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    "ocrText": "NLT/PSF/NSC)130 306\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nDOC. NO. PSB D-34\nDATE October 30, 1952\nCOPY NO. 66\nPSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD\nWashington\nPROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT\nFOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952\nSubmitted to the President and the National Security Council\nby the Psychological Strategy Board\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979\nNSC LTR. 12-12-21 PROJECT NLT 74.75\nBy NLT- NC NARS, Date 12.18.11\nWARNING\nThis document contains information affecting the national defense of the\nUnited States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, Sec-\ntions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in\nany manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nCOPY NO. 66\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nPROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT\nFOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952\nSubmitted to the President and the National Security Council\nby the Psychological Strategy Board\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nI. Evaluative Summary of Significant Psychological Activities\n2\nII. The Work of PSB\n6\nIII. Summaries of Reports:\nDepartment of State\n15\nDepartment of Defense\n19\n*Central Intelligence Agency\n24\nField Representatives of Mutual Security Agency\n38\nText of Report of Department of State\nANNEX A\nText of Report of Department of Defense\nANNEX B\n* For security reasons the summary of the Report of the Central Intel-\nligence Agency is not included. It is being given a separate limited\ndistribution.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 1 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nI. SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW\n1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psycho-\nlogical activities during the reporting period on the part of the de-\npartments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.\nCapabilities by Area\n2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved\nin certain areas, Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in our capa-\nbilities for making an immediately effective psychological contribution\nto the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence. These\ngaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and most of the European\nsatellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially in\nbuilding capabilities for future development.\n3. Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being\nemployed in the psychological field against the USSR. The Russian\n\"jamming\" continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in the\nwhole field of communications, Insofar as Communist China is concerned,\nthe situation is about the same but probably with less receptivity due\nto shortages of receiving facilities among the masses,\nAnti-American Attitudes\n4. In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific\ngrievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in\nanti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States propa-\nganda and pressure. During the reporting period a substantial increase\nwas made\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 2 of 41\nSECURI TY INF ORMA TION ON\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nwas made in the volume of guidance and support material for indirect\nand non-attributable propaganda. However, the above trend makes clear\nthe importance of still further increasing our efforts to develop in-\ndirect and non-attributable information activities.\nWestern Europe\n5. The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area continues\nto cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attitudes\nfavorable to the position-of-strength strategy. European enthusiasm\ncontinues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically military,\ni.e., NATO and EDC. However, U. S. psychological action has contributed\nto an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some countries,\nnotably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integration atti-\ntudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward European functional\nand political unity. All these gains, taken together with the growth\nof military strength in Europe, contributed to counteracting the spread\nof neutralist sentiments.\nMiddle East\n6. The political crisis in Iran has materially reduced U. S.\ncapabilities to influence the present trend of events in that country,\nthough some limited results of non-attributable activities are reported.\nThe danger of further deterioration in Iran, emphasizes the importance of\nrapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring countries,\nwhere repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Egypt,\nthe political crisis similarly reduced current capabilities, but the\npresent\nSECURITY INF CRMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 3 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\npresent situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements\nthat make the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little\nprogress in the psychological field can be reported for the quarter\ntoward the achievement of national policy objectives. A notable\ncontribution to the national psychological effort in the area, how-\never, was the airlift by the United States Air Force of some 3,800\nMoslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda.\nFar East\n7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was in-\ncreased appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological\nimpact of TCA and MSA agricultural, public health, and other aid\nprograms. Psychological capabilities in Southeast Asia have been\nexpanded, especially in the non-attributable field, but little in-\ncrease in current effectiveness is reported. The tendency in the\narea to identify the United States with European colonial powers,\nand with indigenous leadership groups which are opposed by revolu-\ntionary nationalist movements, continues to present a psychological\nobstacle. In Japan, certain non-attributable activities in the labor\nfield continue to make progress.\nKorea\n8. Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of\nhostilities, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure\non the communists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of\nvoluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained\nwidespread acceptance in the non-communist world.\n\"Hate America\" Propaganda\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 4 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\n\"Hate America\" Propaganda\n9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been con-\ncerned with combatting the Soviet-Communist \"Hate America\" propa-\nganda campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on\nthis subject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propa-\nganda channels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil\npurpose of the hate campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate\nthe release by the Department of Defense and its components of in-\nformation on biological and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of\nthese activities cannot be gauged in isolation from other United\nStates operations.\nMilitary Assets for the \"Cold War\"\n10. A number of actions and programs of the Department of Defense\nand the military services during the reporting period, particularly in\nWestern Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of contribu-\ntion these services can make to the national psychological effort.\nHowever, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for\nthe use of military psychological warfare assets in support of ap-\nproved national peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty\nis encountered in exploiting this potential in the absence of specific\nauthority and missions upon which military psychological activities in\npeacetime may be based. The feasibility of making such a delineation\nis under study.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 5 of 41\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nII. THE WORK OF PSB\nGeneral Activities\n11. A paper dealing with the problem of a strategic concept with\nspecial reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5 was completed\nand submitted to the Board. Pending development of capabilities and\nsituations which may make it possible to envisage a final solution of\nthe cold war, it proposed continued effort in the direction of building\ncapabilities and effecting cumulative retraction of Soviet power.\n12. A revised text of a statement was approved by the Board with\nthe understanding that it might be \"worked into an early speech\" in\norder to provide current psychological operations in Eastern Europe with\nneeded support without implying any more ambitious programs there.\n13. The Board decided that intra-agency and inter-departmental\ncoordination for social science research in support of psychological\noperations should be further developed and agreed to continued PSB\nassociation with this study.\nPlanning\n14. During the period under review, the first comprehensive area\nplan to be undertaken by PSB was completed and submitted to the Board for\napproval. This paper, entitled \"A National Psychological Strategy with\nRespect to Germany\", lays down basic guidance for U. S. psychological\noperations aimed at furthering the integration of the German Federal\nRepublic into the Western European Community, and other national objectives.\n15. A similar basic plan for another critical cold war area -\nJapan - was completed in draft form during the Quarter and circulated\nto the departments and agencies concerned for final comments before\nsubmission to the Board in the coming Quarter.\n16. Apart from\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 6 of 47\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\n16. Apart from their immediate importance in providing guidance\nfor national psychological operations in two vital areas, these two\nplans proved valuable in developing and clarifying the novel concept\nof national psychological strategy planning. On the basis of the lessons\nderived from them, the Director's staff began a study aimed at improving\nthe PSB planning process as a whole.\nCoordination\n17. During the Quarter, the Board's coordination function with\nrespect to field implementation of the approved plans for France and\nItaly was furthered in two ways. The U. S. Ambassadors to these countries\ntook advantage of a meeting in London to discuss fully mutual problems\nin connection with the plan, thereby assuring an interchange of their\nexperiences on the subject; and a comprehensive re-study of the two plans\nwas initiated both in the field and in Washington, with a view to deter-\nmining the main lines of approved action to be stressed in the near future.\n18. In anticipation of Board approval of the German plan, the\nOffice of the High Commissioner for Germany organized a coordinating\npanel for implementation of the plan in the field.\nEvaluation\n19. Some progress was made during the Quarter in meeting the Board's\nresponsibility for \"evaluation of the national psychological effort\".\nAt the Board's direction, the Director's staff, in collaboration with\nthe departments and agencies concerned, has undertaken an evaluation of\nthe national psychological effort directed at Italy. The staff has also\nundertaken, as part of a larger government-wide economic policy study,\nan evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic\npolicies in the United Kingdom. These projects should contribute\nadditionally\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 7 of 47\nSecurity Information\nTO SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nadditionally to the establishment of valid criteria and workable\napproaches for future evaluation activity.