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    "title": "National Security Council Report 113/1, Report to the National Security Council by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security on Government Employee Security Program",
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    "ocrText": "The President\nNSC 113/1\nCOPY NO. -\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTRUMAN PRATIONAL\nLERVICE\" SECURITY AND DERATT\nTHE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\non\nGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM\nMay 2, 1952\nWASHINGTON\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 113/1\nMay 2, 1952\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM\nDERVICE\nReference: NSC 113\nThe enclosed memorandum from the Chairman, Inter-\ndepartmental Committee.on Internal Security, together with\nits attached report on the subject, prepared by the ICIS\nwith the participation of the Civil Service Commission in\nresponse to the request of the President contained in NSC\n113, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National\nSecurity Council of the recommendations contained in the\nsecond and fifth paragraphs of the memorandum.\nAttention is invited to the dissent to the report\nby the Department of Defense which is contained in Appendix\nItem 3 thereof.\nIf the recommendations contained in the enclosed\nmemorandum are adopted, it is recommended that they be\nsubmitted to the President with the recommendation that he\napprove them; refer the enclosure to the Director, Bureau\nof the Budget, for issuance of an executive order along\nthe lines set forth in the Recommendations on pages 28\nthrough 36 of the report; and direct the Civil Service\nCommission and the ICIS to undertake the study referred to\nin the fifth paragraph of the enclosed memorandum as a\nbasis for further recommendations to the President.\nJAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\ncc: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Acting Attorney General\nThe Acting Director of Defense Mobilization\nThe Chairman, Civil Service Commission\nThe Director, Bureau of the Budget\nNSC 113/1\nINTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\n2107 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.\nICIS-P67/22\nApril 29, 1952\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne\nNSC Representative on Internal Security\nABORIVED GOVERNMENT DERVICED \"EXTIONAL TRUMAN AND LIBRARY\nSUBJECT:\nGovernment Employee Security Program (NSC 113)\nReference is made to your memorandum of July 17, 1951, referring\nNSC 113 to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. As\nyou know, NSC 113 consists of a copy of the President's letter of\nJuly 14, 1951, to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council,\nand an accompanying note to NSC by the Executive Secretary dated July 16,\n1951. In his letter the President requested the National Security\nCouncil, utilizing the ICIS, and with the participation of the Civil\nService Commission, to make an investigation of the way the Government\nEmployee Security Program is being administered, and to advise him of\nchanges believed to be required. The President also requested that\nconsideration be given to whether provision should be made for uniform\nstandards and procedures and for central review of the decisions made\nin the various departments and agencies.\nIn accordance with the President's request, the ICIS with the\nparticipation of the Civil Service Commission has prepared for the\nconsideration of the National Security Council the enclosed report\ndated April 29, 1952. The ICIS and the Civil Service Commission\nrecommend the issuance of an Executive Order along the lines set forth\nin the recommendations on pages 28 through 36 of the enclosed report.\nThis recommendation is unanimous except for certain changes desired by\nthe Department of Defense which were not acceptable to the other depart-\nments on ICIS and the Civil Service Commission. The dissent by the\nDepartment of Defense is contained in Appendix Item 3 of the report.\nWith reference to the proposal by the Department of Defense for\nsubstitution of the standards set forth in subparagraph a, pages 30\nand 31, except for the first paragraph thereof, the State, Justice and\nTreasury members of ICIS desire to observe that the standards now con-\ntained in the report are sufficiently broad and general in nature so\nas to allow the Department of Defense or any other agency to continue\nto employ the more specific standards proposed by that Department.\nSimilarly, with regard to the addition desired by the Department of\nDefense to the recommendation pertaining to adverse actions against\nemployees, the language now used in the report is not inconsistent\ntherewith and 1s of sufficient scope to allow the requirements outlined\nby that Department or any other agency regarding oral contact with an\nemployee prior to the decision on whether or not to issue charges.\nA review of the enclosed report will indicate the present confused\nsituation which exists by reason of the fact that there are three general\nprograms now in existence in the Federal Service under which employment\nmay be denied or employees may be suspended or removed from the Service.\nThese general programs relate to \"suitability,\" \"security,\" and \"loyalty.\"\nThe ICIS believes it will be clear from a perusal of the report that it\nis extremely difficult, if not impossible, to draw clear lines of demar-\ncation among these programs. This is particularly true in the case of\n\"employee security,\" inasmuch as the characteristics of individuals which\nmake them \"security risks\" very often coincide with or approximate those\nfactors relating to \"disloyalty\" and those relating to general suitability\nfor employment in the Federal Service.\nIn view of the complexities incident to a satisfactory solution\nof these problems, the ICIS submits its report and makes its recommenda-\ntions within the framework of the three existing programs. Nevertheless,\nthe ICIS is unanimously of the opinion that a detailed study should be\nmade of these three programs looking toward evolving a single general\nprogram to cover eligibility for employment in the Federal Service,\nwhether on grounds of loyalty, security, or suitability. A study of\nthis nature should result in recommendations which will eliminate the\nconfusion which currently exists and which, while adequately protecting\nthe interests of the government, will also assure fair and equitable\ntreatment to applicants and employees. In the event NSC agrees that\nsuch a study should be made, the ICIS suggests that it be conducted by\nan appropriate group under the general auspices of the Civil Service\nCommission and the ICIS with equal representation from sensitive and\nnon-sensitive agencies in the executive branch.\nPending completion of the type of study recommended above, the\nsolution submitted herewith should serve to eliminate some of the\ndifficulties which prompted the President's letter of July 14, 1951,\nand to assure that these programs are being properly administered,\nboth from the standpoint of protecting the security interests of the\nGovernment and that of protecting the basic rights of employees.\n/s/ Raymond P. Whearty\nRaymond P. Whearty\nChairman, Interdepartmental Committee on\nInternal Security\n2\nREPORT TO\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nFROM\nINTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\nCONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JULY 14, 1951\nREGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE\nGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM\nSCIRUMAN ANCHIVES \"NATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY\nGOVERNMENT\nApril 29, 1952\nWashington, D. C.\nI - INTRODUCTION\nIn a letter dated July 14, 1951 to the Executive Secretary, National\nSecurity Council, the President expressed concern with the administration\nof \"...provisions of existing law which authorize the heads of the various\ndepartments and agencies to discharge Government employees, or to refuse\nGovernment employment to applicants, on the ground that they are poor security\nrisks.\" The President further stated: \"If these provisions of law are to\nachieve their purpose of protecting the security of the Government without\nunduly infringing on the rights of individuals, they must be administered with\nthe utmost wisdom and courage.\" He asked that the National Security Council,\nthrough its Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and with the\nparticipation of the Civil Service Commission, investigate the way the Govern-\nment Employee Security Program is being administered and \"advise me what\nchanges are believed to be required.\" The President concluded: In\nparticular, I should like consideration given to whether provision should be\nmade for uniform standards and procedures and for central review of the deci-\nsions made in the various departments and agencies.\"\nIn accordance with the President's letter this report was prepared by\nthe ICIS with the collaboration of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly,\nwhere hereinafter the term ICIS is used, it should be understood to include\nparticipation by the Civil Service Commission.\nHARRY U.S. AMORIVES TRAVIONAL TRUMAN STRVICE\" Renniss AND UNITED\n1/ Attached as Item 1 of Appendix\n2\nII - - SCOPE OF ASSIGNMENT\nIn his letter to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council,\nthe President referred to the \"Government Employee Security Program.\"\nAs a matter of fact, there is no single employee security program applicable\nto all Federal departments and agencies, in the sense in which there is\na Federal Employee Loyalty Program. Rather, there are individual depart-\nment and agency security programs, based upon various laws and sections of\nlaws and, in some instances, with no specific statutory basis.\nThe ICIS has concluded from the terms of the President's letter that\nits assignment related primarily to the effects of employee security pro-\ngrams upon individuals without detriment to the security of the Government.\nAlthough employee loyalty is one aspect of the broader subject of\nemployee security, the ICIS has not considered that this assignment\nincludes the Federal Employee Loyalty Program. That Program and its\nadministration has, therefore, been excluded from this investigation\nand study.\nSubject to these limitations, it has been considered that this\nHARRY AROMISS HNATIONAL IRUMAN RETORDS AND LIBERRY\nassignment included:\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\n(1) Investigation of the administration of agency programs\nrelating to denial of employment, and suspension, removal\nand other adverse actions taken against employees, in\nthe interest of national security.\n3\n(2) Determination as to the desirability of uniform standards\nand procedures to govern agency employee security programs.\n(3) Determination as to the desirability of providing for central\nreview of agency decisions in employee security cases.\n(4) Making recommendations on these and related questions.\nIII - INVESTIGATION OF THE PROGRAM\nSTATE ANCHIVES TRUMAN \"MATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY\nA. Scope and Method\nGOVERNMENT\nThe ICIS through its Ad Hoc Group on the Government Employee Security\nProgram took the following steps in the course of its investigation:\n1. Reviewed Public Law 733, 81st Congress and other statutes giving\ndepartments and agencies authority for personnel security programs.