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    "title": "National Security Council Report 73/1, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on the Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation",
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    "ocrText": "The President\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 73/1\nCOPY NO. 1\nE.\nA REPORT\nO, NSL DECLASSIFIED letter, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or\nBy NLT. He NARS 1-14-72 Date 2-10-77 77 (E)\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nTHE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\nWITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES\nIN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION\nHARRY U.S. TRUMAN \"NATIONAL LIBRARY\nJuly 29, 1950\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 73/1\nTOP SECRET\nJuly 29, 1950\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nBy NLT- letter, NARS Date\nTHE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\n(3) 10 (a)s pur (a)s -27S SSIFIED \"ZSIII 7030\nWITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES\nIN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION\nReferences: A. NSC Action No. 308-b\nB. NSC Action No. 315\nC. NSC 73\nPursuant to NSC Action No. 308-b, the enclosed report on the\nsubject, prepared by the NSC Consultants and Staff, with the as-\nsistance of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense,\nthe National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence\nAgency, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National\nSecurity Council and the Secretary of the Treasury.\nIt is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosure,\nit be submitted to the President for consideration with the recom-\nmendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and\ndirect their implementation by all appropriate Executive Depart-\nments and Agencies of the U. S. Government.\nJAMES S. LAY, JR.\nExecutive Secretary\nCC: The Secretary of the Treasury\nNSC 73/1\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nTOP SECRET\nREPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nE.O. NSC DECLASSIFIED 11652, Sec. 3(E) and ID) or (E)\nletter, 1-18-77\non\nBy NLT. HC ; NARS Date 240.27\nTHE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\nWITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES\nIN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To estimate possible further Soviet moves and assess and\nappraise the position and actions of the United States with respect\nthereto in the light of the Korean situation.\nANALYSIS\nIntroduction\n2. In determining our position in the present crisis we must\nbear in mind that the fundamental objective of the United States is\nto maintain the integrity and vitality of its free society and the\nmeasure of world order necessary thereto. This involves the will-\ningness to fight for that objective if necessary. As the aggressor\ncontinues his policy of expansion, we must accept the possibility\nof local conflicts and counter such moves within the limits of our\ncapabilities. As a deterrent our capabilities should be increased\nas rapidly as practicable. Although a global war has not necessar-\nily begun in Korea and may not eventuate, the U. S. has nevertheless\nbeen indirectly at war for some time.\n3. The United States is not now capable of conducting immedi-\nately a general military offensive against the USSR because our\nforces are either not appropriately positioned or are so inadequate\nNSC 73/1\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nas to be incapable of effective action. In the present crisis,\nwhile the United States forces in the Far East are proportionally\nstronger than in any other overseas area, effective action against\nthe North Koreans in Korea can be accomplished only by diversion of\nUnited States forces from existing missions in the Far East and by\nthe reinforcement of such forces from the United States or elsewhere.\nIn certain other areas of the world where United States forces are\nnow located, these forces might be strong enough to take effective\naction against local indigenous forces but could not act on a scale\ncomparable to that in Korea.\nGeneral\n4. It is a tenet of communism that war between communist and\nnon-communist countries is inevitable. This conviction is a basic\nelement in the determination of Soviet policy, although history has\nshown that Russia can be influenced to delay action or retreat from\nlocal objectives if strongly opposed. The Kremlin is determined\nfirst to protect and to preserve its regime in Russia and second to\npromote world communism. The USSR is the implacable enemy of the\nUnited States and the non-communist world. Therefore, the degra-\ndation, weakening and ultimate destruction of the United States are\nprimary intermediate aims of the USSR.