\n20. Following is a detailed report on PSB planning activities for\nthe Quarter:\n21. Plans Completed and Being Executed\n(a) Psychological Operations Plan for the\nReduction of Communist Power in France\n(PSB D-14/c), and\n(b) Psychological Sperations Plan for the\nReduction of Communist Power in Italy\n(PSB D-15/b)\n(1) During the Quarter under review, the Washington inter-\ndepartmental committee and its counterparts in Paris and Rome con-\ntinued to coordinate U. S. activities under these plans.\n(2) According to Embassies Paris and Rome, the French and\nItalian governments have in recent months shown a disposition to\ntake vigorous action to reduce communist power in their respective\ncountries. Therefore, our Ambassadors are agreed that the United\nStates should continue to remain in the background, while making\nknown to both governments our concern that vigorous anti-communist\naction be pursued. They are also agreed that principal liaison\nshould remain at the prime ministerial level.\n(3) The Quarter saw what may prove to be a basic shift in com-\nmunist tactics, reflected in both France and Italy, i.e., away\nfrom a policy of militancy and non-cooperation with non-communist\ngroups and toward a policy of \"respectability\" and cooperation with\nnon-communists. If such a shift persists, the willingness and\nability of the French and Italian governments to take vigorous anti-\ncommunist action might be impaired. In turn, the U. S. would find\nit more difficult to influence these governments and their people\nin taking\nSecur tv Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 8 of 41\nSecurity information\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nin taking a strong anti-communist position.\n(c) Psychological Operations Plan for\nSoviet Orbit Escapees--Phase \"A\"\n(PSB D-18/a)\n(1) Organization under this plan, which is administered by the\nDepartment of State, was completed during the period under review.\nFigures for eligible escapees have been revised slightly, and now\ntotal 20,995 in the countries of reception, plus estimated arrivals\nof 429 per month. Projects authorized or underway include language\nand vocational training courses, a visa opportunity search, and\nregistration and documentation of escapees, in addition to care\nfor their urgent immediate needs.\n(2) Resettlement is now in progress. Voluntary agencies have\nrequested transportation for 860 escapees under the program. Actual\ndepartures number 295, while 508 are awaiting departure for overseas.\nPropaganda utilization has been made of individual cases of re-\nsettled escapees, both by the Voice of America and domestic news\nmedia. The Department of State has under development a propaganda\nplan for exploiting the escapee program as such.\n(3) Funds obligated to the program through fiscal year 1953\nnow total $6,291,760. This includes an initial authorization of\n$4,300,000 in dollars and $1,991,760 in counterpart funds.\n(4) Accomplishment of other purposes of the program has been\nslight. The Department of Defense reports inplementation of the\nLodge Amendment as follows: applications for recruitment, 6008;\nrejections, 4847; acceptances, 395; scheduled for processing, 108;\nunder review by CIC, 655. The Department of the Army does not con-\ntemplate any further liberalization of the conditions under which\nexcapees may be recruited.\n(d) Staff Study\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 9 of 41\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\n(d) Staff Study-Preliminary Analysis\nof the Communist BW Propaganda\nCampaign with Recommendations\n(PSB D-25/b)\nThis study, which is connected with the current \"Hate America\"\ncommunist propaganda campaign, was approved by the Board on\nAugust 7. Responsibility for undertaking and coordinating opera-\ntional planning to deal with the problems raised in the study was\nassigned to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.\nAt PCC direction, a Working Group on Hate America Propaganda has\nbeen assigned to the problem.\n22. Plans Completed But Fot Yet Being Executed--Stand-By Plans\n(a) Psychological Operations Plan Incident\nto Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations\n(PSB D-7/c), and\n(b) Emergency Plan for Break-off of Korean\nArmistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)\nThe first of these plans is designed to establish special\npsychological objectives with respect to our allies as well as to\nour adversaries, to be implemented in the event of successful cease-\nfire negotiations. The second plan endeavors to establish for\ngovernment departments and agencies engaged in psychological opera-\ntions courses of action in preparation for, and in the event of, a\nbreakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations. Overt operational\nplanning under both plans is substantially complete. Covert\noperational planning is currently being revised.\n(c) Plan for Conducting Psychological\nOperations During General Hostilities\n(PSB D-8/b), and\n(d) National Overt Propaganda Policy\nGuidance for General War (PSB D-11/b)\nBoth the plan and the guidance have been distributed to the\nvarious\nSecuri Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 10 of 41\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nvarious departments and agencies for their use, and have been\nintegrated by the military services with their war planning.\nPlanning on inter-departmental problems relating to psychological\npolicies and operations in the event of war is currently being\naccomplished by an X-Day Committee under the Psychological Opera-\ntions Coordinating Committee.\n23. Plans Authorized And In Process Of Development\n(a) Psychological Operations Plan for\nSoviet Orbit Escapees--Phase \"B\"\n(PSB D-18a/1)\nThis phase of the plan is concerned with the psychological and\nsubsidiary military advantages which would result from the stimu-\nlation of defection together with the proper utilization of such\nescapees. Progress in drafting the final plan will be largely\ndependent on a decision as to what use will be made of the funds\navailable under Section 101 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act.\nPhase \"A\", concerned with the care, resettlement and possible utili-\nzation of current escapees, is reported on a bove (see paragraph 21-c).\n(b) A National Psychological Strategy\nwith Respect to Germany (PSB D-21)\nThis plan will prescribe certain desirable psychological courses\nof action in respect to: (1) supporting the achievement of German\nunity; (2) the role of a unified Germany in the unification of\nEurope; (3) actions designed to reduce Soviet capabilities in\nEastern Germany.\n(c) Psychological Strategy Planning for\nthe Middle East (PSB D-22)\n(1) This plan will provide a national psychological strategy,\ndesigned to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the same\ntime to strengthen Western influence in the Middle East, and to insure\nthat the\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 11 of 41\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\n+hat the resources of the area are available to the United States\nand its allies for use in strengthening the free world. It will\nseek to accomplish these objectives by psychological measures aimed\nat overcoming instability within these countries, strengthening the\nwill and ability of these countries to resist aggression, and estab-\nlishing a new relationship with these states which will recognize\ntheir desire to achieve status and respect for their sovereign\nequality.\n(2) Annexes covering the basic factors and considerations are\nnow being developed in order to aid in crystallization of the psy-\ncholotical strategy concept and selection of the psychological\nobjectives and tasks.\n(d) Psychological Strategy Planning for\nSoutheast Asia (PSB D-23)\nThis plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated\npsychological operations in preventing the free countries of South-\neast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing\nin these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from\nwithin and without. Difficulties in policy interpretation are being\nresolved and Board approval is expected during the next Quarter.\n(e) Program of Psychological Preparation\nfor Stalin's Passing from Power (PSB D-24)\nThe participating agencies are now in the process of clearing\na Revised Draft.\n(f) Psychological Strategy Plan for the\nPro-U.S. Orientation of Japan (PSB D-27)\nFollowing the adoption by the National Security Council of\nNSC 125/2 \"United States Objectives and Courses of Action with\nRespect to\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 12 of 41\nSecurity Information\nTOR SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nRespect to Japan\", the Panel agreed to a draft of a plan which is\ndesigned effectively to assist, by means of coordinated psychological\noperations, in carrying out the objectives of NSC 125/2 necessary to\nmaximize Japan's contribution to the attainment of U. S. objectives\nin Asia.\n(g) Psychological Strategy for Economic\nSecurity Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Orbit\n(PSB D-28)\nThe plan is designed to provide a national psychological\nstrategy and specific courses of action with respect to the psycho-\nlogical aspects of U. S. economic security programs concerned with\nthe Soviet orbit by increasing the degree of acceptance in the Free\nWorld of U. S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet\norbit. Suggested courses of action to be developed will be governed\nby the Economic Defense Advisory Committee's decision as to what\nshould be U.S. policy in informational statements to foreign\ngovernments with respect to trade in goods which are not covered\nby the Battle Act and other Security Lists.\n(h) Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare\nAgainst the USSR (PSB D-33)\nThe Board has accepted a recommendation that a panel be\ncreated to examine the field of ideological warfare specifically\ndirected against Soviet doctrine, and to make recommendations as to\nhow the United States can gain superiority in this field.\n(i) Western Europe\nIn consultation with member agencies, particularly the\nDepartment of State, a preliminary study is being undertaken to\ndetermine the most fruitful approach to a psychological strategy\nplan for Western Europe.\n(j) East\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 13 of 41\nSecurity ty Information\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\n(j) East German Youth\nOn instructions from the Board, an inquiry was carried out by\nthe Director's staff which concluded that a program for utilization\nof young East German escapees would be of definite psychological\nvalue. However, it was impossible without answers to specific\nquestions to weigh the psychological desirability against the cost\nof overcoming physical obstacles to such a program in Germany. At\nthe suggestion of the Director the Department of State has under-\ntaken a survey in Germany to determine the advantages and disad-\nvantages which would result if such a program were inaugurated.\n24. Planning Procedure\nAn analysis was made of the difficulties which have been\nencountered in developing PSB plans. Recommendations were developed\nfor an improved format for national psychological strategy plans.\nSecurity Information\nTOP SECRET\nPage 14 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nIII. SUNNARIES OF DEPARTMENTAL AND AGENCY REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD\nUNDER REVIEW.\nA. Summary of the Report of the Department of State on the\nForeign Information Program*\nDuring the period under review the tasks of the Foreign\nInformation and Educational Exchange Programs of the Department\nof State continued to be those set forth in NSC 114/2, namely,\nto multiply and intensify psychological deterrents to aggression\nby Soviet Communism; to intensify and accelerate the growth of\nconfidence in and among the peoples and governments of the free\nworld; to combat extremism and neutralism; to maintain among\nthe peoples held captive by Soviet Communism the hope of ultimate\nliberation; and to maintain particularly among the peoples and\ngovernments of Latin America continued recognition of mutual\ninterdependence.