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    "title": "Memorandum from James S. Lay, Jr. to the National Security Council with Attachment",
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    "ocrText": "The President NLT(PSF/NSC) 1007\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT TOP SECRET\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON\nCOPY NO. 1\nAugust 6, 1951\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSUBJECT:\nStatus and Timing of Current U. S. Programs\nfor National Security\nREFERENCES:\nA. NSC 114 and Annexes to NSC 114\nB. Three memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated July 31, 1951\nC. Memorandum for all holders of NSC 114 and\nAnnexes to NSC 114 from Executive Secretary,\ndated July 31, 1951\nThe enclosed second revision of the basic report on\nthe subject contained in NSC 114, prepared by the Senior NSC Staff\nwith the advice and assistance of representatives of the Department\nof Commerce, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Federal\nCivil Defense Administration, the Interdepartmental Intelligence\nConference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and\nthe Committee on International Security Affairs, is submitted here-\nwith for consideration by the National Security Council, in lieu of\nthe body of the original report in NSC 114 and of the first revision\ncirculated by memorandum dated July 31, 1951.\nAttention is invited to the fact that the changes\nin Part II of the attached draft regarding the military and mobili-\nzation programs will require corresponding amendments in Annex I\nwhich will be reproduced together with the other annexes and with the\nbasic report as finally adopted by the Council.\nMADI TRUMAN NARA\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC 10/5/2009 NLT-PSF-2-1\nNARA 10\nDate 7/13/2012\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAlso enclosed for reference in this connection is a\nlist of those places in the first revision, dated July 31, where\nchanges have been made.\nJames S. hay, go\nJAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\nHAMPS TRUMAN NARA\nCC: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Attorney General\nThe Secretary of Commerce\nThe Director of Defense Mobilization\nThe Economic Cooperation Administrator\nThe Federal Civil Defense Administrator\nThe Director, Bureau of the Budget\nThe Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers\nTOP SECRET\nNOT(PSF/NSC) 1008\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nPRELIMINARY REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nSTATUS AND TIMING OF CURRENT U.S.\nPRCGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\nPART I -- CHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION\nSINCE THE COMPLETION OF NSC 68\nIRIMAN NARA DEPARTMENT\n1. As anticipated in NSC 68 (April 1950), the Soviet rulers\nhave continued in relentless pursuit of the Kremlin design. In\nKorea they have demonstrated a willingness to take actions which in-\nvolve grave risk of precipitating global war. Such risk-taking ap-\npears to be closely calculated: the U.S.S.R. has exercised consider-\nable care and restraint to avoid open and direct involvement. Never-\ntheless, the Kremlin's willingness to accept such risk has been\ngreater than was foreseen in NSC 68.\n2. Since April, 1950 the U.S.S.R. has intensified its del-\nliberate and systematic campaign to prepare the Russian people psy-\nchologically for possible war with the United States. A similar\ncampaign is being carried out in the European satellites and China.\n3. The U.S.S.R. is militarily substantially stronger than it\nwas in April, 1950. Furthermore, the increase in military strength-\nin-being of the Eastern European satellites since April, 1950 has\nbeen large, and alone probably offsets the increases which have been\nachieved in Western Europe. The Chinese communist regime has con-\nsiderable military capabilities at its disposal, has undertaken\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority RAC 10/5/09 NLT-PSF-45-2-1\nNARA so Date 7/13/2012\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nmilitary action in the Soviet interest, and thus far, at least,\nhas made progress in consolidating its control in China. Evidence\nfrom various sources during the past year shows that Soviet military\nproduction is of high quality--and of higher quality than had pre-\nviously been estimated. The ability of the U.S.S.R. to develop\nlarge military capabilities where none existed a few years ago, as\nin North Korea, has been shown in the Korean war and this has re-\nquired a revision of earlier judgments regarding satellite military\npotentials. On all these counts, NSC 68 presented a prospect which\nwas more favorable for the United States than now appears to have\nbeen warranted.\nNARA\n4. Nothing has occurred within the Soviet empire which re-\nquires a revision of earlier judgments that the regime is capable\nof maintaining its control over the Russian people and its satellite\n5. Notably in Korea, and elsewhere as in Iran and the Balkans\nsituations have developed which could more easily issue in general\nwar by accident or miscalculation than was foreseen fifteen months\nago.\n6. As anticipated in NSC 68, the Kremlin regards most seriously\nthe prospect of United States and Western rearmament generally. It\nis highly sensitive to German and Japanese rearmament and the es-\ntablishment of American bases overseas. Its principal immediate\npurpose is to frustrate these programs. Its presently indicated\ncourse of action to that end is to exploit all opportunities to\nsplit the Western Allies, particularly the United States and the UK,\nand to conduct a specious peace campaign designed to exploit both\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nfear of a new general war and reluctance to make the sacrifices\nnecessary to redress the balance of power. There is a serious\ndanger, which may become acute if a cease-fire in Korea is agreed\nto, that by such wiles the USSR may yet lull the free world into a\nfalse sense of security, with adverse effect upon both its military\nposture and its political cohesion. If, however, the United States\ndemonstrates determination and progress in meeting its commitments\nto build the strength of the free world to the level at which it car\ndeter or defeat Soviet aggression, and if Soviet conciliation is\nseen to present no real assurances of peace and security, it is like\nthat the alignment of the West can be maintained and its strength\nfurther developed.\nTRUMAN NARA\n7. If and when it becomes apparent to the Kremlin that the\nWestern alliance and projected rearmament cannot be disrupted and\nfrustrated by political and psychological means the danger of Soviet\npreventive action will become acute.