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    "title": "National Security Council Report 56/1, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration",
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    "ocrText": "The President\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 56/1\nCOPY NO. 1\nDECLASSIFIED\nA REPORT\nE.O. noc 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (ii)\nORD\nletter,\nby . MARS Date 2.10.77\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nUNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY COLLABORATION\nApril 27, 1950\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\nApril 27, 1950\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nDECLASSIFIED\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nE, O. NSC 11652, letter. Sec. 1 or (E)\non\nBy NLT. NARS Date: 2.10.27\nUNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD INTER -AMERICAN\nMILITARY COLLABORATION\nReference: NSC 56\nThe enclosure, based on the reference report by the Secretary\nof Defense and prepared by the NSC Staff with the advice and assist-\nance of representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense,\nthe Chairman, National Security Resources Board, and the Director\nof Central Intelligence, is submitted herewith for consideration\nby the National Security Council.\nIt is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosure,\nit be submitted to the President for consideration with the recom-\nmendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and\ndirect their implementation by all appropriate executive departments\nand agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of\nthe Secretary of State.\nJAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\nCC: The Secretary of the Treasury\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nREPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nUNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY COLLABORATION\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To determine the policies of the United States with\nrespect to military collaboraticn among the American states.\nANALYSIS\nBackground of the Present Situation\n2. In World War II the United States was required to divert\nfrom the main offensive effort to the security of the Caribbean,\nCentral and South American areas a force at one time totaling about\n130,000 men with their equipment. Because of antiquated military\nmethods, European military influences, lack of modern equipment\nand know-how, the Latin American countries, with only one major\nexception, were unable to make any contribution to Western Hemi-\nsphere defense. In the event of a third world war, the military\ntasks of the United States would be facilitated if a repetition of\nthis situation could be avoided. Recognizing this, the United\nStates has since 1945 made various efforts to establish a practi-\ncable basis for more effective inter-American military collabora-\ntion.\n3. In July 1945, the President approved a statement enuncia-\nting policies and principles to be followed by the United States in\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and (D) or (E)\nNSC letter, I 1.1F.77\nBy NLT- He NARS Date 2-10-77\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nthe interests of collectivo hemisphere defense. This statement\nrovided that the United States insofar 38 possible should:\na. Establish U. S. military training missions in the\nother American republics.\nb. Provide training in the United States for Latin\nAmerican military personnel.\nc. Participate in the making of combined joint plans\nfor hemisphere defense.\nd. Provide military equipment to the other American\nrepublics.\n4. This statement also provided that the policy should be\ncarried out in compliance with the following principles:\na, Military cooperation should not be extended any\nAmerican republic SO as to provide it with a military\nestablishment beyond its economic means to support.\nb. Training and equipment should not be provided an\nAmerican republic where there is good reason to believe\nthat they would be used for aggression, or in order to\nthreaten aggression, against neighboring American republics,\nthus prejudicing the primary objective of inter-American\nunity.\nc. In accordance with the democratic principles that\nthe United States represents and upholds throughout the\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nworld, and on which its moral credit is largely based,\nevery effort should be made to assure that U. S. training\nand equipment not be used to deprive the peoples of the\nAmerican republics of their democratic rights and liberties.\nd. All plans made and all measures taken to carry out\nthis program shall be with the approval of the Department\nof Defense in respect to defense policy and with the\napproval of the Department of State in respect to foreign\npolicy.