\nThe Report lists the principal actions taken by the\nDepartment of State in endeavoring to carry out these tasks.\nThey include:\n1. Projecting to the peoples and governments of\nnations dominated by Soviet Communism the growing\nstrength and unity of the free world, This involved\nexploiting in the programs of the International Informa-\ntion Administration such policies, activities and events\nas \"OP RATION MAINBRACE\", joint NATO maneuvers on the\nLuropean continent, the ANZUS Conference, the development\nof tactical atomic weapons, and exposure of the deceitful\nnature of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unifi-\ncation of Germany.\n2. Projecting\n* The full text of the Department of State report is appended as\nANNEX\nSECURITY INFOR TION\nSECRET\nPage 15 of 41\nSECURITY NFORMATION\nSECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\n2. Projecting the peaceful intentions of the U. S.\nthrough exploitation of our disarmament efforts, of our\npatient attempts to reach an armistice in Korea, and of\nthe justice of the UN Command's refusal forcibly to\nrepatriate prisoners of war. Particular emphasis was put\non exposing the manifest absurdity and evil purpose of the\nSoviet hate campaign, including the bacteriological war-\nfare charges.\n3. In its continuing attempts to aggravate internal\nweaknesses of Soviet Communism, the Information Program\nendeavored to exploit such items as the strengthening of\nthe tyranny of the Kremlin over the peoples of the USSR\nimplied in plans for the Communist Party Congress; the\npurges of Communist Party leaders in the satellites and\nin France and Italy, and the implications of the refusal\nof large numbers of Chinese captured in Korea to return\nto China.\n4. Convincing peoples and governments of the free\nworld of the need and the possibility of building up\nadequate military strength as a deterrent to war. This\ninvolved exploitation of \"OPERATION MAINBRACE\" and other\nmaneuvers in Europe; it included also encouragement of\nmoves toward European integration, including the exploita-\ntion, largely through indigenous means, of the establish-\nment of the European Coal and Steel Authority, of develop-\nments within the Council of Europe, and of progress toward\nthe European Defense Community.\n5. Maintenance of confidence in the peaceful\nintentions and reliable leadership of the U. S. included\nspecial\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 16 of 41\nSECURIT INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nspecial efforts to give a balanced understanding of develop-\nments, especially those affecting foreign policy,\ngrowing out of the Presidential election. Special\nefforts were made in the Information Program to explain\nthe motives of the 01 S. when differing with the United\nKingdom in the Iranian crisis and with France on the\nNorth African problem. The program also placed special\nemphasis on projecting a greater understanding of the\ncultural maturity of the united States. Examples of\nthis were the Buropean tour of \"Porgy and Bess\", the\nparticipation of American artists in the Venice UNESCO\nConference, and presentations of typical artistic\ncreations at the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Paris.\n6. Combatting neutralism through exposing its\ndangers as a means of safeguarding individual liberty\nand freedom and as a subversive device of Soviet\nCommunism.\n7. Combatting instability and extreme nationalist\ntendencies, particularly in the Near and Middle East.\nThe Report notes that exploitation of the USAF airlift\nof pilgrims from Beirut to Mecca was left largely to\nindigenous channels, but was the subject of a pictorial\npamphlet produced by the U. S. Information Services in\nBeirut, of a film, and of a series of statements by\nmembers of the crews of the planes involved.\n8. Haintaining hope of ultimate liberation among\nthe peoples held captive by Soviet Communism. Largely\nthrough the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin,\nefforts were made to explain statements in the Presiden-\ntial campaign concerning U. S. policy towards the\nsatellites,\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 17 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nsatellites; to interpret the significance for the satel-\nlites of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress; to\nexpose the \"Hate America\" campaign; to portray the Sino-\nSoviet meeting in Moscow in a light calculated to raise\ndoubts in the minds of Chinese as to the motives of the\nPeiping regime in dealing with the USSR.\n9. Fostering American solidarity through exploitation\nof such actions as the visit of the Secretary of State to Brazil,\nthe conversion of Puerto Rico to Commonwealth status, and\nthrough efforts to expose the threat to Latim A erican countries\ninherent in Soviet Communism.\n10. Operational activities listed in the Report include\napproval of a project for the establishment of an IIA\nRegional Service Center in Beirut; inauguration of a new\nseries of Information Policy Guidances known as \"Informa-\ntion Guidance Bulletins,\" initiation of radio programs in\nnine languages by the ship-borne transmitter \"The Courier,\"\nstationed at Rhodes; production and distribution of a film\nshowing participation of the individual American voter in\nthe process of choosing presidential candidates, and\nscheduling of another film showing the voter's participation\nin the election of the President.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECKET\nPage 18 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SICRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nB. Summary of the Report of the Department of Defense*\nDuring the reporting period the Department of Defense and\nthe military services have continued to make noteworthy contribu-\ntions, incident to their primary military mission, to the national\npsychological effort, However, one of the considerable difficulties\nnoted within the Department of Defense in engaring in cold war\nactivities (except in a supporting role) continues to be the fact\nthat the Department's role in such activities is orincipally implied.\nThere exists no specific delineation of authority and responsibility\nupon which military psychological operations in peace-time may be\nbased, Some such specification for the Department of Defense would\ncontribute to more effective participation of the military services\nin the national psychological effort. This observation applies both\nto operations designed to attain an independent psychological effect,\nand to operations in which, although their primary purpose is military,\npolitical or economic, psychological factors must be considered.\nDuring the period under review, military and naval maneuvers\nand statements of high military officials have served psychological\nends, primarily in 'estern Larope. Although the potential psycholo-\ngical impact of maneuvers at home and abroad is not yet wholly inte-\ngrated into operational plans, continuing attention is being devoted\nto this matter.\nThe Department of Defense has joined in combatting anti-\nAmerican sentiments, particularly in Europe, by various means within\nits area of responsibility. The Department of Defense feels, however,\nthat we are still on the defensive in regard to the \"Hate America\"\ncampaign generally.\nIn the\n* The full text of the Department of Defense report is appended as\nANNEX B.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 19 of 41\nS CURITY INFORM A TION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nIn the Middle East, the Beirut-Jidda airlift and several\nother operations involving the Department of Defense have contributed\nmaterially to the creation of a psychological climate more favorable\nto the West. In Korea, notable actions include the North Morea target\nwarning operations and continuous and effective leaflet drops.\nResearch and forward planning in the psychological field con-\ntinue, directed for the most part to the contingency of general war.\nEfforts are continuing to define the specific role of the Department\nof Defense as an active participant in the cold war,\nOperations by Areas\n1, In the European area, contributions to reduction of\nneutralism and anti-Americanism include participation in 0.5.-French\nmilitary maneuvers east of the Rhine and 0.S.-British-Prench ground\nand air maneuvers in Germany; alert drills of the U.S. garrison in\nBerlin; the large-scale NATO naval maneuvers in the North Sea and\nthe Baltic; fleet visits to Yugoslavia and elsewhere; and state-\nments by General hidgway and other senior U.S. commanders re-\nemphasizing the need for, and practicality of, an unremitting col-\nlective effort to build a position of strength against aggression.\nIn the field of troop-civilian relations, a marked degree of closer\ncooperation and collaboration between u.s. commanders and local gov-\nernment officials has been achieved and will be pressed forward. A\ntrend toward greater acceptance of U.S. military personnel can be\nnoted throughout Western Burope. The continued policy of offshore\nprocurement of supplies from Luropean sources contributes indirectly\nto these ends by stimulating the European economy and fostering\nunderstanding among North Atlantic defense forces,\n2, In the\nSECURITY INFORM TION\nTOP CRET\nPage 20 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\n2. In the iddle East, two operations during the reporting\nperiod, involving Defense Department action, have contributed to the\npsychological effort. These were the airlift of 3,854 pilgrims from\nBeirut to Jidda, and the airlift of 4 tons of hybrid seed corn to\nLebanon. In addition, new evidence has emerged of the favorable\nimpact obtained from the good-will tour of Lebanese-born U.S. jet\nace Major Jabara (previously reported). These actions, undertaken\nspecifically for their psychological effect, have made a significant\ncontribution to the u.s, cold war effort in the area.\n3. In Latin America the Department of Defense continued to\nassist in the training and equipping of national military forces,\nthus contributing to the support of U.S. national policy and to the\nstability of existing governments,\n4. In Korea the conduct of a program to warn civilians residing\nin 78 North Korean cities of the impending bombing by the United\nNations Command expresses the intent to save non-combatant lives,\nand at the same time is designed to increase the pressure on the\ncommunist negotiators at Panmunjom. The continued refusal of the\nUnited Nations Command to use force in repatriation of prisoners of\nwar has gained wide support in the free world. Leaflet, radio, and\nloudspeaker operations, directed at North Korean soldiers and civilians\nand Chinese communist soldiers, were continued at a high level.\nReports continue to indicate wide readership of the leaflets (of\nwhich nearly 3 billion have been dropped to date) despite harsh\nreprisals and scare propaganda used by communist authorities against\nthe individuals involved, In the radio field, a series was initiated\nexploiting\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 21 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nexploiting the statements of Chinese communist prisoners who oppose\nforcible repatriation, On the debit side, publicity on agitation\nin prisoner-of-war camps has provided the communists with additional\neffective propaganda material, despite U.S. attempts to present a\ncontrary interpretation.\nOther Activities\n1. Psychological exploitation of military power: Certain\natomic weapons tests have been exploited psychologically in conjunction\nwith the Decartment of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. The\nDepartment of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive policy on the\nrelease of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles,\nand new weapons, Shows of military force have continued, primarily in\nEurope (as noted above),\n2, In addition to various activities indirectly countering\nthe communist \"Hate America\" campaign, the Department of Defense has\ncooperated closely with the Department of State and other agencies\nconcerned to coordinate the release of information on biological and\nchemical warfare by the Department and its components; and has joined\nin the interdepartmental planning task concerned with countering the\nBY charges and other \"Hate America\" propaganda.