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    "title": "Memorandum from S. Everett Gleason to the National Security Council with Attachment",
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    "ocrText": "The President\nNET (PSF/NSC) 1303\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nTOP SECRET\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nWASHINGTON\n1267h\n<<\nCOPY NO. 1\nOctober 21, 1952\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSUBJECT:\nA Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for\nPlanning for the Security of the United States\nREFERENCES: A. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same\nsubject, dated August 30, 1951\nB. NSC Action No. 543\nC. SE-14\nThe enclosed memorandum from the Director of\nCentral Intelligence and its attached summary evaluation of\nthe net capability of the USSR to injure the continental\nUnited States, prepared pursuant to the National Security\nCouncil Directive transmitted by the reference memorandum,\nare submitted herewith for consideration by the Council at\nan early meeting of the recommendations contained in para-\ngraph 5 of the memorandum.\nIt is requested that special security precautions\nbe observed in the handling of the enclosures and that access\nto the limited number of copies being distributed be re-\nstricted to as few individuals as possible and only on an\nabsolute need-to-know basis.\nS. Everect Ileason\nS. EVERETT GLEASON\nActing Executive Secretary\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\ncc: The Secretary of the Treasury\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979\nThe Attorney General\nNSC LTR. 11.18.81 PROJECT NLT 78.75\nThe Director of Defense Mobilization\nBy NLT- HC NARS, Date 12.1f.41\nThe Federal Civil Defense Administrator\nTOP SECRET\nNLT/PSF/NSC) 1304\nTOP SECRET\nCOPY\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nWashington 25, D. C.\nOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR\nOctober 14, 1952\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary\nNational Security Council\nSUBJECT:\nA Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis\nfor Planning for the Security of the\nUnited States (NSC Action No. 543)\n1.\nOn August 30, 1951, by NSC Action No. 543, the\nNational Security Council directed that the Director of\nCentral Intelligence prepare, in collaboration with the Inter-\ndepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), the Inter-\ndepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), and the Joint\nChiefs of Staff (JCS), a summary evaluation of the net\ncapability of the USSR to injure the Continental United States.\nThe NSC directive required that this summary evaluation be\nprepared upon completion of basic studies by the Intelligence\nAdvisory Committee (IAC) under the direction of its Chairman,\nthe Director of Central Intelligence; by the IIC; by the JCS\nwith collaboration, as required, of the Federal Civil Defense\nAdministration, (FCDA); and by the ICIS with collaboration,\nas required, of the FCDA, as indicated Tab A.\n2. The IAC study was published on October 23, 1951\nas Special Estimate 14, \"Soviet Capabilities for a Military\nAttack on the United States before July 1952. If The IIC\nstudy dated October 10, 1951, and the ICIS study of May 15,\n1952 are enclosed herewith as Tab B.* Because of the\nsensitive nature of the JCS study, it was not distributed\noutside the JCS organization. Members of the working group\nwhich drafted the summary evaluation were briefed orally on\nits contents.\n3. The attached summary evaluation represents a step\nforward in planning for the security of the United States\nand is transmitted as an example of the caliber of work\n*Not enclosed but available upon request to the Executive\nSecretary.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979 1\nTOP SECRET\nNIC LTR. N.IP.SI PROJECT NLT 78.75\nBy NLT- HC NARS, Date 12-18-41\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ncurrently to be expected. In the following important\nrespects, however, it falls far short of supplying the\nestimates essential to security planning:\na. An evaluation of the USSR's capability to injure\nthe United States should contain a plain state-\nment of the estimated percentage of reduction\nin US capabilities likely to result from Soviet\nattack; specifically, percentage reduction in\nthe fields of: US military strength in being,\natomic counterattack capability, industrial\nproduction, and ability to produce new weapons\nof critical importance.\nb. To provide guidance in current planning for\nUS security, evaluations on this subject should\nbe projected into the future and contain an\nestimate of prospective developments in USSR's\noffensive capabilities.\nc. A more adequate and realistic evaluation would\ncover the probable Soviet capabilities to in-\njure US facilities and strengths in all parts\nof the world, and not merely the capability\nof USSR to injure the Continental United States.\nSuch an evaluation should include some estimate\nof Soviet intentions in the light of net\ncapabilities.\n4. Three primary reasons why the attached paper does\nnot meet these requirements are:\na. We lack knowledge of Soviet plans and in-\ntentions and our knowledge of Soviet capa-\nbilities cannot be considered complete.\nb. The basic underlying studies required to produce\nthe statement mentioned in paragraph 3-a do\nnot exist.\nc. There is at present no machinery to plan, guide,\ncoordinate and produce an appraisal or estimate\nbased on the integration of national intelligence\nwith military, political and economic opera-\ntional data dealing with our own capabilities.