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    "title": "National Security Council Report 50, Report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense on the Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence, with Related Material",
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    "ocrText": "NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nDOCUMENT\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\ndoment pat file In DED 6/30/00,\nReport\nNational Security Council Status of Projects\n7-1-49 SAMITIZED NG 79.20\nReport\nTo the National Security Council by the Secretaries of\nState and Defense re the Central Intelligence\nAgency\n7-1-49 A 10-28-31\nAgenda\nFor the Meeting NK of the National Security Council\nto be held at the White House 7-7-49\n7-1-49\n8.5.22\nMinutes\nof the 43rd Meeting of the National Sexurity Council\n7-7-49\nA\nМощо\nFor the President from Sidney W. Souors re the post\nof Director of Central Intelligence\n7-7-49\nDECLANIFIED\nMemo\nFor the National Security Council from Sidney W.\n12.22.43\nSouers re security of information (attachment)\n8-10-49\nA\nMemo\nFor the National Security Council from Sidney W.\nSouers re Intelligence Agencies of Government\nDECLASSIFIED\n5/11/12\n(attachment)\n8-18-49\nA\nMemo\nFor the National Security Council from Sidney W.\nSouers re security information (4 attachments)\n10-6-49\nA\nMemo\nFor the National Security Council from Sidney W.\nSouers re Intelligence Agencies of Government\n(4 attachments)\n10-6-49\nA\nMemo\nFor the National Security Council from Sidney W.\nSouers re the Central Intelligence Agency (attachment) 10-10-49\nA\nSANIME 5-11-12\nMemo\nFor the National Security Council from James S. S DECLANCIED\n12-22-13\nLay, Jr. re the C.I.A. (attachment)\n12-14-49\nA\nMemo\nFor the ational Security Council from Sidney W.\nSouers re Summ Soviet defectors (2 attachments)\n12-20-49\nA\nMemo\nFor the National Security Council from Sidney W.\nSouers re the C.I.A. (attachment)\n12-28-49\nA\nSANITIZED NLT 79.20\n6-4-12\nSANITIZED, 2-25-13\nSAMETIZED, 2-28-13\nFILE LOCATION\nTRUMAN PAPERS - P.S.F.\nSUBJECT FIIE: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL - MEET INGS\nFOLDER: Meeting No. 43 7-7-49\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nGENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION\nGSA DC 73-495\nGSA FORM 7122 (7.72)\nNLT(PSFINSC)4Y0\nTOP SECRET\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 7, 1949\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nThe National Security Council, as agreed\nat its 43rd meeting on July 7, 1949, wishes to in-\nform you of its views with respect to the post of\nDirector of Central Intelligence, that continuity\nof service is essential for the post of Director;\nthat the most qualified person available should be\nselected for the post; and that, in order to insure\ncontinuity and independence of action, the Director\nshould be either a civilian, or, if a service man\nor a foreign service officer, he should be retired\nor one whose service as Director will be his final\ntour of active duty.\nSIDNEY W. SOUERS\nExecutive Secretary\nEARTY ARDHIVES NATIONAL RECORDS TRUMAN AND THEREY\nSE SERVICE WEAT\nDECLASSIFIED\nNSC LETTER 9-26-83\nProject NLT 79-20\nBy NLT- HC NARS, Date 12-22-13\nTOP SECRET\nThe President\nTOP SECRET\nCOPY NO. 1\nNSC 50\nA REPORT\nURAT AROHIVES 'NATIONAL REG#RDS TROMAN AND\nU.S. SERVICE\" GOVERNMENT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE\non\nTHE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nand\nNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE\nJuly 1, 1949\nSARITIZED COPY\nWASHINGTON\nPROJECT NLT 79-20\nAuthority: NLT-NC 12-22-13\nTOP SECRET\nWSC 50\nTOP SECRET\nJuly 1, 1949\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nTHE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND\nNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE\nReferences: A. NSC Action No. 202\nB. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same\nsubject, dated January 24, March 2, March 8,\nand April 4, 1949, respectively.\nAt its 37th meeting the National Security Council considered\nthe report by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey Group on the subject\nand comments with respect thereto (Reference B) and referred them\nto the Secretaries of State and Defense to prepare, in consultation\nwith the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, and in\nthe light of the discussion at that Council meeting, specific recom-\nmendations for Council action. (Reference A)\nThe enclosed report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on\nthe subject prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 202 in consultation\nwith the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, is submitted here-\nwith for consideration by the National Security Council at its next\nmeeting of the recommendations contained therein.\nThe Attorney General is being invited to participate in the\nCouncil's consideration of this report.\nthe recommendations should be put into effect at once and the Council\nThe Secretary of Defense expressed the view that, upon approval,\nshould plan to have a suitable review of the progress made after a\nreasonable period of implementation.