\n5. In assessing the danger of further aggressive moves di-\nrected by the USSR, it is essential to take into account both esti-\nmated Soviet intentions and Soviet military capabilities. The USSR\nNSC 73/1\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nLUMAN\nUSRA\nHARIN\n\"NAYNINAL\nTOP SECRET\nAROHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nGOVERNMENT\nhas the military capability to occupy any country on its periphery,\nto invade all of Western Europe and the Near and Middle East, to\nmake direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and the North American\ncontinent and upon ocean shipping, and to reinforce strongly the\ncommunist military effort in the Far East. The USSR is not, how-\never, believed to have the capability of preventing the U. S. from\ncarrying out an atomic attack or of immediately crippling our indus-\ntrial potential. The USSR, by provoking insurrections and satellite\narmed actions simultaneously on many fronts, and without openly com-\nmitting its own forces, would confront the U. S. and its allies with\nthe following alternatives: abandoning positions of vital political\nand strategic importance, committing and dissipating available capa-\nbilities on the many fronts chosen by the USSR, or undertaking global\nwar.\n6. Given these capabilities, which have existed for some time,\nan attempt must be made to answer the question whether the Soviet-\ninspired hostilities in Korea indicate a change in immediate Soviet\nintentions. This analysis attempts to scan only the immediate future\nrather than a period several months ahead.\n7. The opening of hostilities in Korea could conceivably mean\nthat the Kremlin intends to embark on any one or a combination of\nthe following courses of action:\na. To initiate global war.\nb. To employ Soviet forces, alone or with satellite forces,\nin isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited ob-\njectives, not designed to bring on global war.\nNSC 73/1\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nc. To inspire further aggression using only satellite\nforces, but not using USSR armed forces.\nd. To probe U. S. determination and military effectiveness.\nPossibility of Global War\n8. It has been our estimate that the Kremlin did not intend to\nengage in a major war and might be deterred from initiating such a\nwar in the future if confronted with sufficient political, economic\nand military strength. This estimate has not necessarily been in-\nvalidated by the events of the past few weeks, which are consistent\nwith the following interpretation:\na. In causing the attack to be launched in Korea, the Krem-\nlin did not intend to bring about a global war and did not ex-\npect, although militarily prepared for, United States military\ninvolvement in Korea. The probable aim of the Kremlin was\nsimply to gain control of the entire Korean peninsula and thus\nto strengthen materially its strategic position in Northern\nAsia with global political and military results.\nb. The Kremlin seems to have calculated its moves with a\nview to keeping the responsibility of the Soviet Government\nunengaged and its own military forces uncommitted.\n9. On the other hand, the events of the past few weeks could\nbe interpreted as the first phase of a general Soviet plan for global\nwar. Should the Kremlin in fact be desirous of or reconciled to a\nglobal war, of which the Korean situation is the first phase, the\nfollowing considerations might govern its actions in the near future:\nNSC 73/1\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\na. The Kremlin might be disposed to forego any action which\nit calculated would provoke global war until such time as the\nUnited States had reached the point of maximum diversion and at-\ntrition of its forces-in-being without involvement of the mili-\ntary forces of the Soviet Union. For example, as long as we\nare being forced to commit ever greater increments of our\nforces-in-being in Korea, the Kremlin might not hasten the out-\nbreak of general hostilities since the USSR would be increasing\nits own capabilities as those of the U. S. diminished. This\ncould change, however, at the point where the Kremlin estimated\nthat our maximum weakness had been reached, and that further\npassage of time leading to the material strengthening of the\nrelative position and military posture of the United States\nwould not work to Soviet advantage.\nAHOHIVES AND RECORDS GOVERNMENT LIBRARY\nb. The Kremlin might seek the maximum initial advantage by\nimmediate and simultaneous attack in all possible theatres of\naction on the Eurasian continent: Germany, Austria, Trieste,\nthe Balkans, the Near and Middle East, the Far East, and the\nBritish Isles. If overt attacks by organized Soviet military\nforces (as distinguished from satellite forces) were to occur\nagainst the territory of any North Atlantic Treaty power, or\nagainst the forces of any NAT power in Europe or in Asia, or\nupon South Korea, Iran, Turkey, Greece, or Yugoslavia, the only\nprudent basis for U. S. action would be the assumption that\nglobal war was probable.\nNSC 73/1\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nc. It is also possible that the actions described in b\nabove would be accompanied or be followed presently by a di-\nrect attack upon the continent of North America. A direct\nSoviet attack upon United States territory as well as upon its\narmed forces abroad is a Soviet capability.\nd. In view of the advantages of surprise and of the desir-\nability for an enemy of the U. S. to strike a crippling blow at\nthe North American industrial potential in order to achieve ul-\ntimate victory, the possibility must be constantly borne in mind\nthat the Kremlin might decide to initiate global war by a direct\nsurprise attack upon the territory of the United States before\ntaking the actions outlined in a or b above.