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    "title": "Annex to National Security Council Report 129, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Arab States and Israel",
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    "ocrText": "The President\nNLT(P5F/NSC) 1176 1176\nTOP SECRET\nANNEX TO\nNSC 129\nDESCRITT SECURITY REURMATION\nCOPY NO 1\nGREAT TRUMENT ANDA MASSA\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nUNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH\nRESPECT TO THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL\nApril 7, 1952\nDECLASSIFIED\nRAC 3-14-2012\nAuthority NLT-PSF-46-2-4\nWASHINGTON\nBy SDB NARA, Date: 5/24/13\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL\nDEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIO-\nNAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S. C., SECTION 793 AND 794, AS AMENDED. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER\nTO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nTOP SECRET\nApril 7, 1952\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nNSC STAFF STUDY\nGREAT MARA\non\nUNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO\nTHE ARAB STATES* AND ISRAEL\nPROBLEM\n1. To analyze the current situation in the Arab States\nand Israel and to determine the general courses of action for\nsafeguarding Western interests in the area.\nANALYSIS\nObjectives\n2. The objectives of the United States with respect to\nthe area comprising the Arab States and Israel are:\na. To overcome or prevent instability within\nthese countries which threatens Western interests.\nb. To prevent the extension of Soviet influence\nin the area.\nc. To insure that the resources of the area\nare available to the United States and its allies for\nuse in strengthening the free world.\nd. To strengthen the will and ability of these\ncountries to resist possible future aggression by the\nSoviet Union.\ne. To establish within the community of nations\na new relationship with the states of the area that\nrecognizes their desire to achieve status and respect\nfor their sovereign equality.\nThe Importance of the Area\n3. The area comprising the Arab States and Israel has\ngreat political and strategic importance. It lies at the\nland, sea and air crossroads of three continents, contains\n*For the purposes of this paper, the Arab States include\nEgypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\n-\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nimportant sites for Western military bases, has natural de-\nfensive barriers in its mountains and deserts, and lies close\nto Soviet centers of industry, population and oil resources.\nMore than a third of the world's known oil reserves are lo-\ncated in the Arab States alone. Continued availability of oil\nfrom these sources is of great importance in peace and war.*\n4. These strategic resources are so important to the\nover-all position of the free world that it is in the security\ninterest of the United States to take whatever appropriate\nmeasures it can, in the light of its other commitments, to\ninsure that these resources will be used for strengthening the\nfree world.\nThe Nature of the Problem\n5. Unless the Soviet rulers have decided to initiate\ngeneral war, there is little danger of direct Soviet attack\nupon the area because it is likely that the Soviet rulers\nrealize that aggressive action against the Middle East would\nprovoke general war. (In the event of general war in the next\nfew years, the task of defending the area will have to be\nborne primarily by such local forces as have been developed and\nby such U.K., Commonwealth, and Turkish forces as can be made\navailable.) Currently, therefore, the imminent threat to\nWestern interests arises not so much from the threat of direct\nSoviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-Western\nnationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism which could lead to\ndisorder and might eventually open the way for the extension\nof Soviet control and influence by means short of war. Such\nan extension of Soviet control would be an unacceptable shift\nin the world balance of power. Efforts to prevent or overcome\ninstability in the area and to reduce anti-Western nationalism\nand Arab-Israeli antagonism are therefore essential. To hold\nthe area during a continuing cold war, it will be necessary\nfor the United States to give increasing attention to the area.\n6. Settlement of the specific disputes involving Iran,\nEgypt, and the U.K. is of key importance to our efforts in\nthe region as a whole. If the dispute between Egypt and the\nU.K. can be settled, cooperation with the Arab States in the\nMiddle East Command (MEC) and in other ways would be greatly\nfacilitated and the danger that nationalism will violently\nerupt in other Arab States will be diminished. Other major\nproblems include the tensions and hostile attitudes between the\nArab States and Israel and the prevailing attitude of neutral-\nism.\n*See the NSC 97 series and related papers.\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nBasic Political Factors\n7. The Arab States are in varying degrees experiencing\ndeep and difficult changes as their relatively rigid social\nand economic institutions are compelled to adjust under the\npressure of the forces released by the introduction of Western\ntechniques and ideas, but without the stablizing political and\nreligious forces once dominant in the area. The impact of\nWestern techniques and ideas has been most notable in its\neffect upon relations between political groups in most of these\nstates. In the case of Israel, the attempt to build a modern\nstate and to absorb a large and rapid immigration has created\ninternal problems beyond the capacity of the state to manage.\nMoreover, this immigration, even though reduced in recent\nmonths, arouses fears among the Arabs that Israel will be under\nirresistible pressures to expand.