\nIt is requested that this report be handled with special\nsecurity precautions.\nDistribution:\nThe President\nSIDNEY W. SOUERS\nThe Secretary of State\nExecutive Secretary\nThe Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Secretary of Defense\nThe Attorney General\nThe Secretary of the Army\nBRAY E.S. AROHIVES \"NATIONAL REGORDS SERVICE\" AND LIBRARY\nThe Secretary of the Navy\nThe Secretary of the Air Force\nThe Chairman, National Security\nResources Board\nNSC 50\nTOP SECRET\nCOPY\nTOP SECRET\nJuly 1, 1949\nCOMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nON THE REPORT OF THE DULLES-JACKSON-CORREA COMMITTEE PREPARED\nBY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nThe Report on \"The Central Intelligence Agency and National\nOrganization for Intelligence\" includes 57 individual conclusions\nand recommendations which we have regrouped in order to facilitate\nCouncil consideration. Although some of the conclusions do not\nrequire Council action, we wish to bring them to the Council's\nattention with our comments. Other conclusions and recommendations\ncall for concurrence or non-concurrence by the Council and appro-\npriate implementing action.\n1. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS GOVERNING CIA AND ITS POSITION\nUNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.\na. Summary of the Report.\nThe Survey Group report concludes that:\n(1) Section 102 of the National Security Act\nof 1947 which sets up CIA is sound and that no amendments are neces-\nsary at this time;\n(2) CIA is properly placed under the National\nSecurity Council, but that its Director should establish closer\nliaison with the two members of the Council on whom the Agency\nchiefly depends, namely, the Secretaries of State and Defense.\nb. Comments.\nWe concur in these conclusions and recommendations\nwhich do not require specific Council action or authorization. It\nNSC 50\n- 1 -\nBARRY ARCHIVES NATIONAL TRUMAS DROS AND LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET\n=\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nTOP SECRET\nshould be noted, however, that the National Military Establishment\nand CIA are presently studying the wartime status and responsi-\nbilities of CIA and that recommendations may be presented at a\nlater date on this subject. It may be determined that certain\nfunctions and responsibilities should be under the control of the\nmilitary in time of war.\nc. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council concur in the\nSurvey Group conclusions on this subject, with the understanding\nthat study may determine that certain functions and responsibilities\nshould be under the control of the military in time of war.\n2. THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.\na. Summary of the Report.\nThe Report concludes that:\n(1) The responsibility of CIA with respect to\nthe coordination of intelligence activities has not been fully dis-\ncharged;\n(2) The Intelligence Advisory Committee is\nsoundly conceived as an advisory body, but should, under the forth-\nright initiative and leadership of the Director of Central Intelli-\ngence, participate more actively in the continuing coordination of\nintelligence activities and in the discussion and approval of in-\ntelligence estimates.\nb. Comments.\nWe concur in the observations and conclusions of the\nReport on this general subject. We believe that the objectives\n8.\nTOOMAN\nNSC 50\nbarry\n\"NATIONAL\n- 2 -\nAROMIVES AND\nREDORDS\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET\n0.5.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nTOP SECRET\nsought for can be achieved by the recognition and implementation of\nthese principles and by the organizational and operational improve-\nments recommended elsewhere in the Report.\nIn accordance with these principles and as partial\nimplementation thereof, we recommend certain amendments to National\nSecurity Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, as indicated in\nAnnex \"A\", appended hereto. These amendments would (1) define the\nstatus of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the\nIntelligence Advisory Committee and (2) clarify the procedure whereby\ndissents are included in coordinated intelligence estimates.\nc. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council (1) concur in the\nconclusions and recommendations stated under para. 2 a above as a\nstatement of principles to be followed by the Director of Central\nIntelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee; (2) amend\nNational Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 in accordance\nwith the changes proposed in Annex \"A\" appended hereto.\n3. MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE.\na. Summary of Report.\nThe Report recommends that the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation be added to the membership of the Intelligence Ad-\nvisory Committee and that the Joint Staff (JCS) and Atomic Energy\nCommission be dropped from membership.\nb. Comments.