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SEPART
The President NLT(PSF/NSC)
1013
NSC 114/1
COPY NO. 1
A REPORT
TO THE
PRESIDENT
BY THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
STATUS AND TIMING OF CURRENT
U.S. PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
DECLASSIFIED
August 8, 1951
NSC LIST 2.15.19
By NLT-NCHARS, Date 4-13-79
WASHINGTON
TOD RECRET
PUT SECHET
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS
TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-
NER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
NSC 114/1
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August 8, 1951
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on
STATUS AND TIMING OF CURRENT
U. S. PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
References: A. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject,
"United States Objectives and Programs for
National Security", dated July 12, 1951
B. NSC 68 Series
C. NSC 114 and Annexes to NSC 114
D. NSC Actions Nos. 487-a and 518
E. Three Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated July 31, 1951
F. Memo for all holders of NSC 114 and Annexes to
NSC 114 from Executive Secretary, dated
July 31, 1951
G. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same
subject, dated August 6, 1951
At the 99th meeting, with the President presiding,
the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Deputy Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director
of Defense Mobilization, the Economic Cooperation Administrator,
the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director, Bureau of
the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers consid-
ered a draft report on the subject (Reference G) and adopted it
subject to corrections in paragraph 18 a and paragraph 55 proposed
by the Department of Defense. The report, as corrected and adopted
is contained in the enclosure.
Also enclosed for information in this connection is
Appendix A, "Changes in the World Situation Since the Completion of
NSC 68/4. Eight related annexes, prepared by the respective de-
partments and agencies indicated in each annex, are being circu-
lated under separate cover for information in connection with the
enclosed report.
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Director of Defense Mobilization, the Economic Cooperation Adminis-
trator, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director,
Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Adviser
submit the enclosed preliminary report to the President for his
consideration with the recommendation that he note it and the
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annexes thereto as indicative of the status of the present programs,
approve the "Conclusions" contained in Part III of the report, and
direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments
and agencies of the United States Government.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Defense Mobilization
The Economic Cooperation Administrator
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
NSC 114/1
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ToΓ SECRET
PRELIMINARY REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
STATUS AND TIMING OF CURRENT U. S.
PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
PART I -- CHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION
SINCE THE COMPLETION OF NSC 68
1. As anticipated in NSC 68 (April 1950), the Soviet rulers
have continued in relentless pursuit of the Kremlin design. In
Korea they have demonstrated a willingness to take actions which
involve grave risk of precipitating global war. Such risk-taking
appears to be closely calculated; the USSR has exercised consider-
able care and restraint to avoid open and direct involvement. Never-
theless, the Kremlin's willingness to accept such risk has been
greater than was foreseen in NSC 68.
2. Since April, 1950 the USSR has intensified its deliberate
and systematic campaign to prepare the Russian people psycholo-
gically for possible war with the United States. A similar campaign
is being carried out in the European satellites and China.
3. The USSR is militarily substantially stronger than it was
in April, 1950. Furthermore, the increase in military strength-in-
being of the Eastern European satellites since April, 1950 has been
large, and alone probably offsets the increases which have been
achieved in Western Europe. The Chinese communist regime has con-
siderable military capabilities at its disposal, has undertaken
military action in the Soviet interest, and thus far, at least, has
made progress in consolidating its control in China. Evidence
from various sources during the past year shows that Soviet military
production is of high quality--and of higher quality than had pre-
viously been estimated. The ability of the USSR to develop large
military capabilities where none existed a few years ago, as in
North Korea, has been shown in the Korean war and this has re-
quired a revision of earlier judgments regarding satellite military
potentials. On all these counts, NSC 68 presented a prospect which
was more favorable for the United States than now appears to have
been warranted.
4. Nothing has occurred within the Soviet empire which re-
quires a revision of earlier judgments that the regime is capable
of maintaining its control over the Russian people and its satel-
lites.
5. Notably in Korea, and elsewhere as in Iran and the Balkans
situations have developed which could more easily issue in general
war by accident or miscalculation than was foreseen fifteen months
-ago.
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6. As anticipated in NSC 68, the Kremlin regards most serious-
ly the prospect of United States and Western rearmament generally.
It is highly sensitive to German and Japanese rearmament and the
establishment of American bases overseas. Its principal immediate
purpose is to frustrate these programs. Its presently indicated
course of action to that end is to exploit all opportunities to
split the Western Allies, particularly the United States and the
United Kingdom, and to conduct a specious peace campaign designed
to exploit both fear of a new general war and reluctance to make the
sacrifices necessary to redress the balance of power. There is a
serious danger, which may become acute if a cease-fire in Korea is
agreed to, that by such wiles the USSR may yet lull the free world
into a false sense of security, with adverse effect upon both its
military posture and its political cohesion. If, however, the
United States demonstrates determination and progress in meeting its
commitments to build the strength of the free world to the level at
which it can deter or defeat Soviet aggression, and if Soviet con-
ciliation is seen to present no real assurances of peace and se-
curity, it is likely that the alignment of the West can be main-
tained and its strength further developed.
7. If and when it becomes apparent to the Kremlin that the
Western alliance and projected rearmament cannot be disrupted and
frustrated by political and psychological means, the danger of
Soviet preventive action will become acute.
8. The free world has made important progress in organizing
itself to meet the Soviet threat. UN action to counter Communist
aggression in Korea, the development of NATO, progress with respect
to the Schuman and Pleven plans, the successful conference of
American foreign ministers, progress on the Japanese peace treaty
and on Pacific security arrangements, all indicate in some degree
a developing cohesion and awareness of common peril. This progress
is impressive in relation to normal expectation, but has been slow
and unsatisfying in relation to the abnormal exigencies of the
situation. The United States and its allies have moved less rapidly
than envisaged in NSC 68/4 toward exploiting their vastly superior
economic potential to improve their over-all power position vis-a-vis
the Soviet system. NATO planning has yet to be translated into
effective military strength in being. Tangible support for the UN
cause in Korea has left much to be desired. In general, Far Eastern
issues have tended to divide the free world. Moreover, the situa-
tion in Iran and the Arab states has deteriorated beyond all ex-
pectation.
9. The level of military production in the United States is
not currently meeting the military readiness targets indicated in
NSC 68/4, which moved forward the military readiness level contem-
plated for July 1, 1954, to July 1, 1952. The detailed materiel
programs developed subsequent to the approval of force levels on
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December 14, 1950, were finally approved when the military budget
for FY 1952 was approved on April 19, 1951. In the interim, how-
ever, available funds were used to expand the production base and
to get long lead time items into production on an expanded basis.
The flow of military assistance to allied countries has lagged be-
hind the targets contemplated in NSC 68/4, in part because of the
materiel requirements needed to support United Nations forces in
Korea. The level of military production in Western Europe has been
inadequate to support the objectives of our economic and military
assistance programs. In the earlier phases of our build-up, the
output of military equipment has been a more serious limitation on
the building of military strength than the first drafts upon our
manpower resources. The limitation on the availability of mili-
tary equipment stems from such as the following: the recent date
of final approval of the detailed materiel programs; the practical
problem of reducing long lead time required for military equipment
such as tanks, aircraft, ships, tactical radio, motorized equipment,
and heavy construction items; delay in administrative actions which
could have made tools and facilities available at an earlier date;
organizational problems in production facilities; the decision to
expand the production base and concurrently to secure delivery of
end items; as well as a psychological situation less favorable than
that existing at the time of adoption of NSC 68/4.
10. The estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities contained in
NSC 68 have been revised upwards. It is now estimated that the
USSR will have in mid-1953 the atomic stockpile formerly estimated
for mid-1954. The date when a surprise attack on the United States
might yield decisive results is correspondingly advanced.
11. Although a thorough examination of the subject is not now
available, the strength-in-being of the United States and its
allies has probably increased in absolute terms less than that of
the Soviet system since April 1950. The mobilization effort of the
United States and its allies has brought them closer to the actuali-
zation of their potential than in April 1950. The date at which
this mobilization effort will enable them to achieve the capability
of supporting the objectives outlined in NSC 68 is still some time
off, certainly later than was expected when the NSC 68/4 programs
were developed. The question of comparative capabilities and the
rates of increase in capabilities is of such importance that a
careful assessment should be obtained as rapidly as possible.
12. Review of the world situation shows that the danger to
our security is greater now than it was in April 1950. It is
greater now than it was then thought it would now be. Fifteen
months ago 1954 was regarded as the time of maximum danger. It now
appears that we are already in a period of acute danger which will
continue until the United States and its allies achieve an adequate
position of strength.
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CTOP SECRET
PART II CURRENT PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
The Military Program
13. The military program contained in the enclosure to a
Memorandum for the National Security Council from the Executive
Secretary, subject, "United States Objectives and Programs for
National Security, dated December 14, 1950, with certain augmen-
tations is the present target program. This program is set out in
detail in Annex No. 1. This program is explicit with respect to
military personnel strength and units; it is not explicit with re-
spect to materiel objectives, outlining them broadly by implication
in terms of active forces, tasks to be supported, and establishment
of a mobilization base capable of rapid expansion. The Department
of Defense FY 1952 procurement objective was evolved for the pur-
pose of defining the materiel and mobilization base objectives and
was finally approved by the President on April 19, 1951. This ob-
jective was to have on hand by June 30, 1952, or as soon thereafter
as they could be produced, sufficient major end-items of material
to meet the following requirements:
E. Training consumption through FY 1952 and Korean
combat consumption through December 31, 1951.
b. Full modern equipment for the active forces.
c. Necessary training equipment for civilian components
up to 50% of the amount authorized the active forces. This
will be partly modern type equipment except that 11 wings of
the Air National Guard and 50 Naval Air Reserve Squadrons are
to have all modern aircraft.
d. Except for aircraft, stock levels and war reserves
equal to from 3½ to 6 months (dependent upon the item) combat
consumption of the augmented forces to be in combat one year
after the start of an "all out" war together with 6 months
training requirements of all units to be mobilized and in
training by that date.
It is also planned that in the production of equipment
according to the above criteria, production capacity will be es-
tablished sufficient to be readily expanded, if necessary, to sup-
port combat operations and mobilization requirements if hostilities
should break out on a total basis on or after June 30, 1952.
The Department of Defense program further contemplates
that, subject to further changes in force levels, the procurement
program after FY 1952 shall be sufficient to complete any of the
above objectives which could not be completed by that date due to
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limitation of productive capacity, and, where the above objectives
have been attained, further procurement for war reserves and con-
tinued peacetime usage will be at the minimum level necessary to
keep such expanded capacity in operation and available for rapid
expansion to mobilization requirement. It is further contemplated
that in carrying out the production program maximum utilization
will be made of machine tool reserves without replacement.
14. The military personnel strength and units fixed on
December 14, 1950, have been increased as shown in Annex 1. These
strength and unit targets as thus increased will be met by June 30,
1952.
15. a. At the time of approval of NSC 68/4 on December 14,
1950, it was recognized that the requirements for war re-
serves of certain long lead time materiel and equipment,
originally contemplated for delivery by June 30, 1954, could
not be attained by June 30, 1952. Furthermore, the sharp
increases in the production program as a whole, which would
have been involved in meeting the specific materiel objectives
implied by the interim force goals set in NSC 68/4 as subse-
quently increased, would have led to a peaking of production
across the board followed by a sharp curtailment of the pro-
duction flow. After consideration of these opposing factors
and of production limitations, procurement objectives for the
initial accumulation of war reserves were fixed on April 19,
1951. In order best to achieve the production objective
the Department of Defense is currently reviewing planned pro-
duction schedules in line with the President's statement of
April 27, 1951. This review is under way with a target date
for completion of September 1951.
b. As to requirements for an adequate base of command
facilities (e.g., training and communications facilities,
troop housing, etc.) for mobilization, no specific objectives
to be reached by June 30, 1952 were established on December 14,
1950. While such requirements could have been met by June 30,
1952, it was decided that the rate of their establishment
should be in phase with the remainder of the military program.
Specific objectives for military construction were set on
April 19, 1951, to accommodate the forces to be raised and
equipped by June 30, 1952. Provided the appropriations re-
quested to cover these objectives are made available by
Congress in time, and if the required structural steel is
furnished, these construction objectives will be met on
June 30, 1952. Subject to adequate and timely funding, com-
mand facilities to launch a full mobilization could be created
in the period of approximately 12 months.
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c. As to the requirement for reserve productive capacity
the Department of Defense FY 1952 procurement objective sets
forth a general statement of the policy to be followed. It
is not possible to make any worthwhile generalization as to
the implementation of this policy. In the case of each type
of end-item, the decision as to the relative importance of
reserve production capacity, maintenance of a flow of pro-
duction indefinitely, obtaining requirements at an early date,
as well as many other factors, is different, and produces a
different result as to the size of the reserve production
capacity for that item.
16. There will be a wide variation among end-item programs
in the dates at which the Services complete the equipment and
modernization of approved active forces and get a start on the ac-
cumulation of a minimum level of war reserves. A review of major
Army, Navy and Air Force programs leads to the following conclu-
sions, based on the assumptions that there are no further slippages
in production schedules, that adequate funds, materials, and faci-
lities are available, that prices remain stable, and that Korean
operations will cease in the very near future:
2. For the ARMY:
(1) The units, with minor exceptions, and the
personnel strength to support these units, as increased
since December 14, 1950, have been activated and are now
in being and by June 30, 1952 - as to initial equipment -
will be fully equipped and substantially but not fully
modernized.
(2) Troop facilities will be sufficient by June 30,
1952 to support these forces, but will be inadequate
to support mobilization and deployment of forces to
certain overseas areas.
(3) Present estimates indicate that under the as-
sumptions stated above, the Army can, in the event of
global war, sustain combat operations at the planned
level early in the calendar year 1953. On the other
hand, if all the foregoing conditions are met, except
that with reference to the Korean operations, the con-
tinuance of those operations until the end of calendar
year 1951 will delay Army readiness for global war until late
late in calendar year 1953.
b. For the NAVY:
The build-up toward total personnel and combat
units is proceeding substantially on schedule. The ap-
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proved end FY 1952 active forces will be in place and
operational by July 1, 1952. However, modernization of
equipment of the active forces and the accumulation of
a minimum level of war reserves will not be completed
in all caaes until calendar years 1953 and 1954, with
dates varying widely for individual items.
For Naval Aviation combat forces, the degree of
modernization that would be achieved with funds now re-
quested, in accordance with the Munitions Board "Combined
Aircraft Working Schedule" (A-14) is as follows:
Percent to be
equipped with
Date equipped
late model by
Percent to be
with late model
December 31, 1953
equipped with
(if funds are
(with funds now
late model by
available)
requested)
June 30, 1952
Fighters (VF)
1 June 1954
77.3%
29.5%
Attack (VA)
1 Aug 1954
73.9%*
79.0%*
Carrier Anti-
Submarine (vs) 1 Apr 1954
85.8%
69.0%
Patrol Anti-
Submarine (VP) 1 Dec 1953
96.3%**
31.1%
Helicopters (HS) 1 Dec 1953
91.1%***
10.6%
* Conversion to turbo-jet model between June 30, 1952 and December
31, 1953 accounts for decrease in percent modernization at the
later date.
** While funds for 100% had been requested by the Navy, a reduction
of 45 VP planes was made by the Bureau of the Budget. If the
funds for these planes were provided, 100% completion could be
reached by December 1, 1953.
***Subsequent to the presentation of the budget, the HS program
was increased. As of December 31, 1953, the funds now requested
cover the % indicated. If additional money were made available,
100% could be reached by December 1. This amounts to less than
20 HS and envisages an increased production rate.
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A delivery after December 1953 of the remainder of
the aircraft required to modernize the active forces and one-
third of the Organized Reserve Units is contingent upon
decision to finance the remainder of the program. This
decision was deferred during the FY 1952 budgetary review
process until October-November 1951.
Full accomplishment of the presently approved ships
conversion and construction program will extend into calendar
year 1954 as originally scheduled, in view of the inevitable
long lead time of items of this nature. Current progress as
judged by preliminary schedules indicates an average slippage
of about three months. Thus those portions of these programs
scheduled for completion in the fourth quarter of FY 1952 will
be completed in the first quarter of FY 1953. With complete
budgetary and controlled material support it is expected that
those portions of the programs scheduled for 1953 and 1954 can
be completed as planned.