\n2/\n2. Addressed a letter to all departments and major agencies (except\nthose named in Public Law 733) asking questions to determine which depart-\nments and agencies had established personnel security programs. Replies\nwere analyzed to determine which departments and agencies should be invited\nto send representatives to meet with the Committee,\n3. Held extensive discussions with representatives of 20 departments\nand agencies, of which twelve have some kind of specific statutory authority\nfor security programs and eight do not, These officers described their\npolicies and procedures in considerable detail and were questioned closely.\nSuch other officials as Mr. Robert Ramspeck, Chairman, Civil Service Com-\nmission; Mr. Arthur S. Flemming of the Office of Defense Mobilization;\nand Mr. Harold Benson of the staff of the Commission on Internal Security\nand Individual Rights also gave the Committee the benefit of their judgment.\n4. Analyzed and discussed twelve individual cases in which citizens\nalleged that their individual rights had been violated through denial or\n2/ Attached as Item 2 of Appendix.\n4\ntermination of employment under security programs. These cases were\nreferred to the Committee by the Commission on Internal Security and\nIndividual Rights or by the Executive Secretary of the National Security\nCouncil.\nB. Legal Background\n(1) Specific Statutes\nThere are several Federal statutes which authorize the removal, or\nprohibit the employment, of persons because they are so-called \"security\nrisks.\" Some of the Statutes give direct authority to agency heads to\nremove employees in the interest of national security. Other statutes\nprohibit access by employees to information or property unless they are\ndetermined to be of unquestionable reliability for security purposes.\nStill other statutes prohibit the continued employment or hiring of persons\nunless there has been an FBI investigation and an evaluation of the\ninformation obtained as a result of such investigation.\nThe one general statute authorizing suspensions and removals of\nUNITED\nsecurity risks is Public Law 733, 80th Congress. This statute is specifi-\nGOVERNMENT\ncally applicable to eleven Federal departments and agencies, i.e., State,\nJustice, Commerce, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Atomic\nEnergy Commission, National Security Resources Board, and the National\nAdvisory Committee on Aeronautics. In addition, the President has the\npower to extend the authority to other departments and agencies of the\nGovernment. Pursuant to that authority, the President by Executive Order\n10237 has made it applicable to the Panama Canal Company and the Canal\nZone Government.\n3/ Pending legislation would transfer this investigative responsibility\nto the Civil Service Commission.\n5\nPublic Law 733 gives the agencies within its scope authority to suspend\nand remove employees \"where deemed necessary in the interest of national\nsecurity.\" It made permanent and extended the temporary authority that had\nbeen granted to certain agencies by Public Law 671, 76th Congress and Public\nLaw 808, 77th Congress. However, Public Law 733 accords the employee more\nprocedural rights than its predecessors. Under Public Laws 671 and 808,\nthe employee had merely the right to appear personally and be informed of\nthe reasons for removal-which information was not required to be in writing\n-and the right to submit statements or affidavits as to why he should not\nbe removed. Public Law 733 gives the employee the additional right of a\nwritten statement of charges, a hearing, and in the event of an adverse\ndecision, a review of his case by the agency head or official designated\nby him. Further, it gives him the right to go to the Civil Service Com-\nmission to determine his eligibility for employment in other agencies of\nthe Government.\nThe Atomic Energy Commission, although covered by Public Law 733,\nbases its security program upon the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of\n1946. That Act provides that it shall be the policy of the Commission to\ncontrol the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner \"as to assure\nthe common defense and security\" and requires that no individual be employed\nby the Commission before the FBI has made an investigation and report on\nthe character, associations, and loyalty of the individual. It further\nprovides that to the extent the Commission deems such action necessary,\npersonnel can be employed without regard to the civil service laws, but\nrequires the Commission to make adequate provision for administrative\nreview of any determination to dismiss an employee.\n6\nTRUMAN UNITIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY\nThe National Security Act of 1947 gives the Director of the Central\nIntelligence Agency the authority to terminate the employment of any officer\nor employee of the agency whenever he deems such termination \"necessary or\nadvisable in the interests of the United States.\" It further provides that\nsuch termination shall not affect the right of the officer or employee to\naccept employment in other departments if declared eligible by the Civil\nService Commission.\nThe Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 prohibits the employment of any\ncitizen or resident, or the continuation of employment over 90 days, unless\nthe person has been investigated by the FBI as to \"loyalty and security\"\nand the Administrator has certified that he believes the \"individual is\nloyal to the United States, its Constitution, and form of Government, and\nis not now and never has been a member of any organization advocating con-\ntrary views.\" The Economic Cooperation Administration was abolished by\nthe Mutual Security Act of 1951 and its functions transferred to the Mutual\nSecurity Agency. That Act contains comparable security clearance provisions\nThe National Science Foundation Act of 1950 provides that no employee\nof the Foundation shall be permitted to have access to information or\nproperty to which access restrictions have been established until an FBI\ninvestigation has been made and the Foundation shall have determined that\npermitting such individual to have access to such information or property\n\"will not endanger the common defense and security.\"\nThe Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 requires the Administrator to\nestablish security requirements, including restrictions with respect to\naccess to information and property as he deems necessary. It further pro-\nvides that no employee shall be permitted access to information or property\n7\nuntil it has been determined that no information is contained in the files\nof any Government investigative agency indicating that the employee is of\nquestionable \"loyalty or reliability for security purposes\" or if such\ninformation is disclosed, until a full field investigation has been made\nby the FBI, and there has been an evaluation of the information by the\nAdministrator. In addition, it provides that no person shall occupy any\nposition determined by the Administrator to be of \"critical importance from\nthe standpoint of national security\" until there has been a full field in-\nvestigation by the FBI and an evaluation of the report of such investigation\nby the Administrator.\nThe United States Information and Educational Act of 1948 requires\nemployees falling under the purview of that Act to be investigated by the\nFBI and prohibits the disclosure of information or knowledge where such dis-\nclosure is inconsistent with the \"security\" of the United States. Other\nstatutes require an FBI investigation of new employees of the Institute of\nInter-American Affairs, representatives and delegates to the World Health\nOrganization and International Labor Organization, and persons administering\nassistance to Greece and Turkey, assistance to economically undeveloped areas,\nand relief to countries devastated by the war. Although the State Department\nis included under Public Law 733, its 1952 Appropriation Act contains the\nso-called McCarran rider which authorizes the Secretary of State in his\n\"absolute discretion\" to terminate the employment of any employee of the\nState Department or the Foreign Service whenever he deems such termination\n\"necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.\" The same\napplies to the Department of Commerce.\n8\nOf all the foregoing statutes, it should be noted that only Public\nLaw 733 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 give the employee any procedural\nrights for the review of his case.\n(2) General Authorities\nDepartments and agencies which do not have specific statutory authority\nto suspend or remove employees in security cases must rely on the Employee\nLoyalty Program and the regular civil service procedures in suspending or\nremoving employees who are considered to be security risks.\nIn the case of veterans, however, suspensions and removals under\nregular civil service procedures are subject to the limitations contained\nin the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944. This Act requires 30 days\nHARRY \"NATIONAL TRUMAN\nadvance notice of removals or of suspensions for more than 30 days and\nU.S.\nSERVICE\npermits a veteran to appeal to the Civil Service Commission either on\nGOVERNMENT\nprocedural grounds or upon the merits of his case, Under Public Law 325,\n80th Congress, the Commission's decision in a veteran's case is mandatory\nupon the department or agency. The Veterans' Preference Act is not appli-\ncable to actions taken under Public Law 733 and other acts which vest final\nremoval authority in the head of the department or agency.\nC. Agency Procedures\nDepartments and agencies that take action under Public Law 733 must of\ncourse meet the procedural requirements of that law. Employees whose re-\nmoval in the interest of national security is proposed must be given a\nwritten statement of charges, opportunity to reply, a hearing, and a final\ndecision by the head of the department or agency.\nOf the eleven agencies covered by Public Law 733, eight have issued\nwritten regulations establishing formalized procedures for the handling of\n9\nsecurity cases, while three agencies have issued no regulations. All of the\neight with formalized procedures require that the hearing accorded the\nemployee by Public Law 733 be before a board. Several of those agencies\nprovide for the simultaneous adjudication of questions of both loyalty\nand security where the security aspects of the case arise out of the type\nof derogatory information which may also raise a question as to loyalty under\nExecutive Order 9835. Some of them have described in writing the types\nof derogatory information which indicate that an employee may be a security\nrisk.\nThe Atomic Energy Commission, under provisions of the Atomic Energy\nAct authorizing denial of access to restricted data, has established a\nprocedure covering AEC employees and applicants and employees and applicants\nof contractors. The procedure consists of a notice to the individual,\nopportunity to reply, a board hearing, decision by the manager of the local\ninstallation, right of appeal to a Personnel Security Board in Washington,\nand final decision by the General Manager.\nTRUMAN\nOf the other agencies which have statutory authority for personnel\nHARRY\n\"NATION\nMICHINES Alto\nRECORDS\nsecurity programs, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, Economic\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nCooperation Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency also have\nformalized procedures which provide for hearings for employees before\nboards, although not required to do so by statute. The National Science\nFoundation, which is newly established and has a very small staff, has not\nyet issued personnel security procedures.\nDepartments and agencies which do not have statutory authority for\npersonnel security programs and which desire to remove from employment\n10\npersons they consider security risks, must proceed either under the loyalty\nprogram to the extent that it is applicable, or under the civil service\nlaws and regulations governing suitability for continued employment.