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    "title": "Revised Draft, Report by the National Security Council on the Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation",
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    "ocrText": "NET/PSF/NSC) 6\nSECRES\nTOD\nSEURE\nREVISED DRAFT\nREPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nTHE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\nWITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES\nIN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To estimate possible further Soviet moves and assess and\nappraise the position and actions of the United States with re-\nspect thereto in the light of the Korean situation.\nANALYSIS\nIntroduction\n2. In determining our position and our actions in the present\ncrisis we must bear in mind that the fundamental objective of\nthe United States is to maintain the integrity and vitality of\nits free society and the measure of world order necessary thereto.\nThis involves the willingness to fight for that objective if.\nnecessary. We must accept the probability that As the aggressor\nwill continues his policy of expansion,. we-must aceept-the-possi-\nbility-of-local-conflicts-and-seunter-sueh-meves-within-the-limit\nef-eur capabilities. As a deterrent, and also in preparation for\npossible eventualities, the degree of our capabilities readiness\nshould be increased as rapidly as practicable. Although a global\nwar has not necessarily begun in Korea and may not eventuate, the\nU.S. has nevertheless been indirectly-at engaged ina limited war\nfor some time. Moreover, as a result of this situation, the\nUnited States must now decide whether purely passive, defensive\nmeasures, even supported by a strong military posture, are suf-\nficient to reduce to manageable proportions the Soviet threat\nTOP SECRET\nMARRY\nARCHIVES NATIONAL RECORDS: AND\n- 1 -\nU.S. SERVICE ROVERENCY\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. NSC O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or\nI\n9.8.74\nBy project NLT\nNARS\nBLURE\nSECRET\nJOP SECRET\nto our free society. The United States must consider whether it\nshould not now prepare for and launch, by means short of war,\na political, economic, and psychological offensive against\nthe USSR designed to interfere with the Kremiin's program for\nworld domination as a threat to our free society.\n3. The United States is not now capable of conducting immedi-\nately a general military offensive against the USSR because our\nforces are either not appropriately positioned or are so inade-\nquate as to be incapable of effective action. In the present\ncrisis, while the United States forces in the Far East are pro-\nprotionally stronger than in any other overseas area, effective\naction against the North Koreans in Korea can be accomplished\nonly by diversion of United States forces from existing missions\nin the Far East and by the reinforcement of such forces from the\nUnited States or elsewhere. In certain other areas of the world\nwhere United States forces are now located, these forces might be\nstrong enough to take effective action against local indigenous\nforces but could not act on a scale comparable to that in Korea.\nGeneral\n4. It is a tenet of communism that war between communist and\nnon-communist countries is inevitable. This premise eonvistion\nis a basic element in the determination of Soviet policy, al-\nthough history has shown that Russia can be influenced to delay\naction or retreat from local objectives if strongly opposed.\nThe Kremlin is determined first to protect and to preserve\nits regime in Russia and second to promote world communism.\nThe USSR is the implacable enemy of the United States and the\nnon-communist world. Therefore, the degradation, weakening and\nultimate destruction of the United States are primary inter-\nmediate aims of the USSR.\nTHOMAN\nANNVN\nWATHINAL\nARCHIVES AND\nLIBRARY\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nSERVICE\nTOP SECRET\nSOVERNMENT\n-- 2 -\nTOP CΓOPET\nSEGRE\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\n5. In assessing the danger of further aggressive moves\ndirected by the USSR, it is essential to take into account both\nestimated-Soviet-inentions-amd Soviet military capabilities.