C. For the AIR FORCE:
The 95-Wing Program will be substantially in being
by June 30, 1952, although at that time the initial require-
ments of certain types of equipment will not be fully supplied
with what are presently considered first-line aircraft. It is
impossible to set one date by which all Air Force units of
any strength can be completely modernized since improved
versions of various aircraft models come into production at
different dates. The following are the dates by which all
95 wings of the Air Force's current program will be "modern-
ized" in the sense of being substantially 100% equipped with
late model aircraft; most of the wings will be capable of
fulfilling their missions well in advance of those dates:
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Percentage to be
Equipped with
Date Equipped with
Late Model by
Aircraft Type
Late Model
June 30, 1952
Heavy Bomber
June 1953
72%
*Medium Bomber
September 1953
52%
**Tanker for Medium Bombers
June 1954
20%
Light Bomber
September 1953
31%
Fighter Bomber
March 1953
62%
Fighter Interceptor
December 1952
77%
Troop Carrier and MATS
September 1953
46%
***Trainers
December 1952
62%
* Acceleration of B-47 production above that in the A-14 schedule
is a resultant of Air Force action since June 1, 1951.
** In interim B-29 Tankers will be used to make up any deficit.
***Advanced Multi-Engine-February 1954.
Eleven of the twenty-seven Air National Guard wings,
programmed for modernization, will be equipped with modern
aircraft by March 1953.
The combat reserve aircraft in the relatively small
numbers included in this program will be available by December
1953 except for the medium bomber portion, which will be
available in calendar year 1954.
17. For certain segments of the munitions program, it was
never contemplated that the target dates established in the NSC 68
Series would be met. In the case of aircraft, it was always re-
cognized that, in view of the necessity of organizing a whole new
group of industries, it would be physically impossible to meet the
mid-1952 target dates for the large number of aircraft of the
specified types involved. This is also true of certain long lead
time items for both the Army and Navy. For many other end-items,
including segments of the tank-automotive program, the attainment
of the required volume of production by mid-1952 was never scheduled
since this would be incompatible with establishment of a broad
mobilization base by the same date.
18. However, output has fallen below estimated production
for many important end-items. This condition is accounted for by
a number of factors:
8. The shortage of machine tools has been a major
factor in the inability of all three Services to reach desired
production objectives. The necessary expansion of tool
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facilities has not been proceeding at a sufficiently rapid
rate. Recent action by the Office of Defense Mobilization
to remove price and material bottlenecks should improve this
situation.
b. Design delays and changes and engineering diffi-
culties as, for example, in the aircraft and electronics
field, have contributed to "slippage." Steps already taken
by the Air Force to restrict design changes to a minimum
should improve this situation in the aircraft field.
c. Although there has been no over-all shortage in
basic materials for particular items, lead times have
measurably increased due to difficulties in the effective
distribution of critical materials to munitions production.
The imposition of Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) should im-
prove this situation as noted hereafter.
d. Additional factors accounting for "slippage" in
recent months are set forth in Annex 1.
19. Substantial improvements in these problem areas will re-
quire, in addition to the specific solutions mentioned above, the
concerted effort of all agencies involved, backed by strong public
support engendered by a sense of national urgency that has hereto-
fore been lacking, and backed by timely and adequate financing.
20. In general, the military services met their military per-
sonnel objectives for June 30, 1951 and expect to meet the target
for June 30, 1952. The military strength on June 30, 1951 was
3,252,000. Due to the extremely limited mobilization base of the
Air Force with respect to housing and troop facilities, it has
been necessary to control very carefully the personnel input.
Inadequate troop housing and a drop in voluntary recruiting during
April and May necessitated readjustment in the manning program
which, in turn, resulted in a deficient FY 1951 end strength
amounting to approximately 62,000 (7%). Providing funds contained
in the Public Works Bill now before Congress and necessary con-
struction materials are made available without undue delay, this
deficiency can be made up and the manning objective of 1,061,000
can be attained by June 30, 1952.
21. The approved FY 1952 military strengths are listed below.
They are subject to revision to meet increased force requirements
and, as a result, the status of the manpower pool may change.
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Army
1,550,000
Navy
805,000
Marine Corps
204,029
Air Force
1,061,000
TOTAL
3,620,029
[Army figures exclude West Point cadets;
Navy figures exclude officer candidates.7
This will require a gross input of 1,554,000 men during the year,
of this number the significant elements are 376,000 to build up
to authorized strength and about 400,000 to provide for the release
of Reserve and National Guard personnel now on active duty.
413,000 of the total input will be through induction.
22. The manpower pool, adjusted for the changes made by the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, is estimated
as 850,000 on July 1, 1951. Gains to the pool are expected to be
549,000 with losses of 838,000 through enlistment, induction and
recall of reserves. The pool at the end of FY 1952 is therefore
estimated as 561,000. The status of the manpower pool, under ex-
table: isting selective service legislation, is shown by the following
Status of Manpower Pool at Beginning of Each Fiscal Year
to Support Military Force of 3.6 million
Entering Position
Conservative Estimate
Optimistic Estimate
1952
850,000
1953
950,000
561,000
1954
661,000
414,000
1955
514,000
384,000
1956
484,000
273,000
373,000
Note: The Director of Selective Service recommends that the
minimum level of the Selective Service Pool be fixed
at 300,000. The Department of Defense believes this
figure is too high.
23. The command facilities now on hand and which will be pro-
vided by the Public Works Bill now before Congress are sufficient
only through FY 1952 for the military strengths planned for
July 1, 1952, but are inadequate for mobilization and deployment
of forces to certain overseas areas.
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The Mobilization Program
24. The application of the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP)
to the distribution of steel, copper and aluminum, in place of the
priorities system in effect up to June 30, 1951, should assure to
the munitions production and facilities programs the materials
needed. For CMP to succeed the greatest care must be taken to avoid
excessive issuance of CMP authorizations, especially for materials
for non-military production and construction projects, and par-
ticularly to limit drastically the use of overriding directives.
This is a matter of the utmost importance. In addition, and of
equal importance, the initial military programs must be assured the
necessary civilian-type components (so-called "B products"). In
certain cases, however, it 1s becoming evident that difficulties will
be encountered in maintaining both a large defense program and high
levels of civilian output. A notable case is copper, where the
supply is considerably less than was expected a year ago. Under
these circumstances it has been necessary to reduce automobile pro-
duction, for example, for the fourth quarter of 1951 to 60% of
the first half of 1950 in order to provide the copper required for
defense. A number of alloying metals important to the defense pro-
gram have been placed under full allocation. The operation of
CMP, placing as it does a high premium on proper production sched-
uling, is expected to ease considerably the tight supply situation
in component parts and materials not directly included in the plan.
25. The cutback in the amount of materials permitted in the
production of passenger cars has brought, in the Detroit area, the
first significant unemployment directly traceable to the mobiliza-
tion program. As in the case of other areas where cutbacks in
civilian production may be necessary, defense contracts may be
expected to ease the transition.
26. The essential controls for stabilization of the economy
have been set up, and together with high levels of civilian pro-
duction have reversed, at least temporarily, the inflation which
accompanied the early stages of mobilization. Many of the controls,
dating, as some do, from last September, are based on substantially
higher security programs, and further substantial slippages in these
programs may warrant a review of some elements of the program. For
the intelligent management of the mobilization program it is im-
portant that FY 1952 production schedules be made fully realistic
immediately and that firm schedules for 1953 be available as soon
as possible.
27. To deal with the longer run problems of stabilization and
materials supply, there is being developed an industrial expansion
program of very large proportions. Present plans call, during the
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next two or three years, for a 100% increase over existing capa-
city in primary aluminum capacity, a 13% increase in steel capa-
city, a 14% increase in petroleum supply and an ambitious program
for locating and developing domestic sources of a wide variety of
materials. Attendant increases in transportation and electric power
and other areas of the economy are also under way in order to sup-
port higher levels of defense production without cutting back to
emergency levels of civilian goods production. Many of these pro-
jects, however, require the same scarce materials and components
as needed in munitions production and generally in consumers durable
goods output, with defense output having first call on resources.
The speed with which these expansion projects can be carried forward
will be determined largely by the speed with which munitions output
rises and the degree to which it is felt practicable to reduce
civilian output in this period.
28. Even less than when the original NSC 68 programs were
prepared is there reason for concern that the economy cannot, with-
out serious hardship, carry a load of the magnitude represented by
these programs. In general, the economy has responded well to the
stimulus of the defense program. Additions to the labor force have
been greater than hoped for and over-all production is higher than
expected. Considerable ingenuity in the use of substitute materials
has already been evidenced. Particularly in view of the additional
aluminum and steel capacity expected to be available next year, there
can be no doubt of the ability of the economy to support a level of
military production somewhat higher than that projected in the
NSC 68 programs together with civilian consumption levels comparable
with those prevailing in the period 1947-1949.
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Foreign Military and Economic Assistance
29. No development in the world situation is considered to
have diminished the importance or urgency of completing the
foreign economic and military assistance programs by the target
dates outlined in Annex 2 of NSC 68/3.
a. With respect to the European NAT countries, the
Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) continues to be the basis for
programming military and related economic assistance.
b. Prompt and adequate measures need to be taken to
arrest the general deterioration of the situation in the Near
East, particularly in Iran, the Arab States and Israel.
c. In the Far East the United States aid programs to-
gether with the struggle against aggression in Korea have
played an important part in stemming the tide of Russian-
inspired subversion and conquest; but much remains to be done
and it is too early to predict that the favorable develop-
ments will continue.
30. United States end-item assistance already programmed
through FY 1952 to meet requirements of the MTDP totals about
$10 billion and is related primarily to the unit equipment re-
quirements for forces to be available by July 1, 1952.
a. Deliveries of equipment, for many reasons, have
been slow but are now accelerating; and deliveries of Army
equipment financed with FY 1950 and 1951 appropriations,
are expected to be completed by June 1952.
b. The FY 1952 program includes about $1.0 billion
to meet the military equipment requirements of the non-
NATO countries. Deliveries to these countries, with the
exception of Indochina, are slow due to the shortage of
materiel in relation to global commitments.
c. In FY 1951, $1.23 billion of direct economic aid
was allotted to the European NATO countries, while their
military efforts totaled $6.0 billion dollars; and for
FY 1952, $.86 billion of direct economic aid has been re-
quested to be used primarily to support a $9.0 billion mili-
tary effort by the European NATO countries. About $712
million is proposed to be furnished in FY 1952 to other
European countries, including Yugoslavia, which are not
members of NATO.
d. Other economic aid programs for the non-European
countries total about $600 million in FY 1952; and the
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major portion of these funds will be directly applied to
strengthening the capabilities of these countries to resist
internal and external aggression.
31. The primary difficulties being encountered in completing
programs includes:
a. Insufficient political cohesion and resoluteness
on the part of many governments to take the necessary measures
constitutes a serious barrier to realizing in full the ob-
jectives of our economic and military assistance programs.
In Europe, these factors are reflected in the caution with
which defense expenditures are being undertaken; while in
many non-European countries, they enfeeble efforts to im-
prove the internal security situation and to execute programs
of economic improvement.
b. In continental Europe, a significant difficulty in
completing the MTDP in successive annual installments arises
from the inadequacy of the efforts of these countries to
increase their military equipment production. Munitions
production capacity is available; but financing is not
available in sufficient amounts. The ISAC considers this
problem one of the most urgent facing it.
C. The volume and rate of military equipment deliveries
from the United States have been below expectations and still
further below the level of essential requirements. As a
result, the incentives to raise the forces on schedule are
being weakened. Recently established targets, however,
call for deliveries of the FY 1952 program by December 31,
1952, with the exception of certain aircraft and other
items requiring long periods of production. The ability to
hold these delivery schedules depends greatly on the trend
of defense production in the United States and on the
absence of new competing requirements of higher priority.
d. In the non-European areas, shortages of United
States trained personnel, as well as export goods, are be-
coming accomplishment. acute and are inhibiting the rate of program
32. As to adequacy and timing of our foreign military
and economic assistance programs, the judgments which emerge from
a preliminary re-examination of present objectives and programs of
United States foreign economic and military assistance, initially
outlined in NSC 68/4 and Annex 2 of NSC 68/3, indicate that:
a. The central issue concerns the position which the
United States should take toward the accomplishment by the
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target date of the North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense
Plan.
(1) Recent study by the United States of the cost
of the MTDP indicates that the plan, if carried out as
scheduled, together with non-NATO military costs of the
European NATO countries, would involve a total cost over
the four years from mid-1950 to mid-1954 of approximately
$72 billion, divided into $40 billion of major materiel
requirements and $32 billion of other costs. These
estimates include costs of German participation and
exclude costs of United States and Canadian troops that
would be included in the MTDP forces under Joint Chiefs
of Staff plans These recent estimates show a signifi-
cantly higher cost than did the study contained in
NSC 68/3.
(2) Total United States assistance for FY 1953
and 1954, even if provided at the annual rate requested
of the Congress for FY 1952, would, together with any
present reasonable expectation of European defense
efforts, leave a substantial deficiency in the com-
pletion of the MTDP requirements.
(3) If the over-riding objective is the military
build-up of the size and by the dates contained in the
MTDP, the United States should be prepared to furnish
assistance after FY 1952 in an amount whose outside
limit can now be estimated at about $25 billion. Until
the re-examination of the MTDP, now under way, has pro-
ceeded further no estimate can be given of the extent
to which adjustments and economies in that plan may
reduce the size of the deficiency. To the extent that
adjustments in the military plan permit cost reductions
or extended target periods, this amount can be less; to
the extent that European morale and political cohesion
improve, it may also be less. Nevertheless, it is
probable that United States assistance will be required
during FY 1953 and 1954 at an average annual rate greater
than that requested of the Congress for FY 1952 if the
program is to be substantially accomplished on schedule.
Moreover, the bulk of the funds should be obligated
during FY 1953 in order to permit the necessary flow of
deliveries in 1953 and 1954. Therefore, the funds re-
quired to be obligated by the end of FY 1953 would be
substantially larger than the appropriations requested
for FY 1952.
b. Little scope is available either for significant
reductions in the magnitude or for postponing the target dates
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of our aid programs to the non-European countries. Economic
and military assistance requirements for the non-European
countries, while substantial in the aggregate, approach the
minimums in terms of both magnitude and timing which are
needed to arrest deterioration in the situation, particularly
in the Near East, and, in the cases of Asia and the Pacific,
and Latin America, to lay a firm base on which more far
reaching development and increased military strength can be
built in the near future. Particularly for the Near East
and Asia regions, United States assistance requirements
should not be delayed as to timing.
The Civil Defense Program
33. The civil defense program should contribute to a
reasonable assurance that, in the event of war, the United States
would survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment
of its objectives. Civil defense programs are designed to serve
to minimize casualties in the event of attack, to provide emergency
relief immediately after attack, and to help preserve the pro-
ductive core of the nation. The basic responsibility for civil
defense is local, resting with the States and their local sub-
divisions. The present civil defense program is a State-Federal
program in which the Federal Civil Defense Administration develops
plans and programs for the guidance and assistance of the States.
34. Present plans which will be implemented during the
Fiscal year 1952, if funds are available, procide for the develop-
ment of Federal stockpiles of supplies and equipment and a system
of warehouses for the storage of such reserve stocks; the pro-
curement of organizational equipment in financial collaboration
with the States; and the development of a national attack warning
and communications system. Studies are being made of types of
shelters, traffic control, public attitudes and the need for
shelters and other protected facilities in critical target areas.
35. The Federal Civil Defense Administration has in
operation its Washington, D. C. office, eight of its thirteen
regional offices, its Staff College and one of its three training
schools. Almost all States have civil defense legislation, and
funds provided by State and local governments considerably exceed
Federal appropriations. Federal funds are at present made avail-
able to local governments primarily for medical supplies, and
equipment for training and education. State and local organ-
izations are in some cases in complete operation, but in most
instances, are only skeleton organizations which are being filled
in as rapidly as possible.
36. The principal difficulties involved in completing the
program are the lack of appropriations, attitudes of indifference
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toward civil defense on the part of the public whose interest often
fluctuates in accordance with military successes and reverses.
Subject to substantial financial support by the Congress, the
Civil Defense program can be well under way by June 30, 1952, but
it will not be complete nor adequate.
