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    "title": "Memorandum from James S. Lay, Jr. to President Harry S. Truman with Attached Report, National Security Council Report 18/6, Report to the President by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Yugoslavia",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nNLT(PSF/NSC)849\nWASHINGTON\nmiss Conway file for\nMarch 7, 1951\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nAt its 85th meeting today, the National Security\nCouncil, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury and the\nDirector of Defense Mobilization adopted for your consider-\nation the proposed statement of policy contained in the en-\nclosed report on \"The Position of the U. S. With Respect to\nYugoslavia\" (NSC 18/6), to supersede the previous \"U. S.\nPolicy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia\"\n(NSC 18/4) which you approved on November 18, 1949.\nThe National Security Council, the Acting Secre-\ntary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense Mobilization\nrecommend that you approve the proposed statement of policy\ncontained in the enclosed report, to supersede NSC 18/4, and\ndirect its implementation by all appropriate executive depart-\nments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordi-\nnation of the Secretary of State.\nJames D.Ley.,J. JAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\nAPPROVED:\n(S) Harry S. Truman\nHARRY S. TRUMAN\nDate: march 9, 1951\nHARTY TRUMAN NARA\nBy DJM Date 5/29/98\nTOP SECRET\nThe President\nAULT/PSF/NSC)850\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 18/6\nCOPY NO. 1\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nPRESIDENT\nBY THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nTHE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES\nWITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA\nMarch 7, 1951\nDECLASSIFIED\nWASHINGTON\nAuthority NSC DF List, 1/29/09\nBy so NARA, Date 2/28/11\nTOP SECRET\nHARRY TRUMAN NARA LIBRAPA\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 18/6\nTOP SECRET\nMarch 7, 1951\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nTHE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA\nReferences: A. NSC 18/2 and NSC 18/4\nB. NSC 73/4. par. 37-a-(2)\nC. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsubject: \"United States Policy Toward\nYugoslavia and the Furnishing of Military\nAssistance to Yugoslavia in Case of Aggression\",\ndated September 5, 1950\nD. NSC 18/5 and the Annex thereto\nE. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same\nsubject, dated March 6, 1951\nAt its 85th meeting the National Security Council, the Acting\nSecretary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense Mobilization\nconsidered a draft report on the subject (reference D.) and the\nviews of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect thereto contained\nin reference E.\nAfter noting a statement by General Collins that, as a result\nof discussion with officials of the Department of State, the Joint\nChiefs of Staff recommended withdrawal of their proposed amendment\nto paragraph 2-b of NSC 18/5, the National Security Council, the\nActing Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense\nMobilization adopted the proposed statement of policy in NSC 18/5\nsubject to the amendments recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nin paragraphs 2-e and 2-f thereof. The proposed statement of\npolicy in NSC 1875 as amended and the Annex to NSC 18/5 corre-\nspondingly amended are enclosed herewith.\nThe National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the\nTreasury and the Director of Defense Mobilization recommend that\nthe President approve the enclosed statement of policy, to super-\nsede NSC 18/4, and direct its implementation by all appropriate\nexecutive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under\nthe coordination of the Secretary of State.\nIt is requested that special care be excercised to restrict the\ninformation in this report to a \"need to know\" basis because of the\nextreme sensitivity of the Yugoslav Government to all questions of\nmilitary assistance from the United States or the NATO. This\nrestriction will apply also to all phases of implementation.\nplanning, budgeting, legislative hearings, stockpiling.\nJAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nTRUMAN NARA\nExecutive Secretary\nCC: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Director of Defense Mobilization\nNSC 18/6\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSTATEMENT OF POLICY\nproposed by the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nYUGOSLAVIA\n1. It is of great importance to the national security\ninterests of the United States that Yugoslavia remain free of\nSoviet domination. In present circumstances the independence of\nYugoslavia can be supported only through the existing communist,\nbut anti-Soviet, regime. Notwithstanding the communist character\nof the existing regime, the United States should afford assistance\nto Yugoslavia in order to strengthen its will and ability to\nresist Soviet or Soviet-inspired pressures and possible aggression.\n2. In the light of the preceding paragraph and of the in-\ncreased threat of an attack on Yugoslavia, the United States should\nas a matter or urgency:\na. Expedite the provision of economic assistance to\nYugoslavia under NSC 18/2, taking the necessary steps, in-\ncluding possible use of funds appropriated to foreign aid,\nto avert danger of serious deterioration or collapse of the\nYugoslav economy.\nb. Take appropriate steps to determine what military\nequipment Yugoslavia can effectively utilize to resist ag-\ngression.\nC. On the basis of screened Yugoslav requests and\nacting so far as possible in cooperation with the United\nKingdom, France, and other NATO members:\n(1) Facilitate the purchase of arms by Yugoslavia\nin Western countries, including reimbursable aid and\ngiving Yugoslavia a status equal to that of NATO coun-\ntries in such matters as the granting of U. S. export\nlicenses, and urge other countries to do likewise.\n(2) With due regard to other priorities and to the\nresources available, provide direct assistance, including\nmilitary equipment, on grant aid or other non-payment\nbasis, if satisfactory means for its procurement and\ndelivery can be found.\nd. In concert with the United Kingdom and France, inform\nHARTY TRUMAN NARA USRAPA\nNSC 18/6\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe Yugoslav Government at an appropriate time that in the\nevent of attack it can count on military supplies from the\nWest.\ne. Take steps now which would enable the United States\nto furnish appropriate military supplies to Yugoslavia in\nthe event of attack, procurement of such supplies for stock-\npiles under U. S. control in suitable locations to have a\npriority equal to that of NATO countries. The establishment\nof these stockpiles should be accomplished as rapidly as\npracticable, and maintained as necessary thereafter.\nf. In view of the immediate urgency of the situation\nand in order that the United States may be prepared to take\nwhatever action may be appropriate at the time, make and keep\ncurrent plans to provide Yugoslavia appropriate military\nsupport.\n3. In the event that the USSR and/or its satellites under-\ntake a campaign of extensive guerrilla operations against Yugoslavia,\nthe United States should:\na. Support action in the United Nations aimed at ascer-\ntaining the facts of the case, calling upon the states res-\nponsible to cease such operations, and authorizing appropriate\nmeasures by member states to assist Yugoslavia to defend its\nindependence.\nb. Consult and act in so far as practicable with the UK,\nFrance and other interested states as appropriate.\nC. Deliver military equipment to Yugoslavia if requested\nand in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff at the time.\n4. In the event of overt attack against Yugoslavia by organ-\nized USSR and/or satellite forces, the United States should:\na. Place itself immediately in the best possible position\nto meet the increased threat of global war.\nb. Support action in the United Nations calling for the\nwithdrawal of the invading forces and authorizing appropriate\nmeasures by member states to assist Yugoslavia.\nC. Consult and act in so far as practicable with the\nUK, France and other interested states as appropriate.\nd. Furnish military equipment to Yugoslavia, on receipt\nHARRY TRUMAND NARA UBRARA\nNSC 18/6\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nof Yugoslav requests and in the light of recommendations by\nthe Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.\ne. Implement such portions of the plans provided for\nin 2-f above as may be deemed appropriate in the light of\nthe circumstances then existing and recommendations by the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff at the time.\nHARRY S. TRUMAN NARA LIBRAPP\nNSC 18/6\nI 1 3\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNSC STAFF STUDY\non\nTHE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To determine desirable US courses of action with respect\nto Yugoslavia in the light of current international tensions in-\nvolving the United States and the USSR.