\n8. The free world has made important progress in organizing\nitself to meet the Soviet threat. UN action to counter Communist\naggression in Korea, the development of NATO, progress with respect\nto the Schuman and Pleven plans, the successful conference of\nAmerican foreign ministers, progress on the Japanese peace treaty\nand on Pacific security arrangements, all indicate in some degree\na developing cohesion and awareness of common peril. This progress\nis impressive in relation to normal expectation, but has been slow\nand unsatisfying in relation to the abnormal exigencies of the\nsituation. The United States and its allies have moved less rapidly\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthan envisaged in NSC 68/4 toward exploiting their vastly superior\neconomic potential to improve their over-all power position vis-a-vi\nthe Soviet system. NATO planning has yet to be translated into\nTRUMAN NARA LIBRA\neffective military strength in being. Tangible support for the UN\ncause in Korea has left much to be desired. In general, Far Eastern\nissues have tended to divide the free world. Moreover, the situa-\ntion in Iran and the Arab states has deteriorated beyond all expec-\ntation.\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n9. The level of military production in the United States is\nnot currently meeting the military readiness targets indicated in\nNSC 68/4, which moved forward the military readiness level contem-\nplated for July 1, 1954, to July 1, 1952. The detailed materiel\nprograms developed subsequent to the approval of force levels on\nDecember 14, 1950, were finally approved when the military budget\nfor FY 1952 was approved on April 19, 1951. In the interim, however\navailable funds were used to expand the production base and to get\nlong lead time items into production on an expanded basis. The flow\nof military assistance to allied countries has lagged behind the\ntargets contemplated in NSC 68/4, in part because of the materiel\nTRUMAN\nrequirements needed to support United Nations forces in Korea.\nTURRY NARA\nThe level of military production in Western Europe has been in-\nadequate to support the objectives of our economic and military\nassistance programs. In the earlier phases of our build-up, the\noutput of military equipment has been a more serious limitation\non the building of military strength than the first drafts upon\nour manpower resources. The limitation on the availability of\nmilitary equipment stems from such as the following: the recent\ndate of final approval of the detailed materiel programs; the\npractical problem of reducing long lead time required for military\nequipment such as tanks, aircraft, ships, tactical radio, motorized\nequipment, and heavy construction items; delay in administrative\nactions which could have made tools and facilities available at an\nearlier date; erganizational problems in production facilities;\nthe decision to expand the production base and concurrently to\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nsecure delivery of end items; as well as a psychological situation\nless favorable than that existing at the time of adoption of\nNSC 68/4.\n10. The estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities contained in\nNSC 68 have been revised upwards. It is now estimated that the\nU.S.S.R. will have in mid-1953 the atomic stockpile formerly esti-\nmated for mid-1954. The date when a surprise attack on the United\nStates might yield decisive results is correspondingly advanced.\n11. Although a thorough examination of the subject is not now\navailable, the strength-in-being of the U. S. and its allies has\nprobably increased in absolute terms less than that of the Soviet\nsystem since April 1950. The mobilization effort of the United\nStates and its allies has brought them closer to the actualization\nof their potential than in April 1950. The date at which this\nmobilization effort will enable them to achieve the capability of\nsupporting the objectives outlined in NSC 68 is still some time off,\ncertainly later than was expected when the NSC 68/4 programs were\ndeveloped. The question of comparative capabilities and the rates O\nincrease in capabilities is of such importance that a careful\nassessment should be obtained as rapidly as possible.\nNARA\n12. Review of the world situation shows that the danger to\nour security is greater now than it was in April 1950. It is\ngreater now than it was then thought it would now be. Fifteen\nmonths ago 1954 was regarded as the time of maximum danger. It now\nappears that we are already in a period of acute danger which will\ncontinue until the United States and its allies achieve an adequate\nposition of strength.\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nPART II -- -- CURRENT PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\nThe Military Program\n13. The military program contained in the enclosure to a\nMemorandum for the National Security Council from the Executive\nSecretary, subject, \"United States Objectives and Programs for\nNational Security,\" dated December 14, 1950, with certain augmen-\ntations, is the present target program. This program is set out il\ndetail in Annex No. 1. This program is explicit with respect to\nmilitary personnel strength and units; it is not explicit with re-\nspect to materiel objectives, outlining them broadly by implication\nin terms of active forces, tasks to be supported, and establishment\nof a mobilization base capable of rapid expansion. The Department\nof Defense FY 1952 procurement objective was evolved for the pur-\npose of defining the materiel and mobilization base objectives and\nwas finally approved by the President on April 19, 1951. This ob-\njective was to have on hand by June 30, 1952, or as soon thereafter\nas they could be produced, sufficient major end items of material\nto meet the following requirements:\nTRUMAN NARA\na. Training consumption through FY 1952 and Korean\ncombat consumption through December 31, 1951.\nb. Full modern equipment for the active forces.\nc. Necessary training equipment for civilian components\nup to 50% of the amount authorized the active forces. This\nwill be partly modern type equipment except that 11 wings if\nthe Air National Guard and 50 Naval Air Reserve Squadrons are\nto have all modern aircraft.\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nd. Except for aircraft, stock levels and war reserves equal\nfrom 3½ to 6 months (dependent upon the item) combat consumption\nof the augmented forces to be in combat one year after the start O.\nan \"all out\" war together with 6 months training requirements of\nall units to be mobilized and in training by that date.\nIt is also planned that in the production of equipment\naccording to the above criteria, production capacity will be\nestablished sufficient to be readily expanded, if necessary, to\nsupport combat operations and mobilization requirements if hostili-\nties should break out on a total basis on or after June 30, 1952.\nThe Department of Defense program further contemplates\nthat, subject to further changes in force levels, the procurement\nprogram after FY 1952 shall be sufficient to complete any of the\nabove objectives which could not be completed by that date due to\nlimitation of productive capacity, and, where the above objectives\nhave been attained, further procurement for war reserves and con-\ntinued peace time usage will be at the minimum level necessary to\nkeep such expanded capacity in operation and available for rapid\nexpansion to mobilization requirement. It is further contemplated\nthat in carrying out the production program maximum utilization\nwill be made of machine tool reserves without replacement.\nLIVE TRUKBAN NARA\n14. The military personnel strength and units fixed on\nDecember 14, 1950, have been increased as shown in Section 1 of\nAnnex 1. These strength and unit targets as thus increased will\nbe met by June 30, 1952.