Stockpiling
37. The ultimate targets for the stockpile program
originally established on December 8, 1950 have not been sub-
stantially modified. Attainment of those objectives by June 30,
1954 or earlier for most items is still the objective, but it
was commodities. always recognized that this date was not feasible for many
38. However, since December 1950 the intermediate targets
set for mid-1951 and mid-1952 have been revised downwards for many
commodities for which current military and civilian requirements
are in excess of the supply. For most of the more important
materials, deliveries during FY 1951 were not adequate to meet
the lower targets for that date and in most of these instances the
deliveries now scheduled for FY 1952 will not be sufficient to
make up the difference.
39. The $1.8 billion in supplemental FY 1951 funds recom-
mended on December 8 have been appropriated but the $1.0 billion
in new funds recommended for FY 1952 has been reduced to $.6
billion in the request to the Congress. This may well be adequate
in view of the materials shortages for current production to be
expected over the next year or more. The total cost of the pro-
gram remains about $4.1 billion of new authority, which was
estimated to be required as of December 8, with recent increases
in prices about offsetting minor target reductions.
40. As of June 30, 1951 all funds available as of December 8
had been obligated but $.8 billion of these had not been spent.
Only $.9 billion of the $1.8 billion supplemental for 1951 have
been obligated and none has been spent.
The Information Program
41. The purpose of the information program is to bring home
to the peoples of the world the psychological implications of
the cold war in such a way that we will benefit and the Kremlin
will suffer. This is done through a variety of media and methods.
The Department of State has for a number of years had facilities
designed to accomplish this task. Annex 5 of NSC 68/3 set forth
an information program which called for increases over the
"Campaign of Truth" program (approved by the Congress and the
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President in the summer of 1950). Annex 5 provided for an in-
creased number of broadcast hours and languages in the Voice of
America, and additional booklets, leaflets, magazines, pictures,
press releases, information centers, exchange of persons,
documentary films, intelligence research facilities, etc. The
most important change was the acceleration of the ring program
to assure its completion within a two year period (rather than
five years) by providing all the financial requirements in FY 1951.
This was a radio ring of 14 one-megawatt (1 million watts) medium-
wave transmitters to be established overseas for greater penetra-
tion of Iron Curtain countries and areas of the sub-Asian con-
tinent, supported by 5 one-megawatt short-wave transmitters in
the United States.
42. This expanded program set forth in Annex 5 has fallen
seriously short of what was planned. The principal shortcomings
are the failure to provide for (a) the completion of the ring of
radio transmitters; (b) additional personnel and facilities for
information centers in certain critical areas; (c) exchange of
additional persons and (d) discreet support of indigenous
activities.
43. Due to the refusal of Congress to appropriate funds there
has been an indefinite postponement of the completion of the radio
ring. This and other difficulties can be said to stem directly
from lack of sufficient understanding, on the part of the American
people and their representatives, of the significant role an
adequate information program can and must play in the defense of
the United States.
44. The current program is inadequate on two scores: (a)
the United States has less time to prepare its defenses than was
thought a year ago, and (b) the United States has lost time in
expanding its efforts, particularly in acquiring the radio ring.
To compensate for this, appropriations previously recommended
should be made with an increase of 15% in the appropriations for
radio facilities so that the radio ring can be more rapidly
constructed.
45. Funds presently available make it necessary to postpone
target dates. It is recommended that sufficient funds be sought
to permit advancing target dates. The program can operate at
maximum effectiveness in approximately 24 months from the date
adequate funds are made available.
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Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities
46. The Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies
represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee have taken
and are taking action directed toward the improvement and inten-
sification of foreign intelligence and related activities. For
reasons of security, the specific programs undertaken and con-
templated and their budgetary requirements are not set forth here.
It has been determined, however, that even the substantially
increased budgets required are inconsiderable in relation to the
grand total of the other programs described in NSC 68/4.
47. Since September 1950 there has been substantial pro-
gress in the development of cooperation and coordination among
the several intelligence agencies through the active utilization
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a means to that end.
Although detailed problems remain to be solved, an effective
system of coordination has been established and that aspect of
the program may be said to have been completed.
48. An intensification of intelligence and related activi-
ties, to the extent feasible with the means available, has also
been accomplished. Further progress depends on the augmentation
of personnel and facilities. The projected expansion of CIA
pleted. and the departmental agencies is, in general, about half com-
49. All intelligence agencies have experienced difficulty
in finding and recruiting properly qualified personnel. Only
the intelligence organization of the Department of State has had
notable difficulty in obtaining adequate budgetary provision for
personnel expansion. Lack of adequate and suitable office space
has hindered development responsive to NSC 68.
50. Present programs for the improvement and intensifica-
tion of intelligence and related activities are deemed to be the
most practicable in the circumstances. Their substantial com-
pletion by mid-1952 is anticipated.
The Internal Security Program
51. Although new problems are arising continuously in this
field, the present basic internal security program is virtually
identical with the accelerated program which was recommended by
the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) and
the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and which
was adopted by the National Security Council (NSC 68/4). While
the fundamental elements applicable to the internal security pro-
gram of the ICIS and the IIC are of a continuing nature, ex-
tensive progress relating thereto has already been made by both
Committees. This progress has been manifested by the initiation
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of additional needed measures in areas relating to such problems
as the provision of a more adequate legal basis for insuring
the internal security, the coordination of internal security
planning with plans for the military and civil defense of the
United States, the increase in domestic intelligence and counter
intelligence coverage in the internal security field, the ex-
panding of investigative, prosecutive and related programs
designed to neutralize the activities of individuals and groups
who constitute potential and actual dangers to the nation's
security, the preparation of appropriate measures for industrial
and port security, the protection of classified information as
well as certain types of nonclassified strategic information, the
establishment of preventive measures relating to defense against
unconventional attack, the establishment of entry and exit safe-
guards, etc.
52. There has been almost unqualified cooperation by the
various departments and agencies in support of ICIS-IIC activi-
ties. At present IIC is encountering no major difficulties and
none is anticipated by that Committee, if funds are approved
with which to provide the essential manpower and supplies for its
program. In the case of ICIS, however, several of the programs
and projects advocated by that Committee have met with the ob-
stacle of lack of funds, and it is contemplated that, as further
planning progresses in this body similar obstacles of a monetary
nature may be encountered.
53. The accelerated internal security program previously
recommended is considered adequate. The threat to the internal
security of the United States from communism has not changed
since this program was prepared and it is anticipated that the
threat will continue even if hostilities in Korea are brought
to a successful conclusion. With respect to timing, the entire
program is an immediate one both from the standpoint of measures
currently being employed and those which are earmarked for im-
plementation only in the event of hostilities. Both require
urgent attention on a current basis. Since the ICIS-IIC program
is considered to be urgent and immediate the target date for
readiness is now and not in the future. Accordingly no target
date modification is recommended and as a consequence the Com-
mittees are continuing to impart a sense of urgency to their
deliberations in their efforts to more adequately assure the
internal security of the nation.
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PART III
CONCLUSIONS
54. Review of the world situation shows that the danger to
the national security of the United States posed by the USSR is
greater now than was anticipated during the development of the
NSC 68/4 programs. It now appears that the United States and its
allies are already in a period of acute danger which will continue
until they achieve a position of strength adequate to support the
objectives defined in NSC 68.
55. Review of the status of current United States programs
for national security indicates that, while there is variation
among the several programs, the target dates for the NSC 68/4
programs generally will not be met at the present pace and scale
of effort. Of importance is the current estimate that although
United States Armed Forces will reach the approved active force
and personnel levels by June 30, 1952, they will not by that date
achieve, particularly with respect to critical, hard-to-get, and
long-lead time items of military equipment, the total materiel
position contemplated in NSC 68/4, or in some cases the FY 1952
procurement objectives evolved therefrom. Moreover, without a
great increase of pace and scale of political, economic and
military effort on the part of all NAT members, including the
United States, the July 1954 goals of the NATO Medium Term Defense
Plan will not be met. Finally, the information program and pre-
parations for civil defense are not advancing as rapidly as
necessary.
56. It is vital to our national security that the objectives
of the NSC 68/4 programs be achieved at the earliest practicable
date. It is apparent that some important elements of these pro-
grams cannot be completed by the target dates set in NSC 68/4
under any circumstances. On the other hand, the current estimates
of completion dates for many of the elements of these programs,
assuming the present pace and scale of effort, are inadequate to
the needs of our national security. Substantial advancement of
currently projected completion dates can and must be accomplished.
57. It is not now possible to state the desirability of re-
affirming or modifying the approved target dates for readiness
under presently approved programs. In any event, however, the
gravity of the world situation now demands that as much of all
programs essential to national readiness as is practicable be
accomplished by or before the approved target dates for the
NSC 68/4 programs.
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58. Pending further recommendations in the report to the
President by the National Security Council due on October 1, 1951,
responsible departments and agencies should be directed to in-
crease their efforts to meet the target dates for their presently
approved programs, and, with particular respect to the program
for the production of military equipment, to accelerate presently
planned rates for critical, hard-to-get, and long lead time items,
in order to advance currently projected completion dates as far
as feasible toward the target date of June 30, 1952, and to review
for each item the problem of achieving accelerated production
while at the same time securing an adequate mobilization base.
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APPENDIX A
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CHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION SINCE THE COMPLETION OF NSC 68/4
PART ONE: THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET BLOC
1. Objectives. The U.S.S.R. has given no indication that its
objectives have changed since April 1950. Indeed all available
evidence leads to the conclusion that the Soviet rulers are as con-
vinced as ever of the basic correctness of their policy and are
still intent upon unyielding pursuit of the following goals:
a. The eventual establishment of a Communist world dom-
inated by the U.S.S.R. This basic objective, in addition to
traditional Marxian "world revolution motivation, probably
arises from a Kremlin conviction that the vital interests of
the U.S.S.R. can be assured over the long run only by the eli-
mination of all governments it cannot control. This conviction
is probably based in turn on a Kremlin belief that peaceful
coexistence of the U.S.S.R. and its empire, on the one hand,
and the U.S. and its allies, on the other, is impossible
and that an armed conflict between them is eventually in-
evitable.
b. As essential steps toward realization of this basic
objective, the Soviet rulers in the current situation appear
to be seeking to:
(1) Maintain an advanced state of war-readiness
and offset any increase in the capabilities of the U.S.
and its allies.
(2) Prevent the development of any threat to the
vital interests of the U.S.S.R. or to Soviet control of
the satellites;
(3) Expand the territorial limits of the Soviet
orbit;
(4) Undermine and secure control of governments
not yet under Soviet domination;
(5) Divide the U.S. from its allies and cause
the countries of the free world generally to deny their
resources, including strategic sites, to the U.S.
C. Developments since April 1950 and growing in part out
of the Korean war have apparently caused the Soviet rulers to
place primary emphasis in their foreign policy on those of the
above immediate aims that relate to preventing Western (notably)
West German and Japanese) rearmament and implementation of the
U.S. overseas bases policy.
APPENDIX A
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2. Military capabilities. The U.S.S.R. since April 1950 has
substantially improved the capability of its military forces in
being. It has brought Soviet and satellite military units to an
advanced state of battle readiness and has so deployed them in
advance positions that they could, in any critical area of continen-
tal Europe or Asia, move virtually without further mobilization
and concentration and without additional logistical, organizational,
and training preparations; it has accelerated the modernization of
the Soviet armed forces--including the conversion of the air force
to jets, the construction and extension of airfields in the U.S.S.R.
and the satellites, and the extension of its radar net within both
the U.S.S.R. proper and the satellites; and it has taken further
important steps toward placing the Soviet and satellite economies
on a war footing. Military forces of the European satellites, in-
cluding East Germany, have been increased from 671,000 in the spring
of 1950 to 947,000 at present, and substantial progress has been
made toward Sovietizing them in weapons, organization and training.
Present Soviet military capabilities are estimated as follows:
a. The Soviet and satellite armed forces retain the
capability of overrunning continental Europe and the Near and
Middle East (except India and Pakistan) within a relatively
short period. Both military and non-military stocks, with
the possible exception of aviation fuel, are in sufficient
quantity and so distributed as generally to permit sustained
military operations during that period even though U.S. atomic
capabilities were fully exercised against strategic targets in
the U.S.S.R.
b. In the Far East, North Korea and Chinese Communist
forces, with Soviet logistical and technical support, have
demonstrated a military capability greater than had been
previously estimated. In the event of general war, it would
not be in the over-all security interests of the United States
to commit our forces to the defense of the mainland of Asia.
Communist forces must therefore be credited with the ability
to overrun East and Southeast Asia, and threaten the security
of the off-shore island defense line.
c. The U.S.S.R. does not now have, and, even if it should
seize the Eurasian continent and the U.K., would be unlikely
to secure adequate naval forces and sufficient shipping to
permit sphere. it to mount 8. successful invasion of the Western Hemi-
d. The Soviet Air Force continues capable of providing
adequate tactical support to all ground campaigns which the
U.S.S.R. might launch against continental Europe and the Near
and Middle East (except India and Pakistan) and simultaneously
of attempting a strategic air offensive against the United
Kingdom and the North American continent.
APPENDIX A
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e. Soviet atomic capabilities have increased roughly at
the rate anticipated in April 1950, but are expected to in-
crease more rapidly in the next three years than was pre-
viously estimated. These capabilities, while substantial,
remain inferior to those of the U.S. It is impossible, however,
to estimate with assurance the Kremlin's conclusion with re-
gard to the relative effectiveness of the Soviet and U.S.
atomic warfare capabilities or with regard to the relative
importance of atomic and conventional weapons in determining
the issue of a future general war.
3. Economic capabilities. The U.S.S.R. has not succeeded
since April 1950 in reducing the overwhelming economic superiority
of the West. At the conclusion of the recently completed Fourth
Five-Year Plan, total Soviet-satellite industrial capacity remained
approximately one-fourth that of the NATO powers. Moreover, the
trend during the past year indicates that in the short run at least
the existing gap will widen. However, the U.S.S.R. has continued
and even extended measures that enable it to translate its own and
satellite economic resources into military power in being. In con-
sequence, Soviet strength, at least for immediate military purposes,
continues largely unaffected by the economic inferiority of the
U.S.S.R. and the satellites.
4. Psychological capabilities. Although developments since
April 1950, particularly those related to Korea, may have served
to weaken somewhat the impact of Moscow's propaganda on free peoples,
Soviet capabilities for psychological warfare--both offensive and
defensive--have not been materially reduced. The combination of the
Soviet propaganda apparatus with the world-wide network of local
Communist parties and front societies continues to give the Soviet
Union an organizational advantage for its propaganda efforts. Soviet
control of all informational media within the U.S.S.R. and Soviet
jamming of foreign broadcasts gives the Kremlin a near monopoly in
moulding the thinking of the Soviet peoples on international affairs.
By alternating "war scare" techniques and appeals to the universal
longing for peace, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrably produced during the
past year disruptive effects on Western efforts to deal collectively
with basic security problems. Domestically, a new trend has appeared
in the Soviet anti-American campaign. This trend has been marked
by charges (1) that the U.S. has moved from preparation of aggression
to acts of aggression, and (2) the U.S. has committed "unforgive-
able" crimes against the Russian people and plans to repeat these
crimes. These charges have been principally pegged on accounts of
alleged U.S. atrocities in Korea and on the U.S. "intervention cam-
paign" against Russia of 1918-20. The effect of this new develop-
ment is obviously to increase the psychological preparation of the
Soviet people for possible war.
APPENDIX A
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5. Internal stability of the Soviet regime. Evidence received
since April 1950 indicates that tensions continue within the U.S.S.R.
Moreover, developments with regard to a collective farm merger pro-
gram suggest that the regime may be encountering unusual peasant
opposition. However, the Kremlin, through utilization of police
state techniques, appears capable of successfully suppressing any
difficulties that may arise. It must be concluded, therefore, that
the regime will continue in power and will not be compelled to modify
any of its external policies because of internal pressures.
6. Stability of and degree of Soviet control over European
satellite regimes. It is apparent that since April 1950 stresses
and strains have developed in the European satellites. These are
principally economic in nature, but appear to have some political
potentialities, particularly as regards increasing anti-Russian
sentiment. The difficulties seem to result from the combined im-
pact of the military preparedness effort, Western trade restrictions,
over-ambitious industrialization programs, and agrarian problems.