\n5. The following measures have been taken in implementation\nof the approved policies and principles set forth above:\n8. In 1945, the War and Navy Departments conducted\nexploratory bilateral staff conversations with the armed\nforces of the other American republics for the purpose of\ndetermining the approximate strengths of Latin American\narmed forces and the armaments required to support these\nstrengths. Although these conversations could not result\nin any agreement by the United States to supply military\nequipment or in any agreement by the other governments to\nlimit the composition and size of their armed forces, they\nserved to focus the attention of the other American republics\nupon the United States as a source of procurement.\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nb. Pending enactment of the Inter-American Military\nCooperation Act, an interim program was instituted by which\nlimited amounts of surplus equipment were offered for sale\nto the other American republics under the Surplus Property\nAct. The Inter-American Military Gooperation Act was never\nenacted and the interim program was terminated in 1948.\nC. The President requested Congress to provide authoriza-\ntion in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 for selling\nto the other American republics equipment compatible with\ntheir economic condition and with the needs of hemisphere\ndefense, the United States to be reimbursed by the recipient\ncountries for the value of such equipment. As enacted by\nCongress, this law authorizes the transfer by sale of such\nequipment to countries which have ratified the Inter-American\nTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance, but only with full cash\nreimbursemont of the original cost to the United States,\nincluding necessary rehabilitation and service charges.\nd. The United States Delegation to the Inter-American\nDefense Board has recommended to tho Board that the latter\nundertske the preparation of a common defense scheme for the\nmaintenance of the peace and security of the continent, for\napproval by the American states as a basis for further\nplanning toward the defensc of the Hemisphere. The Inter-\nAmerican Defense Board has adopted the recommendation of the\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nUnited States Delegation, and the member governments of the\nOrganization of American States have been notified accordingly.\ne. The United States has complied with requests of\nmost of the other American republics for U.S. military\ntraining missions.\nf. Latin American military personnel have received,\nand are receiving, training in U. S. military instellations\nunder existing legislation.\nThe Present Situation\n6. The Latin American countries could make their greatest\ncontribution to collective effort in global war by providing for\nregional security to the maximum of their capabilities, thereby\nminimizing diversion of United States forces from the main effort.\nIn eddition some Latin American countries could provide offensive\nforces. However, full realization of the Latin American potential\nfor contributing to the prosecution of a war requires more ef-\nfective inter-American military collaboration than now exists.\nFailure to achieve satisfactory collaboration would impose on\nUnited States forces requirements in excess of their efforts in\nWorld War II, and engender 2 situation detrimental to the security\ninterests of the United States.\n7. In addition to such external hostile threats as might be\nprojected against Latin America, communists in Latin America have\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nthe capability of severely weakening any war effort of the United\nStates by interfering with the source and transit of strategic\nmaterials, by damaging vital installations and by fomenting unrest\nand instability. In the event of war, the main deterrent to\nexecution of this capability is the ability of the security forces\nof the Latin American nations to maintain internal security in\nsupport of their governments. Their employment to this end can be\nfacilitated through military collaboration under established inter-\nAmerican procedures.\n8. Experience in military collaboration with Latin American\ncountries since the war has shown that many of them have a desire\nfor military equipment in excess of their economic capability to\nsupport. Some Latin American countries are overwhelmed by financial\nobligations which they cannot meet; most of them have a severe\nshortage of dollars; their position in international trade is pre-\ncarious; they are seeking United States assistance to solve these\nproblems and are receiving it in the form of loans and constructive,\nbut expensive, economic projects. In approaching the problem of\ninter-American military collaboration most of the Latin American\nleaders will be inspired more by their own ambitions, and by fears\nregarding their neighbors, than by the basic requirements of\nhemisphere defense. Implied United States commitments almost\ninevitably develop in the minds of the Latin\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nAmericans following any military discussions with this country. It\nis difficult in such discussions to avoid stimulation of their de-\nsires for military equipment which this country cannot deliver.