\nANALYSIS\nU. S. Interest in Yugoslavia's continued resistance to the USSR.\n2. The United States gains definite strategic advantages by\nthe denial of Yugoslavia to the Soviet orbit. With its geographic\nposition and an army of over thirty divisions, an independent\nYugoslavia can serve as a shield protecting the Western position\nin the Eastern Mediterranean and adding to Western strength in\nthe general African and Near Eastern area.\n3. Soviet success in destroying the Tito regime and sup-\nplanting it by a government subservient to Moscow would represent\na serious strategic and political reverse for the United States\nand the Western European nations; it would reestablish Soviet power\non the entire eastern shore of the Adriatic, renew and intensify\nthreats to the internal and external security of Greece, expose\nItaly to Soviet influences and pressures, complicate the Western\nposition in Trieste and otherwise provide increased momentum to\nSoviet expansionism of possibly grave global consequence,\n4. Soviet subjugation of Yugoslavia would have a tremendous\npsychological impact on Europe and constitute a blow to the in-\nfluence and morale of the United Nations, of which Yugoslavia is\na member. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have\nindicated general agreement that the maintenance of Yugoslavia's\nability to defend its independence is highly important to the\nsecurity of the North Atlantic area and would be obliged to con-\nfront the problem of taking effective counter-measures if Soviet\ntactics were successful in delaying or blocking effective United\nNations action.\n5. The armed forces of Yugoslavia, especially as considered\ntogether with the armed forces of Greece and Turkey, represent a\nmilitary factor which could be of great importance to the United\nStates and other Western countries in the event of a general war\nwith the USSR. Consequently, the maintenance of Yugoslav military\nNSC 18/6\n- 4 -\nHARRY TRUMAN U NARA CIBRAST\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nstrength and morale at the point of maximum feasible effectiveness\nto meet a Soviet or satellite attack serves the strategic interests\nof the United States.\n6. The Tito heresy represents a rift in the international\ncommunist movement, challenging Kremlin control of world communism\nas an instrument of Soviet imperialism. The loss of a satellite\nwas a great blow to Soviet prestige, and national communism or\n\"Titoism\" has great potentialities as an ideological factor weakening\nSoviet power and influence throughout the world of presently in-\ncalculable consequences. Inasmuch as Soviet success in liquidating\nthe Tito regime would have a profound and perhaps decisive in-\nfluence upon those communist elements which are resisting the\nabsolute control of the Kremlin under the inspiration of Tito's\nsuccessful resistance, it is important to the West that Tito main-\ntain this resistance.\nDevelopment of Soviet pressures on Yugoslavia\n7. Since the open Cominform-Yugoslav break in June 1948 the\nUSSR and its satellites have continued to exert relentless pressure\non the Tito regime with the aim of overthrowing it and replacing\nit with one susceptible to Kremlin control. This campaign has\nincluded incessant propaganda attacks, drastic measures against\nYugoslav diplomats, severance of practically all normal relations\nwith Yugoslavia, economic blockade, frontier incidents, Soviet and\nsatellite troop movements along Yugoslavia's frontiers, and attempts\nto organize anti-Tito movements both inside and outside Yugoslavia.\n8. The Tito regime has given every sign that it will continue\nto resist Soviet pressures and will fight if Yugoslavia is attacked.\nThere is no solid evidence of Soviet success in winning support\namong the people of Yugoslavia or in breaking Tito's grip on the\nYugoslav Communist Party and the apparatus of government in Yugos-\nlavia. His security forces should be able to thwart any attempts\nat internal revolution. There is no prospect of Tito's return to\nthe Kremlin's graces. All available evidence indicates that the\nbreak is final and irrevocable. Although the possibility of\nassassination cannot be overlooked, the removal of Tito alone\nfrom the scene would not be likely to change immediately the basic\nsituation since the other Yugoslav Communist leaders are equally\ncommitted to his policies and involved in his heresy.