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    "label": "National Security Council Report 132, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin",
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    "title": "National Security Council Report 132, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin",
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    "seq": 22,
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    "ocrText": "The President NLT(PSF/NSC) 1195\nVan S. HARRYS\nLERARY\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 132\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nCOPY NO. 1\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nUNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER\nPOSSIBLE SOVIET OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN\nMay 29, 1952\nRAC DECLASSIFIED 3-26-2012\nNIT-PSF\nWASHINGTON\nBy. SOB NARA, Date 6/28/13\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nHAVER FORK\nNSC 132\nTOP SECRET\nMay 29, 1952\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nUNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO\nCOUNTER POSSIBLE SOVIET OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN\nReferences: A. NSC 24/3\nB. NSC 73/4, paragraphs 37-c and 42\nC. NSC 89\nD. NSC Action No. 84-b\nThe enclosed draft report on the subject, prepared by the\nNSC Staff, is submitted herewith for consideration by the\nNational Security Council at an early meeting. The enclosure\nis intended, if adopted, to supersede NSC 24/3.\nIt is recommended that, if the enclosed report is\nadopted, it be submitted to the President for consideration\nwith the recommendation that he approve it and direct its\nimplementation by all appropriate executive departments and\nagencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of\nthe Secretary of State.\nSpecial security precautions are requested in the hand-\nling of the enclosure.\nJAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\ncc: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Acting Director of Defense Mobilization\nNSC 132\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nHARRY MASSACHUSETTS\nDRAFT\nREPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nUNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER\nPOSSIBLE SOVIET OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN\n1. In the view of the United States, the maintenance of\nthe Western position in Berlin is of such importance to the\nWestern powers that it could not be abandoned except at the\ncost of a major political reverse. The Soviet Union has it\nwithin its power to make the Western position in Berlin\nuntenable: this result could be accomplished at any time by the\nuse of force; it might be accomplished over a period of time\nby restricting Western access to the city. In the view of the\nUnited States, the Western powers should not abandon the city\nunder communist pressure even though the resulting situation\nmay involve great risk of general war.\n2. It is also the view of the United States that the\nSoviet Union should be held responsible for any communist action\nagainst the Western position in Berlin whether the action is\ntaken by the Soviets or by East Germans or other satellites.\nShould a significant change in the status of East Germany take\nplace, and particularly should the Soviets take steps tö give\nEast Germany the juridical semblance of autonomy, the courses\nof action which follow should be reviewed. Pending such\nreview, the policy in this paper will retain its validity.\nNSC 132\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHAVE\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n3. As long as Germany remains divided and Berlin is a\nland island in the Soviet Zone, the maintenance of our\nposition in the city will not be an easy task. On the contrary,\nit is likely to be as nerve-wracking as it is important, and\nthere is no way to make it otherwise. We must expect continu-\ning harassing measures of greater or lesser severity. These\nmeasures may be designed to put us under pressure for the\npurpose of gaining concessions from us in Germany or elsewhere\nin return for the relaxation of the harassing measures. Or\nconceivably they may even be designed to provoke us into the\nuse of force in an effort to make us appear responsible for\nthe war which would probably follow. Or, and this is the most\nprobably contingency, these measures might flow from steps which\nthe Soviets would logically take to consolidate and strengthen\ntheir position in the eastern zone of Germany now that they\nare faced with the tying of West Germany into the Western\ndefense community.\n4. In considering possible courses of action, we must\nrecognize that they can be pursued effectively only with the\nsupport of our major allies. It is reasonable to assume that\ndivergencies of view are liable to develop as to the desir-\nability and effectiveness of specific courses of action, and\nthe United States must take these into account at every stage\nof planning and execution of plans.