\nWhen the United States is successful in reaching military agreements\nwith the Latin American countries it is likely that those countries\nwill expect the United States to provide the means to implement\nthe agreements. It is therefore important constantly to be\nn\nguard to avoid stimulating desires and giving rise to an essumption\non their part of implied commitments beyond our intention or capa-\ncity to fulfill. No matter how sound & policy and program for\ninter-American military collaboration may be, the difficulties of\ntiming and implementation will require constant coordination of all\nthe changing political, economic, and military factors affecting\nUnited States over-all security interests in Latin America.\n9. When the Latin American countries are unable to expend\ntheir budgeted funds to procure military equipment from the United\nStates they turn to whatever markets are available (including the\nsatellite nations of the USSR) for such equipment and may develop\nresentment toward the United States. While standardization of\nmilitary equipment for all Latin American countries remains an\nultimate objective, its realization is not necessary for the early\nundertaking of 2, program of inter-American military collaberation.\nProcurement by Latin American countries of military equipment from\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nEuropean sources may well involve the sending of European military\nmissions to the American countries which would be detrimental to\nth ultimate objective of standardization. It must be recognized\nthat the attainment of this ultimate objective is locked\nat\nthe\npresent time by obvious practical difficulties, particularly the\nhigh cost of United States armaments, higher priorities accorded to\nnon-hemisphere countries, and the limitations on United States\nsubsidies during peace time. Furthermore, as desirable as standardi-\nzation may be, it is not an over-riding consideration taking\nprecedence over all other military or political factors in the\nsituation. Under present circumstances, the emphasis on standardi-\nmust be weighed against other factors such as the varying importance\nof the roles of the individual countries in hemisphere defense, the\ncheaper price of certain arms in friendly European countries and\nthe availability of such arms to Latin American countries.\n10. Despite these difficulties, it is important, in view of\nthe probable conditions which we will face in the event of another\nwer, that every effort be made through prior planning and agreement\nto develop effective inter-American military colleboration in time\nf peBce to assure effective collective hemisphere defense im-\nmediately upon the outbreak of war. Development by the IADB of a\ncollective defense schome would facilitate its acceptance by the\nLatin American republics. Detormination on the basis of that scheme\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nof the individual roles would likewise facilitate acceptance of\nthose roles by the respective Latin American republics. When all\nor a sufficient number of the American states shall have approved\nthe collective defense scheme and accepted their military roles\nthere will have been provided the basis for further detailed plan-\nning by the various countries preparatory to the discharge of ac-\ncepted responsibility and maintenance of armed forces consistent\nwith these roles.\n11. A Western Hemisphere Defense Scheme can be developed only\nin broad terms for acceptance by the United States and the Latin\nAmerican governments. Such a defense scheme must not jeopardize\nor unduly influence global strategy in favor of either direct\nmilitary assistance or distribution of equipment solely for the\nachievement of political objectives. The defense scheme to be pro-\nposed for acceptance should include:\na. A strategic concept of the defense of the American\nstates within the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.\nb. A statement of the strategic military objectives of\nthe American states designed to achieve the maximum of West-\nern Hemisphere cooperative strength under the Inter-American\nTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947, for the accomplishment\nof that concept.\nC. A statement of collective strategic military require-\nments of the collaborating American states for accomplishing\ntheir objectives.\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nMilitary Concept, Principles and Objectives\n12. In global war, the basic United States military under-\ntakings required to achieve the objectives of the United States\ninclude, inter alia:\na. Insuring the integrity of the Western Hemisphere\nand promoting and developing its war-making capacity.\nb. In conjunction with our allies, securing such\nbases as are essential for the projection of operations.\nc. Initiating development of the offensive power of\nthe armed forces for such operations as may be necessary\nfor achievement of the national war objectives.\nd. Supporting the war effort of our allies by the\nprovision of all feasible military assistance.\n13. The principal strategic military objectives of the United\nStates in Latin America are:\n2. The continued and increasing production and\ndelivery of essential strategic materials.