\nand, insofar as possible, to assess Soviet intentions. The\nUSSR has the military capability to occupy any country on its\nperiphery, to invade all-of Western Europe and the Near and\nMiddle East, to make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and\nAlaska the North American-continent and upon 000an shipping, and\nto reinforce strengly the communist military effort in the Far\nEast. The USSR also has the capability of initiating limited-\nscale air attacks on the United States and Canada. The USSR is\nnot, however, believed to have the capability of preventing the\nU.S. from carrying out an atomic attack. On the other hand,\nthe USSR may have the capability of reducing or of immediately\ncrippling our industrial potential. The USSR, by provoking\ninsurrections and satellite armed actions simultaneously on\nmany fronts, and without openly committing its own forces,\nwould confront the U.S. and its allies with the following\nalternatives: abandoning positions of vital political and\nstrategic importance, committing and dissipating available\neapabilities strength on the many fronts chosen by the USSR,\nor undertaking global war.\n6. Given these capabilitios, which have existed for some\ntime, and are progessively increasing, an attempt must be made,\nin the light of the Korean situation to analyze and evaluate\nfurther possible short range moves by the USSR. to answer the\nestion-whether-the-Soviet-imspired-hostilities in Korea indi-\note-a-ehange-in-immediate-Soviet-intentiens- This-analysis--\nattempts future a period\nsevoral-monthe-ehead.\nTROMAN\nWARRY\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRART\nSERVICE\"\nBOVERNMENT\nTOP SECRET\n- 3 -\nSECRE\nTOP\nSECRE\nTOP\n7. The opening of hostilities in Korea could conceivably\nmean that the Kremlin intends to embark on any one or a com-\nbination of the following courses of action:\na. To initiate global war.\nb. To employ Soviet forces, alone or with satellite forces,\nin isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited\nobjectives, not designed to bring on global war.\nc. To inspire further aggression using only satellite\nforces, but not using USSR armed forces.\nd. To probe U.S. determination and military effective-\nness.\nPossibility of Global War\n8. It has been our estimate that the Kremlin did not in-\ntend to engage in a major war and might be deterred from in-\nitiating such a war in the future if confronted with sufficient\npolitical, economic and military strength employed as the\npower base for a dynamic foreign policy designed to force the\ncontinuing retreat of Russian Communism. This estimate has not\nnecessarily been invalidated by the events of the past few\nweeks, which are consistent with the following interpretation:\na. In causing the attack to be launched in Korea, the\nKremlin did not intend to bring about a global war and\ndid not expect, although militarily prepared for, United\nStates military involvement in Korea. The probable aim of\nthe Kremlin was simply to gain control of the entire\nKorean peninsula and thus to strengthen materially its\nstrategic position in Northern Asia with global political\nMARRY\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nand military results.\nRECORDS\n8.5.\nSERVICE\"\nb. The Kremlin seems to have calculated its moves with\nBOVERNMENT\na view to keeping the responsibility of the Soviet Govern-\nment unengaged and its own military forces uncommitted.\n9. On the other hand, the events of the past few weeks could\nbe interpreted as the first phase of a general Soviet plan for\nglobal war. Should the Kremlin in fact be desirous of or\nTOP\nSEPRET\nTOP SEGRET\nreconciled to a global war, of which the Korean situation is the\nfirst phase, the following considerations might govern its actions\nin the near future:\na. The Kremlin might be disposed to forego any action which\nis calculated would provoke global war until such time as the\nUnited States had reached the point of maximum diversion and\nattrition of its forces-in-being without involvement of the\nmilitary forces of the Soviet Union. For example, as long as\nwe are being forced to commit ever greater increments of our\nforces-in-being in Korea, the Kremlin might not hasten the out-\nbreak of general hostilities since the USSR would be increasing\nits own capabilities as those of the U.S. diminished. This\ncould change, however, at the point where the Kremlin estimated\nthat our maximum weakness had been reached, and that further\npassage of time leading to the material strengthening of the\nrelative position and military posture of the United States\nwould not work to Soviet advantage.\nb. The Kremlin might undertake seek-the-maximum-initial-ad-\nvantage-by immediate and simultaneous attack in all possible\ntheaters of action on the Eurasian continent: Germany, Austria,\nTrieste, the Balkans, the Near and Middle East, the Far East,\nand the British Isles. If overt attacks by organized Soviet\nmilitary forces (as distinguished from satellite forces) were\nto occur against the territory of any North Atlantic Treaty\nNAT power, or against the forces of any NAT power in Europe\nor in Asia, or upon South Korea, Iran, Turkey, Greece, or Yugo-\nslavia, the only prudent basis for U.S. action would be the\nassumption that global war was imminent prebable.