\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n15. a. At the time of approval of NSC 68/4 on December 14,\n1950, it was recognized that the requirements for war reserves of\ncertain long lead time materiel and equipment, originally con-\ntemplated for delivery by June 30, 1954, could not be attained by\nJune 30, 1952. Furthermore, the sharp increases in the production\nprogram as a whole, which would have been involved in meeting the\nspecific materiel objectives implied by the interim force goals set\nin NSC 68/4 as subsequently increased, would have led to a peaking\nof production across the board followed by a sharp curtailment of\nthe production flow. After consideration of these opposing factors\nand of production limitations, procurement objectives for the\ninitial accumulation of war reserves were fixed on April 19, 1951.\nIn order best to achieve the production objective the Department\nof Defense is currently reviewing planned production schedules in\nline with the President's statement of April 27, 1951; This review\nis underway with a target date for completion of September 1951.\nb. As to requirements for an adequate base of command\nflacilities' (e.g.; training and: communications facilities; troop\nhousing, etc.) for mobilization, no specific objectives to be\nMARA NEW\nreached by June 30, 1952, were established on December 14, 1950.\nWhile such requirements could have been met by June 30, 1952, it\nwas decided that the rate: of their establishment should be in phase\nwith the remainder of the military program. Specific objectives\nfor military construction were set on April 19, 1951, to accom-\nmodate the forces to be raised and equipped by June 30, 1952.\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nProvided the appropriations requested to cover these objectives\nare made available by Congress in time, and if the required\nstructural steel is furnished, these construction objectives will\nbe met on June 30, 1952. Subject to adequate and timely funding,\ncommand facilities to launch a full mobilization could be created\n:\nthe period of approximately 12 months.\nc. As to the requirement for reserve productive capacity\nthe Department of Defense FY 1952 procurement objective sets forth\na general statement of the policy to be followed. It is not\npossible to make any worthwhile generalization as to the implemen-\ntation of this policy. In the case of each type of end-item, the\ndecision as to the relative importance of reserve production\ncapacity, maintenance of a flow of production indefinitely, ob-\ntaining requirements at an early date, as well as many other factor\nis different, and produces a different result as to the size of the\nreserve production capacity for that item.\nTRUBLAN NARA\n16. There will be a wide variation among end-item programs\nin the dates at which the Services complete the equipment and\nmodernization of approved active forces and get a start on the\naccumulation of a minimum level of war reserves. A review of major\nArmy, Navy and Air Force programs leads to the following conclu-\nsions, based on the assumptions that there are no further slippages\nin production schedules, that adequate funds, materials, and\nfacilities are available, that prices remain stable, and that\nKorean operations will cease in the very near future:\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\na. For the ARMY:\n(1) The units, with minor exceptions, and the\npersonnel strength to support these units, as increased\nsince December 14, 1950, have been activated and are now\nin being and by June 30, 1952 - as to initial equipment -\nwill be fully equipped and substantially but not fully\nmodernized.\n(2) Troop facilities will be sufficient by June\n30, 1952 to support these forces, but will be inadequate\nto support mobilization and deployment of forces to\ncertain overseas areas.\n(3) Present estimates indicate that under the\nassumptions stated above, the Army can, in the event of\nglobal war, sustain combat operations at the planned\nlevel early in the calendar year 1953. On the other hand\nif all the foregoing conditions are met, except that with\nreference to the Korean operations, the continuance of\nthose operations until the end of calendar year 1951 will\ndelay Army readiness for global war until late in\ncalendar year 1953.\nb. For the NAVY:\nRARA ALIBABA\nThe build-up toward total personnel and combat units\nis proceeding substantially on schedule. The approved\nend FY 1952 active forces will be in place and operational\nby July 1, 1952. However, modernization of equipment of\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe active forces and the accumulation of a minimum leve\nof war reserves will not be completed in all cases until\ncalendar years 1953 and 1954, with dates varying widely\nfor individual items.\nFor Naval Aviation combat forces, the degree of modernization\nthat would be achieved with funds now requested, in accordance wit\nthe Munitions Board \"Combined Aircraft Working Schedule\" (A-14) is\nas follows:\nPercent to be\nequipped with\nDate equipped\nlate model by\nPercent to be\nwith late model\nDecember 31, 1953\nequipped with\n(if funds are\n(with funds now\nlate model by\navailable)\nrequested)\nJune 30, 1952\nFighters (VF) 1 June 1954\n77.3%\n29.5%\nAttack (VA) 1 Aug 1954\n73.9%*\n79.0%*\nCarrier Anti-\nSubmarine (VS) 1 Apr 1954\n85.8%\n69.0%\nPatrol Anti-\nSubmarine (VP) 1 Dec 1953\n96.3%**\n31.1%\nHelicopters (HS) 1 Dec 1953\n91.1%***\nTRUMAN NARA THRASH\n10.6%\n* Conversion to turbo-jet model between June 30, 1952 and December\n31, 1953 accounts for decrease in percent modernization at the\nlater date.\n** While funds for 10 0% had been requested by the Navy, a reduction\nof 45 VP planes was made by the Bureau of the Budget. If the\nthe funds for these planes were provided, 100% completion could\nbe reached by December 1, 1953.\n***Subsequent to the presentation of the budget, the HS program\nwas increased. As of December 31, 1953, the funds now requested\ncover the % indicated. If additional money were made available,\n100% could be reached by December 1. This amounts to less than\n20 HS and envisages an increased production rate.\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nA delivery after December 1953 of the remainder of the air-\ncraft required to modernize the active forces and one-third of\nthe Organized Reserve Units is contingent upon decision to finance\nthe remainder of the program. This decision was deferred during tl\nFY 1952 budgetary review process until October-November 1951.\nFull accomplishment of the presently approved ships conversion\nand construction program will extend into calendar year 1954 as\noriginally scheduled, in view of the inevitable long-lead time of\nitems of this nature. Current progress as judged by preliminary\nschedules indicates an average slippage of about three months.\nThus those portions of these programs scheduled for completion in\nthe fourth quarter of FY 1952 will be completed in the first\nquarter of FY 1953. With complete budgetary and controlled\nmaterial support it is expected that those portions of the programs\nscheduled for 1953 and 1954 can be completed as planned.