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    "title": "National Security Council Report 64/1, Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina",
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    "ocrText": "The President\nNL.(PSF/NSC)874\nTOB SECRET\nNSC 64/1\nCOPY NO. 1\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTRUMAN\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nHARRY U.S. S. ARCHIVES GOVERNMENT \"NATIONAL RECORDS AND UBRARY\non\nTHE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA\nDecember 21, 1950\nWASHINGTON\nDECLASSIFIED\nNIC LIST 2-15-79\nBy NLT.HC NARS, Date 417-79\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 64/1\nTOP SECRET\nDecember 21, 1950\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nTHE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA\nReference: NSC 64\nAt the request of the Secretary of Defense, the enclosed\nmemorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is circulated\nherewith for the information and consideration of the National Se-\ncurity Council and referred to the NSC Staff for use in the prepa-\nration of a report for Council consideration.\nIn transmitting the enclosure, the Secretary of Defense\nstated that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained therein\nare based on their review of a proposed draft statement of policy on\nIndochina which was formulated by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Com-\nmittee early in October.\nTRUMAN\nJAMES S. LAY, JR.\nExecutive Secretary\nHARRY U.S. ARCHIVES GOVERNMENT \"NATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY\ncc: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Director of Defense Mobilization\nDECLASSIFIED\nBy, NLT'HC NARS, Date 4-17-79\nNSC 64/1\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF\nWashington 25, D. C.\nCOPY\n28 November 1950\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:\nMATHER ARCHIVIONAL RECORDAND TRUMAN VERIAM\nSUBJECT: Possible Future Action in Indochina\nSERVICE\nGOVERNMENT\n1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum,\ndated 13 October 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the\n\"Proposed Statement of U. S. Policy on Indochina for NSC Considera-\ntion\", which you enclosed, in the light of the message enclosed here-\nwith (Enclosure \"A\") from Brigadier General F. G. Brink (USA), Chief,\nMilitary Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. You will recall that\nthe Joint Chiefs of Staff withheld final comment on the subject draft\npolicy statement until the Brink report was received.\n2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the statement of\nUnited States policy proposed by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Com-\nmittee conforms generally to their previously expressed views, in-\ncluding those contained in their memorandum to you on Indochina dated\n27 October 1950. They are of the opinion, however, that the draft\nstatement of United States policy on Indochina proposed by the South-\neast Asia Aid Policy Committee should be recast so as to meet more\neffectively the immediate and critical situation in that country.\nAccordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following\nstatement of short-term and long-term policies which they recommend\nbe substituted for those included in the paper prepared by the South-\neast Asia Aid Policy Committee.\n3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the military prob-\nlems of Indochina are closely interrelated with the political prob-\nlems of the area. Accordingly, many of the policies recommended\nherein lie largely in the political field. The Joint Chiefs of Staff\nconsider, however, that the fundamental causes of the deterioration\nin the Indochinese security situation lie in the lack of will and de-\ntermination on the part of the indigenous people of Indochina to join\nwholeheartedly with the French in resisting communism. The Joint\nChiefs of Staff consider that, without popular support of the Indo-\nchinese people, the French will never achieve a favorable long-range\nmilitary settlement of the security problem of Indochina.\n4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following short-term\nobjectives for Indochina:\nNSC 64/1\n- 1 -\nToΓ\nSECRET\nTRUMAN\nARCHIVES GOVERNMENT \"MATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRI\nTOP SECRET\nSHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES\na. The United States should take action, as a matter of\nurgency, by all means practicable short of the actual employ-\nment of United States military forces, to deny Indochina to\ncommunism.\nb. As long as the present situation exists, the United\nStates should continue to insure that the primary responsibil-\nity for the restoration of peace and security in Indochina\nrests with the French.\nc. The United States should seek to develop its military\nassistance program for Indochina based on an over-all military\nplan prepared by the French, concurred in by the Associated\nStates of Indochina, and acceptable to the United States.