\nC. It is also possible that the actions described in b above\nwould be accompanied or be followed presently by a direct\nattack upon the continent of North America. A direct Soviet\nattack upon United States territory as well as upon its armed\nforces abroad is a Soviet capability.\nd. In view of the advantages of surprise and-ef-the-desira-\nbility-fer-an-enemy-ef-the-U-S--te-strike-a-erippling-blew-at\nhe-Nerth-Ameriean-industrial-petential-in-erder-te-aehieve\nTOP SECRET\n- 5 -\nANNYS\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nBECORDS\n1.5.\nSERVICE\"\nSEOKE\nSEEDS\nSECRET\nultimate-vietery, the possibility must be constantly borne in\nmind that the Kremlin might decide to initiate global war by a\ndirect surprise attack upon the territory of the United States\nbefore taking the actions outlined in a or b above.\n10. Global war could come in one of three ways: (a) by Soviet\nlesign; (b) by a progression of developments growing out of the\npresent situation; or (c) by a miscalculation on the part of either\nthe U.S. or the USSR. If there were evidence justifying the as-\nsumption of immediate global war by Soviet design, the only course\nfor the United States would be full preparation at full speed.\nThe-present-question-is-ene-ef-degpee. While not ruling out the\npossibility that global war is imminent, it is not yet* a suffi-\ncient certainty to be the assumption on which U.S. action should\nbe based. Our efforts should be directed toward increasing our\nwar capabilities and preventing global war from developing by im-\nproving the relative power position of the anti-communist forces\nwhich is the base from which our foreign policy must operate.\nIsolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or with Satellite Forces to\nAchieve Local Ob jectives not Designed to Bring on Global War\n11. USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment of\nsatellite forces there, should be regarded not as an isolated\nphenomenon but possibly as part of a general plan which might in--\nvolve correlated action in other parts of the world. A danger of\ndirect commitment of Soviet forces is in Korea itself where actual\nconflict is in progress between the United States and a Soviet\nsatellite. A successful repulse of the North Korean invasion\nwould not merely restore the status quo. United States troops\nwould be back in force in South Korea, and a build-up of military\nstrength in certain of the non-Communist areas of the Far East\nwould have taken place.\n12. The Kremlin might be prepared to accept in varying degrees\nthe risks of risk a general conflict by launching a local armed\nattacks in order to attain objectives aoquire-territory regarded\nas of importance to the Soviet Union. The-Soviet-Unien-might-be\nexpested-te-aceept-greater-risks-to-attain-objeetives-ef-subotania\n* Underlined in the basic paper for emphasis.\nTROMAN\nNATIONAL\nSTATE\nSERVICE\n- 6 -\no\nFUT\nOLOREI\nTOD SECRET\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nmilitary-value. Without automatically starting global war by\nattacking American troops or a country covered by the North\nAtlantic Treaty, the principal areas where actual Soviet forces\ncould be employed for a local purpose are Iren, Turkey, Yugo-\nslavia, Greece, Afghanisten, Pakistan, or Finland. In addition\nto any one or more of these local operations, the Soviets would\nstill be capable of conducting with surprise important operations\nsimulteneously in Germany and Austria, in the Near, Middle and\nFar East, and against the United Kingdom and the North American\ncontinent. Soviet forces are already deployed in sufficient\nstrength to give them the military capability to act in many eny-\ner-al1-ef-the-fellewing areas, smeng-ethers: The following\nspecific comments apply to: Iren, Turkey, the-Blaek-Sea Greece,\nYugoslavia, and Finland-, Afghanistan, and Pakisten.\n8. In the case of Iran, it is possible that the Soviet\nGovernment would regard the risk of general war as relatively\nsmall while at the same time the acquisition of the Iranian\noil fields and the reduction of a threat to the Baku oil\nregion of the Soviet Union are important Soviet objectives.\nb. In the case of Turkey, the control of the Dardanelles\nand the approaches to the eastern Mediterranean represent very\nimportant military considerations from the point of view of\nSoviet defense as well as a traditional and deep-seated Russian\nobjective. The denial of Soviet control of the Dardanelles\nis vital to the security interests of the United States.