\nTRUMAN NARA\nc. For the AIR FORCE:\nThe 95-Wing Program will be substantially in being by\nJune 30, 1952, although at that time the initial requirements\nof certain types of equipment will not be fully supplied with\nwhat are presently considered first-line aircraft. It is\nimpossible to set one date by which all Air Force units of\nany strength can be completely modernized since improved\nversions of various aircraft models come into production at\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ndifferent dates. The following are the dates by which all\n95 wings of the Air Force's current program will be 'modern-\nized' in the sense of being substantially 100% equipped with\n/late mode17 aircraft; most of the wings will be capable of\nfulfilling their missions well in advance of those dates:\nPercentage to be\nEquipped with\nDate Equipped with\nLate Model by\nAircraft Type\nLate Model\nJune 30, 1952\nHeavy Bomber\nJune 1953\n72%\n*Medium Bomber\nSeptember 1953\n52%\n**Tanker for Medium Bombers\nJune 1954\n20%\nLight Bomber\nSeptember 1953\n31%\nFighter Bomber\nMarch 1953\n62%\nFighter Interceptor\nDecember 1952\n77%\nTroop Carrier and MATS\nSeptember 1953\n46%\n***Trainers\nDecember 1952\n62%\n*Acceleration of B-47 production above that in the A-14 schedule is\na resultant of Air Force action since June 1, 1951.\n**In interim B-29 Tankers will be used to make up any deficit.\n***Advanced Multi-Engine-February 1954.\nEleven of the twenty-seven Air National Guard wings,\nprogrammed for modernization, will be equipped with modern\nTRUSTAN NARA\naircraft by March 1953.\nThe combat reserve aircraft in the relatively small numbers\nincluded in this program will be available by December 1953 ex-\ncept for the medium bomber portion, which will be available in\ncalendar year 1954.\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n17. For certain segments of the munitions program, it was\nnever contemplated that the target dates established in the NSC 68\nSeries would be met. In the case of aircraft, it was always re-\ncognized that, in view of the necessity of organizing a whole new\ngroup of industries, it would be physically impossible to meet the\nmid-1952 target dates for the large number of aircraft of the\nspecified types involved. This is also true of certain long lead\ntime items for both the Army and Navy. For many other end-items,\nincluding segments of the tank-automotive program, the attainment\nof the required volume of production by mid-1952 was never schedule\nsince this would be incompatible with establishment of a broad\nmobilization base by the same date.\n18. However, output has fallen below estimated production\nfor many important end items. This condition is accounted for by\na number of factors:\nTRUSTEN NARA\na. The shortage of machine tools has been a major\nfactor in the inability of all three services to reach desired\nproduction objectives. The necessary expansion of tool\nfacilities has not been proceeding at a sufficiently rapid\nrate. Recent action by the ODM to remove price and material\nbottlenecks and the decision of the Military Departments to\nutilize tool reserves should improve this situation.\nb. Design delays and changes and engineering\ndifficulties as, for example, in the aircraft and electronics\nfield, have contributed to \"slippage.\" Steps already taken\n- 14a -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nby the Air Force to restrict design changes to a minimum\nshould improve this situation in the aircraft field.\nc. Although there has been no over-all shortage in\nbasic materials for particular items, lead times have\nmeasurably increased due to difficulties in the effective\ndistribution of critical materials to munitions production.\nThe imposition of Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) should im-\nprove this situation as noted hereafter.\nd. Additional factors accounting for \"slippage\" in re-\ncent months are set forth in Annex 1.\n19. Substantial improvements in these problem areas will re-\nquire, in addition to the specific solutions mentioned above, the\nconcerted effort of all agencies involved, backed by strong public\nsupport engendered by a sense of national urgency that has hereto-\nfore been lacking, and backed by timely and adequate financing.\n20. In general, the military services met their military per-\nsonnel objectives for June 30, 1951 and expect to meet the target\nfor June 30, 1952. The military strength on June 30, 1951 was\n3,252,000. Due to the extremely limited mobilization base of the\nAir Force with respect to housing and troop facilities, it has\nTRUMAN\nbeen necessary to control very carefully the personnel input.\nNARA\nInadequate troop housing and a drop in voluntary recruiting during\nApril and May necessitated readjustment in the manning program\nwhich, in turn, resulted in a deficient FY 1951 end strength\namounting to approximately 62,000 (7%). Providing funds contained\nin the Public Works Bill now before Congress and necessary con-\nstruction materials are made available without undue delay, this\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ndeficiency can be made up and the manning objective of 1,061,000\ncan be attained by June 30, 1952.\n21. The approved FY 1952 military strengths are listed be-\nlow. They are subject to revision to meet increased force re-\nquirements and, as a result, the status of the manpower pool may\nchange.\nArmy\n1,550,000\nNavy\n805,000\nMarine Corps\n204,029\nAir Force\n1,061,000\nTOTAL\n3,620,029\n/Army figures exclude West Point\ncadets; Navy figures exclude\nofficer candidates.\nThis will require a gross input of 1,554,000 men during the year,\nof this number the significant elements are 376,000 to build up\nto authorized strength and about 400,000 to provide for the release\nof Reserve and National Guard personnel now on active duty.\n413,000 of the total input will be through induction.\nMARA\n22. The manpower pool, adjusted for the changes made by the\nUniversal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, is estimated\nas 850,000 on July 1, 1951. Gains to the pool are expected to be\n549,000 with losses of 838,000 through enlistment, induction and\nrecall of reserves. The pool at the end of FY 1952 is therefore\nestimated as 561,000.\nThe status of the manpower pool, under existing selective\nservice legislation, is shown by the following table:\n-16-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nStatus of Manpower Pool at Beginning of each fiscal year\nto Support Military Force of 3.6 million\nEntering Position\nConservative Estimate\nOptimistic Estimate\n1952\n850,000\n1953\n950,000\n561,000\n1954\n661,000\n414,000\n1955\n514,000\n384,000\n1956\n484,000\n273,000\n373,000\nNote: The Director of Selective Service recommends that the\nminimum level of the Selective Service Pool be fixed\nat 300,000. The Department of Defense believes this\nfigure is too high.\n23. The command facilities now on hand and which will be pro-\nvided by the Public Works Bill now before Congress are sufficient\nonly through FY 1952 for the military strengths planned for\nHARRY S\nMARA\nALLIBRARY\nJuly 1, 1952, but are.inadequate for mobilization and deployment\nof forces to certain overseas areas.