\n10. Global war could come in one of three ways: (a) by Soviet\ndesign; (b) by a progression of developments growing out of the pres-\nent situation; or (c) by a miscalculation on the part of either the\nU. S. or the USSR. If there were evidence justifying the assumption\nof immediate global war by Soviet design, the only course for the\nUnited States would be full preparation at full speed. The present\nquestion is one of degree. While not ruling out the possibility\nthat global war is imminent, it is not yet a sufficient certainty\nto be the assumption on which U. S. action should be based. Our ef-\nforts should be directed toward increasing our war capabilities and\npreventing global war from developing.\nIN TRUMAN \"NATIONAL UBRART\nNSC 73/1\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nIsolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces\nto Achieve Local Objectives not Designed to Bring on Global War\n11. USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment of sat-\nellite forces there, should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon\nbut possibly as part of a general plan which might involve correlated\naction in other parts of the world. A danger of direct commitment of\nSoviet forces is in Korea itself where actual conflict is in progress\nbetween the United States and a Soviet satellite. A successful re-\npulse of the North Korean invasion would not merely restore the\nstatus quo. United States troops would be back in force in South\nKorea, and a build-up of military strength in the non-communist\nareas of the Far East would have taken place.\n12. The Kremlin might be prepared to risk a general conflict\nby launching a local armed attack in order to acquire territory re-\ngarded as of importance to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union might\nbe expected to accept greater risks to attain objectives of substan-\ntial military value. Without automatically starting global war by\nattacking American troops or a country covered by the North Atlantic\nTreaty, the principal areas where actual Soviet forces could be em-\nployed for a local purpose are Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece,\nAfghanistan, Pakistan, or Finland. In addition to any one or more\nof these local operations, the Soviets would still be capable of\nconducting with surprise important operations simultaneously in Ger-\nmany and Austria, in the Near, Middle and Far East, and against the\nUnited Kingdom and the North American continent. Soviet forces are\nalready deployed in sufficient strength to give them the military\nNSC 73/1\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ncapability to act in any or all of the following areas, among others:\nIran, Turkey, the Black Sea, Yugoslavia, and Finland.\na. In the case of Iran, it is possible that the Soviet\nGovernment would regard the risk of general war as relatively\nsmall while at the same time the acquisition of the Iranian oil\nfields and the reduction of a threat to the Baku oil region of\nthe Soviet Union are important Soviet objectives.\nb. In the case of Turkey, the control of the Dardanelles\nand the approaches to the eastern Mediterranean represent very\nimportant military considerations from the point of view of So-\nviet defense as well as a traditional and deep-seated Russian\nobjective. Soviet attack on Turkey would, however, involve\nserious risk of precipitating global war because the United\nStates is in close military association with Turkey and because\nof the Anglo-French-Turkish mutual assistance pact.\nc. Re-establishment of Soviet control over Yugoslavia\nARCHIVES TRUMAN \"NATIONAL AND LIBRARY\nRECORDS\nwould bring definite military advantages to the USSR. At the\nDOVERNMENT\nsame time, the Kremlin would have to weigh the political advan-\ntages of eliminating a dangerous source of communist heresy\nagainst the political dvantages of a Soviet armed assault\non a communist regime, which would tend to deepen rather than\nheal the disruptive effect of independent tendencies in the\ncommunist parties in the free world. Unless such an assault\nwere quickly successful, the repercussions throughout the for-\neign communist parties would be harmful to the Kremlin's prestige\nNSC 73/1\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nand control of the international communist movement. Success\nin Yugoslavia would enable the communists to renew guerrilla\noperations against Greece.\nd. Occupation of Finland, while completely within Soviet\ncapabilities, would undoubtedly encounter fierce and continued\nFinnish guerrilla resistance, which might render Finland less\nuseful to the USSR for the immediate future than the present\nstate of Soviet-Finnish relations.\ne. Afghanistan and Pakistan are of strategic value to the\nUSSR because of their geographical position. Afghanistan could\nbe occupied with little effort. An attack on Pakistan would re-\nquire much more effort and would incur serious risk of global\nwar because of Pakistan's membership in the British Commonwealth.\n13. Unless the Kremlin is willing to accept global war it will\nnot commit Soviet armed forces to action in Germany and Austria.\nSoviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces\n14. The USSR might gain considerably from a policy of initia-\ntion of piecemeal attacks by satellite forces against Yugoslavia,\nIran, Greece, Turkey, or other states around the Soviet periphery.