\n(1) Both the plan and the program should be developed\nand implemented as a matter of urgency. It should be\nclearly understood, however, that United States acceptance\nof the plan is limited to the logistical support which the\nUnited States may agree to furnish. The aid provided under\nthe program should be furnished to the French in Indochina\nand to the Associated States. The allocation of United\nStates military assistance as between the French and the\nnational armies of Indochina should be approved by the\nFrench and United States authorities in Indochina.\n(2) Popular support of the Government by the Indochi-\nnese people is essential to a favorable settlement of the\nsecurity problem of Indochina. Therefore, as a condition\nto the provision of those further increases in military as-\nsistance to Indochina necessary for the implementation of\nan agreed over-all military plan, the United States Govern-\nment should obtain assurances from the French Government\nthat:\n(a) A program providing for the eventual self-\ngovernment of Indochina either within or outside of the\nFrench Union will be developed, made public, and imple-\nmentation initiated at once in order to strengthen the\nnational spirit of the Indochinese in opposition to\ncommunism.\n(b) National armies of the Associated States of\nIndochina will be organized as a matter of urgency.\nWhile it is doubtful that the build-up of these armies\ncan be accomplished in time to contribute significantly\nto the present military situation, the direct political\nand psychological benefits to be derived from this\ncourse would be great and would thus result in immedi-\nate, although indirect, military benefits,\nNSC 64/1\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nFRUMAN\nMATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nLIBRARY\nRUNDRDS\nTOP\nSECRET\nSOVERNMENT\n(c) Pending the formation and training of Indo-\nchinese national armies as effective units, and as an\ninterim emergency measure, France will dispatch suffi-\ncient additional armed forces to Indochina to insure\nthat the restoration of peace and internal security in\nthat country will be accomplished in accordance with\nthe timetable of the over-all military plan for Indo-\nchina.\n(d) France will change its political and military\nconcepts in Indochina to:\ni. Eliminate its policy of \"colonialism\".\nii. Provide proper tutelage to the Associated\nStates.\niii. Insure that a suitable military command\nstructure, unhampered by political interference,\nis established to conduct effective and appropri-\nate military operations. The effective implemen-\ntation of these changes will require competent and\nefficient political and military leaders who will\nbe able to cope with the conditions in that coun-\ntry.\n(3) At an appropriate time the United States should\ninstitute checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set\nforth in subparagraph c-(2) above are being fulfilled.\nd. The United States should exert all practicable political\nand diplomatic measures required to obtain the recognition of\nthe Associated States by the other non-communist states of\nSoutheast and South Asia.\ne. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Com-\nmunist forces against Indochina, the United States should not\npermit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist\nChina but should, in concert with the United Kingdom, support\nFrance and the Associated States by all means short of the ac-\ntual employment of United States military forces. This support\nshould include appropriate expansion of the present military\nassistance program and endeavors to induce States in the neigh-\nborhood of Indochina to commit armed forces to resist the ag-\ngression.\nf. The United States should immediately reconsider its pol-\nicy toward Indochina whenever it appears that the French Govern-\nment may abandon its military position in that country or plans\nto refer the problem of Indochina to the United Nations. Unless\nthe situation throughout the world generally, and Indochina\nNSC 64/1\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nspecifically, changes materially, the United States should seek\nto dissuade the French from referring the Indochina question to\nthe United Nations.\ng. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored resolution,\n\"Uniting for Peace\", has been adopted by the General Assembly\nof the United Nations, and should a situation develop in Indo-\nchina in a manner similar to that in Korea in which United Na-\ntions forces were required, the United States would then prob-\nably be morally obligated to contribute its armed forces des-\nignated for service on behalf of the United Nations. It is,\ntherefore, in the interests of the United States to take such\naction in Indochina as would forestall the need for the General\nAssembly to invoke the provisions of the resolution, \"Uniting\nfor Peace\".