\nForward Planning and Research\n1, The Department of Defense continues to conduct a broad\nprogram of research and development in strategic intelligence and\npsychological warfare operations,\n2. To further the wartime national psychological effort, the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to\nsupport\nSECURITY INFORM ION\nTO SECRET\nPage 22 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP CRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nsupport the \"Joint Emergency War Plan,\" using as guidance for this\npurpose the \" ational Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General\nwar\" approved by the Psychological Strategy Board, The military\nservices and major subordinate commands are currently developing or\nmodifying existing plans accordingly. Planning is progressing on a\n\"Transfer Plan\" to facilitate the wartime transfer of U.S. foreign\ninformation equipment and personnel to military control.\n3. A psychological olan to support the U.S. forces in Japan\nis being developed.\n4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under study a bacer setting\nforth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, on his\nwartime osychological warfare responsibilities.\n5. Initial plans for the wartime conduct of psychological\noperations in Alaska, developed by the Commander in Chief, Alaskan\nForces, have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nSECURITY INFORMATION ATION\nTOP ECRET\nPage 23 of 41\nSECURI INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30. 1952\nPages 24 through 37\ncontaining\nSECTION III C\n\"SUMMARY OF THE REPORT CF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\"\nare specially classified and are not included in this copy\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPages 24-37 of W\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nD. Summary of Reports by Field Staff Representatives of the\nMutual Security Agency*\nWestern Europe\nThe defense build-up and its attendant problems continued to\ndominate the psychological climate in Western Europe during the period\nunder review. Although the period closed with a short-term upswing\nin optimism, new and aggravated psychological factors were among the\nmajor obstacles to the attainment of U. S. policy objectives in the\narea.\nFollowing are the significant psychological factors noted:\n1. Renewal of the Mutual Assostance Program by the U.S.\nCongress served to reassure Europe as to the stability and con-\ntinuity of U. S. policy. However, the relationship of rich bene-\nfactor to needy beneficiary, inherent in the \"foreign aid\" concept,\nremained the most important single obstacle to favorable psycholog-\nical exploitation of U. S. programs in Europe. A new concept,\ngeared to the partnership approach, would provide a much healthier\nclimate for psychological operations.\n2. The defense build-up was accompanied by further swings in\nthe pendulum of popular attitudes. By mid-summer the noticeable\nlift in European confidence and morale which had followed the\nLisbon Conference had sagged badly. Late in the quarter there\nwere signs that progress in the placing of offshore procurement\ncontracts, change in political leadership in Germany, and the\nPinay Government's success in holding the price line had contributed\nto some alleviation of the earlier pessimism. However, the fear of\nwar,\n* This summary is based on reports of field representatives reviewed by\nthe Information Division of MSA.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 38 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nwar, Soviet pressures and the economic burdens of defense con-\ntinued to bode trouble for the rearmament effort.\n3. Progress toward ratification and realization of the\nEuropean Defense Community, particularly in France, ran afoul of\ndiminished public enthusiasm.\n4. NATO, while maintaining general support as a defensive\nalliance, continued to lose its grasp on the popular imagination.\nIt is now viewed as a military alliance and nothing more. The\nNATO Information Service has remained ineffective.\n5. The impression is spreading in Europe that the economic\nsituation is not getting any better. As the quarter ended, em-\nployment was high and inflationary pressures had been checked in\nsome places. On the other hand, pressures on living standards\nand general economic development, growing out of the defense pro-\ngram, were causing visible restlessness. Some progress was achieved\nby MSA programs for economic education, particularly in the field\nof productivity and technical assistance. But U. S. tariff and\ntrade restrictions remained a definite psychological drawback to\nour general efforts abroad.\n6. Neutralism, in its \"third force\" context, continued to\ngive ground in the face of Europe's growing military strength,\nthe developing sense of unity and possibly the Soviet peace\noffensive. At the same time, opposition to the defense build-up\nfrom the Bevanites and other European Socialists remained a very\nserious problem, for which a better substantiated and documented\nrebuttal needs to be made.\n7. Anti-Americanism remained on the increase. Contributing\nfactors were the inevitable problems arising out of the growing number\nof U.S.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 39 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTO SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\nof U. S. troops abroad, the current U. S. election campaign,\nCongressional cutbacks in aid, the growing impression abroad\nthat American of ficials tended to be more blunt and insistent\nin their relations with European governments. Economic pressures\nof the defense program, the generalized European unhappiness with\nthe state of the world, and the feeling in some quarters abroad\nthat America is taking too strong a line against Russia have also\nbeen contributory causes of anti-Americanism.\nIn assessing the effectiveness of the MSA information program in\ndealing with the foregoing psychological problems, the report points\nto further progress during the quarter in the integration of MSA and\nState information operations, and to increasing acceptance of the idea\nwithin the U. S. government that our information operations should be\nsomewhat decentralized. At the same time, the report draws attention\nto serious shortcomings in organization, procedure and direction:\n1. MSA has relied almost entirely on the Mutual Security Act\nfor guidance as to \"national objectives.\"\n2. There is increasing need for improved liaison and policy\nand operations coordination between military and civilian informa-\ntion elements. This is evident in such programs as offshore pro-\ncurement and the delivery of military end-items to Europe.\n3. The NATO information services have not developed an effective\npositive program, and remain weak.\n4. Recent experience has underlined the effectiveness of in-\ndirect propaganda techniques and suggests the need for further\ndevelopment in this field.\n5. In view\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP CRET\nPage 40 of 47\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPSB D-34\nOctober 30, 1952\n5. In view of the great size and psychological impact of the\nannual influx of American tourists in Europe, more should be\ndone to study and influence this particular movement.\nSoutheast Asia (Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, Formosa, Malaya)\nFavorable psychological result S accrued during the quarter from\nMSA programs in the fields of agriculture and public health. The use\nof DDT in anti-malaria campaigns and of aureomycin in treating\ntrachoma helped greatly to increase awareness of American aid,\nDistribution of fertilizer and other agricultural programs made a\nnoticeable impact in the area. Installation of community radio re-\nceivers widened the audience available for information programs.\nAt the same time, it was reported, attempts to achieve the\nmaximum psychological impact from U. S. programs in the area were\nimpeded by conflicting policy interests. The U. S. position, in the\nbelief of peoples of this area, continued to suffer from too close an\nidentification with Western colonial interests and indigenous ruling\ngroups, in the face of a rising tide of revolutionary nationalism.\nThe report concluded with the following suggestions:\n1. Local personnel should be trained to take over from\nAmerican personnel as quickly as possible in our various in-\nformation, economic and social programs.\n2. A special effort should be made to influence and support\nintellectuals, professional people and upper income groups, since\ntheir influence is disproportionately large throughout the area.\nPossibly a team of American specialists could be assigned to es-\ntablish close liaison with these individuals,\n3. A strenuous effort should be made to recruit the highest\ncaliber of U.S. personnel for assignment to Southeast Asia.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 41 of 41\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\nTHE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Department of State)\n(Quarterly Status Report, June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952)\n1. The tasks of the foreign information and educational exchange\nprogram of the Department of State, carried on by the International\nInformation Administration, continued to be those set forth in\nAnnex V. to NSC 114/2, in order of priority as follows:\n(1) \"The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological\ndeterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the\nform of outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union,\nof Communist China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or\nin the form of the subversion of existing free governments by\ncivil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism.\"\n(ii) \"The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the\ngrowth of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments\nof the free world, especially in Western Europe, including\nWestern Germany, in their capability successfully to deter\naggression of Soviet Communism or to defeat it should it\nnonetheless occur and to inspire concrete international,\nnational and individual action accordingly.\"\n(iii) \"The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near\nand Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist\ntendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and\nthe stability of the free world and the withdrawal of govern-\nments and peoples into neutralism.\"\n(iv) \"The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held\ncaptive by Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the\nSoviet Union, hope of ultimate liberation and identification\nwi th the free world and to nourish, without provoking pre-\nmature action, a popular spirit disposed to timely resistance\nto regimes now in power.\"\n(v) \"The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and govern-\nments traditionally linked with the United States, parti-\ncularly in Latin America, a continued recognition of mutual\ninterdependence and to promote national and individual\naction accordingly.\"\n2. During the period June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952, the following\nactions were taken, in accordance with plans for every country and with\nspecial plans as noted, to intensify psychological deterrents to aggres-\nsion and subversion by Soviet Communism:\n(a) The growing strength and unity of the free world continued\nto be projected to the peoples and the governments of nations\ndominated by Soviet Communism. This involved substantive action\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 1 of 10\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\nsoberly to exploit particularly\n(i) The development and the maintenance of defensive military\nstrength on the part of the free world, as demonstrated by\nOperation Mainbrace, maneuvers on the continent of Europe,\nthe ANZUS Conference, and the continuing successful resistance\nto aggression and subversion in Korea, Indochina and Malaya.