Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "348696369",
    "label": "National Security Council Report 129/1, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Arab States and Israel",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348696369"
}

{
    "id": "348696369",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348696369",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Report 129/1, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Arab States and Israel",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348696369",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750697/750697-11-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750697/750697-11-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750697/750697-11-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 35,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348696369",
    "naId": 348696369,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 24,
            "logicalDate": "1952-04-24",
            "month": 4,
            "year": 1952
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 35,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750697/750697-11.pdf",
    "mediaId": "522a61fbb972c769",
    "ocrText": "The President\nNCT(PSF/N3C)1185\nFOP SECRET\nNSC 129/1\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nCOPY NO. 1\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nUNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH\nOR MARA STATE U.S.\nOF\nRESPECT TO THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL\nApril 24, 1952\nDECLASSIFIED\nWASHINGTON\nAuthority INSC LIST9-19-77 LIST\nBy HC NLT Date 10.20.77\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nThe President\nNLT(PSE/NIC) 1184-A NLT 1184-A\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nTOP\nSECRET\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nWASHINGTON\nCOPY NO. 1\nApril 28, 1952\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSUBJECT:\nUnited States Objectives and Policies With\nRespect to the Arab States and Israel\nREFERENCES:\nA. NSC Action No. 629\nB. NSC 129 and Annex to NSC 129\nC. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same\nsubject, dated April 16 and April 22, 1952\nThe President, on April 24, approved the state-\nment of policy contained in NSC 129, as amended and adopted\nby the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 629), and\ndirects its implementation by all appropriate executive de-\npartments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the\ncoordination of the Secretary of State. The report, as\namended, is being issued as NSC 129/1.\nJames JAMES Executive S. LAY, Secretary D.Lay.J. Jr.\nCC: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Acting Director of Defense Mobilization\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979\nNSC LTR. 4-13-42 PROJECT NLT 81.9\nBy NLT- HC NARS, Date 6.23.62\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 129/1\nTOP\nSECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nApril 28, 1952\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nTRUMAN\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nMANNET MONIVES GOVERNMENT \"MATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY\non\nUNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES\nWITH RESPECT TO THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL\nReferences: A. NSC Action No. 629\nB. NSC 129 and Annex to NSC 129\nC. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated April 16 and April\n22, 1952\nD. NSC 47/2 and NSC 47/5; NSC 65/3\nE. NSC 107/2\nF. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsubject, \"Documents Resulting from\nConversations With the British in Regard\nto the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle\nEast\", dated November 19, 1947\nAt the 115th Council meeting with the President presiding,\nthe National Security Council and the Acting Secretary of the\nTreasury considered and adopted NSC 129, subject to the changes\ntherein recommended by the Senior NSC Staff in the reference\nmemorandum of April 22 (NSC Action No. 629).\nThe report, as amended and adopted, was subsequently\nsubmitted to the President for consideration. The President\non April 24 approved the statement of policy contained in NSC\n129, as amended and enclosed herewith, and directs its imple-\nmentation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies\nof the U. S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary\nof State. The NSC Staff study contained in the Annex to NSC\n129, as amended by the Senior NSC Staff, is also enclosed for\nCouncil information.\nAccordingly, NSC 47/2, NSC 47/5 and NSC 65/3 are super-\nseded. In addition, the enclosure, together with the forth-\ncoming revision of NSC 107/2 on Iran and approved NSC reports\nrelating to Greece, Italy and Turkey, are intended to super-\nsede the policy relating to the Eastern Mediterranean and the\nMiddle East contained in the enclosure to Reference F.\nJAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\ncc: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Acting Director of Defense Mobilization\nNSC 129/1\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSTATEMENT OF POLICY\nProposed by the National Security Council\non\nUNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO\nTHE ARAB STATES* AND ISRAEL\nOBJECTIVES\n1. The objectives of the United States with respect\nto the area comprising the Arab States and Israel are:\na. To overcome or prevent instability within\nthese countries which threatens Western interests.\nb. To prevent the extension of Soviet influence\nand at the same time to strengthen Western influence.\nc. To insure that the resources of the area\nare available to the United States and its allies for\nuse in strengthening the free world.\nd. To strengthen the will and ability of these\ncountries to resist possible future aggression by the\nSoviet Union.\ne. To establish within the community of nations\na new relationship with the states of the area that\nrecognizes their desire to achieve status and respect\nfor their sovereign equality.\n*For the purposes of this paper, the Arab States include\nEgypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.\nUnited States Policy toward Iran will be covered in a separate\nreport constituting a revision of NSC 107/2.\nNSC 129/1\n- 1 -\nICP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nGENERAL CONSIDERATIONS\n2. The area comprising the Arab States and Israel is\nof great political and strategic importance because of its\ngeographic position, its natural defensive barriers, its\nsites for military bases, its position with respect to trans-\nportation routes, its petroleum resources and installations,\nthe fact that it is a center for powerful world-wide religious\ngroups, and the effects of its alignment on the prestige of\nthe Western powers and on the policies of other countries in\nthe Middle East, Africa and Asia.\n3. These political and strategic factors are so import-\nant to the over-all position of the free world that it is in\nthe security interest of the United States to take whatever\nappropriate measures it can, in the light of its other com-\nmitments, to achieve the objectives stated above.\n4. Currently, the danger in this area to the security\nof the free world arises not so much from the threat of direct\nSoviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-western\nnationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism which could lead to\ndisorder and eventually to a situation in which regimes\noriented toward the Soviet Union could come to power.\n5. Current acute situations requiring United States\ninitiative are: (a) the controversy between the U.K. and\nUS\nEgypt, and (b) continued Arab-Israeli tensions.\nSOVERNMENT\nNSC 129/1\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPOLICIES AND COURSES OF ACTION\nBECORDS UNITED\nThe Area as a Whole\nSERVICE\n6. The United States should take an increased share of\nresponsibility toward the area, in concert with the U.K. to\nthe greatest practicable extent, and where appropriate also in\nconcert with France and Turkey, on the basis that:\na. The United States should be prepared to play\na larger role in safeguarding Western interests in the\narea, particularly by attempting to facilitate political\nsettlements among the nations of the area and between\nthem and the Western nations, and by providing appropri-\nate economic, technical and military assistance.