\n5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following long-term\nobjectives for Indochina:\nLONG-TERM OBJECTIVES\na. United States security interests demand that this gov-\nernment, by all means short of the actual employment of United\nStates military forces, seek to prevent the further spread of\ncommunism in Southeast Asia generally and, in particular, in\nFrench Indochina.\nb. The United States should seek to insure the establish-\nment of such conditions in Indochina that no foreign armed\nforces will be required for the maintenance of internal security.\nc. The United States should continue to press the French\nto carry out in letter and in spirit the program referred to in\nparagraph 4-c-(2)-(a) above, providing for the eventual self-\ngovernment of Indochina either within or outside of the French\nUnion.\nd. The United States should continue to favor the entry of\nthe three Associated States of Indochina into the United Nations.\ne. The United States should encourage the establishment of\nan appropriate form of regional security arrangement embracing\nIndochina and the other countries of Southeast Asia under Art-\nicles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter.\nU.S. ARCHIVES TRUMAN TRATIONAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS AND LIBRARY\nNSC 64/1\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n6. There is enclosed (Enclosure \"B\") for possible use by the\nNational Security Council Staff the Analysis which was prepared for\nthe Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their study of the prob-\nlem. This Analysis, however, has not received their detailed ap-\nproval.\nFor the Joint Chiefs of Staff:\n(SIGNED)\nTRUMAN\nOMAR N. BRADLEY,\nChairman,\nJoint Chiefs of Staff.\nHARRY U.S. ARCHIVES GOVERNMENT \"NATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY\nEnclosures\nNSC 64/1\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nCOPY\nTOP SECRET\nENCLOSURE \"A\"\nSTATE DEPT MSG\nFROM: US MINISTER SAIGON VIETNAM SGD HEATH\nARCHIVES GOVERNMENT SERVICE\" NATIONAL RECORDS TRUMAN AND UNGRAPY\nTO:\nSECRETARY OF STATE\nNR:\n763\nTOMAP\n4 November 1950\n660718Z\nSent Dept 763 rptd info Paris 267; Dept pass CofSA for action.\nFrom Chief MAAG singned Brink.\nReference unn Deptel 28, Oct 1950.\nFrench are gradually withdrawing from northern frontier and\nplan to hold general line Moncay-Laokay in Tonkin; in order protect\nHanoi-Haiphong area and coal mining area north of Haiphong. Per-\nimeter of these areas is to be organized as main line of resistance.\nPacification measures throughout rest of Indochina will continue\nin effect. Northern portion of new defensive area is mountainous\nwith corridors running generally, but not invariably so, toward\nthe Haiphong-Hanoi Delta area. No natural barriers lie between\nthe new line and the Delta area. Haiphong and Hanoi are both\nsurrounded by open Delta paddy country with numerous winding tri-\nbutaries of the Red River. Railroads lead from Hanoi to Langson\nand Haiphong. The latter, along with the highway, are the main\nsupply routes to the operational area. The presence of Viet Minh\ntroops prevents land communications between Saigon and Hanoi re-\nquiring movements by water and air only. Average time for move-\nments of troops and materiel from Saigon to Haiphong or Hanoi by\nwater and rail varies from 3 to 4 weeks. Airlift between the same\nplaces is 36 hours.\nWeather during November, December and January in Tonkin area\ngenerally excellent with intermittent thunderstorms; in central\ncoastal area poor with average of 20 days per month heavy rain and\nlow ceilings. In southern area generally excellent with intermit-\ntent thunderstorms. In the Tonkin Delta area February weather is\nextremely poor with heavy fog and mist. In central coastal area\nFebruary weather conditions remain unchanged until June. Weather,\ntherefore, favors general offensive operations in next 3 months by\nthe Viet Minh which has not yet materialized.\nArmy: The Army combat strength equals the combat strength of\nthe Viet Minh. Army superiority in artillery, engineer services,\nNSC 64/1\n- 6 -\nToΓ SECRET\nSECRET\nweapons, transportation signal equipment and level of supply. It\nis inferior to Viet Minh in mobility. The Army needs:\n(A) Minimum 9 additional battalions in North Tonkin\narea to make a limited offensive possible. These battalions\nare not available in Indochina and must come from France or\nits possessions.\n(B) Weapons and equipment to supplement materiel now in\nuse and to replace unserviceable materiel. Adequate spare\nparts must be furnished.\nNavy: Navy has complete Naval superiority and can operate\nfreely along the coast; and inland waterways provided formations\nof armored craft are used. Navy mission is:\n(A) To support ground forces in shore operations by pro-\nviding shipping convoys for the transportation of personnel\nand equipment;\n(B) To furnish gunfire support and maintain control of\noff shore areas to prevent Viet Minh smuggling and possible\namphibious assault. The Navy has moved additional emphibious\ncraft and commando units to Tonkin\n(a) To reinforce the line Haiphong-Moncay,\n(b) To prevent possible flanking by sea and\n(c) To conduct operations with ground force along\ninland waterways. The flexibility and ability to move\nconcentrations rapidly as needed, made possible by employ-\nment of amphibious units, should prove a powerful advan-\ntage in Delta fighting. At present the line of defense\nis still too far inland to allow much Naval participa-\ntion in active combat.