\n5. It is believed that an appraisal of the type\nreferred to in paragraph 4-c would serve to provide a more\nadequate basis for planning for the security of the United\nStates. To this end it is recommended that the National\nSecurity Council:\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\na. Note the attached summary evaluation as an\ninitial effort in response to the NSC directive issued\nby NSC Action No. 543, and as an example of the kind of\nwork currently to be expected on this type of problem.\nb. As an interim measure instruct the Director of\nCentral Intelligence to prepare, in collaboration with\nofficials of other governmental bodies as required,\nterms of reference for a more adequate evaluation of the\nUSSR's capability to injure the United States.\nC. Concurrently, instruct the Director of Central\nIntelligence to examine, in collaboration with officials\nof other governmental bodies as needed, the adequacy\nof present machinery, and the character of any new\nmachinery that may be required in order to plan, guide,\ncoordinate, and produce for the National Security Council,\nupon request, evaluations in the nature of \"Commander's\nEstimates, of the USSR's capabilities and intentions\nvis-a-vis the United States, based upon the integration\nof military, political, and economic operational data\ndealing with United States' capabilities and intentions,\nand national intelligence.\n/s/ WALTER B. SMITH\nWalter B. Smith\nDirector\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nCOPY\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE\n6 October 1952\nNET CAPABILITY OF THE USSR TO INJURE THE CONTINENTAL US\nPROBLEM\n1. To prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability\nof the USSR, as of mid-1952, to injure the continental United\nStates.\nSCOPE\n2. This evaluation considers the injury which could be\ninflicted on the continental United States by USSR military\naction and Soviet-inspired sabotage in connection with the\ninitial attack and in connection with attacks immediately\nfollowing. The US has substantial strengths in being outside\nthe continental United States, and no estimate is expressed\nherein as to the effect of a Soviet attack on such strengths\nor the likelihood that the Soviet will allocate parts of\nits striking power to such an attack.\nCONCLUSIONS\n3. The Soviet Union, as of mid-1952, has the net\ncapability to inflict serious but not permanently crippling\ndamage to the continental strengths of the United States.\n4. This Soviet eapability is primarily that of surprise\nair attack using atomic bombs. The Soviet capability for\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ninflicting direct damage on the US by sabotage is small by\ncomparison with damage that could be inflicted by an atomic\nair attack. However, sabotage in conjunction with an atomic\nair attack could significantly increase the total physical\nand psychological impact. Such sabotage could include the\nuse of atomic weapons smuggled into the US if the Kremlin were\ndisposed to accept the considerably increased risk of premature\ndisclosure which this operation would entail.\n5. The Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs, as of mid-\n1952, is probably appreciably less than 100. The nature and\nextent of the damage that could be inflicted by a surprise\nair attack, involving the launching against US targets of\nthe entire Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs, would vary\naccording to the objectives governing the selection of targets.\na. An attack on US targets selected with the\nobjective of inflicting maximum overall\ndamage to US armament production capacity and military\npower would probably prevent the US from regaining its\ncurrent armament production capacity and military power\nfor a period of the order of 2 years.\nb. An attack on US targets selected with the primary\nobjective of neutralizing US atomic capabilities (see\nsub-paragraph 6-a) would probably not prevent an atomic\ncounter attack from the continental US of a size\nunacceptable to the Soviet Union in the light of its\npresent defenses and vulnerabilities.\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nc. An attack on US targets selected with the\nprimary objective of neutralizing US ability to sustain\nlarge scale military operations and to produce new weapons\nof critical importance (see sub-paragraphs 6-b and 6-c),\ncould, under circumstances considered probable for the\nenemy, achieve such neutralization for a period of the\norder of 6 to 12 months.\nd. Regardless of the primary objective of the\nattack or the basis of target selection, the USSR is\nincapable of inflicting by such attack sufficient mass\ncasualties or disorganization to force US government\nchanges or decisions acceptable to the USSR (see sub-\nparagraph 6-d).\nOBJECTIVES OF THE ATTACKS\n6. We believe that any military action or sabotage\nundertaken by the USSR against the continental US would be\nfor the purposes listed below. Achievement of the first\nthree of these objectives is, for the present at least,\nessential to the ultimate success of any Soviet war plan\nagainst the western powers.\na. To prevent the launching of atomic attacks\nagainst the Soviet Union in the light of its defenses\nand vulnerabilities. Probable primary targets would\ninclude Strategic Air Command bases, aircraft and control\nЛ\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ncenters, atomic production facilities and storage sites.