\nNSC 132\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nTRIMAN HARRY NARK LIBERTY\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n5. The United States should therefore, as appropriate,\nseek agreement with its allies to common courses of action in\neach of the situations set forth below:\na. Western access to Berlin is not seriously\nimpeded;\nb. Serious harassing measures short of a full\nblockade are employed;\nc. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a\nsurface blockade are imposed;\nd. The Western position has become or is about to\nbecome untenable;\ne. A Soviet or satellite attack on the Western\nforces in Berlin occurs.\nA. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THAT WESTERN\nACCESS TO BERLIN IS NOT SERIOUSLY IMPEDED\n6. The United States, in concert with appropriate allies,\nshould take advantage of situations in which access to Berlin\nis not seriously impeded, to decrease Berlin's vulnerability\nby such measures as the expansion of stockpiles and of airlift\ncapabilities. In addition, they should prepare to react by\neconomic and other reprisals against the Soviet system in the\nevent that the Soviet rulers intensify their harassing\nmeasures. Finally, in the light of the tensions which would\nbe created by intensified harassing measures they should\ndevelop Western strength and unity to a degree not otherwise\npossible.\nNSC 132\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nPARKETS\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n7. The measures which can be taken to decrease the vul-\nnerability and enhance the security of the Western position in\nBerlin depend largely on the degree of Western unity. If the\nUnited Kingdom, France and the Frederal Republic have a deter-\nmination to hold Berlin equalling our own, it should be\npossible to increase our staying power. If this unity is\nevident to the Soviet rulers, it may serve as a deterrent to\naggressive Soviet action. The United States should do what it\ncan to foster unity on this matter.\n8. A variety of measures should be taken to convey to\nthe Soviet rulers the determination of the Western powers to\nremain in Berlin even at the risk of using force to maintain\naccess to the city. It is believed that informal warnings are\npreferable to formal governmental statements, whether made\npublicly or communicated through diplomatic channels. Formal\naction might become desirable if the communists take or seem\nabout to take actions which threaten to make the Western\nposition untenable. It should be made clear that the Western\npowers will regard the Soviet Union as being responsible for\naction by the East Germans or other satellites.\na. High officials of the United States should from\ntime to time indicate in press conferences, speeches, etc.,\nthat the United States is determined to remain in Berlin,\nwill take whatever measures are necessary to maintain\naccess to the city and their position in it, and is\nNSC 132\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nHAVE NOTA\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nconfident that the Russians are sufficiently aware of the\ndangerous consequences which would flow from the imposi-\ntion of harassing measures to make such action unlikely.\nb. News \"leaks\", black and gray propaganda, etc.,\nshould be designed to buttress the foregoing public\nstatements with \"authoritative\" information and should be\nmeshed with public statements.\nc. U.S. officials in Germany should from time to\ntime \"brief\" the West Berlin and West German authorities\non the determination of the Western. powers to maintain\ntheir position in the city, with the expectation that\nsuch information would reach the communists.\nd. Parallel action by officials of allied govern-\nments should be sought.\n9. The United States should take and encourage action\nwhich will strengthen and make evident allied preparedness to\ncope with a new blockade. This should include the further\nbuild-up of a staggered stockpile* in Berlin adequate to\nmaintain Berlin and the Western position there for a year, as\nan initial goal, based upon the assumption that a limited\nairlift can be established and maintained. The appropriate\nauthorities of the United States Government should prepare,\n*A staggered stockpile as here proposed is one containing a\npreponderant supply of relatively inexpensive items needed in\nlarge quantities, such as coal and grain, which require greater\ncapacity for their transport during an airlift than the\nremaining necessary items.\nNSC 132\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSEAL HARRYS INTERNAL\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nas a matter of urgency, a plan for building up and financing\nthis stockpile and for necessary related measures, such as the\nmaintenance and improvement of Berlin airfields. When the\nforegoing stockpile level has been reached, consideration should\nbe given to the desirability of further increases which would\nprolong the period during which the Western powers could main-\ntain their position in Berlin in the face of harassing\nmeasures.\n10. Consideration should now be given to the questions\nwhether it is feasible to evacuate part of the Berlin popula-\ntion and whether, if this could be done, the Western airlift\ncould supply the remaining population and the Western forces\nwith essential supplies.