\n8. At the apex of the political pyramid in the Arab States\nthere has been a small ruling group. It is drawn largely from\nland-owners and tribal leaders, admixed with a smaller and not\nentirely separate merchant and financial class. Its group in-\nterest is the preservation of the status quo. With the passage\nof time, however, this group--which has traditionally been\nsplit within itself by contests for power--has become less and\nless capable of effective leadership. The traditional ruling\ngroups are under increasing challenge in most of these coun-\ntries.\n9. Below the ruling group, as a distinctive political\nforce, are the urban dwellers: disaffected intellectuals,\nbarred from attaining status by the political monopoly of the\nruling groups; students, unhappy with their prospects and con-\ntemptuous of political leadership that does not build a strong\nand dynamic state; and the small merchants, the artisians, the\nlower and middle levels of the bureaucracy, and the urban wage-\nearners. The outstanding characteristic of this urban group is\ndissatisfaction with things as they are. The relatively rigid\nand semi-feudal organization of society does not provide op-\nportunities for the more capable and educated members of this\ngroup commensurate with the values they place on their capa-\ncities. This creates disaffection within a group some elements\nof which are at least partially fitted for leadership. Since\nmost other elements of the urban group are also in some degree\nmaladjusted to the social scheme, the materials for pressure on\nthe ruling group are readily at hand.\n10. At the base of the political pyramid in these states\nis the peasantry which forms the great majority of the popu-\nlation and which is still a largely passive element in\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nNEW\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\npolitical life. Potentially, this submerged majority offers\nan opportunity for exploitation by some kind of political\nleadership.\n11. In the changing relations between these groups--\nspecifically between the ruling and the urban groups--there\nappear the chief manifestations of political disturbance in\nseveral of these countries. Most of that disturbance focuses\non questions relating to the treatment of foreign interests.\nOn these questions, the leaders of the urban political groups\nseek a radical solution: the total elimination of visible\nforeign power. The ruling group, for its part, often finds\nit desirable to travel some distance in the same direction,\npartly because of its own unwillingness or inability to chal-\nlenge the urban groups directly on this issue. At the same\ntime, because the ruling group is aware that its domestic\nposition could be endangered if xenophobia got out of hand, it\nseeks with decreasing effectiveness to keep the situation in\ncheck at home; it desires compromises radical enough to appease\nthe urban elements but short of the outright eviction of for-\neign interests.\n12. In this internal social conflict, the urban middle\ngroup has the advantage of numbers and dynamism. Its leader-\nship is riding the wave of popular sentiment, so far as popular\nsentiment finds expression in the Arab States. If, however,\nthis leadership is catapulted into power, it must--aside from\nthe elimination of foreign interests--begin largely without a\ndoctrine or a positive political and economic program. It has\nfattened almost exclusively on its open hostility toward the\nWestern powers and Israel. Since, however, the basic strength\nof the urban political leadership comes from its command over\nforces seeking change, the necessity for improvising a program\nof social and economic change cannot be avoided for long with-\nout the risk that another leadership, with a program, will come\nto the fore. Under some circumstances, this could be communist\nleadership.\n13. Religion has important effects upon social, political\nand economic life in the area. This region is the heart of the\ngreater Islamic world stretching from Morocco to the Philip-\npines, embracing approximately 250 million Moslems, and includes\nIsrael, a holy land of three great religions. The reactions of\nthe peoples in this area to United States policy will be re-\nflected in the reactions of Jews and Moslems throughout the\nworld. The three monotheistic religions in the area have in\ncommon a repugnance to the atheism of communist doctrine and\nthis factor could become an important asset in promoting West-\nern objectives in the area.\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nEgypt\n14. These basic political factors have found their most\ntroublesome expression to date in Egypt, where the trend de-\nscribed above immediately threatens both Western interests and\nthe hold on power of moderate local groups. It is necessary\nto prevent, if possible, a further deterioration of the situ-\nation and to regain the vital elements of Western interests.\n15. In Egypt, a clear conflict exists between the\nposition of the U.K. and the demands of the political groups\nnow in power. Resolution of this conflict based on a total\nsurrender of the U.K.'s position would naturally be unaccept-\nable to the U.K. as well as to the United States. Although\na continuation of the impasse between Egypt and the U.K. might\neventually weaken the present regime in Egypt to the point\nwhere political changes would be more likely, there is no\nguarantee that these changes would bring to power, or maintain\nin power, leaders friendly to the West.\n16. The U.K.'s present policy appears to be based on\nthe hope that a continuation of the current deadlock in these\ndisputes will soon either bring the Egyptian Government to\nits senses or cause a favorable change in the composition of\nthe government. The U.S. view is that modification of\nEgyptian position is unlikely and that while a continued\ndeadlock might lead to political changes, it is doubtful that\nthese would be favorable to the West.