There are no indications that the difficulties are sufficiently
serious to jeopardize the Communist regimes, to reduce the firm
grip of Soviet control over these regimes, or to prevent them from
undertaking any action demanded by the Kremlin. The military capa-
bilities and the general war readiness of the European satellites
have substantially increased since April 1950, the rate of increase
being in fact greater than was estimated at that time.
7. Stability and degree of control over Far Eastern satellites.
a. Since April 1950 the Kremlin has been able to
secure large-scale military action furthering its own interests
from its satellite regime in North Korea and from the Chinese
communists. During the Korean war the size of the Chinese
communist military establishment has been increased. However,
deployment to Korea and Manchuria of major portions of their
best forces, increased internal police requirements, and the
logistic strain of the Korean war have reduced present Chinese
communist capabilities for additional external military opera-
tions.
b. While the Korean war has not yet posed a critical
threat to the economic stability of the Chinese communist
regime, the war has subjected and will continue to subject the
regime to increasingly serious economic difficulties. These
difficulties are almost certain to increase during the next
year if Western trade restrictions are rigorously applied.
C. The Korean war has increased the dependence of the
Chinese Communists on the U.S.S.R., but apparently has not
materially changed Sino-Soviet relations. There are areas of
conflicting interests which make rumors of mutual dissatis-
faction plausible, but we have no firm evidence to substantiate
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these rumors. The Korean war has placed strains upon the
internal political, military and economic position of the
Chinese communist regime. While these strains have not yet
become critical, they might well become so if the war were pro-
longed. Whatever may have been the economic and internal poli-
tical consequences suffered by the Chinese as a result of
taking such military action, there is as yet no firm indication
that the Chinese communist regime has been jeopardized or that
Soviet influence over the regime has been reduced.
8. Threat of the U.S.S.R. to U.S. security. The Soviet rulers
since April 1950 have shown through their actions in Korea a greater
willingness to assume risks in the pursuit of their objectives than
was estimated at that time. Moreover, the Soviet rulers have re-
vealed during the same period intense sensitivity over efforts of
the West to strengthen its military position and have increasingly
resorted to threats over the consequences likely to ensue from
continuation of these efforts. The threat to U.S. security posed by
Soviet policies and capabilities appears therefore, to have increased
since April 1950.
a. The Kremlin has since April 1950 stepped up its drive
to destroy the freedom of the Western world through political
warfare and has given every indication that it will further
intensify this drive in the future. For example, with the
immediate objective of dividing the Western powers, undermining
U.S. mobilization, obstructing the NATO program and frus-
trating prospective German and Japanese rearmament and with
the ultimate objective of paralyzing opposition to communism,
the Kremlin may adopt the tactic of encouraging the West to
hope for a settlement of outstanding issues by mutual agree-
ment, without, however, intending to surrender any present
element of Soviet strength or abandoning its objective. The
Kremlin will continue to press its "peace" campaign, to exploit
the fear of war in Europe, to raise hopes of German unification,
and to use the communist parties of France and Italy in an
attempt to confound the political situation and obstruct
effective government. Similerly, wherever in the world non-
communist governments are weak, as in Iran, Indochina, and
Burma, the Kremlin will continue efforts to strengthen the
communist position and, if favorable situations develop, will
support communist coups.
b. The Kremlin through its action in Korea has made
clear that there is a continuing possibility that it may sup-
plement political attack by the employment of satellite military
forces to secure local objectives. In such cases the U.S.S.R.
would give technical and logistic support to the satellite
forces involved. If necessary, Soviet "volunteers" might be
provided. In addition, it must be considered a continuing
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possibility that where no satellite forces are available, as
in Iran, Soviet forces themselves will be employed for local
purposes. Any such aggression would involve risk of general
war developing or of the West suffering losses that would
undermine its power position.
C. There continues a possibility that the U.S.S.R. may at
any time deliberately resort to general war against the U.S.
It appears that the most important immediate objective of the
Kremlin is to divide the West and to halt Western, West German,
and Japanese rearmament. If the Kremlin should fail to make
sufficient progress toward that end by methods short of general
war and if in addition it should become convinced that its
superiority in conventional forces was about to be offset, the
Kremlin would seriously consider resort to war. It is apparent
that for some time U.S., NATO, West German, and Japanese re-
armament is unlikely to progress to the point where the Kremlin
would need to regard it as an immediate threat to Soviet vital
interests. However, in evaluating the prospect of the Kremlin's
actually resorting to war, recognition must be given to (1) the
fact that Soviet forces are in an advanced state of war-readi-
ness and could initiate general war at any time with little or
no warning, and (2) the possibility that the Kremlin might at
any time misinterpret Western defensive measures as an ef-
fective threat to the vital interests of the U.S.S.R.
d. There continues a possibility of general war developing
at almost any moment from an action or series of actions not
intended to produce that result. The Kremlin might, for
example, miscalculate the degree of risk involved in a particu-
lar action or underestimate the cumulative effect of several
actions. Or, it might regard a particular local action as so
necessary or so advantageous as to warrant assuming even a
serious risk of general war. In any event, the international
situation is so tense that some issue might develop to a point
beyond control.
e. Particularly is it possible that the Korean situation
will get out of hand. If the conflict in Korea continues, or
is renewed after a cease fire, the U.S.S.R. will probably con-
tinue to aid the Communist forces in ways which the Kremlin
estimates would not involve serious danger of a break between
the U.S.S.R. and U.S./UN. If, however, the communist forces in
Korea were threatened with decisive defeat, the Kremlin would
probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the
introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the
employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto
local war between the U.S./UN and the U.S.S.R. would exist, At
every stage the Kremlin would probably endeavor to keep open the
possibility of ending the Korean conflict by political negotia-
tion if the global interests of the U.S.S.R. would be served
by disengagement in Korea.
APPENDIX A
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PART TWO: THE POSITION OF THE FREE WORLD
1. Western Europe
a. Military Effort. As is the case in the United States,
the provision of military equipment presents the major problem
in raising the effective strength in being of the Western
European countries. MDAP deliveries have been slower than was
anticipated. As of April 30, 1951, only 53% of the material
programmed in fiscal 1950 and 2% of that programmed in fiscal
1951 had been shipped to port. The personnel strengths of
the NATO countries have shown some increases due to lengthened
conscription periods and increases in military budgets.
National defense expenditures of the European NATO countries,
based on budgetary allocations, have increased approximately
35 percent (from 5.3 billion dollars in the calendar year 1950
to an estimated 8.2 billion in 1951). However, the rate of
expansion has not been as extensive as was desired or hoped
for by the United States.
b. Internal Economic Conditions. The speed-up in West-
ern rearmament programs has required the European countries to
expand the proportion of their increasing total output which
is directed to military purposes and to augment their total
budgetary expenditures. At the same time, it has raised the
prices and put pressure on the supplies of the raw materials
that Western Europe must import. It further appears that the
reduction in living standards associated with the speed-up of
European rearmament programs will be rather inequitably dis-
tributed through mounting inflationary pressures. Although
these economic problems have raised obstacles to developing
and maintaining popular support for European rearmament pro-
grams, they have not critically affected the political or
economic strength and stability of Western Europe.
c. Internal Political Strength. Popular communist
strength increased in recent Italian municipal elections and
remained formidable in the French national elections and some
strength also accrued to extreme right-wing groups in both
elections. The extreme Right is, at the same time, becoming
more powerful in West Germany, where it derives support from
large refugee elements, whose plight presents a continuing
problem. On balance, it can be said that the process of
political polarization has continued in Western Europe since
April 1950, but has not seriously affected such leadership as
the present center political groups have been able to provide
in the major countries of this area. Continuation of this
trend toward polarization would have an adverse effect on
the internal strength and stability of such countries.
d. Political Cohesion. The U.S. leadership and U.N.
solidarity shown in the initial Western reaction to the in-
vasion of the Republic of Korea stimulated anti-communist
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morale in Western Europe. Faith in U.S. leadership was sub-
sequently somewhat shaken by the pressure for a more aggressive
policy in Korea that developed in this country but has probably
been restored by the recent full public explanation of the
U.S. policy in the Far East and by the negotiations for an
armistice. Progress has been made in carrying forward the
NATO program. The U.K. and France also displayed an ability
to stand against Soviet pressures at the Paris Deputies'
meeting. Some progress has, in addition, been made in imple-
menting policies which would eventually render West Germany
an equal, independent, and willing ally of the West. On
balance, therefore, it can probably be said that the cohesion
of Western Europe as an element in the world wide anti-Kremlin
front has been strengthened since April 1950.
2. Africa and the Near East
As against the situation in April 1950, the Western position
in the Near East has, except in Greece and Turkey, deteriorated.
The problems arising from Israeli-Arab hostility, colonial-Western
antagonism, and backward economic conditions have not approached
solution and have in some cases grown more critical. The readiness
of the Near Eastern countries, once again excluding Greece and
Turkey, to accept Western leadership is even less in evidence than
was the case in the spring of 1950.
a. The Arab Near East. Tensions between Israel and the
Arab states have, ii anything, heightened over the past 15
months, and anti-Western sentiment among the Arabs has solidi-
fied. British relations with Egypt, which involve among other
things the issue of traffic through the Suez Canal, have
worsened substantially, as have prospects for stability in
Egypt. As an aftermath of developments in Iran, the British
and American position in other oil concession countries,
notably in Iraq, is more vulnerable to nationalist attack. In
general, pro-Western political forces in the entire Arab area
have lost ground since the spring of 1950.
b. Greece and Turkev. The passage of time since April
1950 has brought some accretion of strength in Greece and
Turkey. In both countries, military forces have had an addi-
tional period of training and have absorbed additional U.S.
equipment. Turkey has demonstrated an impressive degree of
political maturity under its new government and political
instability in Greece is certainly no more an upsetting
factor than it was at the earlier date.
c. Iran. The present crisis in Iran threatens the free
world with the loss of a large quantity of oil products, the
U.K. with the loss of substantial revenues, and Iran with
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political anarchy and a possible Communist assumption of power.
d. Morocco. The French show no signs of abating their
opposition to the nationalist movement in Morocco or of trying
to forestall it by timely concessions; nor have French re-
pressive measures been successful in reducing the amount of
native support accorded the nationalist movement. It must thus
be said that the continued confrontation of colonial and na-
tionalist forces in Morocco has, since April 1950, worsened
the prospects for political stability in this strategic area.
3. South Asia and the Far East.
a. India's foreign policy, as unfolded in connection
with the Korean war and related issues, is further removed
from that of the West than was the case in April 1950. More
importantly, the position of the Congress Party in India has
been weakened by a strengthening of both leftist and rightist
elements.
Tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has in-
creased to the point where actual hostilities threaten the
entire subcontinent. The obscure dispute between Afghanistan
and Pakistan is as far from being settled as ever and, because
of Pakistan's suspicions that India is acting in support of
Afghanistan, it further contributes to the unsettled political
situation in South Asia.
b. The prospects of the present moderate government in
Burma appear, on the whole, less favorable than in April 1950.
The Chinese communists are extending, and have the capability
of increasing military aid to communist insurgent forces.
Should these forces succeed in allying themselves to other
rebel groups in Burma, the position of the government might
become untenable, at least in the absence of greatly increased
external military aid.
c. In Malaya, the Philippines, and Indo China, the in-
ternal struggles that were underway in April 1950 are continu-
ing. In the Philippines, the government has been somewhat
more effective lately in its anti-Huk operations, but has
made no appreciable progress in coping with the basic and, if
anything, worsening economic problems of the Islands. In
Malaya, the relative positions of the government and guerrilla
forces remain approximately the same. This in itself may be
taken as a deterioration in the position of the government,
which has expended large resources in an effort to repress a
military movement whose indefinite continuation would eventu-
ally pose a threat to British rule. In Indo China, after the
initial improvement in the French position associated with
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the change of military command, the struggle is once more
apparently stalemated. If increased Chinese Communist inter-
vention should materialize after an end of hostilities in
Korea, it could tip the present precarious military balance of
power in this area against the French.
d. In Korea, the hostilities beginning in June 1950 have
ravaged and disorganized the country. The Republic of Korea
will need considerable U.S. economic and military aid if even
part of the war damage is to be rehabilitated, if political
stability is to be maintained, and if the ROK is eventually
to be rendered capable of defending itself against future
subversion or attack by North Korea.
e. Japan. Progress has been made toward a peace settle-
ment with Japan without U.S.S.R. or Chinese communist parti-
cipation, and with a continuation of U.S. military protection.
A basis for Japanese rearmament is thus being provided,
although Japanese will and ability to solve the political and
economic problems involved in rearmament have yet to be demo-
strated.
4. Latin American Republics.
In spite of read justments occasioned by increased rearmament of
the U.S. and Western Europe, the economic position of Latin America
has considerably improved since April 1950. Political stability of
the area has in general remained unchanged. With respect to the
East-West struggle, the Latin American countries have, with a few
exceptions, notably Guatemala, evinced greater willingness to colla-
borate with the U.S. and the U.N. in the fields of economic and
political warfare as well as in matters of military preparedness.