\n9. While the Yugoslav Government has looked to the West for\neconomic support and counts on material assistance in the event of\narmed attack, it has attempted to maintain an independent position\noutside of any bloc. It does not yet desire to be associated in\ncollective Western efforts for economic recovery or mutual defense\nassistance, although it has been willing to accept grant food aid\nfrom ECA and MDAP funds, concluding a bilateral agreement with the\nTRUMAN NARA DIBRARY\nNSC 18/6\n- 5 -\nHARRY\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nUnited States under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.\nIn any case, so long as Yugoslavia continues to be subjected to\nSoviet pressures, it will continue to orient itself more and more\ntoward the West. Tito has stated that in any war originating else-\nwhere Yugoslavia would fulfill its obligations as a member of the\nUnited Nations, and that Yugoslavia would fight in case of aggression\nagainst any independent European state. Should Yugoslavia be at-\ntacked as part of a Soviet war against the West, it would fight as\nan ally of the West.\n10. An immediate danger affecting Yugoslavia's will and ability\nto resist mounting pressures lies in the present economic situation.\nWhile emergency relief measures instituted by the U. S. Government\nhave virtually eliminated the immediate food problem, the inability\nof the Yugoslav Government to finance imports of essential raw\nmaterials constitutes a serious problem, the solution of which would\nprobably require additional outside assistance on a grant basis.\nBeyond this, there is the basically unsound economic situation re-\nsulting from an overly ambitious industrial investment plan based\non a rate of investment beyond the present financial and technologi-\ncal resources of the Yugoslav economy and without regard to the\nessential requirements of the Yugoslav people for consumer goods.\nIn this connection, conclusion of current negotiations between the\nInternational Bank and the Yugoslav Government for a development\nprogram, involving over $200,000,000 in foreign lending, is con-\ntingent upon the acceptance by the Yugoslav Government of a scaling\ndown of the Yugoslav investment plan and holding total foreign\nhorrowing within the limit prescribed. If, in fact, a program of\ngrant and loan assistance is undertaken and successfully completed,\nthe industrial potential of Yugoslavia after 1954 will be signifi-\ncantly enhanced, while its dependence on outside aid will be de-\ncreased. In any case the period of the next two or three years\nwill be crucial in that Yugoslavia will continue to require outside\nassistance in order to maintain its ability to resist Soviet\npressures, whether or not such assistance is provided in the form\nof the program of grant and loan assistance mentioned above.\nIntensive guerrilla operations within Yugoslavia directed and\nsupported from the outside.\n11. There are no indications that large-scale Soviet directed\nguerrilla operations against Yugoslavia, on the Greek model, are\nimminent or being planned, although groups of Yugoslav Cominformists\nand of former Greek guerrillas are probably being given military\ntraining in Cominform states. Support to a Macedonian nationalist\nmovement, based principally on Bulgaria, would provide the most\nlikely basis for such operations. It is probable that the Yugoslav\narmed forces would be able to isolate any effort of this type with-\nout immediate outside military assistance. Against substantial\nand continued guerrilla operations strongly supported from outside,\nNSC 18/6\n- 6 -\nTRUMANT NARA LIBRARD\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nhowever, Yugoslavia might eventually require some type of outside\nassistance in order completely to defeat the guerrillas, since it\ncould not replace essential military equipment. In a long struggle\nagainst Cominform guerrillas, Tito's increasing dependence on the\nWest would provide opportunities to draw Yugoslavia into closer\nrelations with Greece and Itåly and with the West in general.\nArmed attack by military forces of Soviet satellite states\n12. The Kremlin has presumably given serious consideration to\nan open attack on Yugoslavia by satellite forces as a means of over-\nthrowing the Tito regime and reducing Yugoslavia to satellite status.\nThe fact that it has not resorted to that course of action would in-\ndicate that hitherto it has judged such a course to be inexpedient.\nMany considerations would support such a judgment. An obviously con-\nclusive consideration is that hitherto the satellite forces have been\nincapable of overcoming prospective Yugoslav resistance.