\nFurther, it might be distinctly to the political and military advan-\ntage of the USSR to involve the allied nations progressively in con-\nflict without a declaration of war on the part of the USSR or with-\nout commitment of its military forces. Such action might leave the\nallies with the alternative of fighting an undeclared war, or of\nNSC 73/1\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET-\nTOP SECRET\nbeing open to the charge of aggression by initiating a declaration\nof war. None of these areas is one in which the USSR particularly\nneeds the advantage of surprise. Furthermore, the military and po-\nlitical capabilities of the USSR and its satellites are so great as\nto permit it to direct piecemeal action against isolated areas while\nstill retaining the capability of strategic surprise. A progressive\nseries of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the USSR would con-\nfront the United States and its allies with the issue whether they\nare willing to accept global war.\n15. According to present estimates, Rumania, Bulgaria, and\nHungary do not possess together sufficient military capabilities\nfor a successful assault on Turkey. However, a satellite attack\non Yugoslavia is a possibility. There have been indications of\npossible preparations for some satellite incursion against Greece.\n16. The use of Polish and Czechoslovakian troops is always\na military possibility in any action in Europe. However, withdrawal\nof large numbers of troops from Poland and Czechoslovakia, particu-\nlarly the latter, might require the employment of other forces to\nmaintain the present communist regime.\nARGATIONAL LIBRARY\nTRUMAN\n17. The use of the East German para-military forces against\nallied troops in Germany is another possibility. It is doubtful\nthat this force would undertake a direct attack on any of the west-\nern zones. Such an attack could not easily be undertaken without\ndirectly involving the Soviet Union. If all or a large part of this\nforce were sent into the western sectors of Berlin it might overcome\nNSC 73/1\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe small forces of the western powers there. Such overt action by\nthe East German police force would again be difficult without di-\nrectly involving the Soviet military authorities. The East German\nforces might be useful to the Soviet Union in connection with a\nblockade of Berlin.\n18. Use of the Chinese communists is a strong possibility.\nThey are the only satellite force in Asia which could commit new\nacts of aggression. The Chinese communists are anxious to control\nFormosa (including the Pescadores) and have announced their deter-\nmination to do so regardless of U. S. decisions or actions. The\nChinese communists have the military capability of assaulting For-\nmosa. An early attack on Formosa is a strong possibility.\n19. There is also a strong probability of continued Chinese\ncommunist attack on the islands near China held by the Nationalists.\n20. Chinese communists, in addition to an attack on Formosa,\nhave the military capability to enter directly the Korean war and\nto initiate military action against Indochina or Burma or Tibet.\nAny or all of these actions are possible. A move against Tibet may\nbe expected in the near future.\n21. Chinese communists have the military capability to capture\nMacao and Hong Kong. Civil disorder, subversion, and sabotage, ap-\npear to be the more likely actions, particularly in Hong Kong, since\nthese could in all probability eventually achieve the objective with-\nout military involvement.\nNSC 73/1\n- 11 -\nTQP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n22. Considerable numbers of Japanese prisoners remain under\nSoviet control and constitute a potential communist para-military\nforce for the invasion or infiltration of Japan should conditions\nin that country invite such action. The diversion of U. S. occu-\npation forces from Japan to Korea, the lack of Japanese defense\nforces, and the inadequacy of Japanese police, heightens the mil-\nitary capability of Japanese forces under Soviet control to attack.\nProbable Non-Military Moves by the USSR\n23. The USSR will undoubtedly direct communist parties and\nstooge groups abroad to embarrass us in every conceivable way. In-\ntensified communist subversive or revolutionary activity might fully\nengage local military resources throughout Asia, as well as involve\nadditional United States and allied military resources.\n24. Current conditions in Iran, though improving, still pro-\nvide wide opportunities for subversive and communist infiltration,\nparticularly for attempted seizure of the government by the commun-\nist-dominated Tudeh Party. In addition, guerrilla warfare fostered\nby the Soviets might break out in Azerbaijan. The testing of our\nfirmness in other areas may take every form known to communist in-\ngenuity. The present denial of electric power to Western Berlin may\nbe in part an expression of this. Other provocations and annoyances\nmay occur, even up to and including an attempt to reimpose the Berlin\nblockade or to blockade Vienna. If any weakness or hesitation on the\npart of the U. S. is encountered anywhere it will be instantaneously\nexploited by the communists to undermine confidence in and support\nof the United States everywhere.