APPENDIX A
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NSC m3g #99 #
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"ocrText": "for SEGREE\nSEPART\nThe President NLT(PSF/NSC)\n1013\nNSC 114/1\nCOPY NO. 1\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nPRESIDENT\nBY THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nSTATUS AND TIMING OF CURRENT\nU.S. PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\nDECLASSIFIED\nAugust 8, 1951\nNSC LIST 2.15.19\nBy NLT-NCHARS, Date 4-13-79\nWASHINGTON\nTOD RECRET\nPUT SECHET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 114/1\nTOP SECRET\nAugust 8, 1951\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nSTATUS AND TIMING OF CURRENT\nU. S. PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\nReferences: A. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject,\n\"United States Objectives and Programs for\nNational Security\", dated July 12, 1951\nB. NSC 68 Series\nC. NSC 114 and Annexes to NSC 114\nD. NSC Actions Nos. 487-a and 518\nE. Three Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated July 31, 1951\nF. Memo for all holders of NSC 114 and Annexes to\nNSC 114 from Executive Secretary, dated\nJuly 31, 1951\nG. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same\nsubject, dated August 6, 1951\nAt the 99th meeting, with the President presiding,\nthe National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the\nDeputy Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director\nof Defense Mobilization, the Economic Cooperation Administrator,\nthe Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director, Bureau of\nthe Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers consid-\nered a draft report on the subject (Reference G) and adopted it\nsubject to corrections in paragraph 18 a and paragraph 55 proposed\nby the Department of Defense. The report, as corrected and adopted\nis contained in the enclosure.\nAlso enclosed for information in this connection is\nAppendix A, \"Changes in the World Situation Since the Completion of\nNSC 68/4. Eight related annexes, prepared by the respective de-\npartments and agencies indicated in each annex, are being circu-\nlated under separate cover for information in connection with the\nenclosed report.\nThe National Security Council, the Secretary of the\nTreasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the\nDirector of Defense Mobilization, the Economic Cooperation Adminis-\ntrator, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director,\nBureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Adviser\nsubmit the enclosed preliminary report to the President for his\nconsideration with the recommendation that he note it and the\nNSC 114/1\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nannexes thereto as indicative of the status of the present programs,\napprove the \"Conclusions\" contained in Part III of the report, and\ndirect their implementation by all appropriate executive departments\nand agencies of the United States Government.\nJAMES S. LAY, JR.\nExecutive Secretary\ncc: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Attorney General\nThe Secretary of Commerce\nThe Director of Defense Mobilization\nThe Economic Cooperation Administrator\nThe Federal Civil Defense Administrator\nThe Director, Bureau of the Budget\nThe Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers\nNSC 114/1\nTOP SECRET\nToΓ SECRET\nPRELIMINARY REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nSTATUS AND TIMING OF CURRENT U. S.\nPROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\nPART I -- CHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION\nSINCE THE COMPLETION OF NSC 68\n1. As anticipated in NSC 68 (April 1950), the Soviet rulers\nhave continued in relentless pursuit of the Kremlin design. In\nKorea they have demonstrated a willingness to take actions which\ninvolve grave risk of precipitating global war. Such risk-taking\nappears to be closely calculated; the USSR has exercised consider-\nable care and restraint to avoid open and direct involvement. Never-\ntheless, the Kremlin's willingness to accept such risk has been\ngreater than was foreseen in NSC 68.\n2. Since April, 1950 the USSR has intensified its deliberate\nand systematic campaign to prepare the Russian people psycholo-\ngically for possible war with the United States. A similar campaign\nis being carried out in the European satellites and China.\n3. The USSR is militarily substantially stronger than it was\nin April, 1950. Furthermore, the increase in military strength-in-\nbeing of the Eastern European satellites since April, 1950 has been\nlarge, and alone probably offsets the increases which have been\nachieved in Western Europe. The Chinese communist regime has con-\nsiderable military capabilities at its disposal, has undertaken\nmilitary action in the Soviet interest, and thus far, at least, has\nmade progress in consolidating its control in China. Evidence\nfrom various sources during the past year shows that Soviet military\nproduction is of high quality--and of higher quality than had pre-\nviously been estimated. The ability of the USSR to develop large\nmilitary capabilities where none existed a few years ago, as in\nNorth Korea, has been shown in the Korean war and this has re-\nquired a revision of earlier judgments regarding satellite military\npotentials. On all these counts, NSC 68 presented a prospect which\nwas more favorable for the United States than now appears to have\nbeen warranted.\n4. Nothing has occurred within the Soviet empire which re-\nquires a revision of earlier judgments that the regime is capable\nof maintaining its control over the Russian people and its satel-\nlites.\n5. Notably in Korea, and elsewhere as in Iran and the Balkans\nsituations have developed which could more easily issue in general\nwar by accident or miscalculation than was foreseen fifteen months\n-ago.\nNSC 114/1\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n6. As anticipated in NSC 68, the Kremlin regards most serious-\nly the prospect of United States and Western rearmament generally.\nIt is highly sensitive to German and Japanese rearmament and the\nestablishment of American bases overseas. Its principal immediate\npurpose is to frustrate these programs. Its presently indicated\ncourse of action to that end is to exploit all opportunities to\nsplit the Western Allies, particularly the United States and the\nUnited Kingdom, and to conduct a specious peace campaign designed\nto exploit both fear of a new general war and reluctance to make the\nsacrifices necessary to redress the balance of power. There is a\nserious danger, which may become acute if a cease-fire in Korea is\nagreed to, that by such wiles the USSR may yet lull the free world\ninto a false sense of security, with adverse effect upon both its\nmilitary posture and its political cohesion. If, however, the\nUnited States demonstrates determination and progress in meeting its\ncommitments to build the strength of the free world to the level at\nwhich it can deter or defeat Soviet aggression, and if Soviet con-\nciliation is seen to present no real assurances of peace and se-\ncurity, it is likely that the alignment of the West can be main-\ntained and its strength further developed.\n7. If and when it becomes apparent to the Kremlin that the\nWestern alliance and projected rearmament cannot be disrupted and\nfrustrated by political and psychological means, the danger of\nSoviet preventive action will become acute.\n8. The free world has made important progress in organizing\nitself to meet the Soviet threat. UN action to counter Communist\naggression in Korea, the development of NATO, progress with respect\nto the Schuman and Pleven plans, the successful conference of\nAmerican foreign ministers, progress on the Japanese peace treaty\nand on Pacific security arrangements, all indicate in some degree\na developing cohesion and awareness of common peril. This progress\nis impressive in relation to normal expectation, but has been slow\nand unsatisfying in relation to the abnormal exigencies of the\nsituation. The United States and its allies have moved less rapidly\nthan envisaged in NSC 68/4 toward exploiting their vastly superior\neconomic potential to improve their over-all power position vis-a-vis\nthe Soviet system. NATO planning has yet to be translated into\neffective military strength in being. Tangible support for the UN\ncause in Korea has left much to be desired. In general, Far Eastern\nissues have tended to divide the free world. Moreover, the situa-\ntion in Iran and the Arab states has deteriorated beyond all ex-\npectation.\n9. The level of military production in the United States is\nnot currently meeting the military readiness targets indicated in\nNSC 68/4, which moved forward the military readiness level contem-\nplated for July 1, 1954, to July 1, 1952. The detailed materiel\nprograms developed subsequent to the approval of force levels on\nNSC 114/1\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nDecember 14, 1950, were finally approved when the military budget\nfor FY 1952 was approved on April 19, 1951. In the interim, how-\never, available funds were used to expand the production base and\nto get long lead time items into production on an expanded basis.\nThe flow of military assistance to allied countries has lagged be-\nhind the targets contemplated in NSC 68/4, in part because of the\nmateriel requirements needed to support United Nations forces in\nKorea. The level of military production in Western Europe has been\ninadequate to support the objectives of our economic and military\nassistance programs. In the earlier phases of our build-up, the\noutput of military equipment has been a more serious limitation on\nthe building of military strength than the first drafts upon our\nmanpower resources. The limitation on the availability of mili-\ntary equipment stems from such as the following: the recent date\nof final approval of the detailed materiel programs; the practical\nproblem of reducing long lead time required for military equipment\nsuch as tanks, aircraft, ships, tactical radio, motorized equipment,\nand heavy construction items; delay in administrative actions which\ncould have made tools and facilities available at an earlier date;\norganizational problems in production facilities; the decision to\nexpand the production base and concurrently to secure delivery of\nend items; as well as a psychological situation less favorable than\nthat existing at the time of adoption of NSC 68/4.\n10. The estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities contained in\nNSC 68 have been revised upwards. It is now estimated that the\nUSSR will have in mid-1953 the atomic stockpile formerly estimated\nfor mid-1954. The date when a surprise attack on the United States\nmight yield decisive results is correspondingly advanced.\n11. Although a thorough examination of the subject is not now\navailable, the strength-in-being of the United States and its\nallies has probably increased in absolute terms less than that of\nthe Soviet system since April 1950. The mobilization effort of the\nUnited States and its allies has brought them closer to the actuali-\nzation of their potential than in April 1950. The date at which\nthis mobilization effort will enable them to achieve the capability\nof supporting the objectives outlined in NSC 68 is still some time\noff, certainly later than was expected when the NSC 68/4 programs\nwere developed. The question of comparative capabilities and the\nrates of increase in capabilities is of such importance that a\ncareful assessment should be obtained as rapidly as possible.\n12. Review of the world situation shows that the danger to\nour security is greater now than it was in April 1950. It is\ngreater now than it was then thought it would now be. Fifteen\nmonths ago 1954 was regarded as the time of maximum danger. It now\nappears that we are already in a period of acute danger which will\ncontinue until the United States and its allies achieve an adequate\nposition of strength.\nNSC 114/1\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nCTOP SECRET\nPART II CURRENT PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\nThe Military Program\n13. The military program contained in the enclosure to a\nMemorandum for the National Security Council from the Executive\nSecretary, subject, \"United States Objectives and Programs for\nNational Security, dated December 14, 1950, with certain augmen-\ntations is the present target program. This program is set out in\ndetail in Annex No. 1. This program is explicit with respect to\nmilitary personnel strength and units; it is not explicit with re-\nspect to materiel objectives, outlining them broadly by implication\nin terms of active forces, tasks to be supported, and establishment\nof a mobilization base capable of rapid expansion. The Department\nof Defense FY 1952 procurement objective was evolved for the pur-\npose of defining the materiel and mobilization base objectives and\nwas finally approved by the President on April 19, 1951. This ob-\njective was to have on hand by June 30, 1952, or as soon thereafter\nas they could be produced, sufficient major end-items of material\nto meet the following requirements:\nE. Training consumption through FY 1952 and Korean\ncombat consumption through December 31, 1951.\nb. Full modern equipment for the active forces.\nc. Necessary training equipment for civilian components\nup to 50% of the amount authorized the active forces. This\nwill be partly modern type equipment except that 11 wings of\nthe Air National Guard and 50 Naval Air Reserve Squadrons are\nto have all modern aircraft.\nd. Except for aircraft, stock levels and war reserves\nequal to from 3½ to 6 months (dependent upon the item) combat\nconsumption of the augmented forces to be in combat one year\nafter the start of an \"all out\" war together with 6 months\ntraining requirements of all units to be mobilized and in\ntraining by that date.\nIt is also planned that in the production of equipment\naccording to the above criteria, production capacity will be es-\ntablished sufficient to be readily expanded, if necessary, to sup-\nport combat operations and mobilization requirements if hostilities\nshould break out on a total basis on or after June 30, 1952.\nThe Department of Defense program further contemplates\nthat, subject to further changes in force levels, the procurement\nprogram after FY 1952 shall be sufficient to complete any of the\nabove objectives which could not be completed by that date due to\nNSC 114/1\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nlimitation of productive capacity, and, where the above objectives\nhave been attained, further procurement for war reserves and con-\ntinued peacetime usage will be at the minimum level necessary to\nkeep such expanded capacity in operation and available for rapid\nexpansion to mobilization requirement. It is further contemplated\nthat in carrying out the production program maximum utilization\nwill be made of machine tool reserves without replacement.\n14. The military personnel strength and units fixed on\nDecember 14, 1950, have been increased as shown in Annex 1. These\nstrength and unit targets as thus increased will be met by June 30,\n1952.\n15. a. At the time of approval of NSC 68/4 on December 14,\n1950, it was recognized that the requirements for war re-\nserves of certain long lead time materiel and equipment,\noriginally contemplated for delivery by June 30, 1954, could\nnot be attained by June 30, 1952. Furthermore, the sharp\nincreases in the production program as a whole, which would\nhave been involved in meeting the specific materiel objectives\nimplied by the interim force goals set in NSC 68/4 as subse-\nquently increased, would have led to a peaking of production\nacross the board followed by a sharp curtailment of the pro-\nduction flow. After consideration of these opposing factors\nand of production limitations, procurement objectives for the\ninitial accumulation of war reserves were fixed on April 19,\n1951. In order best to achieve the production objective\nthe Department of Defense is currently reviewing planned pro-\nduction schedules in line with the President's statement of\nApril 27, 1951. This review is under way with a target date\nfor completion of September 1951.\nb. As to requirements for an adequate base of command\nfacilities (e.g., training and communications facilities,\ntroop housing, etc.) for mobilization, no specific objectives\nto be reached by June 30, 1952 were established on December 14,\n1950. While such requirements could have been met by June 30,\n1952, it was decided that the rate of their establishment\nshould be in phase with the remainder of the military program.\nSpecific objectives for military construction were set on\nApril 19, 1951, to accommodate the forces to be raised and\nequipped by June 30, 1952. Provided the appropriations re-\nquested to cover these objectives are made available by\nCongress in time, and if the required structural steel is\nfurnished, these construction objectives will be met on\nJune 30, 1952. Subject to adequate and timely funding, com-\nmand facilities to launch a full mobilization could be created\nin the period of approximately 12 months.\nNSC 114/1\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nc. As to the requirement for reserve productive capacity\nthe Department of Defense FY 1952 procurement objective sets\nforth a general statement of the policy to be followed. It\nis not possible to make any worthwhile generalization as to\nthe implementation of this policy. In the case of each type\nof end-item, the decision as to the relative importance of\nreserve production capacity, maintenance of a flow of pro-\nduction indefinitely, obtaining requirements at an early date,\nas well as many other factors, is different, and produces a\ndifferent result as to the size of the reserve production\ncapacity for that item.\n16. There will be a wide variation among end-item programs\nin the dates at which the Services complete the equipment and\nmodernization of approved active forces and get a start on the ac-\ncumulation of a minimum level of war reserves. A review of major\nArmy, Navy and Air Force programs leads to the following conclu-\nsions, based on the assumptions that there are no further slippages\nin production schedules, that adequate funds, materials, and faci-\nlities are available, that prices remain stable, and that Korean\noperations will cease in the very near future:\n2. For the ARMY:\n(1) The units, with minor exceptions, and the\npersonnel strength to support these units, as increased\nsince December 14, 1950, have been activated and are now\nin being and by June 30, 1952 - as to initial equipment -\nwill be fully equipped and substantially but not fully\nmodernized.\n(2) Troop facilities will be sufficient by June 30,\n1952 to support these forces, but will be inadequate\nto support mobilization and deployment of forces to\ncertain overseas areas.\n(3) Present estimates indicate that under the as-\nsumptions stated above, the Army can, in the event of\nglobal war, sustain combat operations at the planned\nlevel early in the calendar year 1953. On the other\nhand, if all the foregoing conditions are met, except\nthat with reference to the Korean operations, the con-\ntinuance of those operations until the end of calendar\nyear 1951 will delay Army readiness for global war until late\nlate in calendar year 1953.\nb. For the NAVY:\nThe build-up toward total personnel and combat\nunits is proceeding substantially on schedule. The ap-\nNSC 114/1\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nproved end FY 1952 active forces will be in place and\noperational by July 1, 1952. However, modernization of\nequipment of the active forces and the accumulation of\na minimum level of war reserves will not be completed\nin all caaes until calendar years 1953 and 1954, with\ndates varying widely for individual items.\nFor Naval Aviation combat forces, the degree of\nmodernization that would be achieved with funds now re-\nquested, in accordance with the Munitions Board \"Combined\nAircraft Working Schedule\" (A-14) is as follows:\nPercent to be\nequipped with\nDate equipped\nlate model by\nPercent to be\nwith late model\nDecember 31, 1953\nequipped with\n(if funds are\n(with funds now\nlate model by\navailable)\nrequested)\nJune 30, 1952\nFighters (VF)\n1 June 1954\n77.3%\n29.5%\nAttack (VA)\n1 Aug 1954\n73.9%*\n79.0%*\nCarrier Anti-\nSubmarine (vs) 1 Apr 1954\n85.8%\n69.0%\nPatrol Anti-\nSubmarine (VP) 1 Dec 1953\n96.3%**\n31.1%\nHelicopters (HS) 1 Dec 1953\n91.1%***\n10.6%\n* Conversion to turbo-jet model between June 30, 1952 and December\n31, 1953 accounts for decrease in percent modernization at the\nlater date.\n** While funds for 100% had been requested by the Navy, a reduction\nof 45 VP planes was made by the Bureau of the Budget. If the\nfunds for these planes were provided, 100% completion could be\nreached by December 1, 1953.