\nTherefore, direct USSR Seviet attack on Turkey would₃-hewever\nprecipitate global war;.\nseeause-the-United-States-i-ta-etese-military-sseeeetien\nvith-Turkey-end-beeause-ef-the-Angle-Preneh-Parkish-mutee\nassistanee-paet.\nC. In the case of Greece, the control of the Peloponneses\nand the Greek Islands would present to the USSR very important\nmilitary and political advantages. Geographically, Greece is\na salient through the ring of non-communist states which\nenclose the Soviet hegemony, and its possession would pro-\nvide to the USSR access to the Mediterranean Sea as well as\nTRONIS\nTOP SECRET\n- 7 -\nAMSVE\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES MSV\nRECENTS\nSERVICE\"\nfor SECRET\nTO SECRET\nTOP SECRET\na strategic position with respect to the Eastern Mediter-\nranean, the Near East, and the Dardanelles. Direct USSR\nattack upon Greece would definitely precipitate global war\nbecause of the political commitments and military associations\nof the United Kingdom and the United States with Greece.\ner d. Reestablishment of Soviet control over Yugoslavia\nwould bring definite military advantages to the USSR. At the\nsame time, the Kremlin would have to weigh the political\nadvantages of eliminating a dangerous source of Communist\nheresy against the political disadvantages of a Soviet armed\nassault on a communist regime, which would tend to deepen\nrather than heal the disruptive effect of independent\ntendencies in the communist parties in the free world. Unless\nsuch an assault were quickly successful, the repercussions\nthroughout the foreign communist parties would be harmful to\nthe Kremlin's prestige and control of the international com-\nmunist movement. Success in Yugoslavia would enable the\ncommunists to renew guerrilla operations against Greece- from\nYugoslavia as well as from Bulgaria and Albania. Direct USSR\nattacks on Yugoslavia would include a risk of involving the\nWestern Powers and might lead to global war.\ndr e. Occupation of Finland, while completely within Soviet\ncapabilities, would undoubtedly encounter fierce and continued\nFinnish guerrilla resistance, which might render Finland less\nuseful to the USSR for the immediate future than the present\nstate of Soviet-Finnish relations.\ner f. Afghanistan and Pakistan are of strategic value to\nthe USSR because of their geographical position. Afghanistan\ncould be occupied with little effort. An attack on Pakistan\nwould require much more effort and would incur serious risk\nof global war because of Pakistan's membership in the British\nCommonwealth.\n13. Unless the Kremlin is willing to accept global war it will\nnot commit Soviet armed forces to action in Germany and Austria.\nTOP SECRET\n- 8 -\nATMAN\n\"ЛАГӀСНАЯ\nARCHIVES AND\nMECORDS\nSERVICE\"\nESTERNMENT\nTQP SEORE SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSoviet Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces\n14. The USSR might gain considerably from a policy of initia-\ntion of piecemeal attacks by present or created satellite forces\nagainst Yugoslavia, Iran, Greece, Turkey, or other states around\nthe Soviet periphery. Further, it might be distinctly to the\npolitical and military advantage of the USSR to involve the\nallied nations progressively in conflict without a declaration\nof war on the part of the USSR or without commitment of its mili-\ntary forces. Such action might leave the allies with the alter-\nnative of fighting an undeclared war, or of being open to the\ncharge of aggression by initiating a declaration of war. None of\nthese areas is one in which the USSR particularly needs the\nadvantage of surprise. Furthermore, the military and political\ncapabilities of the USSR and its satellites are so great as to\npermit it to direct piecemeal action against isolated areas while\nstill retaining the capability of strategic surprise. A progres-\nsive series of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the USSR\nwould confront the United States and its allies with the issue of\nwhether-they-are-willing-te-aeeept global war.\n15. According to present estimates, Rumania, Bulgaria, and\nHungary, without military assistance and leadership from the\nUSSR comparable to that provided the North Koreans, do not possess\ntogether sufficient military capabilities for a successful assault\non Turkey- in Asia, although they could overrun Turkey in Europe\nwith relative ease. However,-a A satellite attack on Yugoslavia\nis a possibility. There-have-been-indieations-ef-pessible-prepa-\nratiens-fer-seme-satellite-ineursion-against-Greeee resumption\nof fighting in Greece is also a possibility.