\nA number of agencies which do not have specific statutory authority\nfor security programs but which have designated security officers and\nsensitivepositions do find it necessary to deny employees access to classi-\nfied security information. In cases where this means reassignment or demc-\ntion there is generally not a hearing or other formal proceeding. In cases\nwhere removal of the employee is considered necessary, this is done on the\nground of suitability for employment under the regular civil service\nremoval procedures. Three of these agencies have set up boards to recom-\nmend action on personnel security questions. Eight of them have prepared\npersonnel security regulations of some kind.\nD. Observations Resulting from Review of Procedures and of Cases\nIn the course of its inquiry the ICIS did not undertake to question\nsubstantive decisions of department or agency heads in individual security\ncases reviewed by it. The Committee concerned itself with standards and\nprocedures with reference both to protection of the national security and\nto protection of the individual rights of citizens. The department and\nagency officials who met with the Committee's Ad Hoc Group demonstrated\nan earnest and constructive desire to achieve both ends.\nThe investigation has revealed, however, certain deficiencies which\nreact to the disadvantage of employees and applicants, resulting from\n4/ See page 14 of this report.\n11\ndiverse legal authorities, from the failure of numerous departments and\nagencies to formalize personnel security procedures in writing, from lack\nof a uniform approach among departments and agencies, and from slow or\nill-considered administrative action. These problems may be listed more\nspecifically as follows:\n1. Statutes which form the basis for the employee security programs\nin the various departments and agencies do not provide in a uniform manner\nfor pre-employment or pre-assignment investigations for sensitive positions,\nor for disposition of employees who are denied access to classified material\non security grounds.\n2. There are no uniform government-wide definitions of such key terms\nas \"national security,\" or \"sensitive position.\" This has resulted, in\nthe judgment of the Committee, in some positions being designated as sensi-\ntive which bear no reasonable relationship to any objective concept of\nthe national security. It has resulted also in a tendency to stigmatize\nas \"security risks\" some employees or applicants who might more properly\nhave been considered merely unsuitable for government employment.\nEXCONDE AND UBREAT\n3. Instances were reported in which appointing officers suspended\nemployees immediately upon receipt of incomplete derogatory information\nand in which serious consideration should have been given to whether any\nreal risk to national security would have resulted from keeping the em-\nployees on the job, at least until the investigation had been completed\nand all the information evaluated.\n4. The Committee also learned of some cases in which statements of\ncharges were so vaguely and generally written as to render any intelligent\nreply or defense on the part of the employee impossible.\n12\n5. In view of the lack or inadequacy of time limits stated in secur-\n5/\nity legislation, security cases tend to drag on. Some cases have been\nstudied which took as long as six to twelve months before a decision was\nmade. This is particularly true in large decentralized departments where\ncases are forwarded through various administrative channels.\n6. Several agencies have not reduced their procedural steps for\nsecurity determinations to writing. As a result, procedurally, security\ncases are handled on an individual basis by security officers and admin-\nistrative officers. Even with restraint and good intentions, this results\nin lack of uniformity and application of uneven standards.\n7. No agency provides as part of its security adjudication procedures\nfor review of a case involving the demotion of an employee which occurs\nby virtue of denial of security clearance and the resultant necessity of\nmoving the employee to a non-sensitive position.\n8. The Committee has observed a tendancy in some agencies for\nadministrative or security officers to confront employees with derogatory\ninformation in a manner which coerces them into resigning.\n9. There has been a tendency for employees who transfer from one\ndepartment or agency to another to be subjected to repeated investigations\nand clearances. An opposite but equally important facet of this same\nproblem is the fact that some persons who have been denied employment\nor whose employment has been terminated on the grounds that they are\n5/ Public Law 733 provides a 30-day deadline for issuance of charges\nfollowing suspension (plus 30 more days if charges are amended) but\nsets no time limits for adjudication of cases. Other security\nstatutes provide no time limits whatever.\n13\nsecurity risks in one agency do not obtain objective consideration in\nanother agency where conceivably there would be no basis for considering\nthem as security risks.\n10. There is no provision for a central review of removal actions\nagainst employees on security grounds.\n11. There is a tendency in many departments and agencies to promise\njobs to and in some instance to appoint applicants for sensitive positions\nprior to necessary inquiry.\nIV - - CONCLUSIONS\nSTATE AMOUNT AND THETIONAL income TRUNAH Nio LIBRARY\nGOVERNMENT\n1. An employee security program must be limited to the legitimate\ninterests of national security. Section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912\n(Lloyd-LaFollette Act) provides for the suspension and removal of employees\nfrom the classified service \"for such cause as will promote the efficiency\nof such service.\" Historically, the rules and regulations of the Civil\nService Commission have provided that appointment in the competitive service\nmay be denied to applicants for a number of reasons. These reasons, which\nare generally referred to as relating to \"suitability,\" are listed in\nsection 2.104 of the Commission's regulations. They include the standard\nwhich is prescribed in Executive Order 9835 to govern denial of or removal\nfrom employment on the grounds of loyalty. The same grounds which justify\ndenial of appointment in the competitive civil service will also justify\nremoval of an employee from that service.\n14\nIt may be seen, therefore, that even in the absence of an employee\nsecurity program or security legislation, a person may be denied employment,\nor removed from employment, in the Federal civil service for a number of\nreasons. This has led many persons to question the need for a formal\n\"security\" program, superimposed on the existing programs relating to\nloyalty and suitability. It is the opinion of the Committee that an\nemployee security program is justified, within limits, in order to afford\nthe fullest possible protection to the national security. A program such\nas may be established under Public Law 733, affords the necessary authority\nto agency heads for getting questionable employees quickly out of sensitive\npositions when other remedies are not available. It also permits appro-\npriate action to be taken to protect the Government against persons who\nmay knowingly or unknowingly endanger the national security even though\nthere may not be \"reasonable doubt\" as to their loyalty.\nAn employee security program, as in the case of the Employee Loyalty\nProgram, is a special program which can be justified in these times. As\nsuch, it must be applied only to the extent required \"in the interest of\nnational security.\" Further, it is not required as, nor should it become,\na substitute for the programs which have been established to handle cases\nof applicants or employees of doubtful loyalty or doubtful suitability.\nNot all departments and agencies of the Government will have need of\nan employee security program since the national security, in the sense con-\ntemplated, will not be involved in their operations. Public Law 733 provides\nauthority to suspend and remove employees \"in the interest of the national\nsecurity.\" This authority 1s limited to those departments and agencies named\ntherein, and to such other departments and agencies as may be designated by\n15\nthe President \"in the best interests of national security.\" Obviously, it\nwas the intention of the Congress to limit the application of that authority\nto those departments and agencies whose employees, in the performance of\ntheir duties, might be in position to endanger or compromise the national\nsecurity. The term \"national security\" is not defined in the law. It is\nclear, however, that the term does not relate to all functions and activities\nof the Federal Government; if so, the law would have been made applicable\nto all departments and agencies. In a general sense, it appears that\n\"national security\" as used in Public Law 733 relates to the ability of the\ncountry to protect and defend itself against hostile or destructive action,\novert or covert, including enemy military action. (See definition, page 28)\nAny act, or failure to act, which would have the effect of weakening or\ncompromising this ability can be said to endanger the national security.\nAny department or agency whose functions are such that acts, or failures\nto act, on the part of employees would have this effect will have need of\nan employee security program.\nOn the other hand, acts or failures to act which would have no direct\nbearing upon the ability of the country to protect and defend itself against\nhostile or destructive action, cannot be said to endanger the national\nsecurity. This is true even though such act, or failure to act, may be a\nbreach of confidence or trust; may cause embarrassment to a department or\nagency of the Government, or to a Government official or officials, or to\nprivate citizens; may cause financial loss to the Government or unjust en-\nrichment of a person or persons; or may endanger a non-security program of the\nGovernment. Thus many departments and agencies are responsible for functions which, /\n16\nwhile they are intimately connected with the welfare and happiness of the\npeople of this country, are not directly related to the national security\nas that term is used in connection with an employee security program.\nFurthermore, even in those departments and agencies which have need of\nan employee security program, not all positions in the department or agency\nwill necessarily be concerned with the \"national security,\" and therefore\nnot all employees will be in a position to compromise or endanger the\nnational security. The program must be applicable only with respect to\nthose positions, which may be designated as \"sensitive positions,\" whose\nTRUMAN\nincumbents might be in position to endanger the national security.\nThese facts will serve to limit an employee security program to:\nENTRIPY MACHIVED AND REVERNMENT PRATIONAL DEBANK\n(1) Those departments or agencies, or parts thereof, whose functions are\nconcerned with the \"national security\"; (2) Those positions which may be\ndesignated as \"sensitive\"; and (3) Those adverse actions against employees\nin or applicants for sensitive positions which cannot appropriately be taken\neither under the loyalty program or for reasons of general suitability under\ncivil service rules and regulations.\n2. Desirable uniformity among departments and agencies with employee\nsecurity programs can best be achieved if these programs are all based upon\nthe same legal authority. At the present time there are many different pro-\nvisions of law which can be construed to form the basis for employee security\nprograms in various departments and agencies. The most significant of these\nis Public Law 733, 81st Congress, which authorizes suspensions and removals\n\"in the interest of national security.