\n13. There can be no assurance, however, that the Kremlin's\nestimate of this situation has not changed. It has become apparent\nthat the Tito regime can hardly be overthrown except by force of arms\nThe general deterioration of the international situation may well\nhave caused the Kremlin to regard the solution of the Yugoslav pro-\nblem as a matter of greater urgency. Recent defections of Italian\nCommunists would have the same effect. Meanwhile the satellite\nstates have made intensive preparations for war (augmentation of\nforces in being; re-equipment, especially with heavy weapons; stock-\npiling of military supplies; and industrial mobilization) under\nSoviet direction and with Soviet material assistance. These pre-\nparations have reversed the balance of military strength between\nYugoslavia and the satellite states. The Kremlin may discount the\npossibility of effective Western action in behalf of Yugoslavia\nin view of the commitment of Western forces and resources to other\nareas (the Far East and Western Europe). From that point of view,\nif the Yugoslav problem is to be solved by force, the sooner action\nis taken the better the prospect of success. Soviet calculations,\nhowever, must give full weight to the consideration that an attack\non Yugoslavia might very likely develop into general war.\n14. The current military preparations in the satellite states\nare not conclusive as to the Kremlin's intentions, but they are\nstrongly indicative and do consitute the creation of a new capabil-\nity. A satellite attack on Yugoslavia during 1951 must therefore be\nregarded as a serious possibility.\n15. Yugoslav defensive capabilities are severely limited by\nthe fact that Yugoslav military equipment is largely of German and\nSoviet origin, presenting insoluble problems of maintenance and\nresupply of such equipment. Equipment of the Yugoslav forces from\nWestern sources has been prevented and is made difficult at present\nNSC 18/6\n7\nTRUMAN HARA LIBRARY\nTop SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nby both practical difficulties and political considerations. In\npresent circumstances, organized resistance by the Yugoslav armed\nforces could not be long maintained at heavy rates of expenditure --\nfor no more than a few months in the event of attack by the\nadjacent satellite states (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania).\nIf, however, substantial Western military assistance in form suitable\nfor Yugoslav use could be delivered well in advance of such an\nattack, Yugoslavia might well be thereby enabled to defend itself\nsuccessfully.\n16. If organized Yugoslav resistance were overcome the\nYugoslavs would continue resistance by guerrilla operations. Such\nresistance, however, would also require Western assistance in order\nto be effective and prolonged.\n17. If Soviet participation in an attack by the satellites\nwere sufficiently open and large-scale even though unavowed, the\nUSSR itself could be regarded as a party to the aggression, and the\nsame considerations would apply as in the case of direct attack by\nSoviet forces (paragraphs 19-21 below).\n18. The disadvantages for the United States of a military\nconquest of Yugoslavia by the Soviet satellites with Soviet support\nwould be the same as if the conquest were directly achieved by the\nSoviet armed forces.\nArmed attack by Soviet military forces, with or without assistance\nby satellite forces.\n19. The Kremlin has openly committed its prestige in the\nstruggle to overthrow Tito. It is unlikely, however, that it would\ncommit Soviet forces to an open and direct attack on Yugoslavia\nuntil all other means had been exhausted, and then only after due\nconsideration of the probable consequences in terms of the global\nsituation. The Soviet forces now in adjacent lands (Austria, Hun-\ngary, Rumania) are not sufficient for a primarily Soviet attack on\nYugoslavia. It is probable that such an attack is not now intended.\n20. In present circumstances Yugoslav organized resistance to\na Soviet attack in force could not be long maintained. If substan-\ntial and suitable Western military assistance had been received\nbefore the attack, the period of organized resistance could be ex-\ntended somewhat and the invasion would prove more costly to the USSR.\nIn any case Yugoslavia would eventually be reduced to a guerrilla\nresistance dependent on Western support for effectiveness and\nduration.