\n16. The use of Polish and Czechoslovakian troops is always a\nmilitary possibility in any action in Europe. However, with-\ndrawal of large numbers of troops from Poland and Czechoslo-\nvakia, particularly the latter, might require the employment\nof other forces to maintain the present communist regime.\nTOP SECRET\n- 9 -\nTOD\nTOP\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n17. The use of the East German para-military forces against\nallied troops in Germany is another possibility. It is doubtful\nthat this force would undertake a direct attack on any of the\nwestern zones. Such an attack could not easily be undertaken\nwithout directly involving the Soviet Union. If all or a large\npart of this force were sent into the western sectors of Berlin\nit might overcome the small forces of the western powers there.\nSuch overt action by the East German police force would again\nbe difficult without directly involving the Soviet military\nauthorities. The East German forces might be useful to the\nSoviet Union in connection with a blockade of Berlin.\n18. Use Further use of the Chinese communists, including the\nemployment of organized Chinese communist forces against South\nKorea and Southeast Asia, is a strong possibility. They are the\nonly satellite force in Asia which could commit new major acts of\naggression. The Chinese communists are anxious to control\nFormosa (including the Pescadores) and have announced their\ndetermination to do so regardless of U.S. decisions or actions.\nThe Chinese-cemmunists-have-the military-eapability-ef-assault-\ning-Formosa.- An While an early attack on Formosa is a continuing\nstrong possibility., its success would be doubtful unless\naccompanied by a collapse of the Nationalist regime.\n19 There-is also-a-strong-prebability-of-eentinued Chinese\ncommunist attack on the islands near China held by the National-\nists. can be expected to continue.\n20. Chinese communists, in addition to an attack on Formosa,\nhave the military capability to enter directly the Korean war\nand to initiate military action against Indochina or Burma or\nTibet. Any or all of these actions are possible. A move against\nTibet may be expected in the near future.\nTOP SECRET\nBARRY NATIONAL THOMAN AND LORN\n- 10 -\nTOD SECRE\nfor\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n21. Chinese communists have the military capability to cap-\nture Macao and Hong Kong. Civil disorder, subversion, and\nsabotage, appear to be the more likely actions, particularly\nin Hong Kong, since these could in all probability eventually\nachieve the objective without military involvement.\n22. The capabilities of the Chinese Communists outlined above\ncontribute to the over-all capabilities of the USSR since any\nmilitary action by these forces in the Far East adds security\nto the Soviet eastern flank and lessens the probability that\nthe Soviets may have to fight on two fronts simultaneously.\n23. 22- Considerable-numbers-ef-Japanese-prtseners-remain-ander\nSeviet-eentrel-and-eenstitute-a-petential-eemmuntst-para-military\nferee-fer-the-invasien-er-infiltratien-ef-dapan-sheu1d-eendiions\nin-that-eeuntry-invite-sueh-aetion---Phe-diversien-ef-8-St-oeea-\npation-ferees-frem-Japan-te-Korea-the-lack-ef-dapanee-defense\nforees;-and-the-inadequaey-of-dapanese-potiee;-heightens-the\nmilitary-eapability-of-Japanese-ferees-under-Seviet-eentrel-te\nattack.\nProbable Non-Military Moves by the USSR\n24. 23. The USSR will undoubtedly direct communist parties and\nindoctrinated steege groups abroad to embarrass us in every con-\nceivable way. Intensified communist subversive or revolutionary\nactivity might fully engage local military resources throughout\nAsia, as well as involve additional United States and allied\nmilitary resources.\n25. 24. The following examples will provide cases in point.\nCurrent conditions in Iran, though improving, still provide\nwide opportunities for subversive and communist infiltration,\nparticularly for attempted seizure of the government by the\ncommunist-dominated Tudeh Party. In addition, a revolt\nguerrilla-warfare fostered by the Soviets might be successful\nTHOMAS\nTOP SECRET\n- 11 -\nNAHURAL\nARCHIVER AND\nRECORDS\nSERVICE\"\nSHIPPENT\nLTOD SECRET\nfor SEGRE\nTOP SECRET\nbreak-out in Azerbaijan. The testing of our firmness in other\nareas may take every form known to communist ingenuity. The\npresent denial of electric power to Western Berlin may be in\npart an expression of this. Other provocations and annoyances\nmay occur, even up to and including an attempt to reimpose the\nBerlin blockade or to blockade Vienna.\n26. 25. If any weakness or hesitation on the part of the U.S.\nis encountered anywhere it will be instantaneously exploited\nby the communists to undermine confidence in and support of the\nUnited States everywhere.\n27. 26. 