\n(IA-PO-2-ANZUS)\n(ii) The development of new weapons by the United States\nand other free nations, particularly tactical atomic weapons\nby the United States and the explosion of an atomic bomb by\nthe United Kingdom.\n(iii) The diplomatic, economic, cultural and other supporting\nactions given to the people of West Berlin in order that they\nmight the more strongly resist the harassing tactics of Soviet\nCommunists.\n(iv) The conclusion of the contractual agreements with the\nGerman Federal Republic and its planned inclusion in the\nEuropean Defense Community.\n(v) The exposure in the joint replies of the United States,\nthe United Kingdom and France of the deceitful nature of\nthe proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of\nGermany.\n(b) The friendly disposition and the peaceful intentions of the\nUnited States were concurrently projected. This involved sub-\nstantive action to exploit particularly\n(i) The continuing efforts of the United States to promote\nthe balanced reduction and limitation of armed forces in\nthe Disarmament Commission of the United Nations.\n(ii) The patient efforts of the United Nations Command to\nreach an armistice in Korea and the justice of its refusal\nto repatriate prisoners of war.\n(iii) The manifest absurdity and the malign purpose of pro-\npaganda designed to arouse hatred of the United States,\nparticularly charges that its forces engaged in bacteriological\nwarfare in Korea.\n(c) Aggravation of the internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism\ncontinued to be sought. This involved substantive action to\nexploit particularly\n(i) The strengthening of the tyranny of the Kremlin over the\npeople of the USSR implied in the plans for the Communist\nParty Congress. (IA-PO-53-20, Interim Guidance re Nineteenth\nCommunist Party Congress)\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 2 of 10\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\n(ii) The renewed purges of party leaders both in the\n1953) satellites and in France and Italy. (IA-P0-53-17, Italy,\n(iii) The implication of the refusal of large numbers of\nChinese captured in Korea voluntarily to return to China.\n(IA-PO-7, Use of Prisoners of War in Propaganda)\n(iv) The continuing support by the United States of the\nUnited Nations as an instrumentality for the adjustment of\ndifferences and the relaxation of tensions among nations and\nthe rehabilitation of victims of aggression. (IA-PO-53-16,\nRehabilitation of the Republic of Korea)\n(v) The unsoundness of the fundamental communist economic\nthesis that the capitalist world is now entering a period\nof economic crisis which will ultimately and inevitably\nlead to its collapse.\n(d) Particularly in areas not under the domination of the Kremlin,\nefforts continued to expose the myths surrounding and inspired by\nSoviet Communism and minimizing fears of fifth columns acting on\nits behalf. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly\n(i) The schisms within local communist parties, especially\nthe plight of Marty and Tillon in France.\n(ii) Through indigenous channels the fellow-travelling\ntendencies of the authors of the report of the Inter-\nnational Scientific Commission on bacteriological warfare.\n(IA-PO-4, International Red Cross Conference in Toronto)\n(iii) Through calculated silence, the insignificance of\nthe impending peace conferences in Peiping and Vienna.\n(TA-PO-Asia Peace Conference, September, 1952)\n(iv) The proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced\nLabor of the Economic and Social Council of the UN in a\n\"Red Book\" on forced labor. (IA-PO-53-20-Forced Labor:\nUN Hearings, October 14, 1952)\n(v) The refusal of the USSR to join in further efforts\nto negotiate a treaty concerning Austria.\n(vi) Among Chinese overseas, the nature of the regime now\nin power in China and its threat to freedom in Asia.\n3. The following actions were taken to accelerate the growth of confi-\ndence of the free world in its capability to deter aggression or to defeat\nit should it nonetheless occur.\n(a) Convincing the peoples and the governments of the free world\nof the need and the possibility of building ready military capa-\nbilities as a deterrent to war and of the progress made in achiev-\ning them. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 3 of 10\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\n(i) The developing military strength of the free world\nas revealed in Operation Mainbrace and other maneuvers in\nEurope, with emphasis on the contribution and participation\nof the Europeans, in the continuing successful resistance\nto aggression and subversion in the Far East, in the develop-\nment of new weapons and new techniques by nations of the\nfree world.\n(ii) A balanced understanding of the problems created\nregarding the pace of rearmament by the domestic economic\npressures and the reduction of economic and military\nassistance on the part of the United States.\n(iii) The interest of nations in the Near and Middle East,\nparticularly the Arab States, in mutual defense arrangements.\n(iv) The interest of the Philippines and Japan in developing\nindigenous defense capabilities.\n(b) Encouraging the peoples and the governments of Europe in the\ndevelopment of common institutions for mutual welfare and defense.\nThis involved substantive action to exploit particularly, largely\nthrough indigenous means\n(i) The establishment of the European Coal and Steel\nAuthority.\n(ii) Developments within the Council of Europe.\n(iii) The need to proceed rapidly with the ratification\nof the contractual agreements with Germany and the protocols\nestablishing the European Defense Community. (IA-F0-53-14,\nEDC and European Integration)\n(c) The maintenance of confidence in the peaceful intentions, the\nconsistent policies and the reliable leadership of the United States.\nThis involved substantive action to exploit particularly\n(i) A balanced understanding of developments, especially\naffecting foreign policy, growing out of the presidential\nelection, with a view particularly to encouraging confi-\ndence in the continuity of basic policy regardless of the\noutcome. (IA-PO-1, The Presidential Campaign)\n(ii) The patience and the reasonableness of the United\nStates in its role of agent of the United Nations with\nregard to negotiating an armistice and limiting hostil-\nities in Korea.\n(iii) The motives animating the United States when, as\nwith the United Kingdom concerning Iran and with France\nconcerning North Africa, the United States has undertaken\nto follow policies differing from theirs. (IA-PO-5,\nSelf-Determination)\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 4 of 10\nSECURITY FORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\n(iv) The cultural maturity of the United States as\nan indication of the depth of its perceptions and the\nsophistication of its people, for example, the tour of\n\"Porgy and Bess,\" the participation of artists repre-\nsenting the United States in the conference of Venice\nsponsored by UNESCO and the presentation of typical\nmusical compositions, ballets and performances at the\nCongress for Cultural Freedoms in Paris.\n(v) The development by the United States in the Dis-\narmament Commission of the United Nations of a compre-\nhensive program for the balanced reduction and limitation\nof arms and armed forces.\n(vi) The readiness of the United States, together with\nthe United Kingdom and France, to discuss the unification\nof Germany with the USSR on suitable terms.\n(vii) The dangers of neutralism as a means of safeguarding\nindividual liberty and freedom.\n(viii) The interests of indigenous groups understanding of\nand sympathetic with the objectives of the United States.\n4. The following actions were taken to combat, particularly in the Near and\nMiddle East, tendencies nationalistic and religious threatening to under-\nmine the stability and the cohesion of the free world. This involved sub-\nstantive actions to exploit particularly\n(a) The respect of the people and the government of the United\nStates for the religion and the culture of the peoples of the\nMiddle East, as demonstrated primarily by the readiness of the\nUnited States Air Force to carry thousands of pilgrims to Mecca\nwho otherwise would have been stranded at Beirut and by the\nattentions shown to Feisal of Iraq during his visit to the United\nStates. Exploitation of the airlift to Mecca has been left largely\nto indi genous mechanisms, but it is the subject of a pictorial\npamphlet produced in Beirut, a film and a series of statements by\nmembers of the crews of the planes involved.\n(b) Actions taken by the United States to promote a fair and\nreasonable settlement of the dispute between Iran and the United\nKingdom over the nationalized properties of the Anglo-Iranian\nOil Company.\n(c) The efforts of the United States to promote direct negotia-\ntions between France and the colonial peoples for the achievement\nof popular aspirations in Tunisia and Morocco.\n(d) The encouragement given by the United States to reconcilia-\ntion between Israel and the Arab States.\n5. The following actions were taken to maintain, without provoking pre-\nmature deeds, hope of ultimate liberation among peoples held captive by\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 5 of 10\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\nSoviet Communism. This involved substantive action, carried on almost\nentirely by the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin, to exploit\nparticularly\n(a) The balanced interpretation of statements made in the\ncourse of the presidential campaign concerning the policy\nof the United States toward the satellites of Eastern Europe.\n(b) Interpretation of the significance of the Nineteenth\nCommunist Party Congress.\n(c) Exposure of the campaign of hatred against the United\nStates.\n(d) The manifest impracticality of the proposals of the USSR\nconcerning the unification of Germany.\n(e) Portrayal of the Sino-Soviet meetings in Moscow in a\nlight calculated to raise doubts in the minds of Chinese\non the mainland as to the motives of the Peiping regime in\ntheir dealings with the USSR.\n6. The following actions were taken to maintain among peoples traditionally\nlinked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a continued\nrecognition of mutual interests. This involved substantive action\n(a) To foster Latin American association with U.S. objectives\nand policy especially through exploitation of\n(i) The visit of the Secretary of State to Brazil.\n(ii) The conversion of Puerto Rico to Commonwealth\nstatus.\n(iii) The performance of Puerto Rican and Colombian\ntroops in Korea.\n(b) To interpret the position of the United States with regard\nto issues involved in Latin American nationalism, including\nnationalization of resources (P0-53-10, Alleged International\nOil Cartel, PO-53-5, Self-Determination, and continuous infor-\nmation guidance on Ecuadoran, Bolivian and Chilean elections,\non U.S. tin and copper purchasing policy, etc.)\nTo develop attitudes and methods for meeting the anti-U.S.\npropaganda of the Argentine Government (Circular instruction\nof August 26, 1952, and PO-53-13).\n(c) To demonstrate the dangers to Latin America of Soviet\nCommunism. This involved\n(i) Successful conclusion of the special project\nin Panama initiated in fiscal 1952.\n(ii) Preparation of special programming to meet\nthe deteriorated political situation in Chile.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 6 of 10\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\n(iii) Stimulation of awareness in Latin American\ncountries of the Communist danger in Guatemala.