n(3) These arrangements should provide a basis for\nutilizing the resources and territory of the region in\nsupport of the security interests of Asia and of the\nUnited States in the event of war.\nUNREAS MARAY u APCRIVES ROODER'S AND\n\"NATICHAL LIBRARY\n(4) The United States should be prepared to provide\nas an immediate and interim step, certain military ad-\nvice and assistance to Asiatic nations which are making\ndetermined efforts to combat communist forces and are\nwilling to participate in effective collective security\narrangements for Asia.\nC. The United States should obtain title to Formosa and the\nPescadores and transfer them to the trusteeship of the Pacific\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\n-31-\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nAssociation.\n(1) Title should be obtained from Japan in a peace\nsettlement, relinquishment of China's claims being\nsecured through negotiation with Nationalist China.\n(2) Trusteeship arrangements should be coordinated\nwith the UN trusteeship system through the General\nAssembly.\nHABRYS WARY Cy. ABCEIVED TRUMAN REPUBLICATION \"MATIONAL\" ARD LIBRARY\n(3) The Islands should be utilized as a base for the\norganization and development of such collective security\nforces as may grow out of the arrangements envisaged\nin sub-paragraph B above, and should be available to\nUnited States forces in the event of war.\nD. The United States should take every practicable measure\nto halt further aggression by the Chinese communists and\nshould oppose communism in China, both overtly and covertly,\nby all practicable means short of the commitment of United\nStates military forces.\n(1) Consideration should be given to the appointment\nof a high ranking individual (military officer or civil-\nian) to direct all United States efforts against commu-\nnism in the vicinity oft China.\n(2) Actions to be taken under this policy should be\nselected in the light of the limitations on funds avail-\nable for this purpose.\n(3) United States efforts, both covert and overt as\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nconditions warrant, should include political and econo-\nmic operations and military advice and assistance, the\nlatter directed particularly against communist weakness\non the sea and in the air.\n(4) The United States should in principle avoid extending\nrecognition to a communist regime. In the event we are\neventually forced for tactical reasons to recognize or\nenter into other relations with a communist regime, such\nsteps should not be permitted to alter our basic position\nof opposition to communism in China. In any event every\neffort should be made to avoid recognizing the communist\nregime as the sole government of China. The possibility\nof recognizing a communist regime in part of China and\ncontinuing to recognize another government in non-commu-\nnist China should be explored.\n(5) The National Security Council Staff should prepare\nand submit for the consideration of the Council a report\non the position of the United States with respect to China,\nE. The United States should conclude (with or without Soviet\nTRUMAN\nALL\nparticipation) a peace settlement with Japan.\nHARRY\nARCHIVER AND\n(1) Before the peace settlement and the withdrawal of\n4894⑇\nCOVERN\noccupation forces, definite and timely steps should be\ntaken to provide for the future security of Japan, both\nexternal and internal.\n(2) This settlement should be brief, non-punitive and\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nconfined to general principles.\n(3) The settlement should provide a definite date for\nthe termination of the occupation.\n(4) The peace treaty and collateral arrangements must\nbe consistent with our aim of promoting the orientation\nof Japan toward the United States and away from communism.\n(5) In conjunction with the settlement, arrangements\nshould be made which will be designed to satisfy United\nStates strategic requirements in peace and in the event of\nwar.\n(6) The National Security Council Staff should prepare\nand submit for the consideration of the Council a re-\nport on the position of the United States with respect\nto Japan.\nHARRY ARGHIVES TRUMAN \"MATIONAL AND LIBRANT\nF. The United States should endeavor to create in Asia an\nU.S.\nDOVERNMENT\natmosphere hospitable to economic recovery and development.\nTo this end policies (such as those envisaged in other para-\ngraphs of these Conclusions) designed to contribute to political\nstability and security are essential. Such policies should\nbe supported by economic activities along the following lines:\n(1) Maintenance of a liberal United States import policy\nand vigorous promotion of private trade with non-communist\nAsia, including development of a coordinated program of\ntrade promotion.\n(2) Execution of a stockpile program based upon United\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\n-34-\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nStates needs for strategic reserves and upon immediate\nand long-range economic effects in the supplying\ncountries.\n(3) Extension of early credits, preferably by the\nInternational Bank or private source, for a few spe-\ncific key economic purposes, particularly the rehabili-\ntation of war-devastated facilities, the present con-\ndition of which retards economic recovery.\n(4) Negotiation of treaties of friendship and commerce,\nincluding definition and establishment of conditions\nwhich will facilitate capital movements, trade, and\nBARRY a ARCHIVES RECORDS AND\nS.TRO LIBRET\nother economic relations between the United States and\nthe countries of Asia.\n(5) Promotion of a strong trading area among the non-\ncommunist countries of Asia independent of Soviet-domina-\nted areas.\n(6) Encouragement of similar trade between free Asia\nand other parts of the free world.\n(7) Vigorous prosecution in Asia of the Point IV program.\nG. The United States should, as a step separate and apart\nfrom the Pacific Association, formulate, negotiate and conclude\narrangements with Asiatic and Pacific governments which will\nassure cooperation against communism in all practicable non-\nmilitary fields, such as intelligence information exchanges,\ncontrol of travel and communication, psychological warfare both\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\nat home and abroad.\nH. The United States should, as a policy separate from its\nlong-range economic position, conduct a program of economic\nwarfare in opposition to communism in Asia. The United States\nshould place no reliance upon trade with communist China or\nother Soviet-dominated areas for essential imports into this\ncountry, Japan or any other area whose recovery is a matter\nof interest to the United States. The United States should\nactively endeavor to deny to the communist countries of Asia\nany advantages from trade with other parts of the world,\nparticularly with respect to shipments of military supplies,\nindustrial equipment or raw materials which would augment the\nmilitary capability of Soviet-dominated countries.\nI. The United States should devise a propaganda campaign\nboth foreign and domestic, and publish United States policies\nand programs vis-a-vis Asia designed to gain maximum support\nTRUMAN\nS\nboth at home and abroad.\nHARRY\n\"RATIONAL\nARCHIVED AND\nRECORDS\nJ. The United States should collaborate in bringing about\nADMIN\nU.S.\nthe peaceful evolutionary settlement of dependent area pro-\nblems which will be in accordance with United States interests,\nwill satisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist move-\nments and will not seriously weaken nor alienate our western\nallies.\nK. The United States should in its own interests endeavor\nto obtain the collaboration in Asiatic affairs of other non-\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY\ncommunist nations having interests in Asia.\nL. The United States should mobilize all instrumentalities\nof the government which may be effectively utilized in or\ncontribute to the implementation of the policies contained\nherein, in order that a coordinated political, economic and\nhold\npsychological offensive, both overt and covert, may be brought\nto bear against the communist conspiracy in Asia. Such mobi-\nlization might be implemented by a special executive agency\nor by an organization within an existing executive agency.\n40. The National Security Council Staff should submit for\nconsideration of the Council such additional reports as may be\nrequired for the elaboration or clarification of the basic policy\nwith respect to Asia set forth above.\nMARRY ARCHIVED TRUMAN \"RATIONAL ATTO LIBRARY\nRECORDS\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\n-37-"
}