\n17. This difference of views has made it difficult to\narrive at concerted U.S.-U.K. policies. Our purpose continues\nto be to induce the U.K. to modify its position in ways which,\nwhile maintaining basic Western interests, might make possible\nan early negotiated settlement.\n18. In the absence of such settlements, the situation may\ndeteriorate to the point where various internal groups are en-\ngaged in a struggle for power. In such circumstances, it may\nbe advisable to intervene as opportunity presents itself to\naid those groups most promising for our purpose. We should,\ntherefore, maintain the maximum flexibility in the conduct\nof our relations with these countries.\nThe U.S. and U.K. Roles in the Area\n19. In the past the U.K. has played the major role in\nthe maintenance and defense of Western interests in the area.\nHowever, the rapid decline in the last decade in the ability\nof the U.K. to maintain and defend Western interests in some\nof these countries has led the U.S. to play an increasingly\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SEC RET\nGREAT AND\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nimportant role and now creates the need for a review and\nrestatement of U.S. policy toward the area. In some countries,\nsuch as Greece, where the British have relinquished their\nformer responsibilities, the United States has assumed them.\nAlso, where the United States has major military and economic\ninterests, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, U.S. influence has\nlargely replaced the U.K. influence.\n20. The obstacles to the exercise of U.S. influence in\nthe area in the cold war period and the nature of our relations\nwith other states interested in the area render it desirable\nfor the United States to work closely with such states. Be-\ncause of the previous experience and present position of the\nBritish in the area, and because of common interests in other\nparts of the world, the United States should have an especially\nclose relationship with the British. The U.S. has already ex-\npressed, in the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, its inten-\ntion to cooperate with the British and the French in dealing\nwith certain questions affecting the peace and stability of\nthe Arab States and Israel. To the extent that the defense of\nWestern interests in the cold war requires the use of military\nforce by a Western power, it is clearly in the U.S. interest\nthat the U.K. (or other allies) provide such force.\n21. The decline of Western capabilities in the area is\na complex phenomenon and does not appear to be primarily due\nto the inadequacy of military forces in the area. On the\ncontrary, the British probably have sufficient military forces\nin the area to take any local military actions that might\nbecome necessary in the area during this period. Formerly,\nmilitary measures in the Middle East could be taken under a\nset of rules almost totally inapplicable to the changed re-\nlationship between the European states and the states of the\narea and among the latter. The emergence of the various states\ncomprising the Middle East as independent members of the world\nfamily of nations, and particularly the establishment of the\nUnited Nations as a world organization, has relegated \"gun boat\"\ndiplomacy and military tactics to the discard or at least to\na position of last resort under the exigencies of global war.\n22. It is doubtful whether the U.S. or the U.K., or both\ntogether, could maintain and defend Western interests in the\narea in the 19th century fashion. In fact, it seems clear that\nthe West must work toward the establishment of a new kind of\nrelationship with the Middle Eastern states, involving in-\ncreased recognition of the aspirations of these countries to\nstatus within the community of nations. However, Western\npower and prestige, exercised directly and through local\ngroups, will continue to be important factors in the mainten-\nance of stability within the area. There may well be occasions,\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 6 -\nTOP SEC RET\nHSW\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nas in Egypt at the present time, when the West will have to be\nprepared to use force to maintain its interests or to accept\nthe loss of these interests. Whatever the United States can\ndo to bolster both generally and locally the power and prestige\nof the U.K., will assist the U.K. in maintaining stability\nin the area and will reduce the need for direct action by the\nUnited States or other allied powers--provided that the Western\nattitude toward the area comes more and more to be regarded by\nthe states in the area as being in harmony with their basic\ninterests and that working arrangements for cooperation can be\ndeveloped.\nThe Middle East Command\n23. The MEC proposals are important not only as a means\nof developing collective strength to resist possible attack\nbut principally as a means of stimulating cooperation among the\nstates in the area and between these states and the West --\na development which should be helpful in increasing internal\nstability in the area.\n24. Despite the weakness of their military position,\nthe states of the area have learned neither the value of\nunity nor the collective strength they might attain by\nbanding together. Local rivalries divide the states, and\nthis political fragmentation militates against the devel-\nopment of regional cohesion and regional concepts. The\nArab League is a weak foundation upon which to build any\narea program, and would be weaker still if it were not held\ntogether by Arab antipathy toward Israel.