\n***Subsequent to the presentation of the budget, the HS program\nwas increased. As of December 31, 1953, the funds now requested\ncover the % indicated. If additional money were made available,\n100% could be reached by December 1. This amounts to less than\n20 HS and envisages an increased production rate.\nNSC 114/1\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nA delivery after December 1953 of the remainder of\nthe aircraft required to modernize the active forces and one-\nthird of the Organized Reserve Units is contingent upon\ndecision to finance the remainder of the program. This\ndecision was deferred during the FY 1952 budgetary review\nprocess until October-November 1951.\nFull accomplishment of the presently approved ships\nconversion and construction program will extend into calendar\nyear 1954 as originally scheduled, in view of the inevitable\nlong lead time of items of this nature. Current progress as\njudged by preliminary schedules indicates an average slippage\nof about three months. Thus those portions of these programs\nscheduled for completion in the fourth quarter of FY 1952 will\nbe completed in the first quarter of FY 1953. With complete\nbudgetary and controlled material support it is expected that\nthose portions of the programs scheduled for 1953 and 1954 can\nbe completed as planned.\nC. For the AIR FORCE:\nThe 95-Wing Program will be substantially in being\nby June 30, 1952, although at that time the initial require-\nments of certain types of equipment will not be fully supplied\nwith what are presently considered first-line aircraft. It is\nimpossible to set one date by which all Air Force units of\nany strength can be completely modernized since improved\nversions of various aircraft models come into production at\ndifferent dates. The following are the dates by which all\n95 wings of the Air Force's current program will be \"modern-\nized\" in the sense of being substantially 100% equipped with\nlate model aircraft; most of the wings will be capable of\nfulfilling their missions well in advance of those dates:\nNSC 114/1\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nPercentage to be\nEquipped with\nDate Equipped with\nLate Model by\nAircraft Type\nLate Model\nJune 30, 1952\nHeavy Bomber\nJune 1953\n72%\n*Medium Bomber\nSeptember 1953\n52%\n**Tanker for Medium Bombers\nJune 1954\n20%\nLight Bomber\nSeptember 1953\n31%\nFighter Bomber\nMarch 1953\n62%\nFighter Interceptor\nDecember 1952\n77%\nTroop Carrier and MATS\nSeptember 1953\n46%\n***Trainers\nDecember 1952\n62%\n* Acceleration of B-47 production above that in the A-14 schedule\nis a resultant of Air Force action since June 1, 1951.\n** In interim B-29 Tankers will be used to make up any deficit.\n***Advanced Multi-Engine-February 1954.\nEleven of the twenty-seven Air National Guard wings,\nprogrammed for modernization, will be equipped with modern\naircraft by March 1953.\nThe combat reserve aircraft in the relatively small\nnumbers included in this program will be available by December\n1953 except for the medium bomber portion, which will be\navailable in calendar year 1954.\n17. For certain segments of the munitions program, it was\nnever contemplated that the target dates established in the NSC 68\nSeries would be met. In the case of aircraft, it was always re-\ncognized that, in view of the necessity of organizing a whole new\ngroup of industries, it would be physically impossible to meet the\nmid-1952 target dates for the large number of aircraft of the\nspecified types involved. This is also true of certain long lead\ntime items for both the Army and Navy. For many other end-items,\nincluding segments of the tank-automotive program, the attainment\nof the required volume of production by mid-1952 was never scheduled\nsince this would be incompatible with establishment of a broad\nmobilization base by the same date.\n18. However, output has fallen below estimated production\nfor many important end-items. This condition is accounted for by\na number of factors:\n8. The shortage of machine tools has been a major\nfactor in the inability of all three Services to reach desired\nproduction objectives. The necessary expansion of tool\nNSC 114/1\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nfacilities has not been proceeding at a sufficiently rapid\nrate. Recent action by the Office of Defense Mobilization\nto remove price and material bottlenecks should improve this\nsituation.\nb. Design delays and changes and engineering diffi-\nculties as, for example, in the aircraft and electronics\nfield, have contributed to \"slippage.\" Steps already taken\nby the Air Force to restrict design changes to a minimum\nshould improve this situation in the aircraft field.\nc. Although there has been no over-all shortage in\nbasic materials for particular items, lead times have\nmeasurably increased due to difficulties in the effective\ndistribution of critical materials to munitions production.\nThe imposition of Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) should im-\nprove this situation as noted hereafter.\nd. Additional factors accounting for \"slippage\" in\nrecent months are set forth in Annex 1.\n19. Substantial improvements in these problem areas will re-\nquire, in addition to the specific solutions mentioned above, the\nconcerted effort of all agencies involved, backed by strong public\nsupport engendered by a sense of national urgency that has hereto-\nfore been lacking, and backed by timely and adequate financing.\n20. In general, the military services met their military per-\nsonnel objectives for June 30, 1951 and expect to meet the target\nfor June 30, 1952. The military strength on June 30, 1951 was\n3,252,000. Due to the extremely limited mobilization base of the\nAir Force with respect to housing and troop facilities, it has\nbeen necessary to control very carefully the personnel input.\nInadequate troop housing and a drop in voluntary recruiting during\nApril and May necessitated readjustment in the manning program\nwhich, in turn, resulted in a deficient FY 1951 end strength\namounting to approximately 62,000 (7%). Providing funds contained\nin the Public Works Bill now before Congress and necessary con-\nstruction materials are made available without undue delay, this\ndeficiency can be made up and the manning objective of 1,061,000\ncan be attained by June 30, 1952.\n21. The approved FY 1952 military strengths are listed below.\nThey are subject to revision to meet increased force requirements\nand, as a result, the status of the manpower pool may change.\nNSC 114/1\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nArmy\n1,550,000\nNavy\n805,000\nMarine Corps\n204,029\nAir Force\n1,061,000\nTOTAL\n3,620,029\n[Army figures exclude West Point cadets;\nNavy figures exclude officer candidates.7\nThis will require a gross input of 1,554,000 men during the year,\nof this number the significant elements are 376,000 to build up\nto authorized strength and about 400,000 to provide for the release\nof Reserve and National Guard personnel now on active duty.\n413,000 of the total input will be through induction.\n22. The manpower pool, adjusted for the changes made by the\nUniversal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, is estimated\nas 850,000 on July 1, 1951. Gains to the pool are expected to be\n549,000 with losses of 838,000 through enlistment, induction and\nrecall of reserves. The pool at the end of FY 1952 is therefore\nestimated as 561,000. The status of the manpower pool, under ex-\ntable: isting selective service legislation, is shown by the following\nStatus of Manpower Pool at Beginning of Each Fiscal Year\nto Support Military Force of 3.6 million\nEntering Position\nConservative Estimate\nOptimistic Estimate\n1952\n850,000\n1953\n950,000\n561,000\n1954\n661,000\n414,000\n1955\n514,000\n384,000\n1956\n484,000\n273,000\n373,000\nNote: The Director of Selective Service recommends that the\nminimum level of the Selective Service Pool be fixed\nat 300,000. The Department of Defense believes this\nfigure is too high.\n23. The command facilities now on hand and which will be pro-\nvided by the Public Works Bill now before Congress are sufficient\nonly through FY 1952 for the military strengths planned for\nJuly 1, 1952, but are inadequate for mobilization and deployment\nof forces to certain overseas areas.\nNSC 114/1\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nThe Mobilization Program\n24. The application of the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP)\nto the distribution of steel, copper and aluminum, in place of the\npriorities system in effect up to June 30, 1951, should assure to\nthe munitions production and facilities programs the materials\nneeded. For CMP to succeed the greatest care must be taken to avoid\nexcessive issuance of CMP authorizations, especially for materials\nfor non-military production and construction projects, and par-\nticularly to limit drastically the use of overriding directives.\nThis is a matter of the utmost importance. In addition, and of\nequal importance, the initial military programs must be assured the\nnecessary civilian-type components (so-called \"B products\"). In\ncertain cases, however, it 1s becoming evident that difficulties will\nbe encountered in maintaining both a large defense program and high\nlevels of civilian output. A notable case is copper, where the\nsupply is considerably less than was expected a year ago. Under\nthese circumstances it has been necessary to reduce automobile pro-\nduction, for example, for the fourth quarter of 1951 to 60% of\nthe first half of 1950 in order to provide the copper required for\ndefense. A number of alloying metals important to the defense pro-\ngram have been placed under full allocation. The operation of\nCMP, placing as it does a high premium on proper production sched-\nuling, is expected to ease considerably the tight supply situation\nin component parts and materials not directly included in the plan.\n25. The cutback in the amount of materials permitted in the\nproduction of passenger cars has brought, in the Detroit area, the\nfirst significant unemployment directly traceable to the mobiliza-\ntion program. As in the case of other areas where cutbacks in\ncivilian production may be necessary, defense contracts may be\nexpected to ease the transition.\n26. The essential controls for stabilization of the economy\nhave been set up, and together with high levels of civilian pro-\nduction have reversed, at least temporarily, the inflation which\naccompanied the early stages of mobilization. Many of the controls,\ndating, as some do, from last September, are based on substantially\nhigher security programs, and further substantial slippages in these\nprograms may warrant a review of some elements of the program. For\nthe intelligent management of the mobilization program it is im-\nportant that FY 1952 production schedules be made fully realistic\nimmediately and that firm schedules for 1953 be available as soon\nas possible.\n27. To deal with the longer run problems of stabilization and\nmaterials supply, there is being developed an industrial expansion\nprogram of very large proportions. Present plans call, during the\nNSC 114/1\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nnext two or three years, for a 100% increase over existing capa-\ncity in primary aluminum capacity, a 13% increase in steel capa-\ncity, a 14% increase in petroleum supply and an ambitious program\nfor locating and developing domestic sources of a wide variety of\nmaterials. Attendant increases in transportation and electric power\nand other areas of the economy are also under way in order to sup-\nport higher levels of defense production without cutting back to\nemergency levels of civilian goods production. Many of these pro-\njects, however, require the same scarce materials and components\nas needed in munitions production and generally in consumers durable\ngoods output, with defense output having first call on resources.\nThe speed with which these expansion projects can be carried forward\nwill be determined largely by the speed with which munitions output\nrises and the degree to which it is felt practicable to reduce\ncivilian output in this period.\n28. Even less than when the original NSC 68 programs were\nprepared is there reason for concern that the economy cannot, with-\nout serious hardship, carry a load of the magnitude represented by\nthese programs. In general, the economy has responded well to the\nstimulus of the defense program. Additions to the labor force have\nbeen greater than hoped for and over-all production is higher than\nexpected. Considerable ingenuity in the use of substitute materials\nhas already been evidenced. Particularly in view of the additional\naluminum and steel capacity expected to be available next year, there\ncan be no doubt of the ability of the economy to support a level of\nmilitary production somewhat higher than that projected in the\nNSC 68 programs together with civilian consumption levels comparable\nwith those prevailing in the period 1947-1949.\nNSC 114/1\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nForeign Military and Economic Assistance\n29. No development in the world situation is considered to\nhave diminished the importance or urgency of completing the\nforeign economic and military assistance programs by the target\ndates outlined in Annex 2 of NSC 68/3.\na. With respect to the European NAT countries, the\nMedium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) continues to be the basis for\nprogramming military and related economic assistance.\nb. Prompt and adequate measures need to be taken to\narrest the general deterioration of the situation in the Near\nEast, particularly in Iran, the Arab States and Israel.\nc. In the Far East the United States aid programs to-\ngether with the struggle against aggression in Korea have\nplayed an important part in stemming the tide of Russian-\ninspired subversion and conquest; but much remains to be done\nand it is too early to predict that the favorable develop-\nments will continue.\n30. United States end-item assistance already programmed\nthrough FY 1952 to meet requirements of the MTDP totals about\n$10 billion and is related primarily to the unit equipment re-\nquirements for forces to be available by July 1, 1952.\na. Deliveries of equipment, for many reasons, have\nbeen slow but are now accelerating; and deliveries of Army\nequipment financed with FY 1950 and 1951 appropriations,\nare expected to be completed by June 1952.\nb. The FY 1952 program includes about $1.0 billion\nto meet the military equipment requirements of the non-\nNATO countries. Deliveries to these countries, with the\nexception of Indochina, are slow due to the shortage of\nmateriel in relation to global commitments.\nc. In FY 1951, $1.23 billion of direct economic aid\nwas allotted to the European NATO countries, while their\nmilitary efforts totaled $6.0 billion dollars; and for\nFY 1952, $.86 billion of direct economic aid has been re-\nquested to be used primarily to support a $9.0 billion mili-\ntary effort by the European NATO countries. About $712\nmillion is proposed to be furnished in FY 1952 to other\nEuropean countries, including Yugoslavia, which are not\nmembers of NATO.\nd. Other economic aid programs for the non-European\ncountries total about $600 million in FY 1952; and the\nNSC 114/1\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nmajor portion of these funds will be directly applied to\nstrengthening the capabilities of these countries to resist\ninternal and external aggression.\n31. The primary difficulties being encountered in completing\nprograms includes:\na. Insufficient political cohesion and resoluteness\non the part of many governments to take the necessary measures\nconstitutes a serious barrier to realizing in full the ob-\njectives of our economic and military assistance programs.\nIn Europe, these factors are reflected in the caution with\nwhich defense expenditures are being undertaken; while in\nmany non-European countries, they enfeeble efforts to im-\nprove the internal security situation and to execute programs\nof economic improvement.\nb. In continental Europe, a significant difficulty in\ncompleting the MTDP in successive annual installments arises\nfrom the inadequacy of the efforts of these countries to\nincrease their military equipment production. Munitions\nproduction capacity is available; but financing is not\navailable in sufficient amounts. The ISAC considers this\nproblem one of the most urgent facing it.\nC. The volume and rate of military equipment deliveries\nfrom the United States have been below expectations and still\nfurther below the level of essential requirements. As a\nresult, the incentives to raise the forces on schedule are\nbeing weakened. Recently established targets, however,\ncall for deliveries of the FY 1952 program by December 31,\n1952, with the exception of certain aircraft and other\nitems requiring long periods of production. The ability to\nhold these delivery schedules depends greatly on the trend\nof defense production in the United States and on the\nabsence of new competing requirements of higher priority.\nd. In the non-European areas, shortages of United\nStates trained personnel, as well as export goods, are be-\ncoming accomplishment. acute and are inhibiting the rate of program\n32. As to adequacy and timing of our foreign military\nand economic assistance programs, the judgments which emerge from\na preliminary re-examination of present objectives and programs of\nUnited States foreign economic and military assistance, initially\noutlined in NSC 68/4 and Annex 2 of NSC 68/3, indicate that:\na. The central issue concerns the position which the\nUnited States should take toward the accomplishment by the\nNSC 114/1\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ntarget date of the North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense\nPlan.\n(1) Recent study by the United States of the cost\nof the MTDP indicates that the plan, if carried out as\nscheduled, together with non-NATO military costs of the\nEuropean NATO countries, would involve a total cost over\nthe four years from mid-1950 to mid-1954 of approximately\n$72 billion, divided into $40 billion of major materiel\nrequirements and $32 billion of other costs. These\nestimates include costs of German participation and\nexclude costs of United States and Canadian troops that\nwould be included in the MTDP forces under Joint Chiefs\nof Staff plans These recent estimates show a signifi-\ncantly higher cost than did the study contained in\nNSC 68/3.\n(2) Total United States assistance for FY 1953\nand 1954, even if provided at the annual rate requested\nof the Congress for FY 1952, would, together with any\npresent reasonable expectation of European defense\nefforts, leave a substantial deficiency in the com-\npletion of the MTDP requirements.\n(3) If the over-riding objective is the military\nbuild-up of the size and by the dates contained in the\nMTDP, the United States should be prepared to furnish\nassistance after FY 1952 in an amount whose outside\nlimit can now be estimated at about $25 billion. Until\nthe re-examination of the MTDP, now under way, has pro-\nceeded further no estimate can be given of the extent\nto which adjustments and economies in that plan may\nreduce the size of the deficiency. To the extent that\nadjustments in the military plan permit cost reductions\nor extended target periods, this amount can be less; to\nthe extent that European morale and political cohesion\nimprove, it may also be less. Nevertheless, it is\nprobable that United States assistance will be required\nduring FY 1953 and 1954 at an average annual rate greater\nthan that requested of the Congress for FY 1952 if the\nprogram is to be substantially accomplished on schedule.\nMoreover, the bulk of the funds should be obligated\nduring FY 1953 in order to permit the necessary flow of\ndeliveries in 1953 and 1954. Therefore, the funds re-\nquired to be obligated by the end of FY 1953 would be\nsubstantially larger than the appropriations requested\nfor FY 1952.\nb. Little scope is available either for significant\nreductions in the magnitude or for postponing the target dates\nNSC 114/1\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nof our aid programs to the non-European countries. Economic\nand military assistance requirements for the non-European\ncountries, while substantial in the aggregate, approach the\nminimums in terms of both magnitude and timing which are\nneeded to arrest deterioration in the situation, particularly\nin the Near East, and, in the cases of Asia and the Pacific,\nand Latin America, to lay a firm base on which more far\nreaching development and increased military strength can be\nbuilt in the near future. Particularly for the Near East\nand Asia regions, United States assistance requirements\nshould not be delayed as to timing.