\n21. If the Yugoslavs, in resisting armed aggression, were\nreduced to guerrilla operations, it is not certain that they would\ncontinue to look to Tito and his colleagues as leaders of such a\nNSC 18/6\n- 8 --\nHARRY TRUMAN NARA LIBRAPY\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nguerrilla struggle. In any case the United States would be in a\nposition to consider ways and means of assisting the Yugoslavs to\ncontinue fighting.\n22. A direct Soviet military attack on Yugoslavia would\nrepresent a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter,\nArticle 2 of which requires all members to settle their inter-\nnational disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat\nor use of force against the territorial integrity or political\nindependence of any state.\nNSC 18/6\nTOP SECRET\n- 9 -\nTRUMANI NARA UBRAPZ\nTOP SECRET\nDevelopment of U. S. Policy to date.\n23. The Tito regime, because of its internal policies and\nmethods, is not popular among the Yugoslav people, particularly\namong the population from which the rank and file of the army\nis drawn. It is difficult to predict whether the regime could\nmaintain itself and its control of the army in the event of invasion\nand a series of military defeats. Tito's policy of resistance to\nMoscow, however, commands wide support. At the present time there\nis no organized or united democratic opposition to Tito which repre-\nsents a political force in Yugoslavia. Thus for the Yugoslav people,\nas for the Western nations, there is as a practical matter no third\nalternative to Tito or Stalin. For the present, at least, there\nis no other way of strengthening Yugoslavia against Soviet pressures\nthan by strengthening the present Yugoslav Government in its de-\nfiance of the USSR, and no other way of bolstering Yugoslav re-\nsistance to armed aggression than by bolstering the capacity of\nthe present Yugoslav armed forces to deal with such an attack.\n24. U. S. assistance to Yugoslavia, which in accordance with\nNSC 18/2 has consisted of (a) a relaxed policy on export licensing\nwhich has enabled Tito to import from the U. S. certain 1-A and 1-B\nitems needed to meet shortages and keep the Yugoslav economy afloat;\n(b) a favorable attitude toward a small timber equipment loan to\nYugoslavia by the International Bank and toward drawings by\nYugoslavia of $9 million from the International Monetary Fund;\n(c) direct credits through the Eximbank of $55 million; (d) approval\nof a $35 million loan to Yugoslavia by the German Federal Republic;\n(e) diplomatic intercession with other Western governments to\npersuade them to make favorable trading and credit arrangements\nfor Yugoslavia; (f) $64 million grant aid in the form of food-\nstuffs to help meet the food crisis brought on by the drought of\n1950. This economic assistance has been aimed at short-term\nobjectives, with the purpose of keeping the Tito regime afloat,\nnot at supporting a long-term reconstruction or development pro-\ngram. In that way it has been possible to keep the situation con-\ntinuously under review, to maintain maximum bargaining power in\ndealing with Tito, and to avoid a long-term commitment which might\nwork to the disadvantage of United States interests. Any further\naid extended on the same basis should continue to serve these\nimmediate political objectives. Such aid should be aimed primarily\nat (1) the immediate strengthening of Yugoslavia's military estab-\nlishment and (2) strengthening of public morale and the will to\nresist Soviet pressures or attack. Obviously there must be a close\nrelationship between any program of foreign economic aid and the\nprovision of war materiel to Yugoslavia. In view of Tito's\nreluctance to ask for direct military assistance from the United\nStates, until such time as Yugoslavia makes such requests United\nStates economic assistance might well be directed, though action\nwould be taken on a case-by-case basis, to the objective of\nNSC 18/6\n- 10 -\nTRUMAND NARA\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nimmediately strengthening Yugoslavia's ability to resist rather\nthan giving assistance of the type designed to build up the Yugoslav\nheavy armaments industry. This would not necessarily mean that the\nUnited States would oppose loans for general capital development\npurposes. At the present time Tito does not desire Yugoslav\nparticipation in Western defense and recovery organization as a\nmeans of obtaining economic and military aid. Any attempt to bring\nabout such participation would require not only a change in the\nYugoslav attitude but a willingness on the part of the members of\nthose organizations to accept Yugoslavia and a policy decision on\nthe part of the United States that Yugoslav membership was desirable.