\n11. In preparation for severe harassing measures or a\nblockade, the United States, in concert where appropriate with\nthe U.K., France, and other allied nations, should:\na. Make plans for mounting the maximum practicable\nairlift.\nb. Make plans for such contingencies as use of al-\nternate land routes to Berlin and for engineering work\nwhich may be needed to repair obstructions to ground\ntravel such as bridge and railroad repair.\nc. Make plans for an immediate cessation of trade\nand transport with the Soviet bloc by the United States\nand as many allied nations as possible in the event of a\nblockade. Since the United States now has a virtual em-\nbargo on trade with the Soviet bloc, there is little which\nNSC 132\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nMART NASA LIBRARY\nthe United States can do to increase pressure on the\nSoviet bloc by intensification of its own trade restric-\ntions. In view of the fact that the possibility of\ncounter-action and reprisal depends almost entirely upon\nthe extent to which our allies in Western Europe are\nwilling to take the necessary measures, it is essential\nto obtain some sense of the extent to which these other\ncountries would be willing to institute such measures\nin the event of a new Berlin blockade or other harassment\nof Berlin. Accordingly, the United States should consult\nwith the U.K., France, other Coordinating Committee (COCOM)\ncountries, and Western Germany on this issue and joint\nplanning should be promptly instituted to develop these\nmeasures in detail. In this connection, consideration\nshould be given to the best means of replacing from non-\nSoviet sources, the essential Western imports from the\nSoviet system which might be cut off by the Soviet rulers\nif the Western powers cut off important exports to the\nSoviet system.\nd. Recognizing the possibility that the Western\nposition in Berlin might ultimately become untenable,\nmake plans to materially increase military capabilities to\nmeet the increased threat of general war resulting from\nthat possibility.\ne. Make plans for the use of military force in\ncarrying out the courses of action contained in paragraphs\n23-25.\nNSC 132\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nWALER BIRT\n12. The appropriate authorities of the United States\nGovernment should make such preparations as are feasible for\nadditional reprisals which might be taken against the Soviet\nsystem when and if the Soviet rulers intensify harassing\nmeasures.\n13. The United States should discuss certain aspects of\nthe problem of reprisals with the U.K., France, Western Germany\nand other allies whose cooperation would be important and\nattempt to reach agreement with them on the general nature and\npurpose of the reprisals which would be taken when and if the\nSoviet rulers intensify harassing measures. The costs of re-\nprisals to the Western powers should be considered as well as\nthe cost of any set of reprisals to the Soviet system. Re-\nprisals need not be restricted to ones directly linked to the\nlocal situation, particularly since the Soviet zone is becoming\nincreasingly less vulnerable to the measures of economic retal-\niation employed up to now. For example, reprisals might in-\nclude measures against Soviet sea-borne commerce, such as\nstrict enforcement of all relevant laws, regulations, and so\nforth, with the object of greatly slowing down and impeding\nthis commerce without actually forbidding it.\n14. The appropriate authorities of the United States\nGovernment should keep under continuing review, in the light\nof the situation in Berlin, the courses of action which could\nbe taken to accelerate the Western defense effort and to\nNSC 132\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nWERE STATE\nincrease Western unity, including consideration of full mobili-\nzation.\n15. The United States should discuss means of increasing\nWestern strength and unity with the U.K., France, Western Ger-\nmany, and other allies whose cooperation would be important,\nand attempt to reach agreement with these allies that such\nactions will be initiated when and if the Soviet Union inten-\nsifies harassing measures.\n16. Plans should be developed for covert operations with-\nin the Soviet Zone to exploit, back up, and increase the\neffectiveness of the reprisals against the Soviet system.\nNSC 132\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nThe United States and its allies should maintain flex-\nibility in implementing the courses of action set forth in the\nfollowing sections.\nB. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT OF SERIOUS\nHARASS ING MEASURES SHORT OF A FULL BLOCKADE\n17. One of the most probable lines of Soviet or satellite\naction in the coming period would be employment of harassing\ntactics, particularly with reference to movement of persons\nand things to and from West Berlin, short of full blockade\nbut drastic enough to seriously injure the Western position in\nBerlin, without, however, threatening to make it immediately\nuntenable. In addition to producing this effect, the purpose\nwould probably also be to undermine West Berlin morale and\nSOW confusion and dissension among the Western powers while\nnot incurring the psychological disadvantages of a full block-\nade.