\nb. To neutralize US ability to sustain large scale\nmilitary operations. Probable primary targets would\ninclude concentrated industries critical and basic to\nwar production; basic services, including power and\ntransport; ports and Naval bases; and atomic production\nfacilities.\nc. To neutralize US ability to develop or produce\nany new weapons of critical importance. Probable primary\ntargets would include Atomic Energy key facilities for\nnew development, guided missile production and test\ninstallations, and applied research facilities.\n₫. To so neutralize the general industrial,\neconomic, and psychological strength of the US that\ngovernment decisions or changes acceptable to the Soviet\nUnion would occur, or could be forced by additional\npressures elsewhere in the world. Pursuit of this ob-\njective would probably involve an effort to inflict mass\ncasualities and cause disorganization in urban areas.\nProbable primary targets would include all those listed\nfor other more specific purposes in sub-paragraphs 6-a,\n6-b, and 6-c above, with the additional targets of\ngovernment control centers, population centers, and\nmiscellaneous industry and supplies wherever concentrated.\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nMETHOD AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ATTACKS\n7. Air Attacks. By far the most effective means\navailable to the USSR for injuring the continental United State:\nin the initial stage of hostilities is air attack with atomic\nbombs. It is estimated that the USSR is capable of carrying\nout air attacks against any target in the continental United\nStates and Canada. Some targets listed as essential to its\nobjectives would be difficult to reach with Soviet capability\nof mid-1952. USSR capabilities for air attack are estimated\nin detail as follows:\na. Penetration of US Defenses.\n(1) The capability exists for the USSR to\npenetrate US, Alaskan and Canadian defense with air\nattack at any time and place which it might select.\nThe factors favoring this capability are:\n(a) The USSR has the initiative\n(b) The US aircraft control and warning\nnet is not completed.\n(c) The USSR can jam and reduce the\nefficiency of the aircraft control and warning\nsystem. The extent to which the USSR can do this\nis not known.\n(d) The radar net will not detect low\nflying aircraft at distances which would make\ninterception feasible.\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n(e) The US Ground Observer Corps is not\nyet fully effective.\n(f) The regulation of air traffic into the\nUnited States is not sufficiently rigid to make\nidentification positive. Also electronic\nidentification equipment is not available to\nsupply all friendly aircraft.\n(g) Sufficient all-weather fighters for\nUS air defense forces are not yet available.\nCrew deficiencies also exist.\n(h) Russian bombers can overfly the range\nof US anti-aircraft artillery.\n(2) The net success in penetrating the US\ndefenses in terms of bombs on target would vary with\nthe avenues chosen, the methods of attack and depth\nof targets inside peripheral defenses, character\nof individual targets and their local defenses, and\nthe degree of surprise attained. It is estimated\nthat 65 to 85 per cent of bombs launched could be\ndelivered on target in an attack aimed at US arm-\nament production facilities and military strength\nin general.\nb. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Atomic Bombs.\nAs of mid-1952, the USSR probably had a stockpile of\n50 bombs of approximately 20 KT yield, or the equivalent\n- 9 -\nTop SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nin bombs of different yields. It is possible that the\nnumber of bombs was as low as 25 or as high as 100.\n(1) Assuming that (1) the USSR had a stockpile\nof 100 bombs, (2) all were allotted to the optimum\ntargets in the US, (3) all were dropped with near\noptimum placement, and (4) the entire attack was\ndelivered in a short period, the Soviet Union could\ninflict sufficient damage to prevent the US from re-\ngaining its present armament production capacity\nand military power for at least two years. However,\nthe actual USSR stockpile is probably appreciably\nless than 100 atomic weapons; optimum target\nselection is improbable; and it is probable that\nthe number of bombs delivered on target would be\nonly 65 to 85 per cent of those launched. Conse-\nquently the probable delay in recovery of US armament\nproduction capacity and military power might well\nbe less than two years.\n(2) If the probable Soviet stockpile of atomic\nbombs were used againstUS targets selected with a\nview to preventing the launching of US atomic weapons\n(see sub-paragraph 6-a), we believe that the percent-\nage of bombs on target would be substantially less\nthan 65 to 85 percent. This estimate is based on\nthe nature and location of the targets and on the\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nfact that the aircraft element in these targets is\nmobile. Such an attack, under circumstances con-\nsidered probable for the enemy, would probably not\nprevent an atomic counter attack from the continental\nUS of a size unacceptable to the Soviet Union in\nthe light of its present defenses and vulnerabili-\nties.1/\n(3) If the probable Soviet stockpile were\ndirected at the ability of the US to sustain large\nscale military operations and to produce new weapons\nof critical importance (see sub-paragraphs 6-b and\n6-c), delivery capability should be high. Under\ncircumstances considered probable for the enemy,\nsubstantial neutralization of these US capabilities\ncould probably be achieved for a period of the order\nof 6 to 12 months.2/\n(4) If the probable Soviet stockpile were used\nto achieve any of the purposes stated in paragraph 6,\n1/ As noted in paragraph 2 above, no estimate is expressed\nherein as to the effect of a Soviet attack on US strengths\noverseas, or as to the likelihood that the Kremlin would\nallocate parts of its striking power to such an attack.