\nThe Civil Defense Program\n33. The civil defense program should contribute to a\nreasonable assurance that, in the event of war, the United States\nwould survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment\nof its objectives. Civil defense programs are designed to serve\nto minimize casualties in the event of attack, to provide emergency\nrelief immediately after attack, and to help preserve the pro-\nductive core of the nation. The basic responsibility for civil\ndefense is local, resting with the States and their local sub-\ndivisions. The present civil defense program is a State-Federal\nprogram in which the Federal Civil Defense Administration develops\nplans and programs for the guidance and assistance of the States.\n34. Present plans which will be implemented during the\nFiscal year 1952, if funds are available, procide for the develop-\nment of Federal stockpiles of supplies and equipment and a system\nof warehouses for the storage of such reserve stocks; the pro-\ncurement of organizational equipment in financial collaboration\nwith the States; and the development of a national attack warning\nand communications system. Studies are being made of types of\nshelters, traffic control, public attitudes and the need for\nshelters and other protected facilities in critical target areas.\n35. The Federal Civil Defense Administration has in\noperation its Washington, D. C. office, eight of its thirteen\nregional offices, its Staff College and one of its three training\nschools. Almost all States have civil defense legislation, and\nfunds provided by State and local governments considerably exceed\nFederal appropriations. Federal funds are at present made avail-\nable to local governments primarily for medical supplies, and\nequipment for training and education. State and local organ-\nizations are in some cases in complete operation, but in most\ninstances, are only skeleton organizations which are being filled\nin as rapidly as possible.\n36. The principal difficulties involved in completing the\nprogram are the lack of appropriations, attitudes of indifference\nNSC 114/1\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ntoward civil defense on the part of the public whose interest often\nfluctuates in accordance with military successes and reverses.\nSubject to substantial financial support by the Congress, the\nCivil Defense program can be well under way by June 30, 1952, but\nit will not be complete nor adequate.\nStockpiling\n37. The ultimate targets for the stockpile program\noriginally established on December 8, 1950 have not been sub-\nstantially modified. Attainment of those objectives by June 30,\n1954 or earlier for most items is still the objective, but it\nwas commodities. always recognized that this date was not feasible for many\n38. However, since December 1950 the intermediate targets\nset for mid-1951 and mid-1952 have been revised downwards for many\ncommodities for which current military and civilian requirements\nare in excess of the supply. For most of the more important\nmaterials, deliveries during FY 1951 were not adequate to meet\nthe lower targets for that date and in most of these instances the\ndeliveries now scheduled for FY 1952 will not be sufficient to\nmake up the difference.\n39. The $1.8 billion in supplemental FY 1951 funds recom-\nmended on December 8 have been appropriated but the $1.0 billion\nin new funds recommended for FY 1952 has been reduced to $.6\nbillion in the request to the Congress. This may well be adequate\nin view of the materials shortages for current production to be\nexpected over the next year or more. The total cost of the pro-\ngram remains about $4.1 billion of new authority, which was\nestimated to be required as of December 8, with recent increases\nin prices about offsetting minor target reductions.\n40. As of June 30, 1951 all funds available as of December 8\nhad been obligated but $.8 billion of these had not been spent.\nOnly $.9 billion of the $1.8 billion supplemental for 1951 have\nbeen obligated and none has been spent.\nThe Information Program\n41. The purpose of the information program is to bring home\nto the peoples of the world the psychological implications of\nthe cold war in such a way that we will benefit and the Kremlin\nwill suffer. This is done through a variety of media and methods.\nThe Department of State has for a number of years had facilities\ndesigned to accomplish this task. Annex 5 of NSC 68/3 set forth\nan information program which called for increases over the\n\"Campaign of Truth\" program (approved by the Congress and the\nNSC 114/1\n- 18 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nPresident in the summer of 1950). Annex 5 provided for an in-\ncreased number of broadcast hours and languages in the Voice of\nAmerica, and additional booklets, leaflets, magazines, pictures,\npress releases, information centers, exchange of persons,\ndocumentary films, intelligence research facilities, etc. The\nmost important change was the acceleration of the ring program\nto assure its completion within a two year period (rather than\nfive years) by providing all the financial requirements in FY 1951.\nThis was a radio ring of 14 one-megawatt (1 million watts) medium-\nwave transmitters to be established overseas for greater penetra-\ntion of Iron Curtain countries and areas of the sub-Asian con-\ntinent, supported by 5 one-megawatt short-wave transmitters in\nthe United States.\n42. This expanded program set forth in Annex 5 has fallen\nseriously short of what was planned. The principal shortcomings\nare the failure to provide for (a) the completion of the ring of\nradio transmitters; (b) additional personnel and facilities for\ninformation centers in certain critical areas; (c) exchange of\nadditional persons and (d) discreet support of indigenous\nactivities.\n43. Due to the refusal of Congress to appropriate funds there\nhas been an indefinite postponement of the completion of the radio\nring. This and other difficulties can be said to stem directly\nfrom lack of sufficient understanding, on the part of the American\npeople and their representatives, of the significant role an\nadequate information program can and must play in the defense of\nthe United States.\n44. The current program is inadequate on two scores: (a)\nthe United States has less time to prepare its defenses than was\nthought a year ago, and (b) the United States has lost time in\nexpanding its efforts, particularly in acquiring the radio ring.\nTo compensate for this, appropriations previously recommended\nshould be made with an increase of 15% in the appropriations for\nradio facilities so that the radio ring can be more rapidly\nconstructed.\n45. Funds presently available make it necessary to postpone\ntarget dates. It is recommended that sufficient funds be sought\nto permit advancing target dates. The program can operate at\nmaximum effectiveness in approximately 24 months from the date\nadequate funds are made available.\nNSC 114/1\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nForeign Intelligence and Related Activities\n46. The Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies\nrepresented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee have taken\nand are taking action directed toward the improvement and inten-\nsification of foreign intelligence and related activities. For\nreasons of security, the specific programs undertaken and con-\ntemplated and their budgetary requirements are not set forth here.\nIt has been determined, however, that even the substantially\nincreased budgets required are inconsiderable in relation to the\ngrand total of the other programs described in NSC 68/4.\n47. Since September 1950 there has been substantial pro-\ngress in the development of cooperation and coordination among\nthe several intelligence agencies through the active utilization\nof the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a means to that end.\nAlthough detailed problems remain to be solved, an effective\nsystem of coordination has been established and that aspect of\nthe program may be said to have been completed.\n48. An intensification of intelligence and related activi-\nties, to the extent feasible with the means available, has also\nbeen accomplished. Further progress depends on the augmentation\nof personnel and facilities. The projected expansion of CIA\npleted. and the departmental agencies is, in general, about half com-\n49. All intelligence agencies have experienced difficulty\nin finding and recruiting properly qualified personnel. Only\nthe intelligence organization of the Department of State has had\nnotable difficulty in obtaining adequate budgetary provision for\npersonnel expansion. Lack of adequate and suitable office space\nhas hindered development responsive to NSC 68.\n50. Present programs for the improvement and intensifica-\ntion of intelligence and related activities are deemed to be the\nmost practicable in the circumstances. Their substantial com-\npletion by mid-1952 is anticipated.\nThe Internal Security Program\n51. Although new problems are arising continuously in this\nfield, the present basic internal security program is virtually\nidentical with the accelerated program which was recommended by\nthe Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) and\nthe Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and which\nwas adopted by the National Security Council (NSC 68/4). While\nthe fundamental elements applicable to the internal security pro-\ngram of the ICIS and the IIC are of a continuing nature, ex-\ntensive progress relating thereto has already been made by both\nCommittees. This progress has been manifested by the initiation\nNSC 114/1\n- 20 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nof additional needed measures in areas relating to such problems\nas the provision of a more adequate legal basis for insuring\nthe internal security, the coordination of internal security\nplanning with plans for the military and civil defense of the\nUnited States, the increase in domestic intelligence and counter\nintelligence coverage in the internal security field, the ex-\npanding of investigative, prosecutive and related programs\ndesigned to neutralize the activities of individuals and groups\nwho constitute potential and actual dangers to the nation's\nsecurity, the preparation of appropriate measures for industrial\nand port security, the protection of classified information as\nwell as certain types of nonclassified strategic information, the\nestablishment of preventive measures relating to defense against\nunconventional attack, the establishment of entry and exit safe-\nguards, etc.\n52. There has been almost unqualified cooperation by the\nvarious departments and agencies in support of ICIS-IIC activi-\nties. At present IIC is encountering no major difficulties and\nnone is anticipated by that Committee, if funds are approved\nwith which to provide the essential manpower and supplies for its\nprogram. In the case of ICIS, however, several of the programs\nand projects advocated by that Committee have met with the ob-\nstacle of lack of funds, and it is contemplated that, as further\nplanning progresses in this body similar obstacles of a monetary\nnature may be encountered.\n53. The accelerated internal security program previously\nrecommended is considered adequate. The threat to the internal\nsecurity of the United States from communism has not changed\nsince this program was prepared and it is anticipated that the\nthreat will continue even if hostilities in Korea are brought\nto a successful conclusion. With respect to timing, the entire\nprogram is an immediate one both from the standpoint of measures\ncurrently being employed and those which are earmarked for im-\nplementation only in the event of hostilities. Both require\nurgent attention on a current basis. Since the ICIS-IIC program\nis considered to be urgent and immediate the target date for\nreadiness is now and not in the future. Accordingly no target\ndate modification is recommended and as a consequence the Com-\nmittees are continuing to impart a sense of urgency to their\ndeliberations in their efforts to more adequately assure the\ninternal security of the nation.\nNSC 114/1\n- 21 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nPART III\nCONCLUSIONS\n54. Review of the world situation shows that the danger to\nthe national security of the United States posed by the USSR is\ngreater now than was anticipated during the development of the\nNSC 68/4 programs. It now appears that the United States and its\nallies are already in a period of acute danger which will continue\nuntil they achieve a position of strength adequate to support the\nobjectives defined in NSC 68.\n55. Review of the status of current United States programs\nfor national security indicates that, while there is variation\namong the several programs, the target dates for the NSC 68/4\nprograms generally will not be met at the present pace and scale\nof effort. Of importance is the current estimate that although\nUnited States Armed Forces will reach the approved active force\nand personnel levels by June 30, 1952, they will not by that date\nachieve, particularly with respect to critical, hard-to-get, and\nlong-lead time items of military equipment, the total materiel\nposition contemplated in NSC 68/4, or in some cases the FY 1952\nprocurement objectives evolved therefrom. Moreover, without a\ngreat increase of pace and scale of political, economic and\nmilitary effort on the part of all NAT members, including the\nUnited States, the July 1954 goals of the NATO Medium Term Defense\nPlan will not be met. Finally, the information program and pre-\nparations for civil defense are not advancing as rapidly as\nnecessary.\n56. It is vital to our national security that the objectives\nof the NSC 68/4 programs be achieved at the earliest practicable\ndate. It is apparent that some important elements of these pro-\ngrams cannot be completed by the target dates set in NSC 68/4\nunder any circumstances. On the other hand, the current estimates\nof completion dates for many of the elements of these programs,\nassuming the present pace and scale of effort, are inadequate to\nthe needs of our national security. Substantial advancement of\ncurrently projected completion dates can and must be accomplished.\n57. It is not now possible to state the desirability of re-\naffirming or modifying the approved target dates for readiness\nunder presently approved programs. In any event, however, the\ngravity of the world situation now demands that as much of all\nprograms essential to national readiness as is practicable be\naccomplished by or before the approved target dates for the\nNSC 68/4 programs.\nNSC 114/1\n- 22 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n58. Pending further recommendations in the report to the\nPresident by the National Security Council due on October 1, 1951,\nresponsible departments and agencies should be directed to in-\ncrease their efforts to meet the target dates for their presently\napproved programs, and, with particular respect to the program\nfor the production of military equipment, to accelerate presently\nplanned rates for critical, hard-to-get, and long lead time items,\nin order to advance currently projected completion dates as far\nas feasible toward the target date of June 30, 1952, and to review\nfor each item the problem of achieving accelerated production\nwhile at the same time securing an adequate mobilization base.\nNSC 114/1\n- 23 -\nTOP SECRET\nAPPENDIX A\nTOP SECRET\nCHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION SINCE THE COMPLETION OF NSC 68/4\nPART ONE: THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET BLOC\n1. Objectives. The U.S.S.R. has given no indication that its\nobjectives have changed since April 1950. Indeed all available\nevidence leads to the conclusion that the Soviet rulers are as con-\nvinced as ever of the basic correctness of their policy and are\nstill intent upon unyielding pursuit of the following goals:\na. The eventual establishment of a Communist world dom-\ninated by the U.S.S.R. This basic objective, in addition to\ntraditional Marxian \"world revolution motivation, probably\narises from a Kremlin conviction that the vital interests of\nthe U.S.S.R. can be assured over the long run only by the eli-\nmination of all governments it cannot control. This conviction\nis probably based in turn on a Kremlin belief that peaceful\ncoexistence of the U.S.S.R. and its empire, on the one hand,\nand the U.S. and its allies, on the other, is impossible\nand that an armed conflict between them is eventually in-\nevitable.\nb. As essential steps toward realization of this basic\nobjective, the Soviet rulers in the current situation appear\nto be seeking to:\n(1) Maintain an advanced state of war-readiness\nand offset any increase in the capabilities of the U.S.\nand its allies.\n(2) Prevent the development of any threat to the\nvital interests of the U.S.S.R. or to Soviet control of\nthe satellites;\n(3) Expand the territorial limits of the Soviet\norbit;\n(4) Undermine and secure control of governments\nnot yet under Soviet domination;\n(5) Divide the U.S. from its allies and cause\nthe countries of the free world generally to deny their\nresources, including strategic sites, to the U.S.\nC. Developments since April 1950 and growing in part out\nof the Korean war have apparently caused the Soviet rulers to\nplace primary emphasis in their foreign policy on those of the\nabove immediate aims that relate to preventing Western (notably)\nWest German and Japanese) rearmament and implementation of the\nU.S. overseas bases policy.\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n2. Military capabilities. The U.S.S.R. since April 1950 has\nsubstantially improved the capability of its military forces in\nbeing. It has brought Soviet and satellite military units to an\nadvanced state of battle readiness and has so deployed them in\nadvance positions that they could, in any critical area of continen-\ntal Europe or Asia, move virtually without further mobilization\nand concentration and without additional logistical, organizational,\nand training preparations; it has accelerated the modernization of\nthe Soviet armed forces--including the conversion of the air force\nto jets, the construction and extension of airfields in the U.S.S.R.\nand the satellites, and the extension of its radar net within both\nthe U.S.S.R. proper and the satellites; and it has taken further\nimportant steps toward placing the Soviet and satellite economies\non a war footing. Military forces of the European satellites, in-\ncluding East Germany, have been increased from 671,000 in the spring\nof 1950 to 947,000 at present, and substantial progress has been\nmade toward Sovietizing them in weapons, organization and training.\nPresent Soviet military capabilities are estimated as follows:\na. The Soviet and satellite armed forces retain the\ncapability of overrunning continental Europe and the Near and\nMiddle East (except India and Pakistan) within a relatively\nshort period. Both military and non-military stocks, with\nthe possible exception of aviation fuel, are in sufficient\nquantity and so distributed as generally to permit sustained\nmilitary operations during that period even though U.S. atomic\ncapabilities were fully exercised against strategic targets in\nthe U.S.S.R.\nb. In the Far East, North Korea and Chinese Communist\nforces, with Soviet logistical and technical support, have\ndemonstrated a military capability greater than had been\npreviously estimated. In the event of general war, it would\nnot be in the over-all security interests of the United States\nto commit our forces to the defense of the mainland of Asia.\nCommunist forces must therefore be credited with the ability\nto overrun East and Southeast Asia, and threaten the security\nof the off-shore island defense line.\nc. The U.S.S.R. does not now have, and, even if it should\nseize the Eurasian continent and the U.K., would be unlikely\nto secure adequate naval forces and sufficient shipping to\npermit sphere. it to mount 8. successful invasion of the Western Hemi-\nd. The Soviet Air Force continues capable of providing\nadequate tactical support to all ground campaigns which the\nU.S.S.R. might launch against continental Europe and the Near\nand Middle East (except India and Pakistan) and simultaneously\nof attempting a strategic air offensive against the United\nKingdom and the North American continent.\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nFOP SECRET\ne. Soviet atomic capabilities have increased roughly at\nthe rate anticipated in April 1950, but are expected to in-\ncrease more rapidly in the next three years than was pre-\nviously estimated. These capabilities, while substantial,\nremain inferior to those of the U.S. It is impossible, however,\nto estimate with assurance the Kremlin's conclusion with re-\ngard to the relative effectiveness of the Soviet and U.S.\natomic warfare capabilities or with regard to the relative\nimportance of atomic and conventional weapons in determining\nthe issue of a future general war.