\n18. The object of United States courses of action in\nmeeting such a situation should be to minimize the above-\nmentioned effects, prolong Western capacity to stay in Berlin,\nand use the increased tension to accelerate the strengthening\nof the West. Accordingly, the Western powers should initiate--\ntaking account of the particular circumstances at the time--\nsuch measures as may be appropriate for which preparations\nwill have been made in accordance with the recommendations in\nparagraphs 11-16 above.\nNSC 132\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nMAILY\nC. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THAT A BLOCKADE\nOR HARASS ING MEASURES TANTAMOUNT TO A\nSURFACE BLOCKADE ARE IMPOSED\n19. Because it would be very difficult to disguise the\ntrue nature of any armed attack on Berlin, and nearly certain\nthat any armed attack would rapidly lead to general war, it is\nhighly probable that the Soviets or satellites, if they decide\nto drive the Western powers from Berlin, will attempt to accom-\nplish this result by restricting access to the city. Belief\non the part of the Soviets or satellites that the Western\npowers would probably use force rather than abandon the city\nwithout resistance will tend to deter Soviet action which would\npose this choice for the West. However, the Soviet or satel-\nlites may not be deterred. If the Soviet or satellites so\nintensify harassing measures as to threaten to make the Western\nposition in Berlin eventually untenable, the Western powers\nshould prolong the period during which they will be able to\nremain in the city by taking such measures as an airlift, and\nshould make use of this period to accelerate the Western de-\nfense effort and to increase Western unity, including con-\nsideration of the initiation of full mobilization. They should\nalso take retaliatory action in an effort to induce the Soviet\nor satellites to cease their harassment. In short, during this\nperiod the Western powers should initiate--taking account of\nthe particular circumstances at the time--such measures as may\nbe appropriate for which preparations will have been made in\naccordance with the recommendations in paragraphs 11-16 above.\nNSC 132\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nTop SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n20. The Western powers should re-open the Berlin case\nin the United Nations and should make full use of the United\nNations in their efforts to prevent the serious deterioration\nof the situation and to gain world support for their efforts\nto remain in Berlin.\n21. A direct approach to the appropriate Soviet authori-\nties by the U.K., French, and U.S. Ambassadors in Moscow should\nbe considered if and when a blockade or harassing measures\ntantamount to a blockade are imposed or are about to be im-\nposed.* It might be desirable to make a frank exposition, in\nthe light of firm determination of the Western powers to main-\ntain their position in Berlin, of the consequences of the\ncourse on which the Soviets or satellites appeared about to\nembark or had embarked.\n*This does not, of course, preclude approaches at other levels\nsuch as have been employed in the face of past harassments.\nNSC 132\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nD. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT\nTHAT THE WESTERN POSITION HAS BECOME\nOR IS ABOUT TO BECOME UNTENABLE\n22. The Soviet Union probably now has at its disposal\ntechnical means which could seriously interfere with the\noperation of an airlift. If this proves to be the case and if\nit employs these means, the Western position in Berlin may\nbecome untenable.\n23. The Western powers should avoid the use of force\nunless and until necessity dictates. It might be desirable,\nbefore this stage is reached, to approach the highest Soviet\nauthorities in a last minute effort to avert war. However,\nif the Western position becomes untenable despite the measures\nrecommended in the paragraphs above, it is the view of the\nUnited States Government that the Western powers should use\nforce rather than abandon their position in Berlin. If this\nneed arises, they should act in the realization that they will\nalmost certainly meet resistance, that war is an imminent\nprobability, and that they should initiate reasonable pre-\ncautionary measures probably including full mobilization and\nappropriate redeployments of military forces. Additionally,\nthey should take measures in the UN and elsewhere designed to\nlay the best possible foundation for the forceful action which\nmight become necessary.