\n-17-\nTOP SECRET\nTop SECRET\nThe Mobilization Program\n24. The application of the Controlled Materials Plan to the\ndistribution of steel, copper and aluminum, in place of the prioritie\nsystem in effect up to June 30, 1951, should assure to the munitions\nproduction and facilities programs the materials needed. For CMP to\nsucceed the greatest care must be taken to avoid excessive issuance\nof CMP authorizations, especially for materials for non-military pro-\nduction and construction projects, and particularly to limit drastica\nly the use of overriding directives. This is a matter of the utmost\nimportance. In addition, and of equal importance, the initial mili-\ntary programs must be assured the necessary civilian-type components\n(so-called \"B products\"). In certain cases, however, it is becoming\nevident that difficulties will be encountered in maintaining both a\nlarge defense program and high levels of civilian output. A notable\ncase is copper, where the supply is considerably less than was ex-\nMEDIA TRUMAN NARA\npected a year ago. Under these circumstances it has been necessary\nto reduce automobile production, for example, for the 4th Quarter of\n1951 to 60% of the first half of 1950 in order to provide the copper\nrequired for defense. A number of alloying metals important to the\ndefense program have been placed under full allocation. The opera-\ntion of CMP, placing as it does a high premium on proper production\nscheduling, is expected to ease considerably the tight supply situa-\ntion in component parts and materials not directly included in the\nplan.\n25. The cutback in the amount of materials permitted in the\nproduction of passenger cars has brought, in the Detroit area, the\n-18-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nfirst significant unemployment directly traceable to the mobilization\nprogram. As in the case of other areas where cutbacks in civilian\nproduction may be necessary, defense contracts may be expected to\nease the transition.\n26. The essential controls for stabilization of the economy\nhave been set up, and together with high levels of civilian pro-\nduction have reversed, at least temporarily, the inflation which ac-\ncompanied the early stages of mobilization. Many of the controls,\ndating, as some do, from last September, are based on substantially\nhigher security programs, and further substantial slippages in these\nprograms may warrant a review of some elements of the program. For\nthe intelligent management of the mobilization program it is important\nthat FY 1952 production schedules be made fully realistic immediately\nand that firm schedules for 1953 be available as soon as possible.\n27. To deal with the longer run problems of stabilization and\nmaterials supply, there is being developed an industrial expansion prc\ngram of very large proportions. Present plans call, during the next\ntwo or three years, for a 100% increase over existing capacity in pri-\nmary aluminum capacity, a 13% increase in steel capacity, a 14% in-\nTRIMAN MARA NUBRASKA\ncrease in petroleum supply and an ambitious program for locating and\ndeveloping domestic sources of a wide variety of materials. Attendant\nincreases in transportation and electric power and other areas of the\neconomy are also under way in order to support higher levels of de-\nfense production without cutting back to emergency levels of civilian\ngoods production. Many of these projects, however, require the same\n-19-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nscarce materials and components as needed in munitions production and\ngenerally in consumers durable goods output, with defense output hav-\ning first call on resources. The speed with which these expansion\nprojects can be carried forward will be determined largely by the\nspeed with which munitions output rises and the degree to which it is\nfelt practicable to reduce civilian output in this period.\n28. Even less than when the original NSC 68 programs were pre-\npared is there reason for concern that the economy cannot, without\nserious hardship, carry a load of the magnitude represented by these\nprograms. In general, the economy has responded well to the stimu-\nlus of the defense program. Additions to the labor force have been\ngreater than hoped for and over-all production is higher than ex-\nTRUMAN\nNARA\npected. Considerable ingenuity in the use of substitute materials\nhas already been evidenced. Particularly in view of the additional\naluminum and steel capacity expected to be available next year, there\ncan be no doubt of the ability of the economy to support a level of\nmilitary production somewhat higher than that projected in the NSC 68\nprograms together with civilian consumption levels comparable with\nthose prevailing in the period 1947-1949.\n-20-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nForeign Military and Economic Assistance\n29. No development in the world situation is considered to\nhave diminished the importance or urgency of completing the\nforeign economic and military assistance programs by the target\ndates outlined in Annex 2 of NSC 68/3.\na. With respect to the European NAT countries, the\nMedium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) continues to be the basis for\nprogramming military and related economic assistance.\nb. Prompt and adequate measures need to be taken to\narrest the general deterioration of the situation in the Near\nEast, particularly in Iran, the Arab States and Israel.\nc. In the Far East the United States aid programs to-\ngether with the struggle against aggression in Korea have played\nan important part in stemming the tide of Russian-inspired sub-\nversion and conquest; but much remains to be done and it is too\nearly to predict that the favorable developments will continue.\n30. United States end-item assistance already programmed\nthrough Fiscal Year 1952 to meet requirements of the MTDP totals\nabout $10 billion and is related primarily to the unit equipment\nrequirements for forces to be available by July 1, 1952.\nTRUITAN NARA NUBRASK\na. Deliveries of equipment, for many reasons, have\nbeen slow but are now accelerating; and deliveries of Army\nequipment financed with Fiscal Year 1950 and 1951 appropriations,\nare expected to be completed by June 1952.\nb. The Fiscal Year 1952 program includes about $1.0\nbillion to meet the military equipment requirements of the non- -\nNATO countries. Deliveries to these countries, with the exception\n- 21 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nof Indochina, are slow due to the shortage of materiel in relation\nto global commitments.\nC. In Fiscal Year 1951, $1.23 billion of direct\neconomic aid was allotted to the European NATO countries, while\ntheir military efforts totaled $6.0 billion dollars; and for Fiscal\nYear 1952, $.86 billion of direct economic aid has been requested\nto be used primarily to support a $9.0 billion military effort by\nthe European NATO countries. About $712 million is proposed to\nbe furnished in Fiscal Year 1952 to other European countries, in-\ncluding Yugoslavia, which are not members of NATO.\n- d. Other economic aid programs for the non-European\ncountries total about $600 million in Fiscal Year 1952; and the\nmajor portion of these funds will be directly applied to strengthen\ning the capabilities of these countries to resist internal and\nexternal aggression.\n31. The primary difficulties being encountered in completing\nprograms includes:\nTRUMAN NARA\na. Insufficient political cohesion and of resoluteness\non the part of many governments to take the necessary measures\nconstitutes a serious barrier to realizing in full the objectives\nof our economic and military assistance programs. In Europe,\nthese factors are reflected more in the caution with which defense\nexpenditures are being undertaken; while in many non-European\ncountries, they enfeeble efforts to improve the internal security\nsituation and to execute programs of economic improvement.