\nb. The United States should, however, endeavor to\npersuade other nations, particularly the U.K. to provide\nsuch armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to\ndefend Western interests in the area.\nc. The special United States-Saudi Arabia arrange-\nments now existing should continue.\n7. With respect to the Middle East Command (MEC),* the\nUnited States should:\na. Continue its efforts to establish the Command\nas a means of increasing the stability and strengthening\nthe defense of the area.\nb. Make every appropriate effort to obtain at\nleast token force contributions to the Command from\n*See Appendix A.\nNSC 129/1\n- 3 -\nFOR SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nAustralia, New Zealand and South Africa, and when\npracticable from Pakistan.\nc. Seek to obtain the participation of the states\nin the area in a Middle East defense arrangement.\n₫. While maintaining flexibility as to the com-\nmitment of U.S. forces for the local defense of the\narea in the event of general war, be prepared to reen-\nforce political and psychological measures in the area\nby assigning U.S. token forces in a Middle East defense\narrangement if U.S. willingness to take this action is\nseen to be the key to the establishment of such an\narrangement and to the settlement of the dispute between\nthe U.K. and Egypt.\ne. Be prepared to participate in the integrated\nstaff of the MEC.\n8. The United States should seek to create an atmosphere\nwhich will facilitate obtaining base rights where required\nwithin the area, and upon the threat of and during general\nhostilities, the right to operate forces in the territories\nof the various nations of the area.\n9. As a means of diminishing the threat posed by nation-\nalistic demands for the elimination of Western interests and\nby political instability in the area, the United States should\nmake the fullest practicable use of psychological and political\nprograms (including special political measures) and of economic\nNSC 129/1\n- 4 -\nFOR SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nand military aid programs and technical cooperation to\ninfluence the process of political change into channels that\nwill effect the least compromise of Western interests and\nwill offer the maximum promise of stable non-communist\nregimes. The United States should direct these programs and\nmeasures along the following lines:\na. To support or develop those leadership groups\nin the area which offer the greatest prospect of\nestablishing political stability oriented toward the\nfree world.\nb. Place increased emphasis on measures designed\nto have an early and stabilizing effect upon urban\ngroups.\nc. To improve or, where advisable, assist in the\nconstruction of such facilities, especially in the field of\ntransportation and communications, as are capable of\ndirect contribution to regional defense requirements.\nd. Continue technical cooperation programs designed\nto improve the living standards and level of health and\neducation of the rural population, including actions\nleading to solutions of problems of land tenancy and\ncredit.\nThe U.K.-Egyptian Dispute\n10. With respect to the U.K.-Egyptian dispute, the\nUnited States should:\nNSC 129/1\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\na. Continue to concert with the U.K. in develop-\ning proposals which might make possible an early negoti-\nated settlement.\nb. Continue its efforts to induce the Egyptians to\nreach a settlement which will protect basic Western\ninterests.\nc. If necessary to secure a settlement, let it be\nknown that the United States is prepared to take the\naction set forth in paragraph 7 d above.\nTRUMAN AMD LIBRATOR\nvisitims\nArab-Israeli Disputes\nGOVERNIENT\n11. The United States should utilize all feasible and\nappropriate means to resolve the issues which prevent the\nabatement of Arab distrust of Israel and resulting animosity\ntoward the United States. To this end the United States should\npromote and encourage, without partiality as between Israel\nand the several Arab states but consistent with strategic\nconsiderations:\na. Progress toward a solution of the refugee\nproblem in the area.\nb. Settlement of local Arab Israeli disputes, such\nas boundary problems, questions of water rights, and\nestablishment of financial and economic arrangements\nbetween Israel and the Arab States which would permit\nthe resumption of commercial intercourse within and\nNSC 129/1\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nthrough the area, uninterrupted flow of petroleum\nproducts, and uninhibited operation of and access to\ninternal and international surface and air transport\nfacilities.\nc. Modification of Israeli immigration policy in\norder to reduce possible pressures within Israel for ex-\npansion to accommodate the influx of population.\n12. The United States should continue the policy set\nforth in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950,\nas follows:\nThe Governments of the United Kingdoms\nFrance, and the United States, having had\noccasion during the recent Foreign Ministers'\nMeeting in London to review certain questions\naffecting the peace and stability of the\nArab states and of Israel, and particularly\nthat of the supply of arms and war material\nto these states, have resolved to make the\nfollowing statements:\n1. The three Governments recognize\nthat the Arab states and Israel all need to\nmaintain a certain level of armed forces for\nthe purposes of assuring their internal\nsecurity and their legitimate self-defense\nand to permit them to play their part in the\ndefense of the area as a whole. All applica-\ntions for arms or war material for these\ncountries will be considered in the light of\nthese principles. In this connection the\nthree Governments wish to recall and reaffirm\nthe terms of the statements made by their\nrepresentatives on the Security Council on\nAugust 4, 1949, in which they declared their\nopposition to the development of an arms race\nbetween the Arab states and Israel.\nNSC 129/1\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRE\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n2. The three Governments declare\nthat assurances have been received from\nall the states in question, to which they\npermit arms to be supplied from their\ncountries, that the purchasing state does\nnot intend to undertake any act of aggres-\nsion against any other state. Similar\nassurances will be requested from any\nother state in the area to which they\npermit arms to be supplied in the future.\n3. The three Governments take this\nopportunity of declaring their deep interest\nin and their desire to promote the estab-\nlishment and maintenance of peace and stab-\nility in the area and their unalterable\nopposition to the use of force or threat\nof force between any of the states in that\narea. The three Governments, should they\nfind that any of these states was preparing\nto violate frontiers or armistice lines,\nwould, consistently with their obligations\nas members of the United Nations, immediately\ntake action, both within and outside the\nUnited Nations, to prevent such violation.\nEXTS TRUMAN HURTONAL ODVERNMENT - LIBRARY\nNSC 129/1\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nUNCLASSIFIED\nAPPENDIX A\nSTATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE\nGOVERNMENT POSTIONAL AND UNITED\nAND TURKEY ON THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND\n(November 10, 1951)\nIn proceeding with their announced intention to establish\nthe Middle East Command, the Governments of the United States,\nUnited Kingdom, France and Turkey state that they are guided\nby the following principles:\n1. The United Nations is a world response to the\nprinciple that peace is indivisible and that the security of\nall states is jeopardized by breaches of the peace anywhere;\nat the same time it is incumbent upon the States of any area\nto be willing and able to undertake the initial defense of\ntheir area.\n2. The Defense of the Middle East is vital to the\nfree world and its defense against outside aggression can be\nsecured only by the cooperation of all interested states.