\n25. The armed forces of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and\nIsrael have received some equipment from British and American\nsources and have benefitted in the past from military tutelage\nbut, in general, their standards are not comparable to Western\nones. The Arab Legion in Jordan has been well trained by the\nBritish and is of higher caliber than its Arab neighbors!\nforces. Though its strength is less than one divison, it\ndoes at least suggest what can be accomplished.\n26. Although political factors present serious obstacles\nto a coalition of forces in the near future, there is, even\nwithout coordinated action, an opportunity to build up mili-\ntary strength in individual countries and thus to enhance\ntheir internal stability as well as their powers of resistance\nto aggression. We should, therefore, attempt tostrengthen,\nin coordination with the British, French and Turks if possible,\nbut under bilateral arrangements if necessary, national armed\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 7 -\nTOP SEGRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nforces where there are sound internal reasons for so doing,\nprimarily where there are economic, communication or base\nfacilities of strategic importance.\n27. Meanwhile, we should continue our efforts to lower\nsome of the political barriers which divide the area in order\nthat these states can participate in a Middle East defense\narrangement.\n28. If handled adroitly, the MEC could be used in various\nways to deal with the problem of maintaining and defending\nWestern interests in the area:\na. The acknowledgment by the United States of its\ninterest in the security of the area together with its\nreadiness to participate in the MEC should help to over-\ncome the fear of Soviet aggression in the area, and\nthereby help to build internal strength and strengthen\nthe will of the leadership and key local groups to resist\nSoviet aggression or subversion by local communist\nelements.\nb. The association of the U. S. with the U. K. in\nthe MEC should help to demonstrate the joint interests of\nthe U. S. and U. K. and thus lead to an increase of\nBritish prestige and respect for Western power, and might\nproduce a climate favorable for efforts to settle disputes.\nC. The principles underlying the MEC should help\nto satisfy the desire for \"equal treatment\" as a factor\naffecting relations between the states in the area and\nthe Western powers.\nd. Cooperation in the MFC on problems related to\nthe defense of the area as a whole against outside aggres-\nsion should tend to increase regional cooperation and\nunderstanding in other than military matters.\ne. Where the weakness of the present governments\nis a factor contributing to instability, the MEC should\nprovide opportunities to the Western powers for bolstering\nthese governments.\nThe accomplishments which may be reached through the instru-\nmentality of the MEC lead to the conclusion that its estab-\nlishment is a worth-while objective of the free world.\n29. Moreover, although the MEC is explicitly designed\nto meet external aggression, its greatest usefulness may\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRUMANT NOT\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nactually lie in the opportunity that it provides for\nstrengthening local military forces and their ties with the\nWest, a development which should have a politically stabilizing\neffect. The political trends that can now be foreseen in the\narea are such that the major role of such forces in the near\nfuture may be to maintain non-communist governments in power\nin certain countries. The use of Western forces assigned to\nthe MEC for this purpose would be contrary to the principles\nto which we publicly subscribed in connection with the Command.\nIt should be possible to develop local forces which would be\nreliable and which would be able to deal with internal problems.\nHowever, the possibility cannot be excluded that Western forces\nmight have to be used in exceptional circumstances such as\nthose envisaged by the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950.\n30. To bolster the likelihood of success of the Middle\nEast Command every appropriate effort should be made to secure\nat least token force contributions by Australia, New Zealand,\nand South Africa, and when practicable from Pakistan.\n31. Contributions to the MEC which are expected of mem-\nber states are not specified in the quadripartite statement of\nNovember 10, 1951, but are left for future negotiations. How-\never, it is clear that leadership and guidance must come from\nthe stronger members. From a U.S. military point of view this\narea continues to be a primary responsibility of the United\nKingdom where the use of military forces to further Western\ninterests is required. The extent to which the United States\ncan commit forces in this area is inextricably interwoven with\ncurrent world-wide commitments: defense of the Western Hemi-\nsphere, Western Europe, the Korean war, and so forth. Because\nof these commitments, the United States, during the current\ncold war period, will be able to contribute militarily to\nestablishment of this defense arrangement principally by\nfurnishing staff members, by providing limited amounts of mili-\nif the indigenous states remain so distrustful of each other\ntary equipment, and by assigning training missions. However,\nand of Great Britain that they will not join in a defense\narrangement and if they express a desire for other Allied token\nforce contributions as an essential component of a collective\narrangement, such a request must be considered. In particular,\nif the commitment of U.S. token forces in a Middle East defense\narrangement is seen to be the key to the establishment of such\nan arrangement and to the settlement of the dispute between\nthe United Kingdom and Egypt, the United States should be pre-\nU.S. forces will, of course, be deployed to meet the situation\npared to commit token forces. In the event of a general war,\nexisting at that time.