\nb. While allowing scope for normal political change,\nthe maintenance within each nation of political stability\nand of internal security to insure protection of the instal-\nlati ns upon which the production and de livery of strategic\nmaterials depend.\nc. The mutual cooperation of all of the Latin American\nnations in support of the United States.\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nd. The protection of vital lines of communication.\n8. The provision, development, operation and protection\nof those bases that may be required for the use of the United\nStates and for the protection of lines of communication.\nf. The coordinated protection of Latin America from\ninvasion and from raids.\n2. The provision of those Latin American armed forces\nnecessary for the accomplishment of the foregoing.\nh. The provision by Latin American nations, for the\nsupport of collective action in other theaters, of those\nforces beyond their requirements for the accomplishment of\nthe foregoing.\n14. The United States concept of hemisphere defense is based\non & regional rather than & national (country by country) approach.\nFor example, the problems incident to security of sea lines of\ncommunication are divided into South Atlantic, South Pecific,\nCaribbean, and Western Mexican areas, and must be the joint res-\nponsibility of nations contiguous to those areas. By the same\ntoken, whereas the security of the source of Bolivian tin is &\nresponsibility inherent to Bolivia, the transit of such tin to the\nUnitod States is 8 responsibility shared by at least half B dozen\nother countries. Also, instability or defection of one country\nwill divert from the concerted war effort of its neighbors. HC-\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\ncordingly any examination of the military requirements of a single\nnation must be judged in the light of the whole.\n15. Principal regional areas in Latin America for Western\nHemisphere defense, subject to defense by joint hemisphere forces,\ninclude: Panama Canal Zone and Approaches, which control the vital\neast-west line of communications; Mexico, which is necessary for\nthe protection of the continental United States and as a base for\nthe protection of major north-south lines of communication; the\nVenezuelan oil area including Curacao-Aruba and Trinidad, which\nconstitutes one of the world's great oil reserves and which would\nhave correspondingly increased importance in the event Middle East\noil should be unavailable; Northeast Brazil, which controls the\n\"Straits of Natal-Dakar\" from the west and therefore the major\nnorth-south lines of communication in the Atlantic Ocean; River\nPlate Estuary and Approaches, through which supplies of basic\nfoodstuffs are shipped to many Western Hemisphere nations and\nGreat Britain; Mollendo, Peru--Antcfagasta, Chile, which contains\nthe rail and harber outlets for shipments of Bolivian strategic\nmaterials; and Straits of Magellan, which is an alternate world-\nwide east-west line of communications in the event of loss or\ndamage of the Panama Canal.\n16. The foregoing envisages that armed forces should be\nmaintained by the other American republics generally for the fcl-\nlowing principal purposes:\na. To minimize diversion of the armed forces of the\nUnited States in maintaining the security of the Western\nHemisphere.\nNSC 56/1\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nb.\nTo maintain internal order and security.\nC. To provide local defenses against isolated attacks\nor raids.\nd. To protect coastwise shipping.\ne. To augment the armed forces of the United States in\nprotecting overseas commerce.\nf. To provide facilities for the use of such United\nStates or other American forces as may be required for pro-\ntection against external aggression.\ng. In some cases to provide forces for augmenting\nUnited States forces outside this Hemisphere.\n17. On the basis of the foregoing, U. S. objectives may be\nstated with specific reference to (1) the character of the train-\ning, equipment and doctrine of the armed force to be maintained\nby each Latin American country and (2) the role of each Latin\nAmerican armed force in collective hemisphere defense:\na. As a long-range objective, the United States seeks\nthe complete standardization along U. S. lines of the train-\ning, equipment and doctrine of the armed force of each Latin\nAmerican country.\nb. With respect to roles in hemisphere defense, it is\nenvisaged that each Latin American armed force should be\ncapable of maintaining security within its own territory, in-\ncluding prevention of revolutionary disturbances, prevention\nof clandestine enemy operations, defense against isolated\nattacks or raids, protection of the sources and installations\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nof strategic materials, and local security of bases and mili-\ntary facilities. Beyond these roles applicable to each Latin\nAmerican armed force, certain countries should be capable of\nperforming additional tasks as appropriate.