\" This Act is specifically applicable\nto eleven Federal departments and agencies, and it contains a provision\n17\nGOVERNMEN ANDIATIONAL SERVICE AUTORDS TRUMAN\npermitting its extension to \"such other departments and agencies of the\nGovernment as the President may, from time to time, deem necessary in the\nbest interests of national security.\"\nThe other provisions of law which may form the basis for employee\nsecurity programs generally apply to individual agencies. In general, these\nprovisions of law relate to the necessity for investigations either by the\nFBI or the Civil Service Commission, before individuals may be employed in\nthe agency, or in what might be termed \"sensitive positions\" in the agency.\nWith the exception of the authority applicable to the Central Intelligence\nAgency, they do not contain the specific authorizations to suspend or remove\nemployees \"in the interest of national security\" which are contained in\nPublic Law 733. Nor do they contain the specific protections to the employee\nin terms of notice, reply and hearing which are contained in Public Law 733.\nThe Committee believes that those agencies which have need of an em-\nployee security program should each have the same basic legal authority\nupon which to establish such a program. This is the best way to assure\nsuch uniformity in the administration of the programs as may be desirable.\nWith respect to employees, Public Law 733 contains the necessary elements\nfor a personnel security program which can protect the legitimate interests\nof the national security and at the same time guarantee certain basic rights\nto employees. It permits summary suspension, which makes possible prompt\nremoval of employees from sensitive positions, when the interests of national\nsecurity require. On the other hand, it contains procedural safeguards which\nassure that the employee will have his \"day in court\" before he is removed\nfrom the rolls on security grounds. Further, the President may extend its\n18\nprovisions to any department or agency requiring them, in the best interests\nof national security.\n3. The heads of agencies in which an employee security program has\nheretofore been or is hereafter authorized should be responsible for the\nadministration of the program and for the establishment of procedures, in\naccordance with prescribed minimum standards. The head of each department\nand agency of the Government should be responsible for determining whether\nthere are sensitive positions in his department or agency, using a uniform\ndefinition of \"sensitive position\" in making such determination.\nWhere such a program is authorized, the head of the department or agency\nshould be responsible for prescribing procedures which will protect the Govern-\nment and at the same time safeguard to the fullest practicable extent the\nrights of applicants and employees. Recommended minimum standards in this\nrespect are contained in the \"Recommendations\" part of this report.\n4. There should be provision for a central review of procedures estab-\nlished by department and agency heads for the administration of an employee\nsecurity program, to determine compliance with prescribed minimum standards.\nThe best method of assuring that procedures for the administration of an\nemployee security program in a department of agency comply with prescribed\nminimum standards is to require that they be reviewed by a central body either\nbefore or after being issued. It is not intended to imply that such central\nreview will be for any purpose other than determining compliance with\n19\nminimum standards to be prescribed by the President for an employee security\nprogram. Nor is it intended that the body assigned this review function\nhave authority to prescribe additional rules or regulations which may be\nbinding upon departments and agencies.\nIt appears both reasonable and practicable that the Civil Service\nCommission should be designated as the body to review and advise departments\nand agencies concerning their procedures under the employee security program.\n5. There should be provision for a limited central review of decisions\nof department and agency heads to terminate employees on security grounds.\nIn his letter to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, the\nFresident expressly asked that consideration be given to whether provision\nshould be made for central review of decisions made in the various departments\nand agencies under employee security programs. The ICIS has given serious\nconsideration to this question and to the implications involved therein. It\nhas reached the conclusion that provision for appeal to some central body from\nremoval decisions in security cases is desirable and in the public interest\nfrom the standpoint of assuring that the employee has been given his proce-\ndural rights and has had a fair opportunity to be heard, and that the decision\nof the agency head is supported by substantial evidence, i.e. that it is sup-\nported by such relevant evidence, more than a mere scintilla, such as a reason\nable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion even though the\nreviewing agency is of the opinion that it would have reached a different con-\nclusion had it passed on the matter originally.\nHowever, since only the department or agency involved is thoroughly\nfamiliar with the nature of the work and the security requirements of a given\nsensitive position and since the department or agency head is responsible\nfor the security of his organization, the Committee considers that the\nfinal authority for the decision in a security case must remain with the\n20\nHARRY AREKINES TRUMAN \"NAZIONAL available RECEIVED AHD LIBRAST\ndepartment or agency head. While an appeal for an opinion should be per-\nmitted to a central body in any removal case, the responsibility of that\nbody should be limited to advising the agency concerned as to whether in its\nopinion the employee has been given his procedural rights and has been given\na fair opportunity to be heard, and whether the decision is supported by\nsubstantial evidence as herein defined. When it advises in favor of the\nemployee on any of these issues, the central body should submit its\nopinion to the department or agency head, for final action by him. Pro-\nvision for central review of removal decisions under these conditions\ncannot have an adverse effect upon the employee security requirements of\na department or agency which observes minimum standards in handling\nsecurity determinations. It will, however, tend to protect employees\nagainst arbitrary, capricious, or procedurally deficient removal actions\non security grounds and thus be in the public interest.\nThe Committee has considered whether a new appellate body should be\ncreated to review appealed removal decisions in security cases or whether\na present existing body operating in the appellate field would be more\nappropriate. The Committee concludes that the Civil Service Commission\nwould be the most logical body to accept employee appeals from removal actions\non security grounds for the following reasons:\na. Public Law 733 provides that termination of employment there-\nunder shall not affect the right of an officer or employee to\nseek or accept employment in any other department or agency of\nthe government. It further provides that the Civil Service\nCommission shall have the authority to determine whether such\n21\nperson is eligible for employment by any other department\nor agency of the government. It is therefore contemplated\nby Public Law 733 that in cases in which individuals have\nbeen removed under that law for security reasons the Com-\nmission will review the case and determine whether the affected\nemployee may be employed elsewhere in the government. Such\ndetermination cannot be made by any other department, agency,\nor body, and it is prerequisite to employment of any such\nindividual by any other department or agency.\nb. Some departments and agencies operating under Public Law 733\nare now processing loyalty cases simultaneously as both\nloyalty and security cases. The charges given the individual\nare under both Public Law 733 and Executive Order 9835 as\namended, and the hearing is joint, serving both for adjudication\nof loyalty and security. Separate determinations are made with\nrespect to loyalty and security. There is, however, a right of\nappeal from an adverse loyalty finding to the Loyalty Review\nBoard of the Civil Service Commission. It would therefore\nseem unwise to provide a new and different body to which an\nappeal could be taken from an adverse security finding, thereby\nmultiplying the avenues of appeal. It would seem more legical\nto afford an employee an appeal from an adverse finding on\nsecurity simultaneously with his appeal from an adverse finding\non loyalty; or, where there is no adverse finding on loyalty,\nto the same body which would handle a loyalty appeal. In this\n22\nmanner, where both loyalty and security are involved, each of\nthese matters could be disposed of in one appeal, and, in\naddition, a finding could be made as to the individual's eligi-\nbility for other Federal employment.\n6. Care must be exercised to assure that employees are not coerced\ninto resigning. A resignation is a voluntary act, to be exercised by an\nemployee at his own choice. This applies in cases in which there is a\nsecurity question to the same degree as in other cases. Therefore, depart-\nment and agency officials must be careful to avoid coercing an employee\ninto resigning. Rather, the employee should be fully informed of all his\nrights and should not be influenced as to the course he will take. While\nthe Committee believes that this is generally understood by department and\nagency officials, it has observed some evidence to the contrary in a few\ninstances, which justifies reemphasizing this fundamental principle.\n7. Persons should not be appointed to sensitive positions without\nprior investigation or record check. Many of the security problems which\narise with respect to employees in sensitive positions could be avoided\nif appropriate record checks or full field investigations were made before\nappointments to the sensitive positions were made. The regulations of the\nCivil Service Commission provide for a \"Pre-appointment Check for Sensitive\nPosition,\" which departments and agencies may use in connection with\npersons whom they propose to place in sensitive positions. A \"National\nAgency Check\" may be used for the same purpose.\n23\n8. Refusal of employment to applicants for sensitive positions on\nsecurity grounds. In his letter the President expressed his concern not\nonly with the discharge of employees as poor security risks, but also with\nthe refusal of Government employment on the same grounds. The Committee has,\ntherefore, considered whether it is desirable and feasible to grant applicants\nwho are denied employment on security grounds any rights such as are granted\nto employees who are removed on security grounds.\nWith the exception of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Committee found\nthat virtually all the representatives of departments and agencies with\nwhom it talked were opposed to granting applicants any rights as to notice,\nreply or hearing on security cases. It was argued that the administrative\nburden and cost would be unjustified. It was also pointed out that no\nperson has a right to Government employment and, therefore, no rights are\ntaken away from a person denied such employment for any reason.