25. In addition, the USSR may well seek to create\ndivision in the UN membership with respect to the police action\nin Korea by playing upon hopes of a peaceful settlement, creating\nthe impression that major concessions to the UN position may be\nforthcoming, or even by offering such concessions in a context\nin which the USSR would gain substantial though perhaps not'\nimmediately obvious advantages if such a settlement were made.\nIf the UN forces are dislodged from the peninsula the theme of\naccepting a fait accompli will certainly be played for all it\nis worth. It is also to be anticipated that the USSR will make\nevery effort to divide the U.S. and other non-communist powers\non the issue of Formosa. In general there will also no doubt\nbe a continuance of the peace offensive designed both to divide\nthe U.S. and its allies and to create domestic division between\nelements determined to resist Soviet aggression and elements\nwhich lack such determination.\nCONCLUSIONS\nPart I\nPossible Further Soviet Moves\nin the Immediate Future\n28. 27. 26. The USSR has materially increased its capability\nto wage global war. Even though there is no conclusive indication\nthat whether-or-not the USSR intends to launch a global war at\nSERVE\nNATIONAL\nthis time, the danger of the-pessibility-ef-deliberate Soviet\nARCHIVES AND\nLIBRARY\nRECORDS\nOF\nSERVICE\nresort to war, either deliberately or by accident, exists\nis now greatly increased.\nTOP SECRET\n- 12 -\nTÓP\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTOP BECRET\nIsolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or with Satellite Forces to\nAchieve Local Objectives not Designed to Bring on Global War\n29. 28. 27. There is as yet no conclusive evidence that the\nSoviet Government has or has not decided to commit its forces,\nalone or with satellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks\nagainst local and limited objectives, without intending to bring\non global war. However, if a decision should be made to use\nUSSR Seviet forces in this manner, action could weuld-mest-likely\nbe taken with varying degrees of risk, in any er-all of the fol-\nlowing areas: Finland, North Korea, the Near and Middle East,\nand the Balkans.\nSoviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces\n30. 29. 28. Use of European and Asiatic satellite military\nforces against a variety of objectives is a possibility for the\nimmediate future.\na. An immediate possibility is the use of Chinese Communist\nforces in Korea and against Formosa, but-the-latter-is-mere\nprobable. The success of an early attack on Formosa would be\ndoubtful unless accompanied by the collapse of the Nationalist\nregime.\nb. In addition, depending upon developments in the world\nsituation, the USSR might inspire aggression by satellite\nforces against Western Germany (including Berlin), Austria,\nYugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Tibet, Burma, Indochina, Hong\nKong, and Macao.\nProbable Non-Military Moves by the USSR\n31. 30. 29. We must also expect a variety of Soviet efforts to\nachieve victories by subversive action and tactical maneuvers in\nthe \"peace offensive\" to keep us off balance, to divert our atten-\ntion, to waste our resources, to test our firmness, and to split\nthe free world.\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\nARCHIVES NATIONAL N/R\nLIBRARY\naccorbs\nTOP SECRET\n- 13 -\n8.8.\nSEPTEMBERS\nTOD\nSECRET\nSECRE\nTOP SEGRET\nSECRET\nPart II\nU.S. Actions to Counter Further\nSoviet Moves in the Immediate Future\n32. 31. 30. The following conclusions are addressed to possible\nactions to counter further aggressive moves made or inspired by\nthe USSR in the near future. Those actionswhich the United\nStates and its allies should now be taking to regain the initia-\ntive, to deter further aggression, and to increase our ability\nto defeat aggression, are not included., although their critical\nimportance should not be overlooked. The present situation re-\nquires many such measures, some of which are now being under-\ntaken. Others are under study and will be the subject of sub-\nsequent recommendations. These measures should be taken regard-\nless of future Soviet actions so long as the USSR retains its\npresent capabilities and intentions to threaten the security of\nthe United States. Such measures fall broadly into the following\ncategories:\na. Efforts to unite all nations and peoples, regardless of\nideologies, type of government, color or creed, who can and\nwill contribute to the military opposition to the threat of\nthe Kremlin.\nb. Action to increase military strength of the United States\nand to apply the necessary pressure upon North Atlantic Treaty\nOrganization and other allies to force a corresponding increase\nthrough their own efforts of their military capabilities and\nreadiness.