\n(iv) Encouragement of intellectual movements in\ndefense of Western value (Circular airgram,\nSeptember 30, 1952).\n(v) Counteraction of the Communist BW campaign in\nLatin America (Circular instruction, September 17,\n1952).\n(vi) Counteraction of propaganda in Latin America\nrelated to the Peiping \"Peace\" Conference (IA Special\nInstruction, August 18, 1952 and Latin American\nSupplement).\n7. The following actions of an operational nature were taken in support of\nthe actions listed above.\n(a) Administrative.\n(i) Approval was given to a staff study providing for\nthe establishment of the ITA European Regional Service\nStaff, whose purpose is to provide USIS missions in\nEurope and elsewhere, especially Greece and Turkey,\nwith materials originating in Europe, to provide advice\nas to the effective utilization of media and to cooper-\nate with Office of Information of the Special Representa-\ntive in Europe in servicing US information offices in\nEurope.\n(ii) Approval was given to a staff study providing for\nthe establishment of the IIA Near East Regional Service\nCenter in Beirut. Authorization has been given for the\nshipment of equipment and the assignment of personnel to\nthe Center.\n(iii) The Department of State has under executive order\nassumed from the Mutual Security Agency responsibility\nfor administering the Information Media Guaranties.\n(b) Policy Formulation.\nOn July 10, 1952, the Current Information Policy Staff,\nOffice of the Assistant Administrator for Policies and Plans,\ninaugurated a new series of information policy guidance known as\nInformation Guidance Bulletins. The great majority are trans-\nmitted by telegram to posts having an interest in the subject\nmatter. As of September 30, 1952, 114 Bulletins had been issued.\n(c) Fvaluation.\nEvaluation studies completed include detailed studies of\nproblems in Turkey and Iran, of the placement of USIS materials\nin foreign newspapers, of the use of the USIS transcriptions on\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage\n7\nOf\n10\nSECURITY FORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\nforeign broadcasting systems, of non-theatrical film distribution\nin foreign countries and of key words in propaganda of the United\nStates and the free world.\n(d) International Press Service.\nOn August 11, 1952, responsibility for the preparation of the\nfour regional editions of the Wireless Bulletins was assumed by\nthe Regional Branches of the International Press Service.\n(e) International Broadcasting Service.\n(i) The ship-borne transmitter, the Courier, on September 7,\n1952 began operations at Rhodes. Programs in nine languages\n--Turkish, Persian, Hebrew, Arabic, English, Armenian, Georg-\nian, Azerbaijani and Tartar--are broadcast in short and medium\nwave lengths during a period of 5-3/4 hours daily. Monitoring\nreports thus far available indicate excellent reception.\n(ii) A fifteen minute broadcast in Tartar was inaugurated\nat the local programming center at Munich on September 21,\n1952.\n(iii) A study of the transmitters located in the United\nStates was made by Booz, Allen and Hamilton with a view\nto providing a stronger short-wave signal to relay bases\noverseas.\n(iv) Alfred Hammond Morton assumed charge of the Inter-\nnational Broadcasting Service with the title of Deputy\nAdministrator of the International Information Administration.\n(f) Information Center Service.\nFranklin Publications, Inc., a private corporation formed by\na group of publishers and private interests, was formed in July\nto undertake, on behalf of foundations and universities as well as\nthe Government, the publication and distribution of noteworthy\nAmerican books in translation in foreign countries. The first\nefforts will be made in the Arab States. The sum of $500,000\nhas been made available to it by the Department of State.\n(g) International Motion Picture Service.\n(i) A film showing the participation of the individual\nvoter in the process of choosing presidential candidates\nhas been completed and distributed. Another showing his\nparticipation in the election of a President is scheduled\nfor comple tion immediately after the election.\n(ii) The first conference of film officers, involving\nrepresentatives from posts in the Near and Middle East,\nwas held on Cyprus from August 11 to August 15, 1952,\nwith the purpose of determining how films could be\nproduced with sharper focus on local problems.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRAT\nPage 8 of 10\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\n(h) International Educational Exchange Service.\nA tendency has been noted on the part of certain foreign\ngovernments to undertake unilateral control of the selection of\ntheir citizens who may be offered exchange grants by the United\nStates and other governments. The trend appears to be motivated\nby (1) the heightened nationalism common to Asian states since\nthe war, and (2) a desire to control closely any exchanges that\nmight occur with the Soviet Union and Communist China and at the\nsame time not to make it appear that these governments are being\nsingled out in any way. The Burmese Government has made formal\nrepresentation in this matter to the United States Government,\nexempting only the Fulbright program, since it is founded on a\nformal agreement between the governments. The Department has\ntaken the position that even at the cost of a temporary cessation\nof exchanges with Burma, the principle must be maintained that\nthis government has final responsibility for selecting grantees\nfinanced through congressional appropriations. While Burma is\nthe clearest case in point at the moment, similar situations have\ndeveloped in Indonesia and in Syria and are nascent throughout\nmost of Southeast Asia and the Middle East.\n(i) Cooperation with Private Enterprise.\nProjects are under way with various private agencies, social,\ncommercial and philanthropic, to provide foreign groups with books\nand magazines, to assist Americans travelling abroad, to provide\nradio facilities to underdeveloped areas, to project a balanced\npicture of Wall Street, to promote the exchange of persons and to\ndevelop bi-national community relationships.\n(j) Cooperation with Other Governmental Agencies.\nIntegration of Information activities of the International\nInformation Administration and the Mutual Security Administration\nin other countries has taken place in the United Kingdom, Denmark,\nAustria, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Italy,\nYugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Integration had already taken\nplace in Iceland, Switzerland and Trieste.\n(k) Cooperation with Other Governments.\n(i) Bi-national committees to promote the ready accept-\nance by local populations of troops of the United States\nestablished on their soil have been formally established\nin France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Iceland.\nSimilar committees are functioning on an informal basis in\nLibya and Morocco.\n(ii) Negotiations are under way for limited cooperation in\nforeign information activities with the government of Australia.\nCooperation would chiefly concern broadcasts to Southeast Asia.\nSECURITY NFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 9 of 10\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nSECRET\nAnnex A\nOctober 30, 1952\n(1) Electromagnetic Warfare.\nNo significant change took place in the overall level of\nSoviet jamming, although minor changes took place from time to\ntime in the application of the jamming mechanism to the various\nlanguage broadcasts.\nSufficient information has been received through govern-\nmental intelligence sources to warrant the conclusion that the\nSoviets have in the process of construction, probably in the\nfinal states, somewhere between eight and twelve high powered\ntransmitters either designed for or capable of jamming in the\nmedium frequency and low frequency bands. These are generally\ndistributed around the European periphery of the Iron Curtain.\nAn East German intelligence source heretofore found to be\nreliable, reports the establishment within the government struc-\nture of East Germany of an office for radio warfare. A powerful\nEast Zone broadcasting station moved on to the frequency used by\nthe Armed Forces Network in Berlin. Whether this was intended as\na deliberate interference measure, or whether it represented a\nSoviet need for a frequency is not now known.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nPage 10 of 10\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nSIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE\nDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DURING THE PERIOD FROM\n1 JULY THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER 1952\nSECTION I\nWhat activities has your agency engaged in during the period under\nreview which are psychologically significant for the attainment of national\nobjectives? With respect to the following current psychologically signifi-\ncant problems, situations and objectives, the Department of Defense activity\nwas as indicated below.\n1. The problem of neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western\nEurope, including the United Kingdom? To assist in combatting neutralism\nand anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom,\nthe Department of Defense through the military Services engaged in the fol-\nlowing activities:\na. Reduction of neutralism:\n(1) Shows of military force in Western Europe have been\nstaged. The participation of U.S. military forces in national\nand international maneuvers in this area has expressed U.S.\ndetermination to assist in the defense of Western Europe from\nall aggressors. The following major military demonstrations\nhave realistically portrayed U.S. intentions in this area:\n(a) The U.S. Navy participated in the allied fleet\nmaneuvers in the North Sea and Baltic areas, involving\nsome 160 warships of seven nations, demonstrated the\ncapability of the allied naval forces to defend Western\nEurope.\n(b) Significant among the activities of the military\nforces in achieving psychological advantage was the conduct\nof the combined U.S.-French maneuvers east of the Rhine\nRiver and the alert drills of the U.S. garrison in Berlin.\nThe U.S.-French maneuvers served to demonstrate military\ncapabilities and the efficacy of combined operations. Also\nsuch maneuvers helped to overcome Western European's linger-\ning belief that SHAPE defense would be west of the Rhine or\nfurther back in the event of attack. In Berlin, the U.S.\nmilitary activities have been most valuable in reaffirming\nthe stated U.S. position to the West Berliners, the \"Free\nWorld\" and the Soviets, that any attack directed at West\nBerlin would be met with force. Also of significance were\nthe U,S,-British and French ground and air maneuvers in\nGermany, and the Italian-U.S. maneuvers. Both maneuvers\noccurred in September and tested defenses against the East.\n(c) During the reporting period, the Skyblazers, a\nUSAF aerobatic team of four jet fighters, on behalf of\nCINCUSAFE gave approximately 30 air demonstrations to\nforeign military and civilian audiences throughout Mediter-\nranean and European countries. In a continuing program to\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 1 of 9\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nrotate combat-ready units of the Strategic Air Command to\nforeign stations, USAF medium and heavy bombers visited\ncountries in Europe.\n(2) Statements by General Ridgway and other Senior U.S.\ncommanders have reemphasized the need for collective effort to\nbuild a position of strength as the means of deterring Soviet\naggression. Significant among the themes stressed by U.S.\nmilitary leaders were the following:\n(a) Warnings that critical defense minimums must be met.\n(b) Warnings that the threat of aggression had not\nlessened.\n(c) Praises of great progress made within the NATO\nmilitary structure toward our common goal.\n(d) The need for West German contribution to West\nEuropean defense.