\nb. In continental Europe, a significant difficulty in\ncompleting the MTOP in successive annual installments arises from\n- 22 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe inadequacy of the efforts of these countries to increase their\nmilitary equipment production. Munitions production capacity is\navailable; but financing is not available in sufficient amounts.\nThe ISAC considers this problem one of the most urgent facing it.\nc. The volume and rate of military equipment deliveries\nfrom the United States have been below expectations and still\nfurther below the level of essential requirements. As a result,\nthe incentives to raise the forces on schedule are being weakened.\nRecently established targets, however, call for deliveries of the\nFiscal Year 1952 program by December 31, 1952, with the exception\nof certain aircraft and other items requiring long periods of\nproduction. The ability to hold these delivery schedules depends\ngreatly on the trend of defense production in the United States\nand on the absence of new competing requirements of higher priority.\nd. In the non-European areas, shortages of United States\ntrained personnel, as well as export goods, are becoming acute\nand are inhibiting the rate of program accomplishment.\nTRUBLAN NARA THERE\n32. As to adequacy and timing of our foreign military\nand economic assistance programs, the judgments which emerge from\na preliminary re-examination of present objectives and programs of\nUnited States foreign economic and military assistance, initially\noutlined in NSC 68/4 and Annex 2 of NSC 68/3, indicate that:\na. The central issue concerns the position which the\nUnited States should take toward the accomplishment by the target\ndate of the North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense Plan.\n(1) Recent study by the United States of the cost\nof the MTDP indicates that the plan, if carried out as scheduled,\n- 23 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ntogether with non-NATO military costs of the European NATO\ncountries, would involve a total cost over the four years from\nmid-1950 to mid-1954 of approximately $72 billion, divided into\n$40 billion of major materiel requirements and $32 billion of\nother costs. These estimates include costs of German participa-\ntion; and exclude costs of United States and Canadian troops that\nwould be included in the MTDP forces under JCS plans. These recent\nestimates show a significantly higher cost than did the study\ncontained in NSC 68/3.\n(2) Total United States assistance for Fiscal Year\n1953 and 1954, even if provided at the annual rate requested of\nthe Congress for Fiscal Year 1952, would, together with any present\nreasonable expectation of European defense efforts, leave a\nsubstantial deficiency in the completion of the MTDP requirements.\n(3) If the over-riding objective is the military\nbuild-up of the size and by the dates contained in the MTDP, the\nUnited States should be prepared to furnish assistance after Fiscal\nYear 1952 in an amount whose outside limit can now be estimated\nat about $25 billion. Until the re-examination of the MTDP, now\nunder way, has proceeded further; no estimate can be given of the\nextent to which adjustments and economies in that plan may reduce\nthe size of the deficiency. To the extent that adjustments in\nthe military plan permit cost reductions or extended target\nHASPIT IRUMAN NARA\nperiods, this amount can be less; to the extent that European\nmorale and political cohesion improve, it may also be less.\nNevertheless, it is probable that United States assistance will\nbe required during Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954 at an average annual\n- 24 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nrate greater than that requested of the Congress for Fiscal Year\n1952 if the program is to be substantially accomplished on\nschedule. Moreover, the bulk of the funds should be obligated\nduring Fiscal Year 1953 in order to permit the necessary flow of\ndeliveries in 1953 and 1954. Therefore, the funds required to be\nobligated by the end of Fiscal Year 1953 would be substantially\nlarger than the appropriations requested for Fiscal Year 1952.\nb. Little scope is available either for significant\nreductions in the magnitude or for postponing the target dates of\nour aid programs to the non-European countries. Economic and\nmilitary assistance requirements for the non-European countries,\nwhile substantial in the aggregate, approach the minimums in terms\nof both magnitude and timing which are needed to arrest deteriora-\ntion in the situation, particularly in the Near East, and, in\nHARRITA TRUMAN NARA\nthe cases of Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America, to lay a\nfirm base on which more far reaching development and increased\nmilitary strength can be built in the near future. Particularly\nfor the Near East and Asia regions, United States assistance\nrequirements should not be delayed as to timing.\nTOP SECRET\n- 25 -\nTOP SECRET\nThe Civil Defense Program\n33. The civil defense program should contribute to a reasonable\nassurance that, in the event of war, the United States would survive\nthe initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its object-\nives. Civil defense programs are designed to serve to minimize\ncasualties in the event of attack, to provide emergency relief\nimmediately after attack, and to help preserve the productive core\nof the nation. The basic responsibility for civil defense is local,\nresting with the States and their local subdivisions. The present\ncivil defense program is a State-Federal program in which the Federal\nCivil Defense Administration develops plans and programs for the\nguidance and assistance of the States.\nIRUSLAN NARA TUBRASH\n34. Present plans which will be implemented during the Fiscal\nYear 1952, if funds are available, provide for the development of\nFederal stockpiles of supplies and equipment and a system of ware-\nhouses for the storage of such reserve stocks; the procurement of\norganizational equipment in financial collaboration with the States;\nand the development of a national attack warning and communications\nsystem. Studies are being made of types of shelters, traffic control\npublic attitudes and the need for shelters and other protected facili\nties in critical target areas.\n35. The Federal Civil Defense Administration has in operation\nits Washington, D. C. office, eight of its thirteen regional offices,\nits Staff College and one of its three training schools. Almost all\nStates have civil defense legislation, and funds provided by State\n- 26 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nand local governments considerably exceed Federal appropriations.\nFederal funds are at present made available to local governments\nprimarily for medical supplies, and equipment for training and edu-\ncation. State and local organizations are in some cases in complete\noperation, but in most instances, are only skeleton organizations\nwhich are being filled in as rapidly as possible.