\nNSC 73/1\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n25. In addition, the USSR may well seek to create division in\nthe UN membership with respect to the police action in Korea by play-\ning upon hopes of a peaceful settlement, creating the impression that\nmajor concessions to the UN position may be forthcoming, or even by\noffering such concessions in a context in which the USSR would gain\nsubstantial though perhaps not immediately obvious advantages if such\na settlement were made. If the UN forces are dislodged from the pe-\nninsula the theme of accepting a fait accompli will certainly be\nplayed for all it is worth. It is also to be anticipated that the\nUSSR will make every effort to divide the U. S. and other non-com-\nmunist powers on the issue of Formosa. In general there will also\nno doubt be a continuance of the peace offensive designed both to\ndivide the U. S. and its allies and to create domestic division be-\ntween elements determined to resist Soviet aggression and elements\nwhich lack such determination.\nCONCLUSIONS\nPart I\nPossible Further Soviet Moves\nin the Immediate Future\nPossibility of Global War\n26. Even though there is no conclusive indication whether or\nnot the USSR intends to launch a global war at this time, the pos-\nsibility of deliberate Soviet resort to war exists.\nNSC 73/1\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nIsolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces\nto Achieve Local Objectives not Designed to Bring on Global War\n27. There is as yet no conclusive evidence that the Soviet Gov-\nernment has or has not decided to commit its forces, alone or with\nsatellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and\nlimited objectives, without intending to bring on global war. How-\never, if a decision should be made to use Soviet forces in this man-\nner, action would most likely be taken in any or all of the follow-\ning areas: Korea, the Near and Middle East, and the Balkans.\nSoviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces\n28. Use of European and Asiatic satellite military forces\nagainst a variety of objectives is a possibility for the immediate\nfuture.\na. An immediate possibility is the use of Chinese commun-\nist forces in Korea and against Formosa, but the latter is more\nprobable.\nb. In addition, depending upon developments in the world\nsituation, the USSR might inspire aggression by satellite forces\nagainst Western Germany (including Berlin), Austria, Yugoslavia,\nGreece, Tibet, Burma, Indochina, Hong Kong, and Macao.\nARCHIVES NECORDS AND LIBRARY\nProbable Non-Military Moves by the USSR\n29. We must also expect a variety of Soviet efforts to achieve SOVERNMENTH\nvictories by subversive action and tactical maneuvers in the \"peace\noffensive\" to keep us off balance, to divert our attention, to waste\nour resources, to test our firmness, and to split the free world.\nNSC 73/1\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nPart II\nU. S. Actions to Counter Further\nSoviet Moves in the Immediate Future\n30. The following conclusions are addressed to possible ac-\ntions to counter further aggressive moves made or inspired by the\nUSSR in the near future. Those actions which the United States and\nits allies should now be taking to regain the initiative, to deter\nfurther aggression, and to increase our ability to defeat aggres-\nsion, are not included. The present situation requires many such\nmeasures, some of which are now being undertaken. Others are under\nstudy and will be the subject of subsequent recommendations. These\nmeasures should be taken regardless of future Soviet actions so long\nas the USSR retains its present capabilities and intentions to\nthreaten the security of the United States.\n31. The United States would have to proceed on the assumption\nthat global war is imminent in either of the following cases:\na. Overt attack by organized USSR military forces.\nb. Satellite aggression in several of the areas mentioned\nin paragraph 28-b or in succession in a significant number of\nthese areas.\nOn that basis the United States should prepare to execute emergency\nwar plans and should mobilize accordingly; but should, in so far as\nit has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the mo-\nment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the sit-\nuation then existing. The United States should also immediately\ntake steps:\nNSC 73/1\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nMERITY TRUMAN, Micords MIO THE\nTOP SECRET\na. To conduct a political offensive, particularly in the\nUN, designed to induce a retreat of the aggressors without glo-\nbal war and to insure the unity of the free world if war never-\ntheless follows.\nb. While minimizing United States military commitments\nin areas of little strategic significance, to oppose the ag-\ngression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to\nthe implementation of U. S. national war plans.\nc. To coordinate United States plans with selected allies.\n32. In the event of any single overt act of military aggression\nby Soviet satellite armed forces, the United States should initially\nattempt to localize the conflict. To this end the United States\nshould take all possible counter measures short of seriously impair-\ning the ability to execute emergency war plans. We should seek the\nsupport of our allies and take appropriate steps in the UN. We\nshould concurrently recognize the greatly increased strain on the\nfabric of world peace arising from a further act of aggression fol-\nlowing on the Korean episode and should accelerate and expand mobil-\nization accordingly. The more important possibilities and the de-\ngree of the action to be taken is indicated in paragraphs 33-43\nbelow.