\n3. The Middle East Command is intended to be the\ncenter of cooperative efforts for the defense of the area as\na whole; the achievement of peace and security in the area\nthrough the Middle East Command will bring with it social and\neconomic advancement.\n4. A function of the Middle East Command will be to\nassist and support the States willing to join in the defense\nof the Middle East and to develop the capacity of each to\nplay its proper role in the defense of the area as a whole\nagainst outside aggression. It will not interfere in\nproblems and disputes arising within the area. The establish-\nment of the Middle East Command in no way affects existing\narrangements relating to such matters, notably the Armistice\nAgreements and the United States-United Kingdom-French\nTripartite Declaration of May 1950.\n5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset\nwill be primarily one of planning and providing the Middle\nEast States on their request with assistance in the form of\nadvice and training. Requests for arms and equipment made\nby States in the area willing to join in its defense to\nsponsoring states in a position to assist in this connection\nwill be filled by them to the extent possible following the\ncoordination of such requests through the Middle East Command.\nNSC 129/1\n- 9 -\nUNCLASSIFIED\nUNCLASSIFIED\n6. The Supreme Allied Commander Middle East will\ncommand forces placed at his disposal and will develop\nplans for the operations of all forces within the area (or to\nbe introduced into the area) in time of war or international\nemergency. However, the placing of forces under the command\nof the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East in peacetime is\nnot a prerequisite for joining in the common effort for the\ndefense of the Middle East. Movement of those troops placed\nunder the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East\nto or within the territories of States joining in the defense\nof the Middle East will be made only with the agreement of\nthe State or States concerned and in full accord with their\nnational independence and sovereignty.\n7. While details have yet to be formulated, the\nsponsoring States intend that the Middle East Command should\nbe an integrated Allied Command, not a National Command. The\nresponsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East\nwill be to ensure the effectiveness of the corporate defense\nenterprise represented by the Command. All States joining in\nthis enterprise will be individually associated with the\nCommand on the basis of equality through a Middle East Defense\nLiaison Organization which will be located at Middle East\nCommand Headquarters and will be the link between the Command\nand the countries ready to join in the defense of this area.\n8. Any facilities granted to the Middle East Command\nby States joining in the defense of the Middle East will be\nthe subject of specific agreements.\n9. The broad mission of the Middle East Command and\nits cooperative character make it necessary that all States,\nwhether territorially or not part of the area, act in the best\ninterests of the cooperative defense of the area; the Middle\nEast Command naturally will not further the national interest\nof any particular State.\n10. A continuing objective of the Middle East Command\nis to reduce such deficiencies as exist at present in the\norganization and capacity for defense in a vitally important\narea so that the peacetime role of the States of the area in\nMiddle East defense will progressively increase, thus per-\nmitting the peacetime role of States not territorially part\nof the Middle East to be decreased proportionately.\n11. The sponsoring states of the Middle East Command do\nnot regard the initial form in which the Middle East Command\nwill be organized as unchangeable; they believe that the\nMiddle East Command through mutual understanding should evolve\nin the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide\nfor the defense of the Middle East area as a whole,\nNSC 129/1\n- 10 -\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nApril 24, 1952\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nNSC STAFF STUDY\non\nUNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO\nTHE ARAB STATES* AND ISRAEL\nPROBLEM\n1. To analyze the current situation in the Arab States and\nIsrael to determine the general courses of action that will\nbetter safeguard Western interests in the area and identify\nthese interests as the true interests of the peoples of the\narea.\nANALYSIS\nObjectives\n2. The objectives of the United States with respect to\nthe area comprising the Arab States and Israel are:\na. To overcome or prevent instability within\nthese countries which threatens Western interests.\nb. To prevent the extension of Soviet influence\nin the area.\nc. To insure that the resources of the area\nare available to the United States and its allies for\nuse in strengthening the free world.\nd. To strengthen the will and ability of these\ncountries to resist possible future aggression by the\nSoviet Union.\ne. To establish within the community of nations\na new relationship with the states of the area that\nrecognizes their desire to achieve status and respect\nfor their sovereign equality.\nThe Importance of the Area\n3. The area comprising the Arab States and Israel has\ngreat political and strategic importance. It lies at the\nland, sea and air crossroads of three continents, contains\n*For the purposes of this paper, the Arab States include\nEgypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.\nNSC 129/1\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nimportant sites for Western military bases, has natural de-\nfensive barriers in its mountains and deserts, and lies close\nto Soviet centers of industry, population and oil resources.\nMore than a third of the world's known oil reserves are lo-\ncated in the Arab States alone. Continued availability of oil\nfrom these sources is of great importance in peace and war.*\n4. These strategic resources are so important to the\nover-all position of the free world that it is in the security\ninterest of the United States to take whatever appropriate\nmeasures it can, in the light of its other commitments, to\ninsure that these resources will be used for strengthening the\nfree world.\nThe Nature of the Problem\n5. Unless the Soviet rulers have decided to initiate\ngeneral war, there is little danger of direct Soviet attack\nupon the area because it is likely that the Soviet rulers\nrealize that aggressive action against the Middle East would\nprovoke general war. (In the event of general war in the next\nfew years, the task of defending the area will have to be\nborne primarily by such local forces as have been developed and\nby such U.K., Commonwealth, and Turkish forces as can be made\navailable.) Currently, therefore, the imminent threat to\nWestern interests arises not so much from the threat of direct\nSoviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-Western\nnationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism which could lead to\ndisorder and might eventually open the way for the extension\nof Soviet control and influence by means short of war. Such\nan extension of Soviet control would be an unacceptable shift\nin the world balance of power. Efforts to prevent or overcome\ninstability in the area and to reduce anti-Western nationalism\nand Arab-Israeli antagonism are therefore essential. To hold\nthe area during a continuing cold war, it will be necessary\nfor the United States to give increasing attention to the area.\n6. Settlement of the specific disputes involving Iran,\nEgypt, and the U.K. is of key importance to our efforts in\nthe region as a whole. If the dispute between Egypt and the\nU.K. can be settled, cooperation with the Arab States in the\nMiddle East Command (MEC) and in other ways would be greatly\nfacilitated and the danger that nationalism will violently\nerupt in other Arab States will be diminished. Other major\nproblems include the tensions and hostile attitudes between the\nArab States and Israel and the prevailing attitude of neutral-\nism.\n*See the NSC 97 series and related papers.