\n(e) The allies plan to hold their ground in Germany\nshould the Reds attack,\n(f) Indications of the use of atomic arms for the\njoint defense of Western Europe.\nb. Reduction of anti-American sentiments. Although a certain\namount of progress has been made in solving the problem of anti-\nAmerican sentiments in Western Europe, much remains to be accomp-\nlished. The Department of Defense feels that we are still on the\ndefensive in combatting the \"Hate-America\" campaign but attempts\nare being made to seize the initiative through the following\nmeasures:\n(1) Troop-civilian relations committees organized in\nWestern Europe early this year continue to function. Department\nof Defense participates on these interdepartmental committees\norganized by Department of State Public Affairs officers, by\nproviding representatives for areas where U.S. military personnel\nare stationed. A marked degree of closer cooperation and collabora-\ntion between U.S. commanders and local government officials has\ncontributed to the success of the program, While no definitive\nevaluation can be made of the effectiveness of materials and methods\nused in Service information programs, continuing effort is made to\nestablish trends and indications with a view to improving subject\nmatter presented and to keep it current, The program continues to\nhave a favorable effect and a trend toward greater acceptance of\nU.S. military personnel can be noted throughout Western Europe.\nThis trend is presumably due to firmer action by host governments\nagainst communist propaganda and obstructionism, more favorable\nlocal press and better orientation of U.S. military personnel,\nAt a July meeting called by Ambassador Draper to consider troop-\ncivilian relationships in NATO countries, it was decided that\nformal committees should be established throughout the NATO area,\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 2 of\n9\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nIt is felt that the activities of such interdepartmental com-\nmittees, as already exist, have had notable effect upon neutral-\nism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, and have\nassisted in countering Soviet \"Hate-America\" propaganda by keep-\ning U.S. military personnel better informed and adjusted to local\nconditions, thereby reducing the number of incidents. Detailed\nreports as to the effectiveness of the program as it pertains to\nthe indigenous populations are submitted by Public Affairs Officers\nthrough Department of State channels.\n(2) In the continuing effort to establish and maintain U.S.\ngood-will in areas of national interest, U.S. defense forces have\npromoted friendship and understanding by:\n(a) Visits to European ports and contacts with local\npopulace by units of the U.S. Navy, including a four day\nvisit by eleven ships to Yugoslav waters.\n(b) Scheduled appearances in West European capitals\nand other principal cities by U.S. military bands before\nforeign military and civilian audiences.\n(3) By sending special teams to indoctrinate NATO forces\nin the use of U.S. equipment, the Defense Department has increased\nthe confidence of the NATO forces in their capabilities to defend\nWestern Europe.\n(4) With the view of promoting defense production, stimulat-\ning the economy and fostering understanding among North Atlantic\nDefense forces, the Department of Defense has continued its policy\nof off-shore procurement of supplies from European Defense sources.\nWhenever feasible, this form of economic assistance is so oriented\nas to benefit the non-communist segments of the countries involved.\n2. The problem of securing ratification and implementation of the Bonn\n\"contractual agreements\" and the European Defense Community Treaty? To assist\nin securing ratification and implementation of the Bonn \"contractual agree-\nments\" and the European Defense Community Treaty, the Department of Defense\nthrough the military Services has supplied military assistance or advice as\nto military matters involved.\n3. Soviet \"Hate-America\" propaganda? To assist in combatting the\nSoviet \"Hate-America\" propaganda, the Department of Defense through the mil-\nitary Services has taken the following steps:\na. The Department of Defense Office of Public Information cooper-\nated closely with the Department of State and other agencies involved\nin psychological activities in coordinating information released by the\nDepartment of Defense and its components on biological and chemical war-\nfare. As this was a period of intense communist propaganda on biological\nwarfare against the United States, this coordination was significant in\nassisting the countering of such propaganda. Through the Interdepart-\nmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda, on which the Department\nof Defense Office of Public Information is represented, progress was\nmade in developing plans and means for setting forth United States posi-\ntion regarding the false charges of using germ warfare in Korea. The\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 3 of 9\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTOB SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nInterdepartmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda has conducted\na constant analysis of the Soviet \"Hate-America\" propaganda campaign and\nhas sought immediate and long range means of countering such propaganda.\nThe Department of Air Force has undertaken production of a film entitled\n\"Brain-washing\", counteracting Soviet charges against U.S, forces in\nKorea that United Nations Command is conducting germ warfare,\nb. The Department of Defense has provided the Department of State\nwith advance notice of troop movements in certain overseas areas in\norder to minimize communist propaganda against them and to make most\neffective psychological use of their presence. In addition, these com-\nmittees have continued to monitor and direct the activities of coordinat-\ning subcommittees set up in each country in which there are American\ntroops. These subcommittees consist of representatives from the Armed\nForces, Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the\nDepartment of State. Reports indicate that their work has been effective,\nC. See references made to paragraphs 1 b and 4 for other examples\nconcerning activities conducted to combat \"Hate-America\" propaganda.\n4. National Policy Objectives in the Middle East. In support of the\nnational policy objective to improve U.S. relations in the Moslem world the\nDepartment of Defense has cooperated in establishing good will by:\na. The airlift of 3,854 pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda,\nb. The airlift of 4 tons of hybrid seed corn to Lebanon,\nAs a result of these operations as well as the Major Jabara, USAF, visit,\nreported in August 1952 annual report, friendly relationships have been\nestablished between key Arab leaders and U.S. government representatives in\nEgypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. It has been suggested that the Jabara\nvisit alone made a more significant contribution to the U.S. cold war effort in\nthe Middle East than any other single act undertaken in the area up to that\ntime.\n5. The Allied Position in West Berlin. In support of national policy\nobjectives in Germany, the allied position in West Berlin has been strengthened\nby:\na. The maintaining of U.S. military forces in West Berlin and\ndemonstrating the determination to support and protect the city by force\nif necessary. The recent conduct of maneuvers in West Berlin by U.S.\nmilitary forces was a dynamic expression of our intention to defend the\ncity.\nb. Continued use of the U.S. military approaches to Berlin reaf-\nfirm U.S. policy to keep the approaches to West Berlin open. By inter-\ndepartmental action contingency plans for the psychological exploitation\nof a second Berlin Airlift were developed.\n6. The International Role of Japan in the Post-Treaty Era: Department\nof Defense has rendered support through routine military advice and assistance\nand by providing training and equipment for the Japanese National Police\nReserve. Through the Security Treaty the U.S. has again demonstrated its\nbelief in the efficacy of collective security and has attempted to awaken\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 4 of 9\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nJapan to the communist threat to its national survival. The utilization of\nJapan as a military base for the support of the Korean Campaign has served\nto demonstrate the need for collective effort against aggression and the\ncloseness of danger to the Japanese \"Home Islands\".\n7. National Policy Objectives in Latin America. The Department of\nDefense has contributed to the support of our national policy in Latin America\nand to the stability of existing governments by assisting in the training and\nequipping of military forces of the Latin American countries. This has been\naccomplished by sending U.S. military teams and personnel to various Latin\nAmerican countries and by inviting Latin American military forces to partici-\npate in specialized training programs being conducted in the U.S.\n8. The Korean Campaign and Truce Negotiations. The Department of Defense\nactivities in this area are conducted by the Commander in the Far East, who is\nresponsible for the conduct of psychological operations in Korea in accordance\nwith national policy. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commander\nhas participated in the following significant activities:\na. The conduct of target warning operations in North Korea of\nimpending bombing of 78 North Korean cities expresses the intent of\nthe United Nations Command to save as many lives as possible of non-\ncombatants in target areas. Psychologically, these warning operations\nare also designed to increase the pressure brought to bear by United\nNations Command on the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Army\nnegotiators at Panmunjom, and to contribute a satisfactory termination\nof the Korean conflict.\nb. Provision of military representation to the inter-departmental\ncommi ttee which prepares and transmits the Special Korean Information\nGuidance. This guidance provides CINCUNC with information not readily\navailable in Tokyo, including digest of U.S. and foreign press comments\nand reactions, and substantive materials and suggestions to be used in\nmaintaining the propaganda initiatives in Far East Command. There are a\nnumber of examples in which the U.S. (UN) delegates to the truce negoti-\nations have used information provided them through this means,\nc. The U.S. (UN) policy that it will not use force in the repatri-\nation of prisoners of war has had wide psychological repercussions.\nAlthough the U.S. adherence to the principle of non-forcible repatriation\nhas gained for it wide \"Free World\" support, the continuing firmness in\nthis position has blocked the achievement of an honorable armistice,\nd. An attempt has been made to establish the fact that agitation\nin prisoner of war camps was inspired and provoked by \"hard core\" com-\nmunists. However, the publicity accorded such incidents has provided\nthe communists with additional material for their propaganda campaign\nand raised some doubt as to U.S. (UN) intentions.\ne. The leaflet, radio and loudspeaker operations directed at the\nNorth Korean soldiers and civilians and Chinese communist soldiers\ncontinued. A new commentary series exploiting the statements of Chinese\nCommunist Forces prisoners who oppose return to communist control was\nbegun in September. Themes stressed are: Soviet exploitation of China\nand North Korea; communist brutality and oppressions, and subservience\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRAT\nPage 5 of 9\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nof the communist puppet regimes to the USSR. In leaflet operations,\nnow nearing three billion disseminated, theme emphasis is on good\ntreatment, non-forcible repatriation, nostalgia and support of opera-\ntional plans such as DEADLOCK (armistice negotiations), FRAUD (to dis-\ncredit communist regimes of China and North Korea) and FRIS (EUSAK plan\nto create or aggravate friction between CCF and NKA).