\n2/ US ability to sustain large scale military operations is\nconsidered here as a general ability. If effects were\nanalyzed in terms of sustaining particular military\noperations, i.e. land operations, sea operations, air\noperations, amphibious and joint operations, different\npredictions would likely result for each.\n- 11 -\nToΓ SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INF ORMATION\nsome progress might be made toward achieving the\npurpose described in sub-paragraph 6-d. However,\nthe degree of destruction required to achieve that\npurpose is believed to be well beyond current Soviet\ncapabilities.\nc. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Conventional\nBombs. Using conventional bombs, the USSR could not at\nthe present time inflict injury on the continental\nUnited States that would be significant in achieving\nany of the purposes listed in paragraph 6.\nd. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Chemical, BW\nand Other Unconventional Weapons. At the present time the\nUSSR does not have the capability to use chemical, BW,\nor other unconventional weapons in air attacks to achieve\nany of the purposes listed in paragraph 6.\n8. Effectiveness of Airborne Troop Attacks. The USSR\ncould not materially contribute to the achievement of any of\nthe purposes listed in paragraph 6 by the use of airborne troop\nor commando air drops.\n9. Effectiveness of Sea Attack.\na. Surface Forces. The USSR could not inflict\nsignificant injury on continental United States by use\nof Naval surface forces, as these surface forces lack\nthe strength and composition necessary for operations\nagainst the continental United States.\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nb. Sub-surface Forces. Soviet submarines are\ncapable of reaching, with little chance of detection,\npositions off the US coasts from which personnel could\nbe landed and missiles fired at land targets. There is\nno evidence that the USSR as yet possesses an atomic\nmissile that can be fired from a submarine. Although\nthe possibility exists that the USSR does have such a\nweapon, we consider the damage resulting from such attacks\nwould be minor by comparison to that of atomic air attack,\nand would not materially change the results to be ex-\npected from an air attack which delivered the entire\navailable stockpile.\n10. Sabotage. The Soviet capability for inflicting direct\ndamage on the US by sabotage is small by comparison with\ndamage that could be inflicted by an atomic air attack.\nHowever, sabotage in conjunction with an atomic air attack\ncould significantly increase the total physical and\npsychological impact. Such sabotage could include the use\nof atomic weapons smuggled into the US if the Kremlin were\ndisposed to accept the considerably increased risk of pre-\nmature disclosure which this operation would entail. USSR\nsabotage capabilities are estimated as follows:\na. Use of Saboteurs. Measures to control the\nmovement of potential saboteurs across the borders of or\nwithin the United States do not completely prevent access\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nto most sabotage targets in the United States. If war\noccurs, however, the entry and departure of potential\nsaboteurs probably would be quickly and substantially\ncurtailed. The freedom of action of potential saboteurs\nalso in this event would probably be quickly and\nsubstantially curtailed by U. S. Government detention of\nthose Communists and others who are regarded as potential\nsaboteurs and of resident enemy aliens (including Soviet\nBloc diplomatic and official personnel). Plans for the\naccomplishment of such detention have been prepared.\nb. Physical Sabotage Capabilities against Specific\nTypes of Targets are estimated as follows:\n(1) Industrial Installations and Facilities.\nSabotage capabilities are high against facilities\nupon which a war mobilization, war production and\nwartime civilian economy depend. Security super-\nvision is maintained in critical plants engaged in\nindustrial contracts with defense agencies and also\nin certain essential supporting facilities. No like\nsupervision is maintained in plants serving the\nessential civilian wartime economy. Inadequate\nvisitor control in, and absence of authority to re-\nmove potential saboteurs from, vital non-classified-\ncontract plants and inability to prevent Soviet in-\nspired disruptive strikes, even in classified-con-\ntract plants, further add to the vulnerability of\nthese industrial installations.\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n(2) Key Military Installations. (including\ncommand facilities and other facilities essential\nfor logistical support of the military within an\narea). Sabotage capabilities are slight in view of\npresent deployment and readiness of area military\nforces and other protective countermeasures.\n(3) Port Facilities. Substantial sabotage\ncapabilities exist, since the program for safe-\nguarding port facilities, adopted after evaluation\nof the risks involved, has necessarily been\nlimited primarily to major ports. Even this limited\nprogram is proving difficult to implement in full.