\n24. As a last resort short of the use of force, an ulti-\nmatum to the Soviet Union would probably be desirable. It\nwould demand the lifting of the blockade and other harassing\nNSC 132\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nmeasures and would explicitly or implicitly threaten the use\nof force to break the blockade in the event that the Soviet or\nsatellites disregarded it. The precise nature, terms, and\nform of the ultimatum and the participation in it should be\ndetermined in the light of the circumstances at the time. It\nshould be formulated in terms which are consistent with the\nUN Charter, particularly Article 51, and which will serve to\ngain the widest possible UN support.\n25. If the Western position becomes untenable despite\nthe measures recommended above and if in these circumstances\nit is decided to use force, the Western powers may be able to\nmaintain their position in Berlin if the Soviets do not offer\narmed opposition. If, however, determined Soviet armed\nopposition should develop and continue, the Western powers\nwould have to face general war.\nE. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A\nSOVIET OR SATELLITE ATTACK ON WESTERN FORCES IN BERLIN\n26. The United States, U.K. and France maintain a sizable\nmilitary force in Berlin. An attack on these forces is covered\nby the NAT commitment. A Tripartite Declaration issued at the\nsigning of the EDC Treaty reaffirmed our commitment with re-\nspect to Berlin. We assume that control of Berlin, in and of\nitself, is not so important to the Soviet rulers as to justify\ninvolving the Soviet Union in general war. We can therefore\nact on the assumption that the Soviet rulers will not use\nNSC 132\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nHANK\nSoviet forces to drive the Western powers from the city unless\nthey decide for other reasons to provoke or initiate general\nwar.\n27. If the Soviet Union should attack Berlin with its\nown forces, the United States Government will have to act on\nthe assumption that general war is imminent. In addition to\nresisting the initial attack and to placing itself in the best\npossible position for immediate global war, the United States\nGovernment should, if circumstances permit, address an ulti-\nmatum to the Soviet Government before full implementation of\nemergency war plans. It would be desirable to issue the ulti-\nmatum through NATO, if possible. If this is not possible, it\nwould be of great importance to act in concert with other\nallied governments, especially the Governments of the U.K.,\nFrance, and the Federal Republic. The precise nature, terms\nand form of the ultimatum and the participation in it should\nbe determined in light of the circumstances at the time.\nAppropriate action should be taken in the UN to gain the widest\npossible support for the actions which had been forced upon\nthe United States and its allies by the Soviet Union.\n28. It should be noted that an overt, direct attack on\nBerlin by Soviet forces as an initial move in a deliberate\nresort to war is most unlikely. If the Soviet rulers decide\nto initiate or provoke general war using Berlin as a pretext,\nit is probable that they will seek to conduct themselves in\na way which will obscure their own responsibility and place\nNSC 132\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nresponsibility on the Western powers. It should be an import-\nant objective of the United States and its allies to foil this\neffort, no matter what ruses the Soviet rulers employ to con-\nceal or dissemble the nature of their action.\n29. For the reason indicated in the preceding paragraph,\nit is probable that if the Soviet rulers decide to drive the\nWestern powers from Berlin by force (with the intention of\nproceeding to general war if the attack is resisted), they will\ninitially use East German forces and will attempt to portray\nthis attack as a counteraction to some action by the Western\npowers. If this contingency arises, the United States should\nact as indicated in paragraph 27. It would probably be\nfeasible and it might be even more important in these cir-\ncumstances to issue an ultimatum to the Soviet Union before\nfull implementation of emergency plans for general war.\n30. We can also act on the assumption that the Soviet\nrulers will not use East German or other satellite forces to\ndrive the Western powers from the city unless they decide for\nother reasons to provoke general war. This is so because it\nwould be extremely difficult to localize the resulting\nhostilities. A possible exception should be noted: there is\nperhaps a chance that the Soviet rulers might use East German\nforces--alone or reinforced by other satellite forces--under\ncertain circumstances in the belief that if the Western powers\ndid not back down, the satellite action could be broken off\nNSC 132\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nHARRY\nwithout involving the Soviet Union in war. So long as Soviet\nforces remain in Eastern Germany, should satellite forces\nattack Berlin the United States, in concert with appropriate\nallies, should immediately call upon the Soviet Union to sup-\npress the attack at once or stand responsible for its continu-\nance. Should the USSR fail to take adequate and prompt action\nto terminate the satellite attack, the action outlined in\nparagraph 27 should be taken.\nNSC 132\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMA\nnove INFORMATION"
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