\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nBREAT 4821\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSocial and Economic Problems in the Area\n32. These problems are of concern to the United States\nprimarily because of the political developments to which they\nmay lead. There is growing danger that the process of internal\npolitical change going on in these countries may lead to dis-\norder and to a situation in which regimes subject to the in-\nfluence or control of the Soviet Union could come to power.\n33. The task is thus not so much to prevent the changes\nthat now impend as to guide them into channels that will offer\nthe least threat to Western interests and the maximum assurance\nof independent regimes friendly to the West. To this end we\nshould seek to use the social and economic tools available to\nus in ways that will reduce the explosive power of forces\npressing for revolutionary change to the point where necessary\nchanges can be accomplished without uncontrollable instability.\nThis may often mean that we should work with and through the\npresent ruling groups and, while bolstering their hold on\npower use our influence to induce them to accommodate them-\nselves as necessary to the new forces that are emerging. As\nnew leadership groups emerge, we should also work to associate\ntheir interests with our own and, if and when they gain power,\ncooperate with them in working out programs that will assist\nthem to attain constructive objectives--a course of develop-\nment which will tend to give a measure of moderation and\nstability to their regimes.\n34. Maximum results, at least in the next several years,\nwill probably be assured by programs directed towards meeting\ncertain aspirations of urban groups, which include both the\nleadership and principal supporters of the new political move-\nments in this area. In the economic field, however, such\nprograms may often have to be justified mainly on political\nrather than economic grounds. The greatest economic need in\nmost of these countries is usually for agricultural development,\nbut their aspirations--and, in particular the aspirations of\nthe urban groups-- are for industrial development, despite the\nment economic.\nscarcity of skills and resources necessary to make such develop-\n35. Provision for agricultural development is economi-\nfar-sighted in this area today, for the peasantry, though now\ncally sound and, in addition, it may be considered politically\npolitically passive, is not permanently immune to the sugges-\nization of society. Eventually, ambitious urban leadership\ntion that its lot might be greatly improved by a basic reorgan-\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nMUSA\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ngroups may realize the advantages to be derived from exploit-\ning this potential source of mass discontent. This in turn\nmight some day lead to violent disorder and to the consequent\nloss of government control over parts of the countryside, which\nwould then offer a firm rural base, as in China, for a militant\ncommunist movement. It is desirable to try to anticipate such\npossible developments through programs designed to improve the\nlot of the still politically quiescent peasantry.\n36. Such programs should not, however, exclude the pro-\nvisions of funds for more politically urgent if less economi-\ncally sound programs directed at the rising political forces\nin the cities. It is difficult to define these projects in\nother than the most general terms. They should be designed,\nfor one thing, to improve employment opportunities in the\ncities--in so far as possible in fields of interest to the\nrising political groups. Increases in urban purchasing power\nwill also be helpful to small merchants, who are another sig-\nnificant element of these political movements. Such programs\nshould also provide for improved communications both because\nthe fertilization of other types of development depends on\nadequate transportation and because the means of communication\nat present available are insufficient for defense of the area.\n37. The psychological impact of these projects should\nalso be considered. In so far as possible, the projects should\nbe of a character which will develop pride of country and\nstrengthen the interests of these movements in political sta-\nbility. The effect on the Army, from both an economic and\npsychological standpoint, should also be considered. Examples\nof the kind of projects which might meet the above criteria\nare: public works, such as the construction of new government\nbuildings or army barracks; the establishment of planning\ncommissions charged with making basic surveys of many economic,\nsocial, and cultural aspects of national or regional life; the\nexpansion of health and educational facilities in key cities;\nand the provision of better transportation, communication, and\nproductive and power facilities. It will only be possible to\ndetermine what projects are suitable after field investigations.\nIn their work in these countries the U.S. missions should bear\nthese considerations in mind, and it should be our objective\nto use our assistance programs to shape and guide social and\neconomic developments in these countries in ways which will\nhelp us to attain our political goals.