\n(4) Forests. Sabotage capabilities consist\nchiefly of arson. Present forest protection\nfacilities are inadequate to prevent a substantial\nincrease in forest fire loss through sabotage. How-\never, it is believed that such losses would be\nlimited to an extent that U. S. war strength would\nnot be critically affected.\n(5) Crops and Livestock. While existing measure\nfor safeguarding the nation's food supply are not\nadequate to prevent unconventional attacks, they\nmight serve to minimize damage thereto from such\nattacks. It is believed that losses in this category\nwould be limited to an extent that U. S. war strength\nwould not be critically affected.\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n(6) Public Water Supplies are generally vulner-\nable to temporary and local BW contamination. The\nintroduction of contaminants into water already\nin a circulating system is a greater danger than\nsuch introduction on watersheds or in reservoirs.\n(7) Essential Government Administrative\nOperations. Saboteurs have some capability for\nassassination of key government officials, notwith-\nstanding protective measures to which they have been\nalerted. Saboteurs also have the capability for\ndisrupting the continuity of essential and other\ngovernment operations by the clandestine introduction\nof chemical or biological agents into public\nbuildings. Against this capability, existing\ncountermeasures are only slightly effective.\nc. Sabotage Devices. Potential saboteurs can\nreadily obtain a wide variety of sabotage devices, in-\ncluding chemical and biological agents. They can also\nobtain or produce non-fissionable component parts of\natomic bombs. Each of the foregoing is available in the\nUnited States or procurable through smuggling, for which\nsubstantial opportunities exist over United States land\nand sea frontiers and through abuse of diplomatic im-\nmunity and courtesy. There also exists the possibility\nof introducing assembled atomic bombs from abroad by\nsuch smuggling. The effective limit on sabotage\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nfor SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ncapability will continue to be determined by US controls\non movements of persons and materials and on access to\ncritical targets rather than by the availability of\nsabotage devices.\nWith regard to BW agents, programs pertaining to\n-\ndisease reporting, immunization, research, training,\nstockpiling, alertness, protection of veterinary\nbiologicals and physical security of essential buildings\nare under way in the appropriate agencies. Satisfactory\nexecution of these programs is essential to adequate\ndefense against overt as well as clandestine biological\nwarfare attack.\nd. Non-physical Sabotage. While the continued\npropaganda and other subversive efforts of the Communists\nprobably are not without some result, the prosecutions\nof national and local Communist leaders, plus the in-\ncreasing awareness of the American public of the\nseriousness of this threat, are reducing the Communist\npotential in this field.\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTAB A\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE\non\nA PROJECT TO PROVIDE A MORE ADEQUATE BASIS FOR\nPLANNING FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\n1. Pursuant to authorization by the President there is\nhereby directed the development of the following comprehensive\nstudies in order to provide a more adequate basis for planning\nfor the security of the United States.\na. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to\nlaunch a military attack on the Continental United States,\nto be prepared under the direction of the Director of\nCentral Intelligence as Chairman of the Intelligence\nAdvisory Committee.\nb. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to\nconduct sabotage and otherwise disrupt internal U. S.\nactivities, to be prepared by the Interdepartmental\nIntelligence Conference.\nc. An evaluation of U. S. military capability to\ncounter potential enemy capabilities as estimated in sub-\nparagraph a above, and an estimate of the probable\ndamage to the United States resulting from such attack,\nto be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the\ncollaboration, as required, of the Federal Civil Defense\nAdministration.\nd. An evaluation of ways and means available to\ncounter potential enemy capabilities as estimated in\nsubparagraph b above, and an estimate of the probable\ndamage to the United States resulting from such enemy\nactions, to be prepared by the Interdepartmental.\nCommittee on Internal Security with the collaboration,\nas required of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.\n2. Upon the completion of the foregoing studies there\nwill be prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence in\ncollaboration with the Interdepartmental, Committee on Internal\nSecurity, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and\nthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, a summary evaluation of the net\ncapability of the USSR to injure the Continental United States.\n- 18 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n3. The summary evaluation referred to in paragraph 2\nabove shall be completed as soon as possible and shall be\nforwarded to the National Security Council. Access thereto\nwill be restricted to as few individuals as possible and\nonly on an absolute need-to-know basis.\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET"
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