\nNSC 129/1\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nBasic Political Factors\n7. The Arab States are in varying degrees experiencing\ndeep and difficult changes as their relatively rigid social\nand economic institutions are compelled to adjust under the\npressure of the forces released by the introduction of Western\ntechniques and ideas, but without the stablizing political and\nreligious forces once dominant in the area. The impact of\nWestern techniques and ideas has been most notable in its\neffect upon relations between political groups in most of these\nstates. In the case of Israel, the attempt to build a modern\nstate and to absorb a large and rapid immigration has created\ninternal problems beyond the capacity of the state to manage.\nMoreover, this immigration, even though reduced in recent\nmonths, arouses fears among the Arabs that Israel will be under\nirresistible pressures to expand.\n8. At the apex of the political pyramid in the Arab States\nthere has been a small ruling group. It is drawn largely from\nland-owners and tribal leaders, admixed with a smaller and not\nentirely separate merchant and financial class. Its group in-\nterest is the preservation of the status quo. With the passage\nof time, however, this group--which has traditionally been\nsplit within itself by contests for power--has become less and\nless capable of effective leadership. The traditional ruling\ngroups are under increasing challenge in most of these coun-\ntries.\n9. Below the ruling group, as a distinctive political\nforce, are the urban dwellers: disaffected intellectuals,\nbarred from attaining status by the political monopoly of the\nruling groups; students, unhappy with their prospects and con-\ntemptuous of political leadership that does not build a strong\nand dynamic state; and the small merchants, the artisians, the\nlower and middle levels of the bureaucracy, and the urban wage-\nearners. The outstanding characteristic of this urban group is\ndissatisfaction with things as they are. The relatively rigid\nand semi-feudal organization of society does not provide op-\nportunities for the more capable and educated members of this\ngroup commensurate with the values they place on their capa-\ncities. This creates disaffection within a group some elements\nof which are at least partially fitted for leadership. Since\nmost other elements of the urban group are also in some degree\nmaladjusted to the social scheme, the materials for pressure on\nthe ruling group are readily at hand.\n10. At the base of the political pyramid in these states\nis the peasantry which forms the great majority of the popu-\nlation and which is still a largely passive element in\nTRUMAN\nNSC 129/1\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nPOSTIONAL\nAND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\nDENVICES\nTop SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\npolitical life. Potentially, this submerged majority offers\nan opportunity for exploitation by some kind of political\nleadership.\n11. In the changing relations between these groups--\nspecifically between the ruling and the urban groups--there\nappear the chief manifestations of political disturbance in\nseveral of these countries. Most of that disturbance focuses\non questions relating to the treatment of foreign interests.\nOn these questions, the leaders of the urban political groups\nseek a radical solution: the total elimination of visible\nforeign power. The ruling group, for its part, often finds\nit desirable to travel some distance in the same direction,\npartly because of its own unwillingness or inability to chal-\nlenge the urban groups directly on this issue. At the same\ntime, because the ruling group is aware that its domestic\nposition could be endangered if xenophobia got out of hand, it\nseeks with decreasing effectiveness to keep the situation in\ncheck at home; it desires compromises radical enough to appease\nthe urban elements but short of the outright eviction of for-\neign interests.\n12. In this internal social conflict, the urban middle\ngroup has the advantage of numbers and dynamism. Its leader-\nship is riding the wave of popular sentiment, so far as popular\nsentiment finds expression in the Arab States. If, however,\nthis leadership is catapulted into power, it must--aside from\nthe elimination of foreign interests--begin largely without a\ndoctrine or a positive political and economic program. It has\nfattened almost exclusively on its open hostility toward the\nWestern powers and Israel. Since, however, the basic strength\nof the urban political leadership comes from its command over\nforces seeking change, the necessity for improvising a program\nof social and economic change cannot be avoided for long with-\nout the risk that another leadership, with a program, will come\nto the fore. Under some circumstances, this could be communist\nleadership.\n13. Religion has important effects upon social, political\nand economic life in the area. This region is the heart of the\ngreater Islamic world stretching from Morocco to the Philip-\npines, embracing approximately 250 million Moslems, and includes\nIsrael, a holy land of three great religions. The reactions of\nthe peoples in this area to United States policy will be re-\nflected in the reactions of Jews and Moslems throughout the\nworld. The three monotheistic religions in the area have in\ncommon a repugnance to the atheism of communist doctrine and\nthis factor could become an important asset in promoting West-\nern objectives in the area.\nNSC 129/1\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nCANADA ARCRIVES TRUMAN \"RATIONAL REDORDS AND DIBRARY\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nGOVERNMENT\nEgypt\n14. These basic political factors have found their most\ntroublesome expression to date in Egypt, where the trend de-\nscribed above immediately threatens both Western interests and\nthe hold on power of moderate local groups. It is necessary\nto prevent, if possible, a further deterioration of the situ-\nation and to regain the vital elements of Western interests.\n15. In Egypt, a clear conflict exists between the\nposition of the U.K. and the demands of the political groups\nnow in power. Resolution of this conflict based on a total\nsurrender of the U.K.'s position would naturally be unaccept-\nable to the U.K. as well as to the United States. Although\na continuation of the impasse between Egypt and the U.K. might\neventually weaken the present regime in Egypt to the point\nwhere further political changes would be more likely, there is\nno guarantee that these changes would bring to power, or main-\ntain in power, leaders friendly to the West.\n16. Our purpose continues to be to induce the U.K. to\nmodify its position in ways which, while maintaining basic\nWestern interests, might make possible an early negotiated\nsettlement.\n17. In the absence of such settlements, the situation\nmay deteriorate to the point where various internal groups\nare engaged in a struggle for power. In such circumstances,\nit may be advisable to intervene as opportunity presents itself\nto aid those groups most promising for our purpose. We\nshould, therefore, maintain the maximum flexibility in the\nconduct of our relations with Egypt.\nThe U.S. and U.K. Roles in the Area\n18. In the past the U.K. has played the major role in\nthe maintenance and defense of Western interests in the area.\nHowever, the rapid decline in the last decade in the ability\nof the U.K. to maintain and defend Western interests in some\nof these countries has led the U.S. to play an increasingly\nimportant role and now creates the need for a review and\nrestatement of U.S. policy toward the area. In some countries,\nsuch as Greece, where the British have relinquished their\nformer responsibilities, the United States has assumed them.\nNSC 129/1\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nHARRY\nARCHATIONAL NEGOZORAD\nBRARY\nT&P SECRET\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nGOVERNMEN\nAlso, where the United States has major military and economic\ninterests, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, U.S. influence has\nlargely replaced the U.K. influence.