\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nCONCLUSIONS\n18. In global war, the security of the Western Hemisphere\nand U. S. access to its resources and manpower would be essen-\ntial to the transoceanic projection of major U. S. offensive power.\n19. To minimize diversion of U. S. forces for defense of the\nWestern Hemisphere, the United States should make every effort to\nassure the availability and use of indigenous armed forces in\nLatin America for the execution of military tasks within their\ncapabilities.\n20. The security interests of the United States would be ad-\nvanced by the maintenance and further development of inter-American\nmilitary collaboration, including standardization, continued mili-\ntary orientation of the Latin American states toward the United\nStates, and development of agreed collective defense plans.\n21. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance con-\nstitutes the political framework of the regional defense arrange-\nment required to secure Latin American participation in the defense\nof the Western Hemisphere. Because of its position among the\nAmerican republics, it devolves upon the United States to take the\nlead in the accomplishment of these arrangements. Existing U. S.\npolicies respecting Inter-American military collaboration should be\ncontinued.\n22. Further measures are now required to enable the United\nStates to promote sound collective security and to accomplish in\nthe event of war the prompt and effective implementation of an\nagreed plan for hemisphere defense. As the first measure to this\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nend a Western Hemisphere Defense Scheme, in form acceptable to\nthis Government should be evolved within the Inter-American Defense\nBoard. This Defense Scheme should be within the general framework\nof the U. S. military concept, principles and objectives for col-\nlective security of the Western Hemisphere and should include a\nstatement of the strategic aims and defense principles of the\nAmerican states for the collective security of the zone established\nin the Rio Treaty.\n23. As the next step, the United States should seek to obtain\nacceptance by the Latin American governments of the Hemisphere\nDefense Scheme.\n24. When all or a sufficient number of the American states\nhave approved the Hemisphere Defense Scheme, it should be the\nbasis for the formulation by United States and Latin American mili-\ntary representatives of the military role of each of the American\nstates in the collective defense of the Hemisphere.\n25. When these roles are formulated, the United States should\nsupport necessary and desirable measures leading to the acceptance\nby the various governments of their military rcles in Hemisphere\ndefense.\n26. When the Western Hemisphere Defense Scheme is approved by\nthe United States and the other American republics and upon con-\nsequent acceptance of military roles the United States should then\nprepare for its own purposes a careful estimate of the requirement\nof each of the other American republics for the maintenance of\nforces essential to Hemisphere defense. These estimates should\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nserve as a guide in arrangements for the provision of such mutual\nassistance among the American republics as may be necessary to\nassure addquate implementation of the Hemisphere Defense Scheme.\n27. The United States should seek to persuade the Latin\nAmerican nations to minimize their military expenditures in time\nof peace by maintaining only those armed forces necessary to meet\ntheir obligations for collective defense. To accomplish the fore-\ngoing it may be necessary in some cases for the United States:\na. To assist Latin American nations to obtain from\nU. S. sources the armaments required for the maintenance of\nsuch forces.\nb. To encourage and advise Latin American nations\nthrough U. S. missions and other training media to make\noptimum use of their forces in the interests of collective\ndefense.\n28. The development and implementation of this program at\nall stages as well as the timing of individual steps should be\ncarried out with the closest coordination between the Departments\nof State and Defense and should be guided by:\na. The military requirements of the United States in\nthe event of war.\nb. The strategic justification for the defense roles\nassumed by the American republics.\nC. The need for limitation or exclusion of extra-Hemi-\nsphere military influence in Latin America.\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nd. The economic condition of each Latin American state.\ne. Relative priorities for the allocation of U. S.\nassistance to foreign countries.\nf. Political factors in the foreign relations of the\nUnited States, particularly inter-American relationships such\nas those involving political instability.\nNSC 56/1\nTOP SECRET\n- 18 -\nDECLASSIFIED\n2. O. NSC 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) OF (E)\n- letter, 1-18-77\nBE NLT. He ; NARS Date 2.10.77\nTOP SECRET\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\n3545-STATE-1949\nNSC Meeting #57"
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