\nThe Committee directed its efforts toward finding some solution to\nthe problem which would not be an undue administrative burden upon depart-\nments and agencies. The Committee found that the major inequity in pro-\ncessing security cases resulted from the administrative practices which\nallowed applicants for such sensitive positions to be promised jobs prior\nto the investigation for those jobs.\nMany times an applicant whose education, experience and other quali-\nfications appear from his application to be just right for a particular\njob will be given a promise of appointment to that job by a department or\nagency official, subject to satisfactory security clearance. If this\napplicant has no reason to believe that security clearance will prove a\nstumbling block to his actual employment in the job, he may take steps in\nanticipation of employment which will prove quite detrimental to him if\n24\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\nARCHATIONAL MODER\nB\nSERVICES\nemployment is subsequently denied as it may be on security or other grounds.\nHis failure to be appointed may, therefore, result in demonstrable loss and\nthe mental anguish of believing himself to be a \"security risk.\"\nAccordingly, to correct the situation the Committee concludes that in\nno event should any official make a commitment or a promise of employment\nto an applicant for a sensitive position, subject to completion of the\nrequired investigation. When it is considered that an applicant's services\nare so urgently needed as to make it desirable that he be given such com-\nmitment or promise, the head of the department or agency concerned should\nprovide for his actual appointment to the position in question, subject to\nthe necessary investigation and with the employee being fully informed of\nthe limited nature of such appointment. Such appointment will assure him\nall of the procedural and other rights accorded an employee and, at the\nsame time, will not serve to modify or change established minimum require-\nments for access to classified security information.\n9. While ultimate authority to grant or deny security clearance should\nrest with the head of each department and agency, it is highly desirable\nthat, to the fullest practicable extent, departments and agencies accept\nfrom each other on a mutual and reciprocal basis the results of previous\ninvestigations and previous clearances which have been granted by appro-\npriate authority; however, denial of clearance by one department or agency\nshould not ipso facto result in denial of clearance in all other departments\nand agencies. One of the problems referred to in an earlier section of\n25\nof this report is the fact that there has been a tendency for employees\nwho transfer from one agency to another to be subjected to repeated in-\nvestigations and clearances.\nThis is recognized as a very real problem, and a facet of the employee\nsecurity program which proves least understandable to an employee. It\nresults, however, from the fact that security is a responsibility of the\nhead of each department and agency. Part XI of a proposed Executive Order\n\"Prescribing Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards for Security Clearanc.\nfor Access to Classified Security Information in the Executive Departments\nand Agencies of the United States Government,\" specifically provides: \"The\nprior clearance of, or denial of access to, an individual by an appropriate\nauthority of one department or agency will not, however, be binding on\nanother department or agency. The ultimate authority to grant or deny\nclearance in any case will rest with the head of the department or agency\nwho is responsible for the security of the information to which the indi-\nvidual in question may be granted access.\"\nThis is not to say, however, that nothing can be done to mitigate the\nproblem. In this connection, the Committee subscribes to the following\nstatements from the proposed Executive Order above referred to: \"It is\nhighly desirable that responsible authorities within the executive depart-\nments and agencies accept from each other on a mutual and reciprocal basis\nthe results of previous investigations, and previous clearances which have\nbeen granted by appropriate authority. Such reciprocation will avoid the\nrepetitious filing of Personal History Statements, and the time and expense\nof multiple clearances. However, this applies nly where a prior investi-\n26\ngation by an investigative agency of the Government meets the standards\nprescribed herein. If the prior investigation does not meet such standards,\nsupplemental or additional investigation should be conducted.\"\nIt seems pointless for a department or agency to re-investigate an\nindividual recently cleared by another department or agency with the same\nuniform standards for access to classified information. Yet such re-\ninvestigation is proper if the appointing officer believes that further\ninformation about any part of the person's background or personal attri-\nbutes must be obtained as a basis for a determination as to clearance.\nDespite the uniform standards for access, the security requirements of\nindividual jobs may vary so widely as to justify taking a fresh look at\nthe applicant or employee.\nThis variance means also that denial of clearance in one department\nshould not of itself result in denial of clearance in another. Officials\nof the second department should make up their own minds about the indivi-\ndual's acceptability with reference to the security requirements of the job.\n10. Employee security programs should not be construed to replace,\nchange or otherwise modify the Federal Employee Loyalty Program or the laws,\nand the rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission, relating to\nsuitability for employment in the competitive civil service. In any indi-\nvidual case the program most properly applicable should be utilized for\nits disposition.\n27\nV - RECOMMENDATIONS\n1. In the interest of promoting uniformity in determining the need\nfor and the extent of employee security programs in the various depart-\nments and agencies there should be definitions of the key terms \"national\nsecurity\" and \"sensitive position.\" For this purpose the following defi-\nnitions are recommended:\nThe term national security as used herein relates to the safe-\nguarding of the United States against any attempt to destroy\nor weaken it by force or violence, subversion, or any other\nmeans. Within the area required to be safeguarded are military,\nforeign relations, and related matters of the Government, the\ndisclosure or compromise of which would aid our enemies or\nwould endanger our defense. As used herein the term national\nsecurity does not include questions of policy or judgment with\nrespect to other Government matters relating to the general\nwelfare, health and happiness of our people in their economic\nand political life, not requiring security classification.\nSensitive position means (1) Any position the duties or respon-\nsibilities of which require that the incumbent have access to\nsecurity information or material, classified \"Confidential\",\n\"Secret\" or \"Top Secret\"; and (2) Any position which exists in\nan organizational entity where, because of the nature of the\nwork being done, the very presence of the incumbent would make\nit possible for him to obtain possession of security information\nor material, classified \"Confidential\", \"Secret\" or \"Top Secret\",\n28\nor to commit acts which would directly endanger the national\nsecurity.\n2. The head of each department and agency of the Federal Government\nshould be responsible for identifying the sensitive positions, if any, in\nhis department or agency, using the uniform definition of \"sensitive\nposition.\"\n3. Based upon his review and identification of sensitive positions,\nthe head of each department and agency to which Public Law 733, 81st\nCongress, is not already applicable should decide whether, in his opinion,\nthere is need for an employee security program in his department or agency.\nIf he decides after consultation with ICIS that such program is necessary,\nhe should request issuance of Executive Order authority through normal\nchannels for extension of the provisions of Public Law 733 to his depart-\nment or agency.\n4. Employee security programs should not be construed to replace,\nchange or otherwise modify the Federal Employee Loyalty Program or the laws,\nand the rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission, relating to\nsuitability for employment in the competitive civil service. In any indi-\nvidual case the program most properly applicable should be utilized for its\ndisposition.\n5. The head of each department and agency to which the provisions\nof Public Law 733 apply, or are extended by the President, should be\nresponsible for prescribing and supervising employee security determina-\ntion procedures in his department or agency. Such procedures (including\nthose already established) should conform to the following standards,\n29\nwhich should be prescribed as minimum by the President, and the department\nor agency head should be required to submit existing or proposed procedures\nto the Civil Service Commission for review as to compliance with such\nstandards before or after issuance.\na. Standards\nThe standard for the denial of employment, or the removal from\nemployment, in an executive department or agency on security grounds\nshall be that, on all the evidence, there is reason to believe that the\nemployment or retention of the individual in a sensitive position would\nbe prejudicial to the national security.\nFacts regarding an applicant or employee which may be considered\nin connection with a determination on security grounds shall include, but\nare not necessarily limited to, one or more of the following:\n(1) Activities and associations of the character listed\nin Part V, Section 2 of E.O. 9835, as amended, which,\neven though they do not support a finding of reason-\nable doubt as to loyalty, are sufficiently serious\nto establish a reason to believe that employment or\nretention of the individual in a sensitive position\nwould be prejudicial to the national security.\n(2) Activities or associations which establish a reason to\nbelieve that the individual 1s not reliable or trust-\nworthy, including deliberate misrepresentations,\nfalsifications or omissions of material facts.\n30\n(3) Criminal record or behavior manifesting drug addiction,\nTRUMAN\nhabitual drunkeness, sexual perversion, moral turpitude\nGOVERNMENT ARONOVES SERVICE Respect CHARGINAL AND USRANT\nor financial irresponsibility.\n(4) Facts which establish a reason to believe that the\nindividual may be subjected to influence or pressure\nwhich may cause him to act contrary to the best interests\nof the national security.\n(5) Adjudication of insanity or treatment for serious mental or\nneurological disorder without evidence of cure.\nb. Adverse Actions Against Employees: An adverse action should not\nbe taken against an employee on security grounds unless such action is re-\nquired in the interest of national security. Decision to take any adverse\naction should be reached only after there has been a judicious evaluation\nof all available information, favorable as well as unfavorable, by a re-\nsponsible official or officials of the department or agency. Investigations\nwhich form the basis for any such action should be made by competent inves-\ntigators and should include all pertinent facts, favorable as well as\nunfavorable, together with information on which to base a decision as to the\ncredibility of confidential informants. The fullest practicable use should\nbe made of supplemental investigations in order to clear up doubtful points\nwhich are material and thus avoid the stigma of formal charges based upon\nan incomplete record.