\n19. The obstacles to the exercise of U.S. influence in\nthe area in the cold war period and the nature of our relations\nwith other states interested in the area render it desirable\nfor the United States to work closely with such states. Be-\ncause of the previous experience and present position of the\nBritish in the area, and because of common interests in other\nparts of the world, the United States should have an especially\nclose relationship with the British. The U.S. has already ex-\npressed, in the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, its inten-\ntion to cooperate with the British and the French in dealing\nwith certain questions affecting the peace and stability of\nthe Arab States and Israel. To the extent that the defense of\nWestern interests in the cold war requires the use of military\nforce by a Western power, it is clearly in the U.S. interest\nthat the U.K. (or other allies) provide such force.\n20. The decline of Western capabilities in the area is\na complex phenomenon and does not appear to be primarily due\nto the inadequacy of military forces in the area. On the\ncontrary, the British probably have sufficient military forces\nin the area to take any local military actions that might\nbecome necessary in the area during this period. Formerly,\nmilitary measures in the middle East could be taken under a\nset of rules almost totally inapplicable to the changed re-\nlationship between the European states and the states of the\narea and among the latter. The emergence of the various states\ncomprising the Middle East as independent members of the\nworld family of nations, and particularly the establishment of\nthe United Nations as a world organization, has intensified\nnationalist aspirations in the area and made obsolete many\nof the tactics formerly employed to protect Western interests\nthere.\n21. It is doubtful whether the U.S. or the U.K., or both\ntogether, could maintain and defend Western interests in the\narea in the 19th century fashion. In fact, it seems clear that\nthe West must work toward the establishment of a new kind of\nrelationship with the Middle Eastern states, involving in-\ncreased recognition of the aspirations of these countries to\nstatus within the community of nations. However, Western\npower and prestige, exercised directly and through local\ngroups, will continue to be important factors in the mainten-\nance of stability within the area. There may well be occasions,\nNSC 129/1\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SEGRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nas in Egypt at the present time, when the West will have to be\nprepared to use force to maintain its interests or to accept\nthe loss of these interests. Whatever the United States can\ndo to bolster both generally and locally the power and prestige\nof the U.K., will assist the U.K. in maintaining stability\nin the area and will reduce the need for direct action by the\nUnited States or other allied powers--provided that the Western\nattitude toward the area comes more and more to be regarded by\nthe states in the area as being in harmony with their basic\ninterests and that working arrangements for cooperation can be\ndeveloped.\nThe Middle East Command\n22, The MEC proposals are important not only as a means\nof developing collective strength to resist possible attack\nbut principally as a means of stimulating cooperation among the\nstates in the area and between these states and the West --\na development which should be helpful in increasing internal\nstability in the area.\n23. Despite the weakness of their military position,\nthe states of the area have learned neither the value of\nunity nor the collective strength they might attain by\nbanding together. Local rivalries divide the states, and\nthis political fragmentation militates against the devel-\nopment of regional cohesion and regional concepts. The\nArab League is a weak foundation upon which to build any\narea program, and would be weaker still if it were not held\ntogether by Arab antipathy toward Israel.\n24. The armed forces of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and\nIsrael have received some equipment from British and American\nsources and have benefitted in the past from military tutelage\nbut, in general, their standards are not comparable to Western\nones. The Arab Legion in Jordan has been well trained by the\nBritish and is of higher caliber than its Arab neighbors'\nforces. Though its strength is less than one divison, it\ndoes at least suggest what can be accomplished.\n25. Although political factors present serious obstacles\nto a coalition of forces in the near future, there is, even\nwithout coordinated action, an opportunity to build up mili-\ntary strength in individual countries and thus to enhance\ntheir internal stability as well as their powers of resistance\nto aggression. We should, therefore, attempt tostrengthen,\nin coordination with the British, French and Turks if possible,\nbut under bilateral arrangements if necessary, national armed\nNSC 129/1\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\n/ HAWRY TRUINER\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nforces where there are sound internal reasons for so doing,\nprimarily where there are economic, communication or base\nfacilities of strategic importance.\n26. Meanwhile, we should continue our efforts to lower\nsome of the political barriers which divide the area in order\nthat these states can participate in a Middle East defense\narrangement.\n27. If handled adroitly, the MEC could be used in various\nways to deal with the problem of maintaining and defending\nWestern interests in the area:\na. The acknowledgment by the United States of its\ninterest in the security of the area together with its\nreadiness to participate in the MEC should help to over-\ncome the fear of Soviet aggression in the area, and\nthereby help to build internal strength and strengthen\nthe will of the leadership and key local groups to resist\nSoviet aggression or subversion by local communist\nelements.\nb. The association of the U. S. with the U. K. in\nthe MEC should help to demonstrate the joint interests of\nthe U. S. and U. K. and thus lead to an increase of\nBritish prestige and respect for Western power, and might\nproduce a climate favorable for efforts to settle disputes.\nc. The principles underlying the MEC should help\nto satisfy the desire for \"equal treatment\" as a factor\naffecting relations between the states in the area and\nthe Western powers.\nd. Cooperation in the MEC on problems related to\nthe defense of the area as a whole against outside aggres-\nsion should tend to increase regional cooperation and\nunderstanding in other than military matters.\ne. Where the weakness of the present governments\nis a factor contributing to instability, the MEC should\nprovide opportunities to the Western powers for bolstering\nthese governments.\nThe accomplishments which may be reached through the instru-\nmentality of the MEC lead to the conclusion that its estab-\nlishment is a worth-while objective of the free world.\n28. Moreover, although the MEC is explicitly designed\nto meet external aggression, its greatest usefulness may\nNSC 129/1\n-.18 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP DECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nactually lie in the opportunity that it provides for\nstrengthening local military forces and their ties with the\nWest, a development which should have a politically stabilizing\neffect. The political trends that can now be foreseen in the\narea are such that the major role of such forces in the near\nfuture may be to maintain non-communist governments in power\nin certain countries. The use of Western forces assigned to\nthe MEC for this purpose would be contrary to the principles\nto which we publicly subscribed in connection with the Command.\nIt should be possible to develop local forces which would be\nreliable and which would be able to deal with internal problems.\nHowever, the possibility cannot be excluded that Western forces\nmight have to be used in exceptional circumstances such as\nthose envisaged by the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950.\n29. To bolster the likelihood of success of the Middle\nEast Command every appropriate effort should be made to secure\nat least token force contributions by Australia, New Zealand,\nand South Africa, and when practicable from Pakistan.