\nTo force on Yugoslavia at this time the choice between joining such\norganizations and getting no further aid might be to risk all the\nbenefits of United States policy toward Yugoslavia to date.\n25. Yugoslav leaders realize that in order adequately to equip\ntheir armed forces or to sustain those forces in resisting any Soviet\nor Soviet-inspired attack they must obtain military aid from the\nWest. Considering it necessary to maintain a position of neutrality\nin order not to afford provocation to the Cominform or cause the\nYugoslav people to believe Soviet allegations that Western powers\nhave aggressive intentions against the USSR with Yugoslavia as a\nbase of operations, they have heretofore endeavored with only modest\nsuccess to procure equipment and supplies by purchase through commer-\ncial channels. Tito has stated, however, that in case of attack or\nan apparent imminence of attack he would seek arms from the West,\nand there are now indications he would like to obtain as unobtru-\nsively as possible but through official channels substantial\nquantities of materiel on a long-term credit basis, preferably\nthrough the United Kingdom or other third countries. Tito has\nbeen made aware that the United States and other Western governments\ncannot be expected to make in advance effective preparation to\nprovide arms assistance in case of Yugoslav resistance to aggression\nunless, in addition to lists of requirements, they are provided\nadequate information regarding present equipment and other justifying\ndata. In order to afford confidence to top Yugoslav leaders and\nto bolster morale among their subordinates in key positions of the\nparty and the army, it would be highly useful for the United States\nand other Western countries to give the Yugoslav Government\nassurances that military supplies would be made available in\nthe event of direct or indirect Soviet aggression. The moment\nfor providing such assurances should be chosen in the light of\ndeveloping political and other pertinent factors.\nConsultation with other Governments.\n26. The UK and French Governments have agreed in principle\nwith the U. S. Government that, in the event of an attack against\nYugoslavia, the matter should be brought before the UN and that the\nthree Governments should (a) immediately consult with each other and\nNSC 18/6\n-- 11 -\nHARRA TRUMAN NARA LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nwith other interested states in order to consider possible interim\nsecurity measures to be taken pending action by the UN; (b) partici-\npate as seems appropriate at the time in devising a resolution in\nthe Security Council on measures to deal with the aggression; (c)\ncooperate in the implementation of resolutions adopted by the Se-\ncurity Council; (d) in the event Security Council action is blocked\nby Soviet veto, consult together and with other interested states\nwith a view to possible joint action in making supplies available to\nYugoslavia; (e) make available military supplies, if requested, to\nYugoslavia. In view of the certainty that the USSR would block\nSecurity Council action, it is likely that the General Assembly\nwould be called into session urgently on the basis of the \"Uniting\nfor Peace\" Resolution of November 3, 1950, and that the Western\npowers would work together in the Assembly to devise and carry out\nan appropriate resolution.\nNSC 18/6\n12 -\nTOP SECRET\nHARRY TRUMAN NARA LIBRAPY\nTOP SECRET\nCONCLUSIONS\n27. It is of great importance to the national security inter-\nests of the United States that Yugoslavia remain free of Soviet\ndomination. In present circumstances the independence of Yugo-\nslavia can be supported only through the existing communist, but\nanti-Soviet regime. Notwithstanding the communist character of\nthe existing regime, the United States should afford assistance\nto Yugoslavia in order to strengthen its will and ability to re-\nsist Soviet or Soviet-inspired pressures and possible aggression.\n28. In the light of the preceding paragraph and of the increased\nthreat of an attack on Yugoslavia, the United States should as a\nmatter of urgency:\na. Expedite the provision of economic assistance to Yugo-\nslavia under NSC 18/2, taking the necessary steps, including\npossible use of funds appropriated to foreign aid, to avert dan-\nger of serious deterioration or collapse of the Yugoslav economy.\nb. Take appropriate steps to determine what military equip-\nment Yugoslavia can effectively utilize to resist aggression.