\n31\nConsideration should always be given to transferring the employee to a\nnon-sensitive position without loss of rank or compensation, if it is con-\nsidered that the interests of national security require that he be removed\nfrom his sensitive position. In discussions on cases involving security\nquestions care should be exercised to avoid coercing any employee into re-\nsigning. When it is determined that an employee must be suspended, demoted\nor removed from the service, the minimum protections hereinafter stated in\nsubsections o, d, e and f should be accorded to all United States citizen\nemployees, irrespective of tenure or of manner, method or type of appoint-\nment.\nC. Suspensions\n(1) An employee suspended in the interest of national security\nshould be advised promptly, in writing, as to the reasons\nfor his suspension. To the extent that the interests of\nnational security permit, such advice should be in sufficient\ndetail to acquaint the employee with the reason for his\nsuspension; and, if the suspension notice includes a formal\nnotice of proposed removal action, it should comply with the\nrequirements for statements of charges for such actions.\n(2) A suspended employee should receive a prompt adjudication of\nhis case.\n(3) An employee whose suspension is revoked and who is restored to\nduty should, in all cases, be compensated for the period of the\nsuspension, to the extent permitted by law; provided that the\nemployee shall not be compensated for any extension of the\nperiod of suspension caused by his voluntary action and not\n32\nthe result of the action of the department or agency in sus-\npending him.\nd. Removals from the Service:\n(1) Action to remove an employee from the service in the interest\nof national security should be instituted through a formal\nstatement of charges, in writing and signed by a duly author-\nized official or fficials of the department or agency. Such\nstatement should provide the employee with the derogatory in-\nformation which forms the basis of the proposed action against\nhim, to the extent that in the discretion of the employing\ndepartment or agency security considerations permit, Normally,\nthe empl yee should be entitled to all information except that\nwhich will reveal the names of confidential informants, or which\nwill reveal security information. The statement should also\nalvise the employee of his right to submit a written answer to\nthe charges made therein, supported by affidavits, and of his\nright to an' iministrative hearing before a department or agency\nboard established for this purpose, and to appear before such\noard personally, to be represented by counsel or representative\nof his own choosing and to present evidence on his behalf\nthrough witness or affidavit.\n(2) An employee against whom removal action in the interest\nf\nnational security has been instituted should be afforded a\nhearing, at his request, before a department or agency board,\nmposed of not less than three fficials of the department or\nagency, established for this purpose. Such a board should e\nrovided with competent security counsel. At such hearing\n33\nS\nTRUMA\nHARRY\nARGHATIONAL NEGORDEND\nU.S.\nBERWOEN\nhe should be permitted to be represented by counsel or repre-\nGOVERNMENT\nsentative of his own choosing and to present evidence in his\nbehalf of witness or affidavit. He should also be provided,\nat his request, with a transcript of the hearing, with the\nright to note any exceptions to the record which he considers\nproper. He should be advised promptly, in writing by the\nresponsible official, of the recommendation made to the head\nof the department or agency by this board, if such recommenda-\ntion is adverse to him, and of his right, within a specified\nreasonable period of time, to appeal to the head of the\ndepartment or agency, and to submit any additional written\nstatement which he considers appropriate.\n(3) Recommendations by hearing boards should be promptly reviewed\nby the head of the department or agency, or his designated\nrepresentative for that purpose, and the employee should be\nnotified, in writing, of the decision of the department or\nagency head. The notice of decision to remove the employee\nfrom the service should advise that there exists a right of\nreview by the Civil Service Commission.\n(4) An employee whose removal in the interest of national security\nis proposed should not be involuntarily removed from the rolls\nof the employing department or agency until there has been\na decision on his case by the head of the department or agency,\nafter the employee has had a reasonable opportunity to perfect\nall his appeal rights within the department or agency.\n34\n(5) An employee who has been removed from the service in the\ninterest of national security and who is subsequently restored\nto duty by the head of the department or agency because of\na determination that the removal action was unjustified or\nunwarranted should, in all cases, be compensated for the\nperiod of his removal and prior suspension (if any), to the\nextent permitted by law; provided that the employee shall\nnot be compensated for any extension of the period of sus-\npension or removal caused by his voluntary action and not\nthe result of the action of the department or agency in\nsuspending or removing him.\ne. Review of Removal Decision of Department or Agency Head: An\nemployee who has been removed, or whose removal has been ordered by a\ndepartment or agency head, on security grounds, should have the right to\nhave his case reviewed by the Civil Service Commission, which review shall\nbe limited to the following:\n(1) To determine that the individual has been given his procedural\nrights and has had a fair opportunity to be heard.\n(2) To determine that the decision of the department or agency\nhead is supported by substantial evidence; i.e., that it is\nsupported by such relevant evidence, more than a mere\nscintilla, such as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate\nto support the conclusion even though the reviewing agency\nis of the opinion that it would have reached a different\nconclusion had it passed on the matter originally.\n(3) To determine if the individual is eligible for employment by\nanother department or agency.\n35\nIn any case in which the Civil Service Commission concludes that there has\nbeen a failure to comply with the procedural rights or to give the employee\na fair opportunity to be heard, or that the decision of the department or\nagency head is not supported by substantial evidence, the Commission should\nsubmit its advisory opinion, in writing, to the head of the department or\nagency concerned for his consideration and decision.\nf. Demotions: An employee whose demotion in rank or compensation is\nproposed in the interest of national security should have the same rights\nwithin the department or agency with respect to notice, opportunity for\nreply, and hearing as are provided for an employee whose removal from the\nservice is proposed.\ng. Applicants: In no event should any official make a commitment\nor a promise of employment to an applicant for a sensitive position, sub-\nject to completion of the required investigation. When it is considered\nthat an applicant's services are so urgently needed as to make it desirable\nthat he be given such commitment or promise, the head of the department\nor agency concerned should provide for his actual appointment to the\nposition in question, subject to the necessary investigation and with\nthe employee being fully informed of the limited nature of such appointment.\nSuch appointment will assure him all of the procedural and other rights\naccorded an employee and, at the same time, will not serve to modify or\nchange established minimum requirements for access to classified security\ninformation.\n36\nCOPY\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nAPPENDIX\nWashington\nItem 1\nTRUMAN\nMARK\nARCHIVEZ PRATICHAL RECEIVED Use\nJuly 14, 1951\nU.S.\nSERVICE\nGOVERN\nDear Mr. Lay:\nI have become seriously concerned by a number of reports I have heard\nrecently concerning the administration of the provisions of existing law which\nauthorize the heads of the various departments and agencies to discharge\nGovernment employees, or to refuse Government employment to applicants, on the\nground that they are poor security risks.\nIf these provisions of law are to achieve their purpose of protecting the\nsecurity of the Government without unduly infringing on the rights of individuals,\nthey must be administered with the utmost wisdom and courage. We must never for-\nget that the fundamental purpose of our Government is to protect the rights of\nindividual citizens and one of the highest obligations of the Government is to\nsee that those rights are protected in its own operations.\nThe present situation does not make for good administration. There are no\nuniform standards or procedures to be followed in the different departments and\nagencies concerned. Neither is there any provision for review at a central point\nas there is in the case of the Government Employee Loyalty Program. This is a\nproblem that falls within the scope of the work which I have asked to have under-\ntaken by the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. However, the\nwork of that Commission has been delayed because of the failure of the Senate\nCommittee on the Judciary to report legislation which would exempt the members\nand staff of the Commission from the conflict-of-interest statutes.\nI believe that the present problems involved in the administration of the\nGovernment Employee Security Program are SO acute that they should be given at\nleast preliminary consideration without waiting further for the Commission on\nInternal Security and Individual Rights. Consequently, I should like the\nNational Security Council, utilizing its Interdepartmental Committee on Internal\nSecurity, and with the participation of the Civil Service Commission, to make\nan investigation of the way this program is being administered, and to advise me\nwhat changes are believed to be required. In particular, I should like\nconsideration given to whether provision should be made for uniform standards and\nprocedures and for central review of the decisions made in the various\ndepartments and agencies.\nWhen the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights is able to\nresume its work, it would, of course, have the benefit of the work done pursuant\nto this request.\nNSC 113\n⑈ 1\nAPPENDIX\nItem 1\nI am asking each of the departments and agencies concerned to cooperate\nfully in this study.\nSincerely yours,\n/s/ HARRY S. TRUMAN\nMr. James S. Lay, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\nNational Security Council\nRoom 216, Executive Office Building\nWashington, D. C.\nNSC 113\nii.\nINTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\nAPPENDIX\n2107 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.\nItem 2\nIn order to carry out the request by the President in his letter\nof July 14, 1951, to the National Security Council, and pursuant to\nDirections from the Council, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal\nSecurity (ICIS), has established the ICIS Ad Hoc Group on the Government\nEmployee Security Program. The Ad Hoc Group is composed of representa-\ntives from the member agencies of the ICIS and the Civil Service Commission.\nIn accordance with the above, the Ad Hoc Group will conduct an\ninvestigation of the administration of the provisions of existing laws,\nand rules, regulations, and practices under which the heads of the various\ndepartmonts and agencies discharge Government employees, or refuse Govern-\nment employment to applicants, on the ground that they are poor security\nrisks. On the basis of its investigation the Ad Hoc Group shall recommend\nto the ICIS those changes in this program which it believes to be required.