\nAir: Viet Minh air strength reported as 40 aircraft which\ncan be successfully engaged by French Air Reserve. Viet Minh\nanti aircraft artillery is negligible at this time (a few 20mm\nguns have recently made their first appearance). French have a\nsmall and highly coordinated efficient air transport organization\nfor routine and emergency supply and troop movements which has\nbeen operating for 3 years from Hanoi Bay. It is capable of ready\nexpansion. Military Air Transport can be supplemented by commer-\ncial airlines. There is a specific need for light bombers, fighter\nbombers, air transport craft and low level reconnaissance planes\nfor photography. The potential of the French Army, Navy and Air\nsupported by their greater resources of all kinds is greater than\nViet Minh potential. But as present closer coordination of the\naction of these forces is needed.\nHARRY\nAMV\nNSC 64/1\n- 7 -\nBE\n3\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nThe French state that they now contemplate changing their\ntroop dispositions from a \"pacification pattern\" of widely\nscattered small units in North Tonkin intended to gain the good\nwill of the natives and keep down local invidents, to an \"opera-\ntional pattern\". This will require a political decision.\nThe present problem in Indochina under current plans is:\nARCHIVES \"NATIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS AND LIBRARY\n(A) To regroup companies and smaller units now in\nTonkin area into combat fighting battalions or regiments\nU.S.\nwith cross-country ability in order to maintain a flexible\nGOVERNMENT\nline of resistance,\n(B) To achieve the proper coordinated action of these\nforces in local area action,\n(c) To at least maintain the pacification statue quo\nthroughout remainder of Indochina.\nA withdrawal to the Hanoi-Haiphong Delta area will permit a\nstronger coordinated defense in which combined French Army, Navy,\nand Air Forces can begin dual support and be employed to their\nutmost capabilities, when their action is properly coordinated.\nThere are excellent fields of fire for Infantry and Artillery.\nAir will not be forced to operate in restricted mountainous areas\nand targets will be better defined and more accessible. Numerous\nwaterways in the Delta area will greatly hamper Viet Minh movements\nbecause of the necessity to move on foot. Viet Minh routes of\nadvance will be canalized and opportunity for rendezvous made more\ndifficult. French troops will have greater ground, water and air\ntransportation facilities which will afford greater opportunity\nfor quick concentration of larger French troops against the Viet\nMinh forces. The withdrawal will also permit a regrouping of\ntroops for local offensive action or a general offensive. French\nsupply lines will be shortened and Viet Minh lines lengthened forc-\ning them to establish sub-arsenals and sub-depots south of the\nfrontier where they will be subject to French air attack and ground\npenetration. The withdrawal, however will permit the Viet Minh to\nconsolicate the area from which these units are withdrawn giving\nthem airstrips, better bases in Indochina and permit political\norganization and their conscription of the population and may pro-\nduce an unfavorable chain reaction among the population of Indo-\nchina. It is possible that relatively few weapons and possibly\naircraft will be given by the Chinese Communists as token gift\nto the Viet Minh. Chinese Communists may be loath to spare many\nof these weapons because of their commitments in Manchuria,\nChanghai-Amoy area, Kowloon, Canton and Tibet.\nNSC 64/1\n- 8 -\nTop SECRET\nARCHIVES TRU \"NATIONAL SERVICE\" RECORDS MAN AND LIBRARY\nmor SECRET\nIt must be assumed that, in general, French are fighting in\nunfriendly territory in all their military efforts in Vietnam.\nTheir military operations may be jeopardized by transfer of loyalty\nto the Viet Minh throughout Vietnam unless further politically\neffective concessions are made by France to Vietnam and the for-\nmation of Vietnamese Army is initiated.\nWeakness of present French military organization appears to\nbe:\n(A) An excessibely static organization of defensive area\nwith no provisions for mutual support. Detachments from\ngeneral reserves are sent to the areas as needed ans pass to\ncontrol of area commander,\n(B) There are not yet combat organizations greater than\nbattalion size and this does not provide adequate striking\nforces for strong military effort,\n(c) Lack of proper coordination of forces. Few air-\nground liaison teams exist.