\nWe concur in the proposal that the Federal Bureau\nof Investigation be added to the membership of the Intelligence\nNSC 50\nTROMAN\n- 3 -\nLEAVE\nTOP SECRET\nNATIONAL\nAROHIVES AND\nREUORDS\nSEART\n: SERVICE\" WEBT\nTOP SECRET\nAdvisory Committee, but do not agree that the Joint Staff (JCS) and\nAtomic Energy Commission be dropped from membership. A sufficient\nnumber of problems arise which are of joint concern to foreign\nintelligence and domestic security intelligence to warrant the\nmembership on the IAC of the FBI in order that coordination and\ncooperation in the national interest may be achieved.\nWe also wish to point out that the Recommended Action\nunder para. 2 c above would, if approved, have the effect of clari-\nfying the status of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member\nof the Intelligence Advisory Committee.\nc. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council (1) invite the\nAttorney General to have the Federal Bureau of Investigation become\na member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; (2) if this invita-\ntion is accepted, amend National Security Council Directive No. 1\naccordingly, as provided in Annex \"A\" appended hereto.\n4. PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION\nOR ATTENTION.\na. Summary of the Report.\nThroughout the Conclusions and Recommendations of\nthe Survey Group Report, attention is drawn to a number of particu-\nlar intelligence questions requiring special attention or coordina-\ntion. These may be listed as follows:\n(1) Scientific Intelligence.\n(2) Domestic Intelligence and counter-intelli-\ngence insofar as they relate to the national security.\nTROMAS\nNSC 50\nANNUS\n\"NATIONAL\nARONIVES AND\n- 4 -\nREOGRDS\nINTERNATIONAL\nTOP SECRET\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nTOP SECRET\n(3) Provisions for prompt coordinated intelli-\ngence estimates in crisis situations.\n(4) The proper allocation of responsibility for\npolitical summaries.\n(5) The exploitation of intelligence from\nforeign nationality groups and foreign individuals in the United\nStates.\n(6) The coordination of covert intelligence\nactivities in occupied areas.\n(7) Coordination of the handling of defectors.\n(8) Increased emphasis on the counter-espionage\nactivities abroad of the Central Intelligence Agency and closer\nliaison for counter-espionage matters with the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation.\nb.\nComments.\nWe concur in these conclusions and comments as inter-\npreted above and point out that recent progress has been made in\nsome of these fields. For example, that of scientific intelligence\nthrough the creation of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, by\nan agreement on a procedure for providing prompt coordinated national\nintelligence estimates in crisis situations, and by an agreement\nunder consideration by the IAC agencies and the FBI with respect to\nthe exploitation of defectors and other aliens.\nFor the purpose of clarity and guidance:\nParagraph 4 a (2) is considered to refer to the coordina-\ntion of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence with\nNSC 50\nTRUMAR\nfor SECRET\n- 5 -\nARIVE se AROMIVES \"NATIONALL SERVICE\" RECORDS ENVERNMENT MHD LIBERTY\nToΓ SECRET\ndomestic intelligence and domestic counterintelligence for the\npurpose of correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to\nnational security.\nParagraph 4 a (3) is considered to refer to provision for\nprompt coordinated national intelligence estimates in crisis situa-\ntions.\nParagraph 4 a (5) is considered to refer to the exploita-\ntion of foreign nationality groups and foreign individuals in the\nUnited States for the purposes of foreign intelligence.\nWe anticipate that the addition of the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation to the membership of the Intelligence Advisory Com-\nmittee will contribute particularly to the objectives under points\n(2), (3), (5) and (7) above. With respect to paragraph 4 a (8)\nabove, we believe the maintenance of close liaison for these pur-\nposes is essential.\nC.\nRecommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council:\n(1) Draw the particular attention of the Di-\nrector of Central Intelligence and Intelligence Advisory Committee\nto the need for early and sustained action for more effective co-\nordination in the fields listed under para. 4 a above as discussed\nin the Survey Group Report;\n(2) Request the Director of Central Intelli-\ngence to submit to the Council within a period of six months a re-\nport on progress in these matters.\n(3) Invite the Attorney General to have the\nTRUMAN\nNSC 50\n- 6 -\nAREAS U.S. AROMIVES NATIONAL REDORDS SERVICE\" AND SEAL TOTAL\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nFederal Bureau of Investigation become a member of the Intelligence\nAdvisory Committee.\n(4) If this invitation is accepted, amend\nNational Security Council Directive No. 1 accordingly, as provided\nin Annox \"A\" appended hereto.\n(5) Note that nothing contained in NSCID1, as\namended, is intended to affect or change NSC 17/4, approved by the\nPresident on March 23, 1949 and the Director of the Federal Bureau\nof Investigation is a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee\nfor the purpose of coordinating domestic intelligence and related\nmatters with foreign intelligence matters and his relations with\nthe CIA shall be as provided in Section 102 of the National Security\nAct of 1947.