\n30. Contributions to the MEC which are expected of mem-\nber states are not specified in the quadripartite statement of\nNovember 10, 1951, but are left for future negotiations. How-\never, it is clear that leadership and guidance must come from\nthe stronger members. From a U.S. military point of view this\narea continues to be a primary responsibility of the United\nKingdom where the use of military forces to further Western\ninterests is required. The extent to which the United States\ncan commit forces in this area is inextricably interwoven with\ncurrent world-wide commitments: defense of the Western Hemi-\nsphere, Western Europe, the Korean war, and so forth. Because\nof these commitments, the United States, during the current\ncold war period, will be able to contribute militarily to\nestablishment of this defense arrangement principally by\nfurnishing staff members, by providing limited amounts of mili-\ntary equipment, and by assigning training missions. However,\nif the indigenous states remain so distrustful of each other\nand of Great Britain that they will not join in a defense\narrangement and if they express a desire for other Allied token\nforce contributions as an essential component of a collective\narrangement, such a request must be considered. In particular,\nif the commitment of U.S. token forces in a Middle East defense\narrangement is seen to be the key to the establishment of such\nan arrangement and to the settlement of the dispute between\nthe United Kingdom and Egypt, the United States should be pre-\npared to commit token forces. In the event of a general war,\nU.S. forces will, of course, be deployed to meet the situation\nexisting at that time.\n-IISC 129/1\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET\nS AUBVH\nHARRY\nPHATIONAR\nARGHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nTOP SECRET\nGOVERNMENT\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSocial and Economic Problems in the Area\n31. These problems are of concern to the United States\nprimarily because of the political developments to which they\nmay lead. There is growing danger that the process of internal\npolitical change going on in these countries may lead to dis-\norder and to a situation in which regimes subject to the in-\nfluence or control of the Soviet Union could come to power.\n32. The task is thus not so much to prevent the changes\nthat now impend as to guide them into channels that will offer\nthe least threat to Western interests and the maximum assurance\nof independent regimes friendly to the West. To this end we\nshould seek to use the social and economic tools available to\nus in ways that will reduce the explosive power of forces\npressing for revolutionary change to the point where necessary\nchanges can be accomplished without uncontrollable instability.\nThis may often mean that we should work with and through the\npresent ruling groups and, while bolstering their hold on\npower, use our influence to induce them to accommodate them-\nselves as necessary to the new forces that are emerging. As\nnew leadership groups emerge, we should also work to associate\ntheir interests with our own and, if and when they gain power,\ncooperate with them in working out programs that will assist\nthem to attain constructive objectives--a course of develop-\nment which will tend to give a measure of moderation and\nstability to their regimes.\n33. Maximum results, at least in the next several years,\nwill probably be assured by programs directed towards meeting\ncertain aspirations of urban groups, which include both the\nleadership and principal supporters of the new political move-\nments in this area. In the economic field, however, such\nprograms may often have to be justified mainly on political\nrather than economic grounds. The greatest economic need in\nmost of these countries is usually for agricultural development,\nbut their aspirations--and, in particular the aspirations of\nthe urban groups-- are for industrial development, despite the\nscarcity of skills and resources necessary to make such develop-\nment economic.\n34. Provision for agricultural development is economi-\ncally sound and, in addition, it may be considered politically\nfar-sighted in this area today, for the peasantry, though now\npolitically passive, is not permanently immune to the sugges-\ntion that its lot might be greatly improved by a basic reorgan-\nization of society. Eventually, ambitious urban leadership\nNSC 129/1\n- 20 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ngroups may realize the advantages to be derived from exploit-\ning this potential source of mass discontent. This in turn\nmight some day lead to violent disorder and to the consequent\nloss of government control over parts of the countryside, which\nwould then offer a firm rural base, as in China, for a militant\ncommunist movement. It is desirable to try to anticipate such\npossible developments through programs designed to improve the\nlot of the still politically quiescent peasantry.\n35. Such programs should not, however, exclude the pro-\nvisions of funds for more politically urgent if less economi-\ncally sound programs directed at the rising political forces\nin the cities. It is difficult to define these projects in\nother than the most general terms, They should be designed,\nfor one thing, to improve employment opportunities in the\ncities--in so far as possible in fields of interest to the\nrising political groups. Increases in urban purchasing power\nwill also be helpful to small merchants, who are another sig-\nnificant element of these political movements. Such programs\nshould also provide for improved communications both because\nthe fertilization of other types of development depends on\nadequate transportation and because the means of communication\nat present available are insufficient for defense of the area.\n36. The psychological impact of these projects should\nalso be considered. In so far as possible, the projects should\nbe of a character which will develop pride of country and\nstrengthen the interests of these movements in political sta-\nbility. The effect on the Army, from both an economic and\npsychological standpoint, should also be considered. Examples\nof the kind of projects which might meet the above criteria\nare: public works, such as the construction of new government\nbuildings or army barracks; the establishment of planning\ncommissions charged with making basic surveys of many economic,\nsocial, and cultural aspects of national or regional life; the\nexpansion of health and educational facilities in key cities;\nand the provision of better transportation, communication, and\nproductive and power facilities. It will only be possible to\ndetermine what projects are suitable after field investigations.\nIn their work in these countries the U.S. missions should bear\nthese considerations in mind, and it should be our objective\nto use our assistance programs to shape and guide social and\neconomic developments in these countries in ways which will\nhelp us to attain our political goals.\n37. It is clear that, in developing and carrying out\nthese programs it will be necessary to make compromises betweem\nlong-term and short-term considerations. In the long-term, as\nNSC 129/1\n- 21 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP\nSECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nsuggested above, it is probable that the present ruling groups\nwill loose more of their power--unless they prove able to ad-\njust their outlook and to assume leadership of the changing\nsocial and economic and political development of their coun-\ntries. In the short-term, however, the West depends greatly\non these groups in certain countries for the maintenance of\nstability in the area, and will often find it necessary to\nwork with and through those men and groups who now exercise\npower, even though it may not be in full sympathy with them\nand may not expect that they will be able to retain such power\nover the long run.\n38. It will probably be necessary, if our programs are\nto be carried out successfully, to funnel a considerable amount\nof our economic assistance through these groups and so bolster\ntheir hold on power. Where this is necessary, our attempt\nshould be to modify the policies of these groups in ways de-\nsirable from the long-term point of view, but we should not\ndeliberately sacrifice important short-term interests because\nof our view as to what consititues the most desirable long-\nterm courses of development.