\nConclusions:\n(1) There has been unduly exaggerated military impor-\ntance attacked to Cao Bang incident; political effect has\nbeen serious,\n(2) French military forces have been greatly shocked\nby this incident and better reorganization of their fighting\nforces can be expected,\n(3) Contemplated withdrawal will involve series of diffi-\ncult operations and further French losses must be expected,\n(4) If adequate military aid arrives within next two\nmonths and French forces in Tonkin receive an additional 9\nbattalions and are reorganized and properly trained as the\nFrench plan, serious penetrations by Viet Minh of Hanoi-\nHaiphong Delta area and coal mines north of Haiphong can be\nprevented,\n(5) Moncay-Laokay line is over-extended and can be\neasily penetrated by Viet Minh forces. Laokay itself offers\nlittle military advantage except as bar to Viet Minh advance\ndown Red River but can be by-passed or captured by Viet Minh.\nPossession of Moncay denies Viet Minh port on the gulf. This\nport and the port immediately south, if held, can be used\nas bases from which to launch French counter-offensive.\nNSC 64/1\n- 9 -\nTOB SECRET\n(6) French at present are in no position initiate\ncounter-offensive to drive Viet Minh to northern border, nor\nwill then be in predictable future in view of increasing Viet\nMinh strength, unless additional trained troops are brought\nin from France or its possessions,\n(7) Viet Minh activities Cambodia and Laos as well as\nVietnam are increasing and no troops can be spared from these\nareas or operations in Tonkin,\n(8) Formation of Vietnamese Army is still under discus-\nsion, and not likely to become consolidated force within a\nyear, and will not have any appreciable military value before\n1952 except possibly as police force in pacification areas.\nConclusions are based on assumption that Chinese Communists\nwill not openly participate in Viet Minh operations and\nimmediate military aid requested in Legtel 566, October 16\nwill arrive by 1 January 1951.\nExtremely fast-moving political situation in Indochina presents\nmany complications for French Military Command. Current plans of\nFrench military here are at present still dependent on contro-\nversial negotiations and political decisions which must be made\nquickly, and the military is being delayed in implementing their\ncurrent plans. Three main questions at this time are:\n(A) Decision which must yet be made as to changing the\nmission of military in Tonkin entirely from pacification to\ndirect operational,\n(B) Manner and speed with which Vietnamese Army will be\nactivated,\n(c) Speed with which military air will be delivered.\nCurrent French plans will be successful only if these ques-\ntions are resolved successfully without delay.\nParticipated in conference with Juin and have discussed sit-\nuation and plans with Carpentier here, Allessandri in Hanoi, and\nchiefs of major forces. General Valluy, Juin assistant, has re-\nmained here with him and I have had similar discussion with him.\nHARRY U.S. TRUMAN SOVERNING \"NATIONAL USIARY\nNSC 64/1\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHe has requested another conversation Monday 6th. General Harding\nvisited here one day, gave him situation briefly but no prolonged\ndiscussion since he returned Singapore after Carpentier had denied\nhim visit to northern Tonkin. Carpentier has given me free access\nto himself, his staff and commanders and authority to visit Tonkin,\nwhich I have done, including Hanoi and Haiphong. Will keep you\ninformed.\nNote: DEPTEL 28 is CM IN 6446 (30 Oct) G2.\nLEGTEL 566 is CM IN 6223 (30 Oct) G2.\nHARRY ARCHIVES TRUMAN \"NATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY\nACTION: G2\nGOVERNMENT\nINFO: G3, JCS G4, MUN\nCM IN 8337\n(6 November 1950)\nNSC 64/1\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nCOPY\nToΓ SECRET\nENCLOSURE \"B\"\nTHEREY ARCHIVER \"NATIONAL RECORDS MAN AND USRARY\nANALYSIS\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\n1. On 5 April 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a\nmemorandum to the Secretary of Defense in which it was stated,\namong other things, that:\n\"The mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present\nof critical strategic importance to the United States because:\n\"a. They are the major sources of certain strategic\nmaterials required for the completion of United States\nstockpile projects;\n\"b. The area is a crossroad of communications;\n\"c. Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of\ncontainment of communism stretching from Japan southward\nand around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of the\nthree major non-Communist base areas in this quarter of\nthe world--Japan, India, and Australia--depends in a large\nmeasure on the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists.\nIf Southeast Asia is lost, these three base areas will tend\nto be isolated from one another;\n\"d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to\nthe fall of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia.\nTheir fall would:\n\"(1) Require changing the Philippines and\nIndonesia from supporting positions in the Asian off-\nshore island chain to front-line bases for the de-\nfense of the Western Hemisphere. It would also call\nfor a review of the strategic deployment of United\nStates forces in the Far East; and\n\"(2) Bring about almost immediately a dangerous\ncondition with respect to the internal security of the\nPhilippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, and would con-\ntribute to their probable eventual fall to the com-\nmunists;\n\"e. The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the\nvirtually complete denial to the United States of the\nPacific littoral of Asia. Southeast Asian mainland areas\nare important in the conduct of operations to contain\ncommunist expansion;\nNSC 64/1\n- 12 -\nTOB SECRIT\nTOP SECRET\n\"f. Communist control of this area would alleviate\nconsiderably the food problem of China and would make\navailable to the USSR important strategic materials. In\nthis connection, Soviet control of all the major compo-\nnents of Asia'a war potential might become a decisive fac-\ntor affecting the balance of power between the United\nStates and the USSR. A Soviet position of dominance over\nAsia, Western Europe, or both, would constitute a major\nthreat to United States security; and\nTRUMAN\n\"g. A Soviet position of dominance over the Far\n\"NATIONAL\nARGHITES AND\nLISKARY\nEast would also threaten the United States position in\nJapan since that country could thereby be denied its\nAsian markets, sources of food and other raw materials.\nBOVERNMENT\nThe feasibility of retention by the United States of its\nAsian offshore island bases could thus be jeopardized.\"\n2. The series of defeats suffered recently by the French in\nnorthern Tonkin serves to focus attention upon the urgency of the\ncurrent military situation in Indochina and points up the fact\nthat the Viet Minhs now constitute a direct threat to the French\nmilitary position in Indochina. The current military situation\nis serious since the effect produced by the impact of French de-\nfeats can gain momentum which may have dire repercussions upon an\nalready deteriorating political situation in Southeast Asia. By\ntaking over border posts, the Viet Minhs now can maintain unin-\nterrupted liaison with Communist China. At this time when a major-\nity of the Indochinese are favorably disposed toward the Viet Minhs,\nas opposed to the French and Bao Dai, any increases in popular\nsupport of the Viet Minhs could have alarming consequences. The\ndeteriorating military and political situation in French Indochina\ndemands that the United States policy toward Indochina be recast\nin order to assist in restoring the balance in favor of the French\nand Vietnamese.\n3. There is an important difference between the strategic\nimportance of Indochina to the United States in a major war and\nits strategic importance in a cold war. Current war plans do not\ncontemplate the deployment of United States military forces for\nthe retention of Indochina in the event. of global war. However,\nif the communists gained control of Indochina at any time other than\nin the course of a global war, this would bring about almost im-\nmediately a dangerous condition with respect to the internal secu-\n1ty of all of the other countries of Southeast Asia, as well as the\nPhilippines and Indonesia, and would contribute to their probable\neventual fall to communism. Even India and Pakistan would be threat-\nened. Thus the loss of Indochina to communism would have direct\nimplications on United States security. In addition, this loss would\nhave widespread political and psychological repercussions upon other\nnon-communist states throughout the world. In view of United States\nsecurity interests in the country, and the critical situation now\nNSC 64/1\n- 13 -\nTOR SECRET\nTRUMAN\nLIBE\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVE\nAND\nToΓ\nSECRET\nREQUIRES\nexisting there, the United States should take action, as a matter\nof urgency, by all means practicable short of the actual employment\nof United States military forces, to deny Indochina to communism.\n4. It appears that the French are only now beginning to recog-\nnize the military and political measures which must be undertaken in\norder to secure the French position in Indochina. The French atti-\ntudes and actions, however, must not be permitted to obscure the\nUnited States interest in the solution of the Indochina problem.\n5. It has been suggested that if the French remain in Indochina\nthat country might be lost to communism, regardless of the military\naid programs which the United States may implement. This thinking\npresupposes either such a low order of military power in France and\nher colonies as to make it utterly impossible for that nation to\ncope with the Viet Minhs or such intransigence and unrealism in the\nFrench Government as to preclude it from facing facts. Current\nintelligence estimates do not accord France and her colonies this\nlow order of military power. While, up to this time, the attitude\nof the French Government toward French Indochina has been one of\ntemporization and consequently one of weakness, it is believed that\nthe seriousness of the situation, particularly the political situ-\nation, may now have been recognized by the French Government.