\n3. Economic capabilities. The U.S.S.R. has not succeeded\nsince April 1950 in reducing the overwhelming economic superiority\nof the West. At the conclusion of the recently completed Fourth\nFive-Year Plan, total Soviet-satellite industrial capacity remained\napproximately one-fourth that of the NATO powers. Moreover, the\ntrend during the past year indicates that in the short run at least\nthe existing gap will widen. However, the U.S.S.R. has continued\nand even extended measures that enable it to translate its own and\nsatellite economic resources into military power in being. In con-\nsequence, Soviet strength, at least for immediate military purposes,\ncontinues largely unaffected by the economic inferiority of the\nU.S.S.R. and the satellites.\n4. Psychological capabilities. Although developments since\nApril 1950, particularly those related to Korea, may have served\nto weaken somewhat the impact of Moscow's propaganda on free peoples,\nSoviet capabilities for psychological warfare--both offensive and\ndefensive--have not been materially reduced. The combination of the\nSoviet propaganda apparatus with the world-wide network of local\nCommunist parties and front societies continues to give the Soviet\nUnion an organizational advantage for its propaganda efforts. Soviet\ncontrol of all informational media within the U.S.S.R. and Soviet\njamming of foreign broadcasts gives the Kremlin a near monopoly in\nmoulding the thinking of the Soviet peoples on international affairs.\nBy alternating \"war scare\" techniques and appeals to the universal\nlonging for peace, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrably produced during the\npast year disruptive effects on Western efforts to deal collectively\nwith basic security problems. Domestically, a new trend has appeared\nin the Soviet anti-American campaign. This trend has been marked\nby charges (1) that the U.S. has moved from preparation of aggression\nto acts of aggression, and (2) the U.S. has committed \"unforgive-\nable\" crimes against the Russian people and plans to repeat these\ncrimes. These charges have been principally pegged on accounts of\nalleged U.S. atrocities in Korea and on the U.S. \"intervention cam-\npaign\" against Russia of 1918-20. The effect of this new develop-\nment is obviously to increase the psychological preparation of the\nSoviet people for possible war.\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n5. Internal stability of the Soviet regime. Evidence received\nsince April 1950 indicates that tensions continue within the U.S.S.R.\nMoreover, developments with regard to a collective farm merger pro-\ngram suggest that the regime may be encountering unusual peasant\nopposition. However, the Kremlin, through utilization of police\nstate techniques, appears capable of successfully suppressing any\ndifficulties that may arise. It must be concluded, therefore, that\nthe regime will continue in power and will not be compelled to modify\nany of its external policies because of internal pressures.\n6. Stability of and degree of Soviet control over European\nsatellite regimes. It is apparent that since April 1950 stresses\nand strains have developed in the European satellites. These are\nprincipally economic in nature, but appear to have some political\npotentialities, particularly as regards increasing anti-Russian\nsentiment. The difficulties seem to result from the combined im-\npact of the military preparedness effort, Western trade restrictions,\nover-ambitious industrialization programs, and agrarian problems.\nThere are no indications that the difficulties are sufficiently\nserious to jeopardize the Communist regimes, to reduce the firm\ngrip of Soviet control over these regimes, or to prevent them from\nundertaking any action demanded by the Kremlin. The military capa-\nbilities and the general war readiness of the European satellites\nhave substantially increased since April 1950, the rate of increase\nbeing in fact greater than was estimated at that time.\n7. Stability and degree of control over Far Eastern satellites.\na. Since April 1950 the Kremlin has been able to\nsecure large-scale military action furthering its own interests\nfrom its satellite regime in North Korea and from the Chinese\ncommunists. During the Korean war the size of the Chinese\ncommunist military establishment has been increased. However,\ndeployment to Korea and Manchuria of major portions of their\nbest forces, increased internal police requirements, and the\nlogistic strain of the Korean war have reduced present Chinese\ncommunist capabilities for additional external military opera-\ntions.\nb. While the Korean war has not yet posed a critical\nthreat to the economic stability of the Chinese communist\nregime, the war has subjected and will continue to subject the\nregime to increasingly serious economic difficulties. These\ndifficulties are almost certain to increase during the next\nyear if Western trade restrictions are rigorously applied.\nC. The Korean war has increased the dependence of the\nChinese Communists on the U.S.S.R., but apparently has not\nmaterially changed Sino-Soviet relations. There are areas of\nconflicting interests which make rumors of mutual dissatis-\nfaction plausible, but we have no firm evidence to substantiate\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthese rumors. The Korean war has placed strains upon the\ninternal political, military and economic position of the\nChinese communist regime. While these strains have not yet\nbecome critical, they might well become so if the war were pro-\nlonged. Whatever may have been the economic and internal poli-\ntical consequences suffered by the Chinese as a result of\ntaking such military action, there is as yet no firm indication\nthat the Chinese communist regime has been jeopardized or that\nSoviet influence over the regime has been reduced.\n8. Threat of the U.S.S.R. to U.S. security. The Soviet rulers\nsince April 1950 have shown through their actions in Korea a greater\nwillingness to assume risks in the pursuit of their objectives than\nwas estimated at that time. Moreover, the Soviet rulers have re-\nvealed during the same period intense sensitivity over efforts of\nthe West to strengthen its military position and have increasingly\nresorted to threats over the consequences likely to ensue from\ncontinuation of these efforts. The threat to U.S. security posed by\nSoviet policies and capabilities appears therefore, to have increased\nsince April 1950.\na. The Kremlin has since April 1950 stepped up its drive\nto destroy the freedom of the Western world through political\nwarfare and has given every indication that it will further\nintensify this drive in the future. For example, with the\nimmediate objective of dividing the Western powers, undermining\nU.S. mobilization, obstructing the NATO program and frus-\ntrating prospective German and Japanese rearmament and with\nthe ultimate objective of paralyzing opposition to communism,\nthe Kremlin may adopt the tactic of encouraging the West to\nhope for a settlement of outstanding issues by mutual agree-\nment, without, however, intending to surrender any present\nelement of Soviet strength or abandoning its objective. The\nKremlin will continue to press its \"peace\" campaign, to exploit\nthe fear of war in Europe, to raise hopes of German unification,\nand to use the communist parties of France and Italy in an\nattempt to confound the political situation and obstruct\neffective government. Similerly, wherever in the world non-\ncommunist governments are weak, as in Iran, Indochina, and\nBurma, the Kremlin will continue efforts to strengthen the\ncommunist position and, if favorable situations develop, will\nsupport communist coups.\nb. The Kremlin through its action in Korea has made\nclear that there is a continuing possibility that it may sup-\nplement political attack by the employment of satellite military\nforces to secure local objectives. In such cases the U.S.S.R.\nwould give technical and logistic support to the satellite\nforces involved. If necessary, Soviet \"volunteers\" might be\nprovided. In addition, it must be considered a continuing\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 5 --\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\npossibility that where no satellite forces are available, as\nin Iran, Soviet forces themselves will be employed for local\npurposes. Any such aggression would involve risk of general\nwar developing or of the West suffering losses that would\nundermine its power position.\nC. There continues a possibility that the U.S.S.R. may at\nany time deliberately resort to general war against the U.S.\nIt appears that the most important immediate objective of the\nKremlin is to divide the West and to halt Western, West German,\nand Japanese rearmament. If the Kremlin should fail to make\nsufficient progress toward that end by methods short of general\nwar and if in addition it should become convinced that its\nsuperiority in conventional forces was about to be offset, the\nKremlin would seriously consider resort to war. It is apparent\nthat for some time U.S., NATO, West German, and Japanese re-\narmament is unlikely to progress to the point where the Kremlin\nwould need to regard it as an immediate threat to Soviet vital\ninterests. However, in evaluating the prospect of the Kremlin's\nactually resorting to war, recognition must be given to (1) the\nfact that Soviet forces are in an advanced state of war-readi-\nness and could initiate general war at any time with little or\nno warning, and (2) the possibility that the Kremlin might at\nany time misinterpret Western defensive measures as an ef-\nfective threat to the vital interests of the U.S.S.R.\nd. There continues a possibility of general war developing\nat almost any moment from an action or series of actions not\nintended to produce that result. The Kremlin might, for\nexample, miscalculate the degree of risk involved in a particu-\nlar action or underestimate the cumulative effect of several\nactions. Or, it might regard a particular local action as so\nnecessary or so advantageous as to warrant assuming even a\nserious risk of general war. In any event, the international\nsituation is so tense that some issue might develop to a point\nbeyond control.\ne. Particularly is it possible that the Korean situation\nwill get out of hand. If the conflict in Korea continues, or\nis renewed after a cease fire, the U.S.S.R. will probably con-\ntinue to aid the Communist forces in ways which the Kremlin\nestimates would not involve serious danger of a break between\nthe U.S.S.R. and U.S./UN. If, however, the communist forces in\nKorea were threatened with decisive defeat, the Kremlin would\nprobably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the\nintroduction of \"volunteer\" forces. It might even include the\nemployment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto\nlocal war between the U.S./UN and the U.S.S.R. would exist, At\nevery stage the Kremlin would probably endeavor to keep open the\npossibility of ending the Korean conflict by political negotia-\ntion if the global interests of the U.S.S.R. would be served\nby disengagement in Korea.\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nPART TWO: THE POSITION OF THE FREE WORLD\n1. Western Europe\na. Military Effort. As is the case in the United States,\nthe provision of military equipment presents the major problem\nin raising the effective strength in being of the Western\nEuropean countries. MDAP deliveries have been slower than was\nanticipated. As of April 30, 1951, only 53% of the material\nprogrammed in fiscal 1950 and 2% of that programmed in fiscal\n1951 had been shipped to port. The personnel strengths of\nthe NATO countries have shown some increases due to lengthened\nconscription periods and increases in military budgets.\nNational defense expenditures of the European NATO countries,\nbased on budgetary allocations, have increased approximately\n35 percent (from 5.3 billion dollars in the calendar year 1950\nto an estimated 8.2 billion in 1951). However, the rate of\nexpansion has not been as extensive as was desired or hoped\nfor by the United States.\nb. Internal Economic Conditions. The speed-up in West-\nern rearmament programs has required the European countries to\nexpand the proportion of their increasing total output which\nis directed to military purposes and to augment their total\nbudgetary expenditures. At the same time, it has raised the\nprices and put pressure on the supplies of the raw materials\nthat Western Europe must import. It further appears that the\nreduction in living standards associated with the speed-up of\nEuropean rearmament programs will be rather inequitably dis-\ntributed through mounting inflationary pressures. Although\nthese economic problems have raised obstacles to developing\nand maintaining popular support for European rearmament pro-\ngrams, they have not critically affected the political or\neconomic strength and stability of Western Europe.\nc. Internal Political Strength. Popular communist\nstrength increased in recent Italian municipal elections and\nremained formidable in the French national elections and some\nstrength also accrued to extreme right-wing groups in both\nelections. The extreme Right is, at the same time, becoming\nmore powerful in West Germany, where it derives support from\nlarge refugee elements, whose plight presents a continuing\nproblem. On balance, it can be said that the process of\npolitical polarization has continued in Western Europe since\nApril 1950, but has not seriously affected such leadership as\nthe present center political groups have been able to provide\nin the major countries of this area. Continuation of this\ntrend toward polarization would have an adverse effect on\nthe internal strength and stability of such countries.\nd. Political Cohesion. The U.S. leadership and U.N.\nsolidarity shown in the initial Western reaction to the in-\nvasion of the Republic of Korea stimulated anti-communist\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n-- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nmorale in Western Europe. Faith in U.S. leadership was sub-\nsequently somewhat shaken by the pressure for a more aggressive\npolicy in Korea that developed in this country but has probably\nbeen restored by the recent full public explanation of the\nU.S. policy in the Far East and by the negotiations for an\narmistice. Progress has been made in carrying forward the\nNATO program. The U.K. and France also displayed an ability\nto stand against Soviet pressures at the Paris Deputies'\nmeeting. Some progress has, in addition, been made in imple-\nmenting policies which would eventually render West Germany\nan equal, independent, and willing ally of the West. On\nbalance, therefore, it can probably be said that the cohesion\nof Western Europe as an element in the world wide anti-Kremlin\nfront has been strengthened since April 1950.\n2. Africa and the Near East\nAs against the situation in April 1950, the Western position\nin the Near East has, except in Greece and Turkey, deteriorated.\nThe problems arising from Israeli-Arab hostility, colonial-Western\nantagonism, and backward economic conditions have not approached\nsolution and have in some cases grown more critical. The readiness\nof the Near Eastern countries, once again excluding Greece and\nTurkey, to accept Western leadership is even less in evidence than\nwas the case in the spring of 1950.\na. The Arab Near East. Tensions between Israel and the\nArab states have, ii anything, heightened over the past 15\nmonths, and anti-Western sentiment among the Arabs has solidi-\nfied. British relations with Egypt, which involve among other\nthings the issue of traffic through the Suez Canal, have\nworsened substantially, as have prospects for stability in\nEgypt. As an aftermath of developments in Iran, the British\nand American position in other oil concession countries,\nnotably in Iraq, is more vulnerable to nationalist attack. In\ngeneral, pro-Western political forces in the entire Arab area\nhave lost ground since the spring of 1950.\nb. Greece and Turkev. The passage of time since April\n1950 has brought some accretion of strength in Greece and\nTurkey. In both countries, military forces have had an addi-\ntional period of training and have absorbed additional U.S.\nequipment. Turkey has demonstrated an impressive degree of\npolitical maturity under its new government and political\ninstability in Greece is certainly no more an upsetting\nfactor than it was at the earlier date.\nc. Iran. The present crisis in Iran threatens the free\nworld with the loss of a large quantity of oil products, the\nU.K. with the loss of substantial revenues, and Iran with\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\npolitical anarchy and a possible Communist assumption of power.\nd. Morocco. The French show no signs of abating their\nopposition to the nationalist movement in Morocco or of trying\nto forestall it by timely concessions; nor have French re-\npressive measures been successful in reducing the amount of\nnative support accorded the nationalist movement. It must thus\nbe said that the continued confrontation of colonial and na-\ntionalist forces in Morocco has, since April 1950, worsened\nthe prospects for political stability in this strategic area.\n3. South Asia and the Far East.\na. India's foreign policy, as unfolded in connection\nwith the Korean war and related issues, is further removed\nfrom that of the West than was the case in April 1950. More\nimportantly, the position of the Congress Party in India has\nbeen weakened by a strengthening of both leftist and rightist\nelements.\nTension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has in-\ncreased to the point where actual hostilities threaten the\nentire subcontinent. The obscure dispute between Afghanistan\nand Pakistan is as far from being settled as ever and, because\nof Pakistan's suspicions that India is acting in support of\nAfghanistan, it further contributes to the unsettled political\nsituation in South Asia.\nb. The prospects of the present moderate government in\nBurma appear, on the whole, less favorable than in April 1950.\nThe Chinese communists are extending, and have the capability\nof increasing military aid to communist insurgent forces.\nShould these forces succeed in allying themselves to other\nrebel groups in Burma, the position of the government might\nbecome untenable, at least in the absence of greatly increased\nexternal military aid.\nc. In Malaya, the Philippines, and Indo China, the in-\nternal struggles that were underway in April 1950 are continu-\ning. In the Philippines, the government has been somewhat\nmore effective lately in its anti-Huk operations, but has\nmade no appreciable progress in coping with the basic and, if\nanything, worsening economic problems of the Islands. In\nMalaya, the relative positions of the government and guerrilla\nforces remain approximately the same. This in itself may be\ntaken as a deterioration in the position of the government,\nwhich has expended large resources in an effort to repress a\nmilitary movement whose indefinite continuation would eventu-\nally pose a threat to British rule. In Indo China, after the\ninitial improvement in the French position associated with\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe change of military command, the struggle is once more\napparently stalemated. If increased Chinese Communist inter-\nvention should materialize after an end of hostilities in\nKorea, it could tip the present precarious military balance of\npower in this area against the French.\nd. In Korea, the hostilities beginning in June 1950 have\nravaged and disorganized the country. The Republic of Korea\nwill need considerable U.S. economic and military aid if even\npart of the war damage is to be rehabilitated, if political\nstability is to be maintained, and if the ROK is eventually\nto be rendered capable of defending itself against future\nsubversion or attack by North Korea.\ne. Japan. Progress has been made toward a peace settle-\nment with Japan without U.S.S.R. or Chinese communist parti-\ncipation, and with a continuation of U.S. military protection.\nA basis for Japanese rearmament is thus being provided,\nalthough Japanese will and ability to solve the political and\neconomic problems involved in rearmament have yet to be demo-\nstrated.\n4. Latin American Republics.\nIn spite of read justments occasioned by increased rearmament of\nthe U.S. and Western Europe, the economic position of Latin America\nhas considerably improved since April 1950. Political stability of\nthe area has in general remained unchanged. With respect to the\nEast-West struggle, the Latin American countries have, with a few\nexceptions, notably Guatemala, evinced greater willingness to colla-\nborate with the U.S. and the U.N. in the fields of economic and\npolitical warfare as well as in matters of military preparedness.\nAPPENDIX A\nNSC 114/1\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nOP SECRET\nNSC m3g #99 #"
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