\n39. The problem of leadership is fundamental. Our\nprincipal aim should be to encourage the emergence of competent\nleaders, relatively well-disposed toward the West, through pro-\ngrams designed for this purpose, including, where possible a\nconscious, though perhaps covert, effort to cultivate and aid\nsuch potential leaders, even when they are not in power. As\nthey come to power, we should work as closely with them as the\ntemper of their country will permit and should furnish them\nwhatever aid we usefully can. We must be prepared, however,\nfor the fact that they may not wish or be able to express any\novert good will toward, or to seek any explicit association\nwith, the West. The force of nationalism is too strong a\nmotivating element in the process of political change that is\nnow going on in these countries to be disregarded by any\nleadership which emerges from that process, however competent\nand responsible it may be. In our own interests we should not\nbe deterred by the xenophobic slogans which that leadership\nmay employ from doing whatever we can to bolster it in power\nwhere it appears to offer the best prospect of prolonged,\nstable, effective, non-communist government.\n40. In undertaking social and economic actions in the\narea, the United States should keep the British and, as neces--\nsary and desirable, other allied governments informed and\nshould seek to reach agreement with these governments on the\naims which the aid programs should be designed to accomplish.\nNSC 129/1\n- 22 -\nTOP SECRET\nANORIVES MATTONAL RECORDS AND\nSERVICE\"\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nThis is necessary to make the most effective use of their\ncapabilities in the area and to avoid working at cross pur-\nposes with them. It will, for the reasons indicated above,\nprobably be in the U.S. national interest to continue our pro-\ngrams of economic aid over the next several years to the\ncountries in the area. In carrying out both urban and rural\neconomic programs it may be desirable, within the context of\nthe political objectives outlined above, to concentrate on\npilot projects susceptible of having early and, if possible,\nregional application and on programs productive of tangible\nbenefits at an early date for as many people or key groups as\npossible.\n41. In providing military aid under MSA, it will be\nnecessary to develop adequate controls to prevent an arms race\nbetween the Arab States and Israel. We should explore ways\nand means of developing consultation and collaboration on\nsocial and economic problems among the states associated\nwith MEC, including Israel wherever possible, in order to\npromote cooperation on non-military enterprises of benefit\nto the region as a whole.\nThe Problem of Israel\n42. The United States has been viewed with growing dis-\ntrust by the Arab States in the last few years because of the\nresponsibility ascribed to it for the establishment of Israel\nas a nation. This increases the difficulties in attaining\nU.S. policy objectives in the area. Israel's immigration\npolicy, while temporarily more selective because of the ad-\nverse economic situation in that country, is still regarded\nby the Arabs as a direct threat to their security because it\nwill produce pressures within Israel for expansion to accommo-\ndate the influx of population. A genuine conflict of interests\nbetween the Arab States and Israel is involved. In order to\novercome Arab distrust of the United States it will be neces-\nsary at a minimum to use the political, economic and psycholo-\ngical tools at our command to show our concern for and in-\nterest in their problems and it may be necessary to use our\ninfluence to secure some modification of Israeli policies,\nparticularly the immigration policy. It is probable that Arab\ndistrust of Israel cannot be removed except over a long period\nof time. It would therefore be desirable for the United\nStates, without partiality as between Israel and the Arab\nstates in the political, economic, religious, psychological,\nsocial, and military matters, but consistent with strategic\nconsiderations, to utilize all feasible and appropriate means\nto resolve the issues which separate the Arab states and Israel\nand which give rise to animosity toward the United States.\nNSC 129/1\n- 23 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SEGRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nFundamental to the abatement of Arab distrust of the United\nStates and accommodation to the fact of Israel's existence\nare (a) progress toward a solution of a refugee problem in the\narea; (b) settlement of local Arab Israeli disputes, such as\nboundary problems, questions of water rights, and establishment\nof financial and economic arrangements between Israel and the\nArab States which would permit the resumption of commercial\nintercourse within and through the area, uninterrupted flow of\npetroleum products, and uninhibited operation of and access to\ninternal and international surface and air transport facilities;\n(c) modification of Israeli immigration policy in order to\nreduce possible pressures within Israel for expansion to accom-\nmodate the influx of population.\nPsychological Measures\n43, Other factors contributing to the reluctance of\nthe Arab States to identify their interests with those of the\nUnited States are (a) a growing tendency in the area to be-\nlieve that the United States gives unqualified support to the\nU.K.'s political and economic objectives in the area; (b) com-\nmunist propaganda to the effect that U.S. economic, political\nand military activities in these countries indicate an ambi-\ntion to dominate and exploit the area; and (c) a belief com-\nbining neutralist and defeatist tendencies that there is little\ndanger of Soviet aggression and that even should war come, the\nUnited States and its allies would not in any case be able to\nrepel an attack on the area. Changes in the attitudes can be\nassisted by an intensified psychological effort designed to\nsupport the various political, economic and military measures\nbeing undertaken by the United States in the area, though we\ncannot expect large results until and unless progress has been\nmade on the substantive problems. This effort can take ad-\nvantage of the good will engendered by U.S. philanthropic and\neducational agencies in the area.\n44. The objective of an intensified psychological effort\nshould be to show the peoples and governments of the area\nthat their interests and aspirations can best be furthered by\nassociation with the West and, conversely, defeated by per-\nmitting communism to increase in strength in the area. We\nshould seek to break down the association that has been created\nin their minds between the West and the principal obstacles,\nin and outside of their countries, to the fulfillment of their\nambitions and national impulses. At the same time, however,\nour psychological effort should seek to indicate the im-\npracticability, as well as the undesirability, of any efforts\nto carry out impending political changes in such a way and\nwith such rapidity as to destroy internal stability, eliminate\nNSC 129/1\n- 24 -\nTOP SEC RET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nWestern interests, and enhance the influence of the Soviet\nUnion or local communists. It should be made clear that the\nWest will resist such developments; that there are limits\nbeyond which it cannot go in permitting encroachments on its\ninterests in the area; and that the political prospects of\nany group favoring communism or the Soviet Union are dim. We\nshould thus seek, by both inducements and deterrents, to turn\nrising political forces from the more potentially threatening\nactivities to the pursuit of an internal position and external\nstatus which is in their interests and which we do not seek\nto oppose.