\n6. The United States should urge France to meet its responsi-\nbility by taking the military, political, and economic action,\nincluding the injection of new leadership, necessary to save Indo-\nchina from communism. If France decides to withdraw from French\nIndochina, there would, in all probability, be only a slight chance\nthat the United Nations could retrieve the situation in that country\nin favor of the Western Powers.\n7. The following are the three major courses with military\nimplications which might be adopted to achieve peace and security in\nIndochina against either the internal threat of the Viet Minhs or\nthe external threat of Communist China:\na. Through armed action by France and the Associated States\nof Indochina together with the forces of the United States and/or\nother Western Powers;\nb. By armed action by France and the Associated States of\nIndochina supported by United States military aid and assistance;\nand\nC. By United Nations action either under the United States-\nsponsored resolution, \"Uniting for Peace,\" or by French with-\ndrawal from Indochina and action by the United Nations similar\nto that followed in the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia.\n8. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist\nforces against Indochina the United States should not permit itself\nNSC 64/1\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nto become engaged in a general war with Communist China and should\nnot, therefore, commit United States forces to that area; neither\nshould the United States commit its military forces to Indochina\nin order to assist the French in restoring internal security. The\nconsiderations underlying these views are:\na. Involvement of United States forces against Viet Minh\nforces would be likely to lead to war with Communist China.\nTRUMAN\nb. A general war with Communist China would, in all\nMICHIVES AND LIBRANDI\nINSTIONAL\nprobability, have to be taken as a prelude to global war;\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nc. Our major enemy in a global war would be the USSR;\nGOVERNMENT\nd. Our primary theater in the event of a global war would,\nin all probability, be Western Europe; and\ne. The forces of the Western Powers are insufficient to\nwage war on the mainland of Asia and at the same time accomplish\nthe predetermined Allied objectives in Europe.\n9. While minor commitments of United States military forces\nmight be sufficient to defeat the Viet Minhs in Indochina it is\nmore probable that such commitments would lead to a major involve-\nment of the United States in that area similar to that in Korea or\neven to global war. Accordingly, there would be great potential\ndanger to the security interests of the United States in the\ncommitment of any \"token\" or \"minor\" United States forces in Indo-\nchina.\n10. Indochina is an area in which the French bear primary\nresponsibility, and the problem of restoration of peace and security\nto that country should continue to rest with the French. Overt\nintervention by any foreign power on the side of France would\nimmediately enhance the danger of a global war and would lay France\nand the other foreign powers open to a charge of imperialism.\n11. Thus far the French apparently have failed in Indochina to\nprovide adequate political and military leadership, to develop\nsound military plans, and to utilize properly their military re-\nsources. The urgency of the situation in Indochina, however, is so\ngreat that the present United States military aid program for that\ncountry should continue, and steps should be taken to expedite\nshipment of the materiel earmarked for that area. However, it\nwould be desirable for the United States military assistance program\nto be based on an over-all military plan for Indochina developed\nby the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina,\nand acceptable to the United States. This plan should be developed\nas a result of staff talks conducted in Saigon among representatives\nof the three countries. It should be made clear from the outset\nNSC 64/1\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nABOUVES TRUMAN \"NATIONAL AND LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET\nthat United States acceptance of the plan is limited to the\nlogistical support which the United States may agree to furnish.\nIf time permits, military representatives of the United Kingdom\nalso might be invited to attend. There should be a timetable to\nthe plan. Estimates of materiel requirements which the United\nStates would be expected to provide on an accelerated basis should\nalso be submitted.