\n38. It is clear that, in developing and carrying out\nthese programs it will be necessary to make compromises betweem\nlong-term and short-term considerations. In the long-term, as\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nsuggested above, it is probable that the present ruling groups\nwill loose more of their power--unless they prove able to ad-\njust their outlook and to assume leadership of the changing\nsocial and economic and political development of their coun-\ntries. In the short-term, however, the West depends greatly\non these groups in certain countries for the maintenance of\nstability in the area, and will often find it necessary to\nwork with and through those men and groups who now exercise\npower, even though it may not be in full sympathy with them\nand may not expect that they will be able to retain such power\nover the long run.\n39. It will probably be necessary, if our programs are\nto be carried out successfully, to funnel a considerable amount\nof our economic assistance through these groups and so bolster\ntheir hold on power. Where this is necessary, our attempt\nshould be to modify the policies of these groups in ways de-\nsirable from the long-term point of view, but we should not\ndeliberately sacrifice important short-term interests because\nof our view as to what consititues the most desirable long-\nterm courses of development.\n40. The problem of leadership is fundamental. Our\nprincipal aim should be to encourage the emergence of competent\nleaders, relatively well-disposed toward the West, through pro-\ngrams designed for this purpose, including, where possible a\nconscious, though perhaps covert, effort to cultivate and aid\nsuch potential leaders, even when they are not in power. As\nthey come to power, we should work as closely with them as the\ntemper of their country will permit and should furnish them\nwhatever aid we usefully can. We must be prepared, however,\nfor the fact that they may not wish or be able to express any\novert good will toward, or to seek any explicit association\nwith, the West. The force of nationalism is too strong a\nmotivating element in the process of political change that is\nnow going on in these countries to be disregarded by any\nleadership which emerges from that process, however competent\nand responsible it may be. In our own interests we should not\nbe deterred by the xenophobic slogans which that leadership\nmay employ from doing whatever we can to bolster it in power\nwhere it appears to offer the best prospect of prolonged,\nstable, effective, non-communist government.\n41. In undertaking social and economic actions in the\narea, the United States should keep the British and, as neces--\nsary and desirable, other allied governments informed and\nshould seek to reach agreement with these governments on the\naims which the aid programs should be designed to accomplish.\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNW\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nThis is necessary to make the most effective use of their\ncapabilities in the area and to avoid working at cross pur-\nposes with them. It will, for the reasons indicated above,\nprobably be in the U.S. national interest to continue our pro-\ngrams of economic aid over the next several years to the\ncountries in the area. In carrying out both urban and rural\neconomic programs it may be desirable, within the context of\nthe political objectives outlined above, to concentrate on\npilot projects susceptible of having early and, if possible,\nregional application and on programs productive of tangible\npossible. benefits at an early date for as many people or key groups as\n42. In providing military aid under MSA, it will be\nnecessary to develop adequate controls to prevent an arms race\nbetween the Arab States and Israel. We should explore ways\nand means of developing consultation and collaboration on\nsocial and economic problems among the states associated\nwith MEC, including Israel wherever possible, in order to\npromote cooperation on non-military enterprises of benefit\nto the region as a whole.\nThe Problem of Israel\n43. The United States has been viewed with growing dis-\ntrust by the Arab States in the last few years because of the\nresponsibility ascribed to it for the establishment of Israel\nas a nation. This increases the difficulties in attaining\nU.S. policy objectives in the area. Israel's immigration\npolicy, while temporarily more selective because of the ad-\nverse economic situation in that country, is still regarded\nby the Arabs as a direct threat to their security because it\nwill produce pressures within Israel for expansion to accommo-\ndate the influx of population. A genuine conflict of interests\nbetween the Arab States and Israel is involved. In order to\novercome Arab distrust of the United States it will be neces-\nsary at a minimum to use the political, economic and psycholo-\ngical tools at our command to show our concern for and in-\nterest in their problems and it may be necessary to use our\ninfluence to secure some modification of Israeli policies,\nparticularly the immigration policy. It is probable that Arab\ndistrust of Israel cannot be removed except over a long period\nof time. It would therefore be desirable for the United\nStates, without partiality as between Israel and the Arab\nstates in the political, economic, religious, psychological,\nsocial, and military matters, but consistent with strategic\nconsiderations, to utilize all feasible and appropriate means\nto resolve the issues which separate the Arab states and Israel\nand which give rise to animosity toward the United States.\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nNOTES\nFundamental to the abatement of Arab distrust of the United\nStates and accommodation to the fact of Israel's existence\nare (a) progress toward a solution of a refugee problem in the\narea; (b) settlement of local Arab Israeli disputes, such as\nboundary problems, questions of water rights, and establishment\nof financial and economic arrangements between Israel and the\nArab States which would permit the resumption of commercial\nintercourse within and through the area, uninterrupted flow of\npetroleum products, and uninhibited operation of and access to\ninternal and international surface and air transport facilities;\n(c) modification of Israeli immigration policy in order to\nreduce possible pressures within Israel for expansion to accom-\nmodate the influx of population.