\nIn order to formulate its recommendations in this regard, the\nAd Hoc Group will require certain information from your agency as outlined\nbelow:\n1. Does your agency discharge employees on the ground that they\nare poor security risks?\n2. Does your agency refuse employment to applicants on the\nground that they are poor security risks?\nHARRY ANOTHIVES MASTONAL STATEMENT RECORDS AND\n3. Should your answer to Questions 1 or 2 above be in the affirmative,\nplease indicate the name and telephone number of the person or persons\nwho determine whether such employment will be terminated or refused.\nAlso, you are requested to furnish six copies of any security regula-\ntions your agency may have pertaining to Questions 1 and 2.\n4. Have you designated any sensitive positions within your agency?\nIf so, please indicate the number and categories.\n5. Does your agency employ the sensitive preappointment loyalty check\nas provided for in the Federal Personnel Manual, Chapter I 2-2? If so,\nto what extent?\n6. Should your answer to Questions 4 or 5 above be in the affirmative,\nplease indicate the name and telephone number of the person or persons\nwho are responsible for the designation of sensitive positions within\nyour agency or responsible for determining whether individuals should be\ncleared as a result of sensitive preappointment checks.\nYour submission of the requested information should cover all the bureaus,\noffices, divisions, etc., of your agency.\nIt will be greatly appreciated if this information would be furnished\nwithin seven days of the date of this letter.\nSincerely yours,\nRaymond P. Whearty\nChairman, Interdepartmental Committee on\niii\nInternal Security\nAPPENDIX\nLETTERS TO BE SENT TO THE FOLLOWING DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES\nItem 2\nDepartment of Agriculture\nInterstate Commerce Commission\nDepartment of the Interior\nNational Academy of Sciences and\nNational Research Council\nDepartment of Labor\nNational Labor Relations Board\nBureau of the Budget\nNational Science Foundation\nCivil Aeronautics Board\nOffice of Defense Mobilization\nCivil Service Commission\nOffice of Housing Expediter\nDefense Production Administration\nRailroad Retirement Board\nDefense Transport Administration\nReconstruction Finance Corporation\nDisplaced Persons Commission\nSecurities & Exchange Commission\nEconomic Cooperation Administration\nSelective Service\nEconomic Stabilizition Agency\nSmithsonian Institution\nExport-Import Bank of Washington\nTennessee Valley Authority\nFederal Civil Defense Administration\nUnited States Tariff Commission\nFederal Communications Commission\nVeterans Administration\nFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation\nWhite House Office\nFederal Mediation & Conciliation Service\nPost Office Department\nFederal Power Commission\nFederal Reserve System\nFederal Security Agency\nFederal Trade Commission\nGeneral Accounting Office\nGeneral Services Administration\nGovernment Printing Office\nHousing and Home Finance Agency\nInstitute of Inter-American Affairs\niv\nAPPENDIX\nItem 3\nHARRY STATEMENT TRUMAN VIBRARY\nDissent by Department of Defense\nto ICIS Report to NSC dated April 29, 1952,\nsubject \"Government Employee Security Program\"\n1. Page 30, subparagraph a. Standards. Change to read as follows:\n\"The standard for the denial of employment, or the removal from employ-\nment, in an Executive Department or Agency on security grounds shall be\nthat, on all the evidence, there is reason to believe that the employment\nor retention of the individual in a particular sensitive position would\nbe prejudicial to the national security.\" The reasons for advocating the\ninclusion of the word \"particular\" are as follows:\na. Security determinations should be made in consideration of\nthe circumstances surrounding an individual's employment and particularly\nthe duties which he is to perform. It is difficult to see how these\nfactors can be overlooked or disregarded in an individual security determi-\nnation. One of the main features which should distinguish a security\nprogram from a loyalty program is that the former must not result in\nabstract adjudications but must be consistently directed to the fitness\nof the individual, on security grounds, to hold a specific position.\nb. The Department of Defense criteria for determining eligi-\nbility for access to classified security information prescribe more rigid\ninvestigative standards for access to Top Secret information than for\naccess to Secret or Confidential information; and more rigid investigative\nstandards for access to Secret information than for access to Confidential\ninformation. These same differences in requirements are included in the\nproposed Executive Order on this subject. This is a recognition of the\nfact that requirements for access to classified security information vary\nwith the degree of sensitivity of the information.\nC. Much of the derogatory information disclosed in investiga-\ntions of employees might be classed as \"borderline\" and some of this\ninformation, while it would justify an adverse security determination\nif the individual holds a position requiring access to Top Secret war\nplans, might permit a fevorable security determination if he merely\nholds a position requiring access to documents containing Confidential\nSecurity information. If each determination on security matters must\nbe in terms of the highest security classification, it must result that\na number of employees who might otherwise be cleared for certain types of\nsensitive positions would necessarily be denied all security clearance,\nto the detriment of Government departments and agencies. Such procedure\nwould also serve to bring additional criticism upon the administration of\nthe security programs.\nd. If the standard is so worded as to require security clearance\nin terms of the highest security classification, all employees might well\ncontend that once given a security clearance they are eligible for every\nV\nAPPENDIX\nItem 3\ncategory of sensitive position and that, in the absence of additional\nderogatory information being revealed, there can be no further question\nas to security clearance regardless of the types of positions to which they\nmay later be transferred.\n2. Page 30, subparagraph a. Standards. Eliminate the following\nlanguage:\n\"Facts regarding an applicant or employee which may be con-\nsidered in connection with a determination on security grounds shall\ninclude, but are not necessarily limited to, one or more of the\nfollowing:\n\"(1) Activities and associations of the character\nlisted in Part V, Section 2 of E.O. 9835 which,\neven though they do not support a finding of\nreasonable doubt as to loyalty, are sufficiently\nserious to establish a reason to believe that\nemployment or retention of the individual in a\nsensitive position is not advisable in the interest\nof national security.\n\"(2) Activities or associations which establish a reason-\nable doubt as to the reliability or trustworthiness\nof the individual, including deliberate misrepresenta-\ntions, falsifications or omissions of material facts.\n\"(3) Criminal record or behavior manifesting drug addiction,\nhabitual drunkeness, sexual perversion, moral turpitude\nor financial irresponsibility.\n\"(4) Facts which establish the reasonable probability that\nthe individual may be subjected to influence or pressure\nwhich may cause him to act contrary to the best inter-\nests of the national security.\n\"(5) Adjudication of insanity or treatment for serious mental\nor neurological disorder without evidence of cure.\"\nSubstitute the following:\na. Facts which may warrant denial of employment or removal.\nThere may be reason to believe that the employment or retention of the\nindividual in a particular sensitive position would be prejudicial to\nthe national security if he has:\n(1) Committed or attempted to commit, conspired with, or\naided or abetted another who committed or attempted to commit, any act\nof espionage, sabotage, treason, or sedition.\nvi\nAPPENDIX\nItem 3\n(2) Established an association with espionage agents of\na foreign nation, with individuals reliably reported as suspected of\nespionage, or with other representatives of foreign nations whose\ninterests may be inimical to the interests of the United States.\n(Ordinarily this will not include chance or casual meetings, nor con-\ntacts limited to normal business or official relations.)\n(3) Advocated or supported the overthrow of the Govern-\nment of the United States or the alteration of the constitutional form\nof the Government of the United States by force or violence.\n(4) Held membership in or joined any organization after\nit was designated by the Attorney General as being within the purview\nof Executive Order 9835 unless he withdrew from such membership when\nthe organization was so designated or otherwise satisfactorily explains\nhis continued membership.\n(5) Participated in the activities of an organization\nlater designated by the Attorney General as being within the purview\nof Executive Order 9835, in a capacity where he should reasonably\nhave had knowledge of the subversive aims or purposes of the organiza-\ntion.\n(6) Established a sympathetic association with members\nof the Communist Party; or with leading members of an organization\nwhich has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States\nas coming within the purview of Executive Order 9835. (Ordinarily\nthis will not include chance or casual meetings, nor contacts limited\nto normal business or official relations.)\n(7) Participated in the activities of an organization\nestablished as a front for an organization designated by the Attorney\nGeneral as being within the purview of Executive Order 9835, when his\npersonal views were sympathetic to the purposes of such organization.\n(8) Participated in the activities of an organization\nwith knowledge that it had been infiltrated with members of subversive\ngroups under circumstances indicating that he was a part of or sympa-\nthetic to the infiltrating element or sympathetic to its purposes.\n(9) Shown sympathetic interest in totalitarian,\nfascist, communist, or similar subversive ideologies.\n(10) Established and presently maintains a close\ncontinuing association with a spouse, relative or friend who has\nengaged in activities or associations of the types referred to in\n(1) through (9) above. A close continuing association may be deemed\nto exist if the person lives at the same premises as, frequently\nvisits, or frequently communicates with, such spouse, relative or\nfriend.\nvii\nAPPENDIX\nItem 3\n(11) Established a close continuing association of\nthe type described in (10) above, even though later separated by\ndistance, if the circumstances indicate that renewal of the associa-\ntion is probable.\nHARRY U.S. S. TRUMAN SOVERTINEN ARCEIVE SERVICE Accords AND\n(12) Performed or attempted to perform his duties, or\notherwise acted or knowingly failed to act, so as to serve the inter-\nests of another government in preference to the interests of the\nUnited States.\n(13) Wilfully violated or disregarded security\nregulations of any government agency to a degree which would\nendanger the national security.\n(14) Engaged in any other activity or association\nlisted in paragraph 2, Part V, Executive Order 9835.\nb. Other matters to be considered. As bearing on the exist-\nence of one or more of the facts which may warrant removal specified\nin subparagraph a. above and also on the ultimate question whether there\nis reason to believe that the employment or retention of the individual\nin a particular sensitive position would be prejudicial to the national\nsecurity, the following matters will be taken into account, together\nwith any mitigating circumstances that may exist:\n(1) The presence of a spouse, parent, brother, sister,\nor offspring in a nation whose interest may be inimical to the inter-\nests of the United States, or in satellites or occupied areas of such\na nation, under circumstances permitting coercion or pressure to be\nbrought on the individual through such relatives.