\nC. Actions in the political, psychological, economic, and,\nin certain instances, the military fields directed toward gain-\ning the initiative, thus putting the USSR on the defensive\nwherever possible.\n33. 32. 31. The United States would have to proceed on the as-\nsumption that global war is imminent in either of the following\neases:\nTOP SECRET\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\na. Overt attack by organized SSR military forces.\nb. Satellite aggression in several of the areas mentioned\nin paragraph 28 30 b or in succession in a significant number\nof these areas.\nOn that basis the United States should prepare to execute emer--\ngency war plans and should mobilize accordingly; but should, in..\nsofer as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities\nonly at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the\nlight of the situation then existing. The United States should\nalso immediately take steps:\na. To conduct a political offensive, particularly in the\nUN, designed to induce a retreat of the aggressors without\nglobal war and to insure the unity of the free world if war\nnevertheless follows.\nb. While minimizing United States military commitments in\nareas of little strategic significance, to oppose the aggres-\nsion to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the\nimplementation of U.S. national war plans.\nc. To coordinate United States plans with selected allies.\n34. 33. 32. In the event of any single overt act of military\naggression by Soviet satellite armed forces, the United States\nshould initially attempt to localize the conflict. To this end\nthe United States should ake all possible countermeasures short\nof seriously impairing the ability to execute emergency war plans.\nWe should seek the support of our allies and take appropriate\nsteps in the UN. We should concurrently recognize the greatly\nincreased strain on the fabric of world peace arising from a\nfurther act of aggression following on the Korean episode and\nshould accelerate and expand mobilization accordingly. The more\nimportant possibilities and the degree of the action to be taken\nis indicated in paragraphs 35 - 45 34---44 33 43 below.\nTROMAN\nARCHIVES AND RECORDS\nKINNARY\nSERVICE\"\nTOP SECRET\n= 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n35. 34. 33. Formosa\na. In the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa\nor the Pescadores, the United States should repel the assault\nin accordance with existing directives. While the principle\nof attempting to localize the aggression would be applicable\nto such an attack on Formosa, the danger of larger involve-\nment with the Chinese communists or with the Soviet Union\nwould be increased and there should be a commensurate ex-\npansion of our mobilization measures.\nb. If it should develop that the nationalist forces on\nFormosa ean-no-longer-be-defended-against defect to\nthe Chinese communists, attack, the matter should im-\nmediately be brought to the attention of the National Security\nCouncil for the earliest possible review of the United States\ncommitment to protect Formosa and the Pescadores and of our\ngeneral defensive position in the Far East.\n36. 35. 34. Korea. In the event of the overtuse of organized\nChinese communist forces in Korea, the United States should:\na. Take appropriate retaliatory measures against communist\nChina. in-aecerdanee-with-studies-whieh-are-te-be-prepared\nas-a-matter-ef-urgeney.\nb. Accelerate and expand our present mobilization to the\nextent necessary to meet the situation. as-mueh-as-pessible\nhort-ef-formal-announeed-mobiligation-ef-all-U.S--peseurees\nC. Review the U.S. military commitment in Korea in the\nlight of circumstances then existing.\n37. 36. 35. Yugoslavia. In the event of a Soviet satellite\nattack on Yugoslavia, the United States should:\na. Implement existing policy (NSC 18/4) pending a review\nof that policy.\n8.TROMAN\nAMOUN\nARCHIVES A NATIONAL\ndr.\nREPUBLICATION\nTOP SECRET\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTOB SECRET\nb. Accelerate and expand our present mobilization to the\nextent indicated by a review of the situation at the time.\nas-mueh-as-pessible-shert-ef-fermal-anneuneed-mebiligatien\nef-a11-U:S:-reseurees-\n38. 37- 36- Greece. In the event of a Soviet satellite attack\non Greece, the United States should:\na. Provide accelerated military assistance to Greece and\ngive political support to UN peliee action,. in-aecerdance\nwith-plans-whieh-are-te-be-prepared-as-a-matter-ef-urgeney\nIf necessary, deploy such U.S. forces to the support of Greece\nas can be made available without unduly jeopardizing our\nnational security.