\nPsychological Measures\n44. Other factors contributing to the reluctance of\nthe Arab States to identify their interests with those of the\nUnited States are (a) a growing tendency in the area to be-\nlieve that the United States gives unqualified support to the\nU.K.'s political and economic objectives in the area; (b) com-\nmunist propaganda to the effect that U.S. economic, political\nand military activities in these countries indicate an ambi-\ntion to dominate and exploit the area; and (c) a belief com-\nbining neutralist and defeatist tendencies that there is little\ndanger of Soviet aggression and that even should war come, the\nUnited States and its allies would not in any case be able to\nrepel an attack on the area. Changes in the attitudes can be\nassisted by an intensified psychological effort designed to\nsupport the various political, economic and military measures\nbeing undertaken by the United States in the area, though we\ncannot expect large results until and unless progress has been\nmade on the substantive problems. This effort can take ad-\nvantage of the good will engendered by U.S. philanthropic and\neducational agencies in the area.\n45. The objective of an intensified psychological effort\nshould be to show the peoples and governments of the area\nthat their interests and aspirations can best be furthered by\nassociation with the West and, conversely, defeated by per-\nmitting communism to increase in strength in the area. We\nshould seek to break down the association that has been created\nin their minds between the West and the principal obstacles,\nin and outside of their countries, to the fulfillment of their\nour psychological effort should seek to indicate the im-\nambitions and national impulses. At the same time, however,\npracticability, as well as the undesirability, of any efforts\nto carry out impending political changes in such a way and\nwith such rapidity as to destroy internal stability, eliminate\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nNADA\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nWestern interests, and enhance the influence of the Soviet\nUnion or local communists. It should be made clear that the\nWest will resist such developments; that there are limits\nbeyond which it cannot go in permitting encroachments on its\ninterests in the area; and that the political prospects of\nany group favoring communism or the Soviet Union are dim. We\nshould thus seek, by both inducements and deterrents, to turn\nrising political forces from the more potentially threatening\nactivities to the pursuit of an internal position and external\nstatus which is in their interests and which we do not seek\nto oppose.\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nMAY TRUMAN\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS\nThreats to Western Interests\n46. U. S. interests and Western interests generally in\nthe Arab States and Israel are menaced by possible develop-\nments during a continuing cold war. The threats derive,\nin large part, from the fact that the traditional semi-feudal\nleadership of this area is being challenged by rising politi-\ncal forces, having their leadership and principal support in\nthe cities. These forces find the present rigid social and\neconomic systems and the oligarchical political rule in most\nof the countries inconsistent with their national and personal\nambitions. In the face of that challenge, the ruling groups\nseek to preserve their position by supporting, in some degree,\nthe nationalistic demands for elimination of Western interests\nwhich are the main political stock-in-trade of the rising\npolitical forces. The immediate threat is thus to such\nspecific Western interests as those in oil resources and the\nSuez Canal. The basic threat, however, is that this process\nof internal political change may lead to disorder and even-\ntually to a situation in which regimes oriented toward the\nSoviet Union could come to power. These threats are exacer-\nbated, and U.S. influence is diminished, by the Arab-Israeli\ntensions, which make solutions to many problems in the area\nmuch more difficult to find and work out than they would other-\nwise be.\n47. The over-all policy of the United States in the\nface of these threats should be to guide this process of\npolitical change, by a judicious combination of inducement and\ndeterrents, into channels that will effect the least compro-\nmise of Western interests and will offer the maximum promise\nof developing stable non-communist regimes. The problem of\nleadership is crucial. We should make full use of our mili-\ntary and economic programs and of special political measures\nto support, or develop, leaders whose maintenance in, or\nadvent to, power gives such promise. In addition to the fore-\ngoing the United States should utilize all feasible and\nappropriate means to resolve the issues which prevent the\nabatement of Arab distrust of Israel and resulting animosity\ntoward the United States.\nEgypt\n48. Settlement of the specific disputes involving\nEgypt and the U.K. is of key importance. If the dispute\nbetween Egypt and the U.K. can be settled, cooperation with\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nthe Arab States in the MEC and in other ways would be greatly\nfacilitated and the danger that Arab nationalism will\nviolently erupt in other Arab states will be greatly diminished.