\n5.\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.\na.\nSummary of the Report.\nThe report concludes that in CIA there has been a\nconfusion between the responsibility for producing coordinated\nnational intelligence estimates and the responsibility for miscel-\nlaneous research and reporting. It finds further that the Council's\nIntelligence Directives on this subject are sound, but have not been\neffectively carried out. It recommends, aside from organizational\nchanges described in the following section, that CIA should draw\nupon and review the specialized intelligence production of the\nagencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence esti-\nmates and that these estimates should be discussed and approved by\nthe IAC, whose members should be collectively responsible. Such\n,\nTROMAN\nNATIONAL\nNSC 50\nAROMIVES AND\nREOORDS\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET\n- 7 -\nA.S. o GOVERNMENT\nTOP SECRET\nestimates should be recognized as the most authoritative available\nto policy makers.\nb. Comments.\nWe concur in these conclusions except that we do not\nbelieve that the Director and the IAC should be bound by the concept\nof collective responsibility, because this would inevitably reduce\ncoordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator\namong the agencies concerned. A procedure should be adopted which\nwould permit the Director and the IAC to fulfill their respective\nresponsibilities to the President and the NSC regardless of unani-\nmous agreement, but providing for concurrent submissions of dissent.\nThe CIA, however, should interpret and follow the NSC Intelligence\nDirectives so as to refrain as far as possible from competitive\nintelligence activities in the production of research intelligence\nestimates.\nc. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council concur in the\nconclusions and recommendations stated above, as interpreted by our\ncomments, as a statement of principles to be observed by the Director\nof Central Intelligence and the IAC.\n6.\nORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.\na. Summary of the Report.\nThe Survey Group Report proposes a number of major\nchanges in the internal organization of CIA with a view to supporting\nthe objectives set forth in the Report. These changes are the\nfollowing:\nTRUMAN\nAgava\nAROHIVES \"NATIONAL AND\n18RMY\nREGORDS\nNSC 50\n1.5.\n- 8 -\nSERVER WEAT\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n(1) The operations\nL\nshould be integrated under single over-\nall direction in an operations division, with its separate adminis\ntration, within CIA.\n(2) Out of the present Office of Reports and\nEstimates there should be created (a) a small estimates division\nwhich would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product\nof the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national\nintelligence estimates and (b) a research and reports division to\naccomplish central research in, and coordinated production of, in-\ntelligence in recognized fields of common interest.\n(3) The Foreign Documents Branch of\nshould be included in the proposed research and\nreports division.\n(4) The Foreign Broadcast Information Branch\nshould be included in the proposed operations division.\n(5) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and\nPlanning Staff should be reconstituted as a staff responsible only\nto the Director of Central Intelligence, with the task of developing\nplans for the coordination of intelligence activities. It would\nalso perform the present tasks of the Office of Collection and Dis-\nsemination with respect to the coordination of collection require-\nments and requests and the dissemination of intelligence.\nb. Comments.\nWe concur in these recommendations with the exception\nTRUM\nNSC 50\nARE\n\"NATIONAL\nTOP SECRET\n9\nAROMIVES AND\nREDORDS\nservice\"\nGOVERN HUNT\nTOP SECRET\nthat we do not agree that the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch\nshould be included in the proposed operations division. This\ndivision should include those activities (\nwhich conduct covert or semi-covert\nintelligence and related operations which are closely inter-\ndependent and have similar administrative and security problems.\nWith regard to the recommendations regarding the\nOffice of Reports and Estimates, the Interdepartmental Coordinating\nand Planning Staff and the Office of Collection and Dissemination,\nwe concur in them and in the concept of CIA upon which they are\nbased. However, we recognize that there may be other methods of\norganization which will accomplish the same objectives.\nC.\nRecommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council (1) approve the\nrecommendations of the Survey Group Report on the reorganization\nof CIA as listed in para. 6 a above, subject to the exception and\ncomments noted in para. 6 b; (2) direct the Director of Central In-\ntelligence to carry out these recommendations, as approved by the\nCouncil, and report to the Council in ninety days on progress toward\ntheir implementation.\n7.\nTHE SECURITY OF INFORMATION AND THE AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICITY.\na. Summary of the Report.\nThe Report recommends that (1) the Director of Central\nIntelligence should, in cases where the disclosure of secret informa-\ntion is sought from him and he has doubt as to whether he should\nNSC 50\n- 10 -\nBARTY 0.5 ARDRIVES \"NATIONAL REGORDS SERVICE\" SOVERNMENT TRUMAN AND\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ncomply, refer the question to the National Security Council; (2) in\nthe interest of security, the Central Intelligence Agency should\nincreasingly emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence\nrather than its secret intelligence activities in order to reverse\nthe present unfortunate trend where it finds itself advertised\nalmost exclusively as a secret service organization.\nb. Comments.\nWe concur in these recommendations with the reserva-\ntion that, in principle, all publicity is undesirable and that only\nwhere it is unavoidable should the procedure set forth in subpara-\ngraph 7 a (2) above be followed.\nC. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council (1) approve the\nrecommendations of the Survey Group Report on the security of in-\nformation and the avoidance of publicity, subject to the reservation\nnoted in para. 7 b above; (2) instruct the Director of Contral In-\ntelligence to prepare appropriate National Socurity Council Intelli-\ngence Directives covering these points and submit them for approval\nwithin a period of thirty days.\n8. CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE BOARD.\na. Summary of the Report.\nThe report recommends that the Director of Central\nIntelligence should be made permanent chairman of the United States\nCommunications Intelligence Board.\nUSC 50\nU.S. AROHIVES NATIONAL REGURDS SERVICE\" ROVERNMENT AND LIBERTY\nTOP SECRET\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nb. Comments.\nWe do not concur in this recommendation. This matter\nwas considered when the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board was\nset up and the present arrangements decided on. These arrangements,\nwhich provide for a rotating chairmanship, are operating satisfac-\ntorily and it seems undesirable to make a change.\nc.\nRecommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council not concur in the\nrecommendation contained in the Report.\n9.\nOPERATING PROBLEMS RELATING TO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.\na.\nSummary of the Report.\nThe Report sets forth certain recommendations re-\ngarding individual operating problems of the clandestine activities\nof CIA. These are questions which, according to the Report, require\nparticular emphasis or have been neglected in the past. The princi-\npal questions so indicated may be summarized as follows:\n(2) Relations with departmental agencies should\nbe brought closer and the guidance which the\nreceives from intelligence consumers should be strength-\nened. This might be achieved by including representatives of the\nService agencies and the State Department in appropriate sections\nTROMAN\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 50\n- 12 -\nURITE R.S. ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL RE00RDB SERVICE AND TIMET\nTOP SECRET\n(3) The Director of Central Intelligence should\nassure himself that the operating services of CIA receive adequate\nguidance on the current and strategic intelligence and policy needs\nof the Government.\nb. Comments.\nWe concur in these recommendations all of which point\nto significant operating problems relating to clandestine activities\nwhich require particular and constant emphasis.\nc. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council (1) approve the\nrecommendation of the Report as listed in para. 9 a above; (2)\ndirect the Director of Central Intelligence to carry them out with\nthe assistance of the other departments and agencies concerned and\nreport to the National Security Council on any difficulties en-\ncountered.\n10. THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN OR MILITARY PERSONNEL IN KEY CIA\nPOSITIONS.\na. Summary of the Report.\nThe Report concludes that:\n(1) The placing in key positions in CIA of a\nlarge percentage of military personnel, many of them on relatively\nNSC 50\nARTH as ANOHIVES \"NATIONAL REDORDS SERVICE\" SOVERNMENT TRUMAS AND LIBERT\nTOP SECRET\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nshort tour of duty assignment, tends to discourage competent civil-\nian personnel from looking to employment in the Agency as a career.\n(2) Continuity of service is essential for the\nsuccessful carrying out of the duties of Director of Central Intelli-\ngence. The best hope for insuring this continuity and the greatest\nassurance of independence of action is for a civilian to be Director\nof Central Intelligence. A serviceman selected for the post should\nresign from active military duty.\nb. Comments.\nWe do not wholly concur in these conclusions. It is\nmost important that both civilian and military personnel be repre-\nsented in the key positions in the Central Intelligence Agency al-\nthough we do not believe it is desirable to attempt to fix any pre-\ncise ratio for the two. This is a matter to be worked out by the\nDirector in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense.\nWe agree that continuity of service is essential for the\npost of Director. The most qualified person available should be\nselected for the post. In order to insure continuity and independ-\nence of action, he should be either a civilian, or if a service man\nor a foreign service officer, he should be either retired or one\nwhose service as Director will be his final tour of active duty.\nC. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council:\n(1) Concur in the above comments as an expres-\nsion of its views on this question.\n(2) Inform the President of these views insofar\nNSC 50\nLARY ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL REGORDS TRUMAN AND 1\nTOP SECRET\n- 14 -\n8.5.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nTOP SECRET\nas they concern the post of Director of Central Intelligence.\n(3) Inform the Director of Central Intelligence\nof these views insofar as they concern the staffing of other key\npositions in CIA.\n11. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE LEADERSHIP AND POLICIES OF THE\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.\na. Summary of the Report.\nThe Report concludes that:\n(1) The directing staff of CIA has not demon-\nstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate of the organization\nor the ability to discharge that mandate effectively.\n(2) Administrative organization and policies\ntend to impede the carrying out of the essential intelligence\nfunctions of CIA under the Act.\nb. Comments.\nWe do not wholly concur in these conclusions. While\nwe recognize the existence of important defects in the organization\nand operation of CIA, we believe that these conclusions are too\nsweeping. Complicating factors in appraising CIA's efficiency have\nbeen the shortness of time during which to develop an effective\norganization and a lack of common understanding as to the respective\nmissions of CIA and the departmental intelligence agencies. How-\never, as indicated in the Report and concurred in by us, numerous\nand important improvements are necessary and need to be carried\nout promptly and effectively.\ntasway\nNSC 50\nLIMITY 1 I INSURANCE 08.\nTOP SECRET\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nC. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council (1) note the Con-\nclusions and Recommendations of the Report on this subject: (2)\napprove the above Comments thereon.\n12. THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.\na. Comments.\nThe National Military Establishment concurs in the\nConclusions and Recommendations of Chapter 11 of the Report except\nthat it does not agree that the Service intelligence agencies should\nbe staffed with personnel who concentrate in intelligence over the\nmajor portion of their careers. It is the policy of the Military\nEstablishment to assign qualified personnel to intelligence duties\neven though they have not had previous intelligence experience.\nHowever, continued efforts are made to attract the highest type\npersonnel to intelligence duty.\nb. Recommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council note the above\nComments by the National Military Establishment.\n13. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.\na. Comments.\nThe Department of State concurs in the Conclusions\nand Recommendations of Chapter 12 of the Report and is undertaking\nto put them into effect as part of general plans for reorganization\nwithin the Department.\nb.\nRecommended Action.\nThat the National Security Council note the above\nComments by the Department of State.\nNSC 50\n- 16 -\nUNITY & AROMIVES \"NATIONAL RECORDS SERVICE\" government THOMAS AND THERT\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nANNEX \"A\"\n1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordination\nbetween the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organi-\nzations, an Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the\nDirector of Central Intelligence, who shall be Chairman thereof,\nDirector of Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the respective\nintelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and\nAir Force, and from the Joint Staff (JCS), and the Atomic Energy\nCommission, or their representatives, shall be established to advise\nthe Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central In-\ntelligence will invite the chief, or his representative, of any\nother intelligence Agency having functions related to the national\nsecurity to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever\nmatters within the purview of his Agency are to be discussed.\n*****\n5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate\nNational Intelligence to the President, to members of the National\nSecurity Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies,\nand to such Governmental Departments and Agencies as the National\nSecurity Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence\nso disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence\nAgencies or shall carry an-agreed a statement of substantially\ndissent differing opinions.\nAUG TRUMAN UNITED\nNSC 50\n8.5,\nTOP SECRET\n- 17 -"
}