\nNSC 129/1\n- 25 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS\nThreats to Western Interests\n45. U. S. interests and Western interests generally in\nthe Arab States and Israel are menaced by possible develop-\nments during a continuing cold war. The threats derive,\nin large part, from the fact that the traditional semi-feudal\nleadership of this area is being challenged by rising politi-\ncal forces, having their leadership and principal support in\nthe cities. These forces find the present rigid social and\neconomic systems and the oligarchical political rule in most\nof the countries inconsistent with their national and personal\nambitions. In the face of that challenge, the ruling groups\nseek to preserve their position by supporting, in some degree,\nthe nationalistic demands for elimination of Western interests\nwhich are the main political stock-in-trade of the rising\npolitical forces. The immediate threat is thus to such\nspecific Western interests as those in oil resources and the\nSuez Canal. The basic threat, however, is that this process\nof internal political change may lead to disorder and even-\ntually to a situation in which regimes oriented toward the\nSoviet Union could come to power. These threats are exacer-\nbated, and U.S. influence is diminished, by the Arab-Israeli\ntensions, which make solutions to many problems in the area\nmuch more difficult to find and work out than they would other-\nwise be.\n46. The over-all policy of the United States in the\nface of these threats should be to guide this process of\npolitical change, by a judicious combination of inducement and\ndeterrents, into channels that will effect the least compro-\nmise of Western interests and will offer the maximum promise\nof developing stable non-communist regimes. The problem of\nleadership is crucial. We should make full use of our mili-\ntary and economic programs and of special political measures\nto support, or develop, leaders whose maintenance in, or\nadvent to, power gives such promise. In addition to the fore-\ngoing the United States should utilize all feasible and\nappropriate means to resolve the issues which prevent the\nabatement of Arab distrust of Israel and resulting animosity\ntoward the United States.\nEgypt\n47. Settlement of the specific disputes involving\nEgypt and the U.K. is of key importance. If the dispute\nbetween Egypt and the U.K. can be settled, cooperation with\nNSC 129/1\n- 26 -\nTOP SECRET\nTHEATY\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTENT\nthe Arab States in the MEC and in other ways would be greatly\nfacilitated and the danger that Arab nationalism will\nviolently erupt in other Arab states will be greatly diminished.\nIf settlements of these problems are not achieved and if\ncontinuing deadlocks eventually weaken the present regimes,\nthe West may be confronted with a situation in which it will\nhave to accept the loss of these interests (and the chain\nreaction thus initiated in other countries in the area) or\nuse force to regain and hold its interests. This latter\ncourse would involve serious risks and, if followed, would\nlimit our ability to take action in other areas, such as\nSoutheast Asia, where these is actual or threatened communist\naggression.\n48. The United States should maintain its efforts to\ninduce the Egyptians to modify their positions with respect to\ntheir disputes with the U.K. The United States should con-\ntinue its efforts to arrive at a concert of views with the\nU.K. with respect to proposals which, while protecting basic\nWestern interests, might make possible early negotiated\nsettlements. If such a concert of views is obtained, we\nwould, of course, strongly support efforts for settlements on\nthat basis.\nU.S. and U.K. Roles in the Area\n49. The United States should take an increased share of\nresponsibility toward the area, in concert with the U.K. to\nthe greatest practicable extent, on the basis that:\na. The United States should be prepared to play\na larger role in safeguarding Western interests in the\narea, particularly by attempting to facilitate political\nsettlements among the nations of the area and between\nthem and the Western nations, and by providing appropriate\neconomic, technical and military assistance.\nb. The United States should, however, endeavor to\npersuade other nations, particularly the U.K. to pre-\nvide such armed forces as may be necessary and approp-\nriate to defend Western interests in the area.\nc. The special United States-Saudi Arabia arrange-\nments now existing should continue.\nMilitary Assistance and the Middle East Command\n50. Military aid, and in some instances military missions,\ncan be helpful in strengthening local forces both for the\nmaintenance of internal stability and also for defense against\nNSC 129/1\n- 27 -\nTOP SECRET\nAND\nLIVERS\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTHEST\npossible Soviet attack, as well as in influencing the course\nof political developments in these countries. While military\nassistance may in some instances have to be taken on a bi-\nlateral basis in order to avoid undue delay, we should take\nall practicable steps to establish the Middle East Command\nand continue our efforts to obtain the participation of the\nstates in the area in the Command. In the event of general\nwar, U.S. forces will, of course, be deployed to meet the\nsituation existing at that time.\n51. The United States should retain flexibility as to\nits role in defense of the area in the event of general war.\nHowever, the MEC can be an important means for dealing with\nthe problems of the cold war period as well as for the\nstrengthening of the area against possible Soviet attack.\nEvery effort should be made to obtain at least token force\ncontributions to the MEC from Australia, New Zealand, and\nSouth Africa, and when practicable from Pakistan. The United\nStates should be prepared to assign personnel to the staff of\nthe Command, and to provide training missions. If political\nand psychological measures prove inadequate to secure the\nestablishment of an ME defense arrangement and to settlement\nof the dispute between the U.K. and Egypt, and if the key to\nthe accomplishment of these objectives is seen to be the\nassignment of U.S. token forces to this arrangement, the\nUnited States should be prepared to assign such forces.\n52. A primary purpose of strengthening the indigenous\nmilitary forces of the states in the area is to assist in\nthe maintenance of internal stability. The use of Western\nforces assigned to the MEC for this purpose would be contrary\nto the principles underlying the MEC. However, the possibility\ncannot be excluded that in exceptional circumstances Western\nforces might have to be used within the area itself: In the\nevent of (a) forceful violation of the Arab-Israeli borders,\n(b) requests by legitimate governments for assistance in\nsuppressing communist uprisings, and (c) other situations\ninvolving serious threats to important Western interests. In\nallocating forces to the MEC, these possible contingencies\nshould be taken into account.\nEconomic, Social and Psychological Programs\n53. The primary purpose of our assistance programs is to\nguide, if possible, political developments in the area in ways\nwhich will involve least danger to Western interests and maxi-\nmum assurance of stable non-communist governments. This\nNSC 129/1\n- 28 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nshould be borne in mind in planning and carrying out our social\nand economic program. We should continue and possibly expand\nour programs of economic aid, including aid for the resettle-\nment of refugees. Because the rising (and threatening)\npolitical forces in the area have their leadership and main\nsupport in the cities, provision should be made in our economic\nprograms for projects which will tend to associate the inter-\nests of these urban forces with our own and to develop their\ninterests in political stability in their countries. We\nshould also focus much of our psychological effort on these\ngroups. We should intensify that effort with the dual aim\nof showing the governments and key groups of this area that\ntheir interests and aspirations can best be furthered by\nassociation with the West and that basic Western interests\nmust be respected. Both economic and psychological programs\nshould be designed to further and support our political and\nmilitary measures with the object of enabling the United\nStates to play a more effective role in shaping political\nchanges in these countries and in strengthening their\nability to resist subversion and aggression.\nHASPY U.S. AMERICAN TRUMAN DUVERNMENT RECORDS AND ORDER\nNSC 129/1\n- 29 -\nTUP SECRET\nTOP SECRE\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTRUMAN NATIONAL LIBRARY AND\nU.S.\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\n3545-STATE-1949\nMTG. 115"
}