\nb. Preeeed-te-full-mobilizatien- Mobilize to the extent\nnecessary to meet the situation.\n39. 38. 37 Germany---In-the-event-of-a-majer-attaek-by-East\nerman-para-military-ferees-on-Berlin-er-West-dermany=\na.-Existing-U.S--lans-and-the-preeedures-nder-the-Nerth\nAtlantie-Treaty-sheuld-be-earried-out-as-apprepriate.\nb.-The-United-States-sheuld-ppeeeed-te-full-mebiliaien\nGermany.\na. In the event of a major attack by East German para-\nmilitary forces on Berlin:\n(1) Review the situation and in the interim institute\nappropriate mobilization measures but without full\nmobilization of all U.S. resources.\nb. In the event of a major attack by East German para-\nmilitary forces on West Germany:\n(1) Existing U.S. plans and procedures under the North\nAtlantic Treaty should be carried out as appropriate.\n(2) The U.S. should proceed to full mobilization.\nTRUMAN\nASSUL\nNATIONAL\nTOP SECRET\nI I 17\nARCHIVES AND\nLIBGARY\nRECORDS\n8.8.\nSERVICE\"\nTOP\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nC. Meanwhile the United States should press for the\ncontrolled rearmament aeeelerate-efferts-te-inerease-the\nability of Western Germany so that it could assist in\ndefending te-defend itself and 04 so contribute to the\ndefense of Western Europe.\n40. 39. 38. Berlin Blockade. In the event the USSR reimposes\nthe Berlin blockade the United States should react strongly\nand at once, including appropriate mobilization measures,\nsince the maintenance of our position in Berlin is of the ut-\nmost political importance. The reestablishment of the full-\nscale airlift would be militarily unsound and is impracticable\nunder present conditions. A partial airlift should, however,\nbe established by the United States, United Kingdom, and any\nother states able and willing to contribute. pending-the-eem-\npletien-ef-a-study-now-under-way-regarding-the-measures-te-be\ntaken-to-meet-sueh-a-situatien\n41. 40. 39- Vienna Blockade. In-the-event-the-US8R-sheuld\nimpese-a-bleekade-ef-Vienna,-the-United-States-sheuld-implement\nexisting-peliey-(NSC-63/l)-and-preeeed-te-approprtate-mebilima-\ntien-measures- In the event the USSR should impose a blockade\nof Vienna, the establishment of a full-scale airlift would be\nmilitarily unsound and is impracticable under present con-\nditions. The U.S. should implement existing policy (NSC 38/6)\nto the extent feasible, utilizing a partial airlift to be es-\ntablished by the U.S., the U.K., and any other nations able\nand willing to contribute. The U.S. should accelerate and\nexpand our present mobilization to the extent necessary at the\ntime.\nTRUMAN\nBARRY\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nLIORARY\nRECORDS\nSERVICE\"\nINVESTMENT\nYORTH\n- 18 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n42. 43. 40.-Japan.\nUnite\nMeanwhile,\nJapanese\nplaced\ndefend\nJapanese\npelice;\n43. 42. 43.- Indochina. In the ovent of overt attack by\norganized Chinese communist forces against Indochina, the\nUnited States should:\n8. In concert with the U.K. support France and the\nassociated states in with plans which be\nb. Accelerate and expand our present military assistance\nprogram.\nmuch\npessible\nsher\nef\nformal\nall-U.S.\nC. Mobilize to the extent necessary to meet the situation.\n44. 43. 42. Iran. In the vont of internal subversion or\nguerrilla\nwarfare in Iran, the United States should accelerate\nits assistance to the Iranian Government. Meanwhile, the United\nStates should, in concert with the British, undertake aggressive\naction to forestall Soviet covert moves in Iran.\n45. 44. 43. Other areas.\na. In the event of Chinese communist aggression against\nChinese inshore islands, Tibet, or Macao, the United States\nTHE\nTOP\nSMORT\n- 19 -\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nshould take political action but would not expect to take\nmilitary affirmative action. - Our-mebilisatien-plane-weuld\naet-be-affeeted.\nb. If such aggression were directed against Burma or\nHong Kong, the United States would expect the UK and the\nCommonwealth to take the initiative. In the case of Burma\nthe United States, acting through the British, should\naccelerate its assistance to that government. In the case\nof Hong Kong, the United States should give-pelitical\nsuppert-to-any-N-pelee-eetten---Mebitiatia-eeuld-be-in-\nereased-aecerdingly. consider furnishing relief assistance\nto the British and such military assistance as may be\nappropriate in the light of our own military commitments and\ncapabilities at that time.\nYADMAN\nANNER\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nSERVICE\nTOP SECRET\n- 20 -\nTOP SECRET"
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