\n9. Psychological Results of Presence of U.S. Personnel Abroad. The\nstationing of U.S. military and civilian personnel abroad has raised psycho-\nlogical problems, many of which are still unsolved, but, in spite of these\nproblems, it is believed that the presence of such personnel in areas abroad\nhas been of value in reaffirming and demonstrating U.S. intentions to assist\nin the collective security effort.\na. All U.S. military personnel selected for assignment overseas\nreceive a course of instruction prior to embarkation. In addition, upon\narrival at their destination, all personnel are oriented on their mission;\nproper standards of conduct; cooperation with our Allies; local history,\ngeography, and customs; and other subjects considered essential by the\nunit commander.\nb. To orient and condition psychological warfare personnel of the\n580th and 581st ARC Wings, the Department of Defense requested the\nDepartment of State to brief unit personnel on the scope of U.S. national\npsychological programs and the significance of U.S. psychological warfare\ninterests abroad. It is particularly significant that personnel of\nmilitary psychological units receive such information prior to being\ndeployed to overseas areas.\n10. Shows of Military Force. Although the programs and activities of\nthe Department of Defense both at home and abroad are designed primari ly to\nachieve military ends, it is recognized that many if not all of these activ-\nities have an inherent psychological impact. In recognition of the natural\npsychological effect of such Defense activities, both advantageous and adverse,\nadded consideration to the proper exploitation of the following activities is\nwarranted.\na. The continuous program of maneuvers by U.S. military forces\nboth at home and abroad engenders a feeling of confidence in the capa-\nbilities of the U.S. to assist in the defense of free nations from com-\nmunist aggression. However, the potential psychological impact of such\nmaneuvers is not generally integrated into operational plans.\nb. In the latter part of September, at the request of the Depart-\nment of State, action was taken to conduct a flight of USAF B-29's to\nMalaya, a neutral South East Asia country. Flights such as this, as\nwell as the continued appearance of U.S. aircraft and naval vessels\nthroughout the world, support U.S. position of world leadership by\ndemonstrating military striking potential, technical excellence of\nequipment, and military preparedness of U.S. Government.\nC. Recent expansion of military interests in foreign areas has\nresulted in the establishment of a strategic air base in Greenland.\nSuch expansions illustrate the scope of U.S. military planning and free-\nworld cooperation and determination to defend against communism in the\nevent of general hostilities.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 6 of 9\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTO SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nd. In conjunction with the Department of State and the Atomic\nEnergy Commission, exploitation of certain atomic weapons tests has\nbeen made. The Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive\npolicy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons,\nguided missiles and new weapons. This policy provides that agencies\nconcerned with psychological operations coordinate fully whenever public\ninformation is to be released on these weapons.\n11. What new evidence has emerged during the quarter concerning the psy-\nchological effectiveness of activities conducted before the reporting period?\na. As a result of U.S. psychological operations in the Arab World,\nsuch as the good-will tour of Major Jabara (Jet Ace) (reported in August\n1952 annual report) relationships between key Arab leaders and U.S.\ngovernment representatives in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria have\nbeen improved. This has contributed to a psychological atmosphere favor-\nable to U.S. interests in the Middle East and significantly contributed\nto the U.S. cold war effort in this area.\nb. The UN psychological warfare effort is providing valuable support\nfor the Korean campaign. Reports continue to indicate that a majority of\nthe people in a leaflet drop area read UN leaflets, including some party\nmembers, and that the leaflets or information contained therein are passed\non. The North Korean civilians in general believe the information. Re-\nports still indicate that the North Korean civilian is waiting for and\napparently expects a UN offensive. Most local authorities in North Korea\nare continuing efforts to prevent UN propaganda from reaching the soldier\nand civilian. Leaflet drop areas are declared \"Off Limits\", inhabitants\nare confined to their homes until leaflets are disposed of, the people\nare told that leaflets are poisoned and all people are threatened with\n\"cruel punishment\" if they pick up UN leaflets. Most prisoners state\nthat there is a continuous campaign to minimize effectiveness of UN psy-\nchological warfare operations. Communist officers refute UN propaganda\nstatements, the soldiers are subjected to unannounced inspections, leaf-\nlets are turned in and burned, men apprehended with leaflets are subject\nto disciplinary action including confinement.\n12. Included in current activities and separate from plans and capabil-\nities is the program of research and development in strategic intelligence\nand psychological warfare operations. Fundamentally, this program is concerned\nwith rendering maximum assistance to the achievement of national objectives by\n(1) in times of \"cold war\", reducing the power and influence of potentially\nhostile nations, (2) in case of hostilities, defeat of the enemy, and (3) at\nall times countering threats to our national security. Research and develop-\nment support of national objectives is rendered by research programs classified\nunder the following technical fields:\na. Strategic Intelligence programs to improve through social science\nresearch techniques the collection and military utilization of basic,\ncomprehensive data on foreign areas and peoples, including:\n(1) Potentially hostile groups and peoples.\n(2) Potential allies.\n(3) Strategic areas and peoples which are subjected in times\nof \"cold war\" to intense international pressures and tenstions.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 7 of\n9\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nb. Psychological warfare research programs to render maximum\nassistance to achievement of national objectives by affecting (through\nmeans other than destructive weapons) the will and capacity of individ-\nuals and groups to support their leaders and national policies.\nc. Psychological warfare materiel research programs to develop\nequipment and devices to facilitate communication with peoples in\npotentially hostile and inaccessible areas.\nd. Civil Defense research programs to maintain high morale at\nhome in case of hostilities by such means as increasing efficiency\nof security measures, adequate defense against enemy psychological\nwarfare, and effective disaster control.\ne. Military Government and Military Relations (in Foreign Areas)\nresearch programs to increase the effectiveness of techniques for:\n(1) The control and management of enemy areas occupied by\nour military forces.\n(2) The indoctrination in democratic principles of enemy\nnationals in areas occupied by our military forces.\n(3) The fostering of better relationships between our mili-\ntary forces abroad and the nationals of host friendly nations.\nSECTION II\nWhat significant progress has been made in developing plans, capabili-\nties and organizational means for contributing further to the national\npsychological effort?\n13. Preparation of Psychological Warfare Plan. To further the wartime\nnational psychological warfare effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a\npsychological warfare plan to support the \"Joint Outline Emergency War Plan.\"\nThe \"National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War,\" approved by\nthe Psychological Strategy Board was used as guidance in the preparation of\nthis plan, which now puts wartime psychological warfare plans and objectives\nin phase with approved policy guidance. The military Services and major sub-\nordinate commands are in the process of developing or modifying existing\nplans in accordance with current guidance.\n14. Specific Planning for Psychological Warfare.\na. In the psychological warfare field planning is progressing\ntoward the development of a \"Transfer Plan\" which will facilitate the\nwartime transfer of U.S. foreign information equipment and personnel from\nother agencies to the military control, for the execution of U.S. psycho-\nlogical warfare operations in military theaters of operations.\nb. For the Far Bastern area a psychological plan to support the\nU.S. forces in Japan is being developed.\nC. An ad hoc committee has been formed to develop a program for\npromoting the surrender of enemy air crews.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 8 of\n9\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nPSB D-34\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex B\nOctober 30, 1952\nd. To meet the communist threat in Europe, two plans for the reduc-\ntion of communist power in France and Italy are presently under consider-\nation.\ne. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have under study a SHAPE paper\nwhich sets forth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe\n(SACEUR), concerning his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities.\nf. Initial plans for the conduct of wartime psychological operations\nin Alaska, developed by Commander in Chief, Alaskan Forces, have been\nsubmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and review.\n15. Planning for Unconventional Warfare. In the field of unconventional\nwarfare, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently approved a paper establishing a\ndelineation of responsibilities between the Services and the Central Intelli-\ngence Agency in the field of Escape and Evasion. In addition, a SHAPE paper\nconcerning the delineation of responsibilities of the clandestine services and\nSACEUR to include organization and definitions is presently under study and\nreview by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\n16, Planning for Guerrilla Warfare and Covert Operations. The Joint\nChiefs of Staff, during the period covered by the previous paper, delineated\nthe responsibility of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guerrilla\nwarfare, and covert operations. A study is now being made of the command\nrelationship between CIA/DPC (new title: PMS) organization and the armed\nforces, in active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged.\n17. General Planning on Continuous Basis. In addition to activities\ninvolving current psychological problems, the Department of Defense, in accord-\nance with national policy, prepares plans and makes preparations for the war-\ntime conduct of psychological and unconventional warfare, and in these fields\nparticipates on a continuing basis int\na. Interdepartmental and international planning.\nb. Orientation and training of personnel.\nc. Coordination with other agencies and departments.\nd. Support of other agencies and departments as required.\n18. Research and Development Emphasis on Psychological Warfare. The\nResearch and Development Board has reactivated a Panel on Psychological Warfare,\nwhose responsibility will be to plan an integrated program of research and\ndevelopment for military psychological operations and periodically review the\nprogress of the departments in implementing this goal. As in the case of all\nR&DB panels, associate memberships on the Panel on Psychological Warfare will\nbe available to interested non-military agencies.\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nTOP SECRET\nPage 9 of 9"
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