\n33. Formosa\na. In the event of a Chinese communist attack on Formosa\nor the Pescadores, the United States should repel the assault\nin accordance with existing directives. While the principle\nNSC 73/1\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nof attempting to localize the aggression would be applicable\nto such an attack on Formosa, the danger of larger involvement\nwith the Chinese communists or with the Soviet Union would be\nincreased and there should be a commensurate expansion of our\nmobilization measures.\nb. If it should develop that Formosa can no longer be de-\nfended against Chinese communist attack, the matter should im-\nmediately be brought to the attention of the National Security\nCouncil for the earliest possible review of the United States\ncommitment to protect Formosa and the Pescadores and of our\ngeneral defensive position in the Far East.\n34. Korea. In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese\ncommunist forces in Korea, the United States should:\na. Take appropriate retaliatory measures against commun-\nist China in accordance with studies which are to be prepared\nas a matter of urgency.\nb. Accelerate and expand our present mobilization as much\nas possible short of formal announced mobilization of all U. S.\nresources.\nc. Review the U. S. military commitment in Korea in the\nlight of circumstances then existing.\n35. Yugoslavia. In the event of a Soviet satellite attack on\nYugoslavia, the United States should:\na. Implement existing policy (NSC 18/4) pending a review\nof that policy.\nNSC 73/1\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nb. Accelerate and expand our present mobilization as much\nas possible short of formal announced mobilization of all U. S.\nresources.\n36. Greece. In the event of a Soviet satellite attack on\nGreece, the United States should:\na. Support UN police action in accordance with plans\nwhich are to be prepared as a matter of urgency.\nb. Proceed to full mobilization.\n37. Germany. In the event of a major attack by East German\npara-military forces on Berlin or West Germany:\na. Existing U. S. plans and the procedures under the\nNorth Atlantic Treaty should be carried out as appropriate.\nb. The United States should proceed to full mobilization.\nc. Meanwhile the United States should accelerate efforts\nto increase the ability of Western Germany to defend itself\nand to contribute to the defense of Western Europe.\n38. Berlin Blockade. In the event the USSR reimposes the Ber-\nlin blockade the United States should react strongly and at once,\nincluding appropriate mobilization measures, since the maintenance\nof our position in Berlin is of the utmost political importance. The\nre-establishment of the full-scale airlift would be militarily un-\nsound and is impracticable under present conditions. A partial air-\nlift should, however, be established by the United States, United\nKingdom, and any other states able and willing to contribute pending\nthe completion of a study now under way regarding the measures to be\ntaken to meet such a situation.\nNSC 73/1\n- 18 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n39. Vienna Blockade. In the event the USSR should impose a\nblockade of Vienna, the United States should implement existing pol-\nicy (NSC 63/1) and proceed to appropriate mobilization measures.\n40. Japan.\na. In the event of a major attack on Japan by Japanese or\nother forces under communist control, United States forces\nshould act under existing directives and the United States\nshould increase its mobilization accordingly. Meanwhile, the\nUnited States should take steps to insure that the Japanese\npolice forces are augmented, suitably equipped and placed un-\nder central direction, and that Japan's ability to defend it-\nself and to contribute to U. S. defensive strength in the Far\nEast is increased.\nb. In the event of internal subversion or insurrection\nin Japan, the United States should direct the occupation au-\nthorities to render all possible assistance to the Japanese\npolice, and in so far as possible avoid direct participation\nby U. S. troops.\n41. Indochina. In the event of overt attack by organized\nChinese communist forces against Indochina, the United States should:\na. Support France and the associated states in accordance\nwith plans which are to be developed in consultation with the\nUK and France.\nb. Accelerate and expand our present mobilization as much\nas possible short of formal announced mobilization of all U. S.\nresources.\nNSC 73/1\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n42. Iran. In the event of internal subversion or guerrilla\nwarfare in Iran, the United States should accelerate its assistance\nto the Iranian Government. Meanwhile, the United States should, in\nconcert with the British, undertake aggressive action to forestall\nSoviet covert moves in Iran.\n43. Other areas.\na. In the event of Chinese communist aggression against\nChinese inshore islands, Tibet, or Macao, the United States\nwould not expect to take affirmative action. Our mobilization\nplans would not be affected.\nb. If such aggression were directed against Burma or\nHong Kong, the United States would expect the UK and the Com-\nmonwealth to take the initiative. The United States should\ngive political support to any UN police action. Mobilization\nshould be increased accordingly.\nNSC 73/1\n- 20 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\nMTG.\" 64"
}