\n36. The principal difficulties involved in completing the\nprogram are the lack of appropriations, attitudes of indifference\ntowards civil defense on the part of the public whose interest often\nfluctuates in accordance with military successes and reverses. Sub-\nject to substantial financial support by the Congress, the Civil\nDefense program can be well under way by June 30, 1952, but it will\nnot be complete nor adequate.\nStockpiling\nTRUSTAN NAFA LIBRA\n37. The ultimate targets for the stockpile program originally\nestablished on December 8, 1950 have not been substantially modified\nAttainment of those objectives by June 30, 1954 or earlier for most\nitems is still the objective, but it was always recognized that this\ndate was not feasible for many commodities.\n38. However, since last December the intermediate targets set\nfor mid-1951 and mid-1952 have been revised downwards for many\ncommodities for which current military and civilian requirements are\nin excess of the supply. For most of the more important materials,\n- 27 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ndeliveries during FY 1951 were not adequate to meet the lower\ntargets for that date and in most of these instances the deliveries\nnow scheduled for FY 1952 will not be sufficient to make up the\ndifference.\n39. The $1.8 billion in supplemental FY 1951 funds recom-\nmended on December 8 have been appropriated but the $1.0 billion\nin new funds recommended for FY 1952 has been reduced to $.6 billio\nin the request to the Congress. This may well be adequate in view\nof the materials shortages for current production to be expected\nover the next year or more. The total cost of the program remains\nabout $4.1 billion of new authority, which was estimated to be\nrequired as of December 8, with recent increases in prices about\noffsetting minor target reductions.\n40. As of June 30, 1951 all funds available as of December 8\nhad been obligated but $.8 billion of these had not been spent.\nOnly $.9 billion of the $1.8 billion supplemental for 1951 have\nbeen obligated and none has been spent.\nThe Information Program\nHASPY TRUBLAN NARA ALIBRESA\n41. The purpose of the information program is to bring home\nto the peoples of the world the psychological implications of\nthe cold war in such a way that we will benefit and the Kremlin\nwill suffer. This is done through a variety of media and methods.\nThe Department of State has for a number of years had facilities\ndesigned to accomplish this task.\n⑉a 28 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex V of NSC 68/3 set forth an information program which called\nfor increases over the \"Campaign of Truth\" program (approved by the\nCongress and the President in the summer of 1950). Annex V provided\nfor an increased number of broadcast hours and languages in the VOA,\nand additional booklets, leaflets, magazines, pictures, press re-\nleases, information centers, exchange of persons, documentary films,\nintelligence research facilities, etc. The most important change\nwas the acceleration of the ring program to assure its completion\nwithin a two year period (rather than five years) by providing all\nthe financial requirements in FY 1951. This was a radio ring of 14\none megawatt (1 million watts) medium-wave transmitters to be es-\ntablished overseas for greater penetration of Iron Curtain countries\nand areas of the sub-Asian continent, supported by 5 one megawatt\nshort-wave transmitters in the United States.\n42. This expanded program set forth in Annex V has fallen\nHARISH TRUSSLAN NARA MILBORK\nseriously short of what was planned. The principal shortcomings are\nthe failure to provide for (a) the completion of the ring of radio\ntransmitters; (b) additional personnel and facilities for information\ncenters in certain critical areas; (c) exchange of additional persons\nand (d) discreet support of indigenous activities.\n43. Due to the refusal of Congress to appropriate funds there\nhas been an indefinite postponement of the completion of the radio\nring. This and other difficulties can be said to stem directly from\nlack of sufficient understanding on the part of the American people,\nand their representatives, of the significant role an adequate in-\nformation program can and must play in the defense of the United\nStates.\n- 29 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n44. The current program is inadequate on two scores: (a)\nthe United States has less time to prepare 1ts defenses than was\nthought a year ago, and (b) the United States has lost time in\nexpanding its efforts, particularly in acquiring the radio ring. To\ncompensate for this, appropriations previously recommended should be\nmade with an increase of 15% in the appropriations for radio facili-\nties so that the radio ring can be more rapidly constructed.\nTRUMAN\nNAME HARRY'S\n45. Funds presently available make it necessary to postpone\ntarget dates. It is recommended that sufficient funds be sought to\npermit advancing target dates. The program can operate at maximum\neffectiveness in approximately 24 months from the date adequate funds\nare made available.\n- 30 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nForeign Intelligence and Related Activities\n46. The Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies\nrepresented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee have taken\nand are taking action directed toward the improvement and inten-\nsification of foreign intelligence and related activities. For\nreasons of security, the specific programs undertaken and con-\ntemplated and their budgetary requirements are not set forth hero\nIt has been determined, however, that even the substantially\nincreased budgets required are inconsiderable in relation to the\ngrand total of the other programs described in NSC 68/4.\n47. Since September 1950 there has been substantial progres\nin the development of cooperation and coordination among the\nseveral intelligence agencies through the active utilization of\nthe Intelligence Advisory Committee as a means to that end.\nAlthough detailed problems remain to be solved, an effective\nsystem of coordination has been established and that aspect of\nthe program may be said to have been completed.\nTRUMAN NARA\n48. An intensification of intelligence and related activi-\nties, to the extent feasible with the means available, has also\nbeen accomplished. Further progress depends on the augmentation\nof personnel and facilities. The projected expansion of CIA\nand the departmental agencies is, in general, about half com-\npleted.\n49. All intelligence agencies have experienced difficulty\nin finding and recruiting properly qualified personnel. Only\nthe intelligence organization of the Department of State has had\nnotable difficulty in obtaining adequate budgetary provision\n- 31 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nfor personnel expansion. Lack of adequate and suitable office\nspace has hindered development responsive to NSC 68.\n50. Present programs for the improvement and intensifica-\ntion of intelligence and related activities are deemed to be the\nmost practicable in the circumstances. Their substantial com-\npletion by mid-1952 is anticipated.