\nIf settlements of these problems are not achieved and if\ncontinuing deadlocks eventually weaken the present regimes,\nthe West may be confronted with a situation in which it will\nhave to accept the loss of these interests (and the chain\nreaction thus initiated in other countries in the area) or\nuse force to regain and hold its interests. This latter\ncourse would involve serious risks and, if followed, would\nlimit our ability to take action in other areas, such as\nSoutheast Asia, where these is actual or threatened communist\naggression.\n49. The United States should maintain its efforts to\ninduce the Egyptians to modify their positions with respect to\ntheir disputes with the U.K. The United States should con-\ntinue its efforts to arrive at a concert of views with the\nU.K. with respect to proposals which, while protecting basic\nWestern interests, might make possible early negotiated\nsettlements. If such a concert of views is obtained, we\nwould, of course, strongly support efforts for settlements on\nthat basis.\nU.S. and U.K. Roles in the Area\n50. The United States should take an increased share of\nresponsibility toward the area, in concert with the U.K. to\nthe greatest practicable extent, on the basis that:\na. The United States should be prepared to play\na larger role in safeguarding Western interests in the\narea, particularly by attempting to facilitate political\nsettlements among the nations of the area and between\nthem and the Western nations, and by providing appropriate\neconomic, technical and military assistance.\nb. The United States should, however, endeavor to\npersuade other nations, particularly the U.K. to pre-\nvide such armed forces as may be necessary and approp-\nriate to defend Western interests in the area.\nc. The special United States-Saudi Arabia arrange-\nments now existing should continue.\nMilitary Assistance and the Middle East Command\n51. Military aid, and in some instances military missions,\ncan be helpful in strengthening local forces both for the\nmaintenance of internal stability and also for defense against\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nI\nSECURITY INFORMATION\npossible Soviet attack, as well as in influencing the course\nof political developments in these countries. While military\nassistance may in some instances have to be taken on a bi-\nlateral basis in order to avoid undue delay, we should take\nall practicable steps to establish the Middle East Command\nand continue our efforts to obtain the participation of the\nstates in the area in the Command. In the event of general\nwar, U.S. forces will, of course, be deployed to meet the\nsituation existing at that time.\n52. The United States should retain flexibility as to\nits role in defense of the area in the event of general war.\nHowever, the MEC can be an important means for dealing with\nthe problems of the cold war period as well as for the\nstrengthening of the area against possible Soviet attack.\nEvery effort should be made to obtain at least token force\ncontributions to the MEC from Australia, New Zealand, and\nSouth Africa, and when practicable from Pakistan. The United\nStates should be prepared to assign personnel to the staff of\nthe Command, and to provide training missions. If political\nand psychological measures prove inadequate to secure the\nestablishment of an ME defense arrangement and to settlement\nof the dispute between the U.K. and Egypt, and if the key to\nthe accomplishment of these objectives is seen to be the\nassignment of U.S. token forces to this arrangement, the\nUnited States should be prepared to assign such forces.\n53. A primary purpose of strengthening the indigenous\nmilitary forces of the states in the area is to assist in\nthe maintenance of internal stability. The use of Western\nforces assigned to the MEC for this purpose would be contrary\nto the principles underlying the MEC. However, the possibility\ncannot be excluded that in exceptional circumstances Western\nforces might have to be used within the area itself: in the\nevent of (a) forceful violation of the Arab-Israeli borders,\n(b) requests by legitimate governments for assistance in\nsuppressing communist uprisings, and (c) other situations\ninvolving serious threats to important Western interests. In\nallocating forces to the MEC, these possible contingencies\nshould be taken into account.\nEconomic, Social and Psychological Programs\n54. The primary purpose of our assistance programs is to\nguide, if possible;political developments in the area in ways\nwhich will involve least danger to Western interests and maxi-\nmum assurance of stable non-communist governments. This\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 18 -\nTOP SECRET\nSPERT AIRCA\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nshould be borne in mind in planning and carrying out our social\nand economic program. We should continue and possibly expand\nour programs of economic aid, including aid for the resettle-\nment of refugees. Because the rising (and threatening)\npolitical forces in the area have their leadership and main\nsupport in the cities, provision should be made in our economic\nprograms for projects which will tend to associate the inter-\nests of these urban forces with our own and to develop their\ninterests in political stability in their countries. We\nshould also focus much of our psychological effort on these\ngroups. We should intensify that effort with the dual aim\nof showing the governments and key groups of this area that\ntheir interests and aspirations can best be furthered by\nassociation with the West and that basic Western interests\nmust be respected. Both economic and psychological programs\nshould be designed to further and support our political and\nmilitary measures with the object of enabling the United\nStates to play a more effective role in shaping political\nchanges in these countries and in strengthening their\nability to resist subversion and aggression.\nANNEX TO NSC 129\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n2007 commin"
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