\n(2) Any circumstances which make it apparent that the\nindividual is subject to coercion by a foreign government whose\ninterests may be inimical to the interests of the United States.\n(3) Violation of security regulations.\n(4) Falsification or deliberate omission of signifi-\ncant information from a Personnel Security Questionnaire, Personal\nHistory Statement, or similar document.\n(5) Acts of a reckless, irresponsible or wanton nature\nwhich indicate such poor judgment and instability as to suggest that\nthe individual might disclose classified information to unauthorized\npersons or otherwise assist such persons, whether deliberately or\ninadvertently, in activities inimical to the security of the\nUnited States.\n(6) The individual's discreetness and trustworthiness,\nviii\nAPPENDIX\nItem 3\nC. Grounds for removal under other procedures. Individuals\nwho have habitual criminal tendencies, who are addicted to alcohol or\ndrugs, who have manifested homosexual tendencies, or who have mental\ndisorders of any sort are very likely to endanger national security\nif employed in sensitive positions. But they should usually be dis-\ncharged on grounds of character or suitability and not on grounds of\nsecurity.\nd. The reasons for this proposal are as follows:\n(1) One of the primary objectives of this study is to\nbring about as much uniformity in the administration of the employee\nsecurity programs as may be practical. It is seriously doubted whether\nsecurity criteria phrased in such general terms as those included in\nthe proposed report would achieve the desired uniformity in the\nadministration of security programs throughout the government. The\nmore definitive and precise the criteria, the greater are the chances\nof uniform interpretation and application.\n(2) The criteria contained in subparagraphs (3) and (5)\nunder \"Standards\" in the report relate to personal characteristics which,\nwhile they would undoubtedly indicate that the individual's employment\nin a sensitive position might be dangerous, are such that they would\nnormally justify removal of the individual on grounds of unsuitability\nfor employment rather than as a security risk. Despite this fact and\ndespite the general language included in recommendation 4 of the report,\nit is likely that many agencies may take advantage of the inclusion of\nthese characteristics among the facts which may be considered in making\nsecurity determinations and process cases involving these characteris-\ntics as security cases. This fact can result in additional criticism\nof the employee security program.\n(3) The criteria recommended have been in use in the\nDepartment of Defense for some time and have proven satisfactory.\nSubstantially the same criteria, possibly differently arranged, have\nbeen used by other agencies. They are recommended as appropriate for\nadoption, in the interest of the greater uniformity, by all agencies\nhaving employee security programs. It will be noted that they are\ndivided into three categories, namely (a) criteria which would create\na prima facie case of reason to believe that the employment or reten-\ntion of the individual in a particular sensitive position would be\nprejudicial to the national security; (b) criteria which would not\ncreate a prima facie case but which might properly be considered in\nmaking the contemplated security consideration; and (c) those personal\ncharacteristics which, while they might indicate that the individual's\nemployment in a particular sensitive position might be dangerous,\nwould normally justify removal on grounds of character or suitability\nand not on grounds of security.\nix\nAPPENDIX\nItem 3\n3. Page 31, subparagraph b. Adverse actions against employees.\nBetween the paragraph ending on Page 31 and the paragraph beginning\non Page 32, insert the following:\na. The officials responsible for preferring charges may,\nin their discretion, contact an employee prior to the decision on\nHAMPS SERVICES REGORDS TRUMAR LIBRARY\nwhether or not to issue charges. Where oral contact is made with\nthe employee, whether by these officials or someone acting for them,\nGOVERNMENT\nit should be in accordance with the following requirements which\nwill safeguard his rights:\n(1) Employee to be informed he is under no compulsion\nto answer.\n(2) Questions to relate to issues upon which charging\nofficials seek clarification.\n(3) Verbatim record to be kept of the entire proceeding.\n(4) If charges are then issued, no person participating\nin the above proceeding to sit as member of the board appointed to\nhear such charges.\nb. The reasons for this proposal are as follows:\n(1) It is recognized that the report as now written\nwould allow each agency to adept any procedures it wishes concerning\nprecharge oral contact in security cases. Nevertheless, the\nDepartment of Defense feels that the report should deal specifically\nwith this important phase of security procedures.\n(2) Pre-charge oral contact will often eliminate\nnecessity of charges and necessity of suspending the employee.\nIt is recognized that once charges have been issued and an employee\nhas been suspended, irreparable damage may have been done to his\nreputation even though he is subsequently cleared. Many cases\ncontain issues which can only be cleared up through oral discussion\nwith the employee. In many of these cases it would be manifestly\nunfair to require that charges be issued before giving the employee\nan opportunity to make oral explanations. This is particularly true\nbecause it would seem that when the charges referred to in the Second\nProviso of P. L. 733 are issued, the employee must be suspended.\nCharges can be kept confidential. Suspension, however, cannot be\nconcealed.\n(3) Minimum safeguards for pre-charge oral contact should\nbe specified. If no requirements for pre-charge oral contact are speci-\nfied, it would leave the way open for destroying the effectiveness of\nthe procedural guarantees set forth in Public Law 733. The employee\ncould be subjected to high pressure inquisitions which would not be\nlimited to issues raised by reports of investigation and which would\nbe unreviewable, since unrecorded. Furthermore, there would be no\nguarantee that those who participated in such questioning would not\nlater sit on the board appointed to hear charges. Under fundamental\nx\nAPPENDIX\nItem 3\nprinciples of due process they should be disqualified. No agency, of\ncourse, would deliberately countenance such procedures, but the very\nnecessity for this report to the President indicates the necessity for\na complete report covering all phases of security removal procedures.\n(4) Standards for pre-charge oral contact should be\nuniform for all P. L. 733 agencies. The Department of Defense proposal\nwould make for such uniformity. In this connection, it should be noted\nthat another P. L. 733 agency may avoid unnecessary suspensions by a\nmethod other than the use of pre-charge oral contact. Instead, this\nagency may issue charges which do not fall under P. L. 733, but fall\nunder another security law (applicable only to that agency) which does\nnot require that the charges be accompanied by suspension of the\nemployee.\n(5) Loyalty and security procedures should mesh insofar\nas possible. Loyalty regulations forbid pre-charge oral contact\n(although they provide for interrogatories). On the other hand, they\ndo not require suspension when loyalty charges are issued. This is\njust the reverse of the rules applicable in security cases. Under\neither procedure, however, the employee can be given an opportunity\nto explain his case in person before he would be suspended. A serious\nproblem arises, however, when a case involves both loyalty and security,\na problem which must be faced squarely by this report. Where both\naspects are involved, can there be pre-charge oral contact? If not,\nit would seem that the employee in such a case could not be afforded\nan opportunity to present oral explanations prior to his suspension.\nLack of such an opportunity is not only fundamentally unfair, as\nalready indicated, but it is discriminatory. It would tend to make\nboards consider cases involving both loyalty and security as security\ncases alone. This, of course, would be contrary to E. O. 9835 and to\nthe entire concept of the two procedures. The difficulty can be\nremedied by specifically allowing for pre-charge oral contact in all\nsecurity cases, whether or not they involve security alone.\n4. Pages 33-34, subparagraph d. Removals from the Service. a.\nSubparagraph (2), eliminate the last sentence reading as follows: \"He\nshould be advised promptly in writing by the responsible official, of\nthe recommendation made to the head of the department or agency by\nthis board, if such recommendation is adverse to him, and of his right,\nwithin a specified reasonable period of time, to appeal to the head\nof the department or agency, and to submit any additional written\nstatement which he considers appropriate.\"\nb. Page 34, paragraph 5.d. (3), eliminate the following\nlanguage: \"Recommendations by hearing boards should be promptly\nreviewed by the head of the department or agency, or his designated\nrepresentative for that purpose, and the employee should be notified,\nin writing, of the decision of the department or agency head. The\nnotice of decision to remove the employee from the service should\nadvise him of his right to appeal the decision to the Civil Service\nCommission.\"\nxi\nAPPENDIX\nItem 3\nC. Substitute the following language: \"After such hearing\nand before a final decision adverse to him is rendered by the head\nof the department or agency, the employee shall be advised of his\nright, within a specified reasonable period of time, to appeal to the\nhead of the department or agency or an official or officials designated\nby him, and to submit any additional written statement which he considers\nappropriate. The employee shall be notified promptly in writing of the\nfinal decision of the department or agency head, and if such decision\nis to remove the employee from the service, he shall be advised that\nthere exists a right of review by the Civil Service Commission.\"\nd. The reasons for this proposal are: The present wording\nof the last sentence in paragraph 5.d. (2) and paragraph 5.d. (3) is\nsuch that it may require some change in the existing practices in\nthe Departments of Army and Air Force with respect to the handling of\nemployee security cases above the level of the local hearing board.\nThese existing procedures actually provide employees with more rights\nand protections than they are guaranteed by statute, and are necessary\nin view of the wide-spread operations of these military departments.\nIt is believed that it has been the intention of the ICIS in this\nconnection to recommend appeal procedures within a department or agency\nwhich will guarantee an employee rights at least equal to those pre-\nscribed by P. L. 733. The proposed substitute language above will\nassure this objective, with the added right of the employee to submit\nadditional evidence to the head of a department or agency in connection\nwith his case. It will also not preclude the establishment of central\nreview or hearing boards as may be considered appropriate by individual\ndepartments or agencies. At the same time it will also not raise the\npossibility that established procedures in the Departments of the Army\nand Air Force will have to be changed. For these reasons the adoption\nof the proposed substitute language is strongly urged.\nxii\nGPO-SSO-5682\nNSC MEET N6 117"
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