\nc. On the basis of screened Yugoslav requests and acting\nso far as possible in cooperation with the United Kingdom,\nFrance, and other NATO members:\n(1) Facilitate the purchase of arms by Yugoslavia in\nWestern countries, including reimbursable aid and giving\nYugoslavia a status equal to that of NATO countries in such\nmatters as the granting of U. S. export licenses, and urge\nother countries to do likewise.\n(2) With due regard to other priorities and to the\nresources available, provide direct assistance, including\nmilitary equipment, on grant aid or other non-payment\nbasis, if satisfactory means for its procurement and de-\nlivery can be found.\n(3) Undertake such training and technical assistance\nas may be arranged with the Yugoslav Government regarding\nthe use of arms and aid provided under (1) and (2) above.\nd. In concert with the United Kingdom and France, inform\nthe Yugoslav Government at an appropriate time that in the event\nof attack it can count on receiving military supplies from the\nWest. The Yugoslav Government should not be allowed to forget\nthat the effective provision of such supplies is in large meas-\nure dependent upon the three governments being in possession in\nadvance of an attack of detailed and verified data regarding the\nYugoslav military needs.\nNSC 18/6\n- 13 -\nHARTY TRUMAND NARA\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ne. Take steps now which would enable the United States\nto furnish appropriate military supplies to Yugoslavia in the\nevent of attack, procurement of such supplies for stockpiles\nunder U. S. control in suitable locations to have a priority\nequal to that of the NATO countries. The establishment of\nthese stockpiles should be accomplished as rapidly as practi-\ncable and maintained as necessary thereafter.\nf. In view of the immediate urgency of the situation and\nin order that the United States may be prepared to take what-\never action may be appropriate at the time, make and keep\ncurrent plans to provide Yugoslavia appropriate military sup-\nport.\n29. In the event that the USSR or its satellites undertake a\ncampaign of extensive guerrilla operations against Yugoslavia, the\nUnited States should:\na. Support action in the United Nations aimed at ascer-\ntaining the facts of the case, calling upon the states respon-\nsible to cease such operations, and authorizing appropriate\nmeasures by member states to assist Yugoslavia to defend its\nindependence.\nb. Consult and act in so far as practicable with the\nUnited Kingdom, France and other interested states as appro-\npriate.\nC. Deliver military equipment to Yugoslavia if requested\nand in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff at the time.\n30. In the event of overt attack against Yugoslavia by organ-\nized USSR and/or satellite forces, the United States should:\na. Place itself immediately in the best possible posi-\ntion to meet the increased threat of global war.\nb. Support and if necessary initiate action by the Se-\ncurity Council, or by the General Assembly (including the\ncalling of a special session if necessary) in default of action\nby the Security Council, calling for the withdrawal of the\ninvading forces and authorizing appropriate measures by member\nstates to assist Yugoslavia.\nC. Consult and act in so far as practicable with the\nUnited Kingdom, France and other interested states as appro-\npriate.\nd. Furnish military equipment to Yugoslavia, on receipt\nNSC 18/6\n- 14 -\nHAVE TRUMAND NAFA CERTEF\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nof Yugoslav requests and in the light of recommendations by\nthe Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.\ne. Implement such portions of the plans provided for in\nparagraph 28-f above as may be deemed appropriate in the light\nof the circumstances then existing and recommendations by the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff at the time.\n31. United States agencies concerned with informational and\nrelated programs or with unconventional operations should continue\nall practical efforts to support United States policies and objec-\ntives as set forth in this paper, emphasizing American concern for\nthe national independence of the Yugoslavs, as of other peoples,\nand strengthening them in their resolve to defend their indepen-\ndence. Care should be taken, however, not to present the Tito re-\ngime as anything other than what it is, a communist dictatorship\nwhich is receiving support from the West only because it is re-\nsisting the efforts of the Kremlin to destroy the independence of\nthe Yugoslav state.\nNSC 18/6\n- 15 -\nHARRY TRUMAN NARA LIBRAPA\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nGPO-SSO-5682"
}