\nTRUMAN NARA\nThe Internal Security Program\n51. Although new problems are arising continuously in this\nfield, the present basic internal security program is virtually\nidentical with the accelerated program which was recommended by\nthe Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) and\nthe Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and which\nwas adopted by the National Security Council (NSC 68/4). While\nthe fundamental elements applicable to the internal security pro\ngram of the ICIS and the IIC are of a continuing nature, ex-\ntensive progress relating thereto has already been made by both\nCommittees. This progress has been manifested by the initia-\ntion of additional needed measures in areas relating to such\nproblems as the provision of a more adequate legal basis for\ninsuring the internal security, the coordination of internal\nsecurity planning with plans for the military and civil defense\nof the United States, the increase in domestic intelligence and\ncounter intelligence coverage in the internal security field,\nthe expanding of investigative, prosecutive and related programs\ndesigned to neutralize the activities of individuals and groups\nwho constitute potential and actual dangers to the nation's\nsecurity, the preparation of appropriate measures for industrial\n- 32 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nand port security, the protection of classified information as\nwell as certain types of nonclassified strategic information, the\nestablishment of preventive measures relating to defense against\nunconventional attack, the establishment of entry and exit safe-\nguards, etc.\n52. There has been almost unqualified cooperation by the\nvarious departments and agencies in support of ICIS-IIC activitie\nAt present IIC is encountering no major difficulties and none is\nanticipated by that Committee, if funds are approved with which\nto provide the essential manpower and supplies for its program.\nIn the case of ICIS, however, several of the programs and pro-\njects advocated by that Committee have met with the obstacle of\nlack of funds, and it is contemplated that, as further planning\nprogresses in this body similar obstacles of a monetary nature\nmay be encountered.\nMARA ALIBRARA\n53. The accelerated internal security program previously\nrecommended is considered adequate. The threat to the internal\nsecurity of the United States from communism has not changed\nsince this program was prepared and it is anticipated that the\nthreat will continue even if hostilities in Korea are brought\nto a successful conclusion. With respect to timing, the entire\nprogram is an immediate one both from the standpoint of measures\ncurrently being employed and those which are earmarked for im-\nplementation only in the event of hostilities. Both require\nurgent attention on a current basis. Since the ICIS-IIC program\nis considered to be urgent and immediate the target date for\nreadiness is now and not in the future. Accordingly no target\n- 33 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ndate modification is recommended and as a consequence the Com-\nmittees are continuing to impart a sense of urgency to their\ndeliberations in their efforts to more adequately assure the\nRASTA TRUMAN NARA\ninternal security of the nation.\n- 34 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nPART III\nCONCLUSIONS\n54. Review of the world situation shows that the danger to\nthe national security of the United States posed by the USSR is\ngreater now than was anticipated during the development of the NSC\n68/4 programs. It now appears that the United States and its allie\nare already in a period of acute danger which will continue until\nthey: achieve a position of strength adequate to support the ob-\njectives defined in NSC 68.\nTRUMAN NARA STREET\n55. Review of the status of current United States programs\nfor national security indicates that, while there is variation amon{\nthe several programs, the target dates for the NSC 68/4 programs\ngenerally will not be met at the present pace and scale of effort.\nOf importance is the current estimate that although U.S. Armed\nForces will reach the approved active force and personnel levels by\nJune 30, 1952, they will not by that date achieve, particularly with\nrespect to critical, hard-to-get, and long lead time items of mili-\ntary equipment, the total materiel position contemplated in the FY\n1952 procurement directive as evolved from NSC 68/4. Moreover,\nwithout a great increase of pace and scale of political, economic\nand military effort on the part of all NAT members, including the\nUnited States, the July 1954 goals of the NATO Medium Term Defense\nPlan will not be met. Finally, the information program and prepara-\ntions for civil defense are not advancing as rapidly as necessary.\n-35-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n56. It is vital to our national security that the objectives\nof the NSC 68/4 programs be achieved at the earliest practicable\ndate. It is apparent that some important elements of these program\ncannot be completed by the target dates set in NSC 68/4 under any\ncircumstances. On the other hand, the current estimates of com-\npletion dates for ma ny of the elements of these programs, assuming\nthe present pace and scale of effort, are inadequate to the needs\nof our national security. Substantial advancement of currently\nprojected completion dates can and must be accomplished.\nPARTYS TRUMEN NARA NEBRASKA\n57. It is not now possible to state the desimbility of\nreaffirming or modifying the approved target dates for readiness\nunder presently approved programs. In any event, however, the grav-\nity of the world situation now demands that as much of all programs\nessential to national readiness as is practicable be accomplished\nby or before the approved target dates for the NSC 68/4 programs.\n58. Pending further recommendations in the report to the\nPresident by the National Security Council due on October 1, 1951,\nresponsible departments and agencies should be directed to increase\ntheir efforts to meet the target dates for their presently approved\nprograms, and, with particular respect to the program for the pro-\nduction of military equipment, to accelerate presently planned rates\nfor critical, hard-to-get, and long lead time items, in order to\nadvance currently projected completion dates as far as feasible\ntoward the target date of June 30, 1952, and to review for each\nitem the problem of achieving accelerated production while at the\nsame time securing an adequate mobilization base.\n-36-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nLIST OF CHANGES IN DRAFT REPORT\non\n\"STATUS AND TIMING OF CURRENT U. S. PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\",\nATTACHED TO MEMO FOR NSC FROM EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,\nDATED JULY 31, 1951\nPart I - No changes\nPart II\nParagraph 13 -- Last sentence replaced by three new sentences.\n14 -- Complete new paragraph inserted.\n15 -- Complete new paragraph inserted.\n16 -- Revision of old paragraphs 14 and 15.\n18 -- Revision of old paragraphs 17 and 18.\n19 -- Complete new paragraph inserted.\n20 -- Old paragraph 19 with last three sentences\nrevised.\nNARA\n23 -- Revision of old paragraph 22.\n24 -- First two sentences of old paragraph 23 re-\nplaced by three new sentences.\nPart III - CONCLUSIONS\nParagraph 55 -- Second and third sentences of old paragraph 54\nrevised.\n56 -- Third sentence of old paragraph 55 revised.\n57 -- First two sentences of old paragraph 56 elim-\ninated.\n58 -- Old paragraph 57 revised.\nTOP SECRET"
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