\n12. Popular support of the Government by the Indochinese\npeople is essential to a favorable settlement of the security\nproblem of Indochina. Therefore, as a condition to the provision\nof those further increases in military assistance to Indochina\nnecessary for the implementation of an agreed over-all military\nplan, the United States Government should obtain assurances from\nthe French Government that:\na. A program providing for the eventual self-government\nof Indochina either within or outside of the French Union will\nbe developed, made public, and implementation initiated at\nonce in order to strengthen the national spirit of the Indo-\nchinese in opposition to communism;\nb. National armies of the Associated States of Indochina\nwill be organized as a matter of urgency. While it is doubtful\nthat the build-up of these armies can be accomplished in time\nto contribute significantly to the present military situation,\nthe direct political and psychological benefits to be derived\nfrom this course would be great and would thus result in\nimmediate, although indirect, military benefits;\nc. Pending the formation and training of Indochinese\nnational armies as effective units, and as an interim emergency\nmeasure, France will dispatch sufficient additional armed\nforces to Indochina to insure that the restoration of peace and\ninternal security in that country will be accomplished in\naccordance with the timetable of the over-all military plan for\nIndochina; and\nd. France will change its political and military concepts\nin Indochina to:\n(1) Eliminate its policy of \"colonialism\";\n(2) Provide proper tutelage to the Associated States;\nand\n(3) Insure that a suitable military command structure,\nunhampered by political interference, is established to\nconduct effective and appropriate military operations.\nThe effective implementation of these changes will require\ncompetent and efficient political and military leaders who will\nbe able to cope with the conditions in that country.\nNSC 64/1\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nToΓ SECRET\n13. At an appropriate time the United States should institute\nchecks to satisfy itself that the conditions set forth in paragraph\n12 above are being fulfilled. The United States should also con-\ntinue to maintain the situation in Indochina under continuing\nreview and should be prepared to revise its policy when conditions\nwarrant.\n14. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist\nforces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself\nto become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should,\nin concert with the United Kingdom, support France and the Associated\nStates by all means short of the actual employment of United States\nmilitary forces. This support should include appropriate expansion\nof the present military assistance program.\n15. Any appeal by France to the United Nations would, in all\nprobability, be embarrassing for the Western Powers since the rule\nof France over its colony is not likely to be well received by the\nGeneral Assembly of the United Nations. The USSR has recognized\nthe Viet Minh Government and, therefore, a veto by the USSR of any\nassistance for France would have to be expected in the Security\nCouncil. In view of the foregoing, unless the situation throughout\nthe world generally and in Indochina specifically changes materially,\nthe United States should seek to dissuade the French from referring\nthe Indochina question to the United Nations.\n16. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored resolution,\n\"Uniting for Peace,' has been adopted by the General Assembly of\nthe United Nations, and should a situation develop in Indochina in\na manner similar to that in Korea in which United Nations forces\nwere required, the United States would then probably be morally\nobligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on\nbehalf of the United Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests\nof the United States to take such action in Indochina as would\nforestall the need for the General Assembly to invoke the provisions\nof the resolution, \"Uniting for Peace.' Should France, however,\nrefer the question of Indochina to the United Nations, the United\nStates should give consideration to adopting a position favoring\nearly French withdrawal from Indochina and action by the United\nNations similar to that followed in the case of the Netherlands and\nIndonesia.\n17. It appears that, in view of the unrest in Southeast Asia\ngenerally and in Indochina specifically, any military victory in\nIncochina over the communists would be temporary in nature. The\nlong-term solution to the unrest in Indochina lies in sweeping\npolitical and economic concessions by France and in the ultimate\nself-government of the three Associated States within the French\nUnion or their complete independence of France. From the viewpoint\nof the United States, pressure on France to provide the much needed\nleadership to initiate these reforms and to grant self-government\nwill prove less expensive